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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation aims to examine the manner in which the concept of autonomy (jiritsu) 
is treated in modern and contemporary Japanese literature.  This examination will be 
performed by analysing the autonomous attitude of a contemporary Japanese writer 
Nakagami Kenji (1946–1992).  This dissertation focuses on examining Nakagami 
Kenji’s ambivalent attitude towards his act of writing.  We will explore the manner in 
which his act of writing appears to be a paradox between self-identification and the 
integration into the collective.  Then, we will observe the possibility in which 
Nakagami’s ambivalent attitude is extended to cover Maruyama Masao’s relative 
definition of autonomy and Karatani Kōjin’s interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s notion 
of freedom and responsibility.   
Nakagami’s attempt is certainly not confined to only his works.  The notion of 
autonomy may be applied to perceive a similar thought that was represented by previous 
writers.  We will also examine various never-ending autonomous attempts expressed 
by Sakaguchi Ango, Miyazawa Kenji and Nakahara Chūya.  Moreover, we will 
analyse how Nakagami’s distrust of the modern Japanese language and his admiration 
of the body as an undeniable object are reflected in his major novels in detail and 
attempt to extend this observation into the works of the theatrical artists in the 1960s 
such as Betsuyaku Minoru, Kara Jūrō, Hijikata Tatsumi and Terayama Shūji and 
contemporary women writers such as Tsushima Yūko, Takamura Kaoru, Tawada Yōko 
and Yoshimoto Banana.  These writers and artists struggled to establish their 
autonomous freedom as they encountered the conflict between their individual bodies 
that personifies their personal autonomy and the modern Japanese language that 
confines them in the fixed and submissive roles in present-day Japan. 
  In this dissertation, I would like to conclude that Nakagami Kenji’s ambivalent 
attitude towards his act of writing can be an eternal self-legislation, that is, his endless 
attempt to establish autonomous freedom, which evolves from the paradox between the 
individual (body) and the collective (language).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
だれもひとつの島ではない。だれもそれ自体で完全なものではない。す
べての人間は大陸のひとかけら、全体の一部分、もし海によって土が洗
い流されれば、欧州は小さくなる。あるいは岬も、あるいは汝の友人た
ちや汝自身の土地も同じこと。あらゆる人の死は私を削り落とす、なぜ
なら、私は人類の一部なのだから。ゆえに、決して誰がために鐘は鳴る
と問うなかれ、それは汝のために鳴っているのだから。 
 
No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a 
part of the main. If a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as 
well as if promontory were, as well as if a manor of thy friend's or of thine 
own were. Any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind; 
and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.   
 
John Donne, Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In memory of my father 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
 
In this dissertation, I would like to examine the manner in which the concept of 
autonomy (jiritsu 自律) is treated in modern and contemporary Japanese literature.  
This will be done through an analysis of the autonomous attitude of a contemporary 
Japanese writer, Nakagami Kenji (中上健次  1946–1992).  Nakagami was an 
illegitimate child, born in the burakumin (Japanese outcast) ghetto of Shingū City in 
Wakayama prefecture (known by the old name of the province, Kishū) one year after the 
end of World War II.  His complex ancestry and the burakumin neighbourhood 
provided the background for the gravity of his thought-provoking works.  Nakagami 
won the Akutagawa Prize for his story Misaki (岬 The Cape) in 1976, which ushered 
him into the Japanese bundan (the literary circle) as a promising writer.  His own harsh 
experiences provided the themes and motifs that were consistently manifest in his 
works—especially, Karekinada (枯木灘 Sea of Dead Trees, 1977) and Chi no hate 
shijō no toki (地の果て至上の時 The Sublime Time at the End of the Earth, 1984), 
which are the sequels to Misaki.  The three stories are known as Akiyuki sanbusaku (秋
幸三部作), the trilogy of Akiyuki.  His other works include Keshō (化粧 Makeup), 
which was written between 1974 and 1977; Sennen no yuraku (千年の愉楽  A 
Thousand Years of Pleasure, 1982), a story that treated outcast young men as 
semi-divine entities; Nichirin no tsubasa (日輪の翼 The Wings of the Sun, 1984); 
Kumano-shū (熊野集 A Kumano Collection, 1984); Kiseki (奇蹟 Miracle, 1989); 
Sanka (讃歌 Hymn, 1990); Keibetsu (軽蔑 Scorn, 1992); and Izoku (異族 The 
Different Tribe, 1993), which was one of his posthumous, unfinished works.  These 
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works have recurring themes.  Many of Nakagami’s works including the Akiyuki 
trilogy are set in Kumano,1 and are known as the ‘Kumano saga’.  Converging and 
diverging concurrently, each story in the Kumano saga is intricately interlinked with 
other stories that have the outcast community in Kishū as their backdrop.  Nakagami is 
the first Akutagawa Prize winner who was born after the war and belongs to a 
generation whose youth witnessed the tumultuous period of student protests, a high 
economic growth rate and the rapid diffusion of industrialization, consumer culture and 
mass communication.  Since the early 1970s and until his death in 1992, Nakagami 
produced controversial novels and essays and gained a reputation as one of the most 
important and influential contemporary Japanese writers.  In 1996, his literary oeuvre 
comprised fifteen volumes of complete works, Nakagami Kenji zenshū (NKZ).  Over 
the past few decades, there have been a considerable number of studies on Nakagami’s 
literature, both nationally and internationally.  Nakagami’s texts have been read and 
examined from various viewpoints: narratology, intertextuality, comparative literature, 
feminism, gender, body, racism, social minority groups and so forth.2   
                                                  
1 Kumano is the old name of Wakayama prefecture (Kishū).  It is well known as a sacred site to 
both Shinto and Buddhism since ancient times.  For example, there are three sacred shrines 
(Kumano sanzan: Kumano hongū, Kumano hayatama jinja in Shingū, Kumano nachi jinja in Nachi) 
where successive emperors visited.  Therefore, numerous old tales and narratives grew out of this 
area.  This area was added to the World Heritage List in 2004. 
2 For example, see, Eve Zimmerman, ‘In the Trap of Words: Nakagami Kenji and the Making of 
Degenerate Fictions’, in Stephan Snyder and Philip Gabriel (eds), Ōe and Beyond, Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1999, 130–152 and Out of the Alleyway Nakagami Kenji and the Poetics 
of Outcaste Fiction, Harvard University Asia Center, 2007; Mats Karlsson, The Kumano Saga of 
Nakagami Kenji, Edsbruk: Akademitryck, 2001; Nina Cornyetz, Dangerous Woman, Deadly Words, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999; Livia Monnet, ‘Ghostly Women, Displaced Femininities, 
and Male Family Romances: Violence, Gender, and Sexuality in Two Texts by Nakagami Kenji’, 
Japan Forum (8:1 1996): 13–34; Noriko Miura, Marginal Voice, Marginal Body: The Treatment of 
The Human Body in the Works of Nakagami Kenji, Leslie Marmon Silko, and Salman Rushdie, 
Dissertation. Com, USA, 2000; Alan Tansman, ‘History, Repetition, and Freedom in the Narratives 
of Nakagami Kenji’, Journal of Japanese Studies (24:2 1998): 257–288; Karatani Kōjin, Sakaguchi 
Ango to Nakagami Kenji, Tokyo: Ōta shuppan,1996; Watanabe Naomi, Nakagami Kenji ron: 
Itoshisa nitsuite, Tokyo: Kawade shobō shinsha, 1996; Yomota Inuhiko, Kishu to tensei, Tokyo: 
Shinchōsha, 1987; Iguchi Tokio, Kiki to tōsō: Ōe Kenzaburō to Nakagami Kenji, Tokyo: Sakuhinsha, 
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By focusing on the works and critical remarks of Nakagami Kenji—mainly, the 
essays written in the 1970s, the comments made during lectures, round-table discussions 
and in fiction—I would like to highlight the ambivalent nature of his writings.  This 
dissertation is an attempt to illustrate whether the ambivalent attitude in Nakagami’s 
process of writing fiction is to be regarded as an autonomous action, or more precisely 
as a continuing act of autonomous decision-making.  The aim is to explore the manner 
in which the notion of autonomy may develop from dichotomous, contradictory or fluid 
situations as opposed to monothetic, holistic or static ones.  Viewed from this 
perspective, the dissertation suggests that the notion of autonomy derived from 
Nakagami Kenji’s ambivalent attitude towards his act of writing can be considered as an 
act of autonomous decision-making that is constantly altered according to the existing 
situation.  Moreover, I would like to examine whether this type of autonomous attitude 
arising from a conceptual conflict is observed in the works of other 
modern/contemporary Japanese writers.   
Since the hostage crisis involving three Japanese civilians in Iraq in April 2004, the 
word jiko-sekinin ( 自 己 責 任  self-responsibility) or jiko-kettei ( 自 己 決 定 
self-determination) has been a topic of debate in Japan.  Many publishers have been 
working to publish new books on the issue of self-determination, freedom or free will, 
which is related to moral responsibility.3  The issue of autonomy—or in more concrete 
terms, the right of self-determination or the freedom to make our own decisions—has 
been one of the most controversial subjects in many fields of study, for instance, 
                                                                                                                                                  
2004. 
3 For example, see Karatani Kōjin, Rinri 21, Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2000; Takeda Seiji, Ningen-teki jiyū 
no jōken―Hēgeru to posutomodan, Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2004; Miyadai Shinji and Nakamasa Masaki, 
Nichijō･kyōdōtai･aironī―Jiko-kettei no honshitsu to genkai, Tokyo: Sōfūsha, 2004; Saitō Jun’ichi, 
Jiyū, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2005; Ōya Takehiro, Jiyū to wa nanika―kanshi shakai to ‘kojin’ no 
shōmetsu, Tokyo: Chikuma shinsho, 2007. 
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political thought or medical ethics.4  In these fields, one may notice that a decision 
made by an individual is always called into question: ‘To what extent should an 
individual assume responsibility for his or her actions in the case of activities carried 
out by voluntary peace groups in Iraq or voluntary euthanasia?’  The answer is always 
complex and in some cases, ironic.  To the best of my knowledge, the notion of 
autonomy in modern/contemporary Japanese fiction has not really been studied, 
especially not in English.  Indeed, an examination of the concept of autonomy in 
modern/contemporary Japanese fiction and poetry from the perspective of the conflict 
between freedom and moral responsibility would be interesting.  In addition to 
Nakagami Kenji, in this dissertation, I have chosen writers, poets and dramatists whom 
I considered to be reasonably central—that is, writers whose work revealed significant 
elements related to the concept of autonomy—for example Sakaguchi Ango (坂口安吾 
1906–1955), Miyazawa Kenji (宮沢 賢治 1896–1933), Nakahara Chūya (中原中也 
1907–1937), Betsuyaku Minoru (別役実  b. 1937), Hijikata Tastumi (土方巽 
1928–1986), Terayama Shūji (寺山修二 1935–1983), Kara Jūrō (唐十郎 b. 1940), 
Tsushima Yūko (津島佑子 b. 1947), Takamura Kaoru (高村薫 b. 1953), Tawada 
Yōko (多和田葉子 b. 1961) and Yoshimoto Banana (よしもとばなな b. 1964).  
This is certainly not a complete list of modern/contemporary Japanese writers who 
express the concept of autonomy in their works.  Further, I do not intend to compare 
the texts of these writers using the approach of comparative literature.  In this 
dissertation, I wish to explore the possibility of using the degree of autonomy as a 
means of reinterpreting the works of modern/contemporary Japanese writers.  I hope 
this study will generate an interest in the issue of self-determination and moral 
                                                  
4 For example, see Tateiwa Shin’ya, Yowaku aru jiyū e: Jiko-kettei, kaigo, seishi no gijutsu, Tokyo: 
Seidosha, 2000. 
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responsibility, and serve as a catalyst for the creation of a connection to other areas of 
study on the subject of autonomy. 
Nakagami Kenji creates his literary universe through a sort of ambivalent world view.  
He adopts the view that the dichotomy between the two (nikō tairitsu 二項対立) will 
never be dialectically reconciled or end with unipolar domination; rather, it repeats its 
pattern endlessly.5  Nakagami does not attempt to destroy the conceptual dichotomy 
between the two because he considers the two poles as preconditions for each other.  
Further, he views this type of antinomy as a powerful impetus to continue to write his 
novels.  In my view, Nakagami demonstrates his autonomous attitude through this 
continued act of writing, which he considers as an endless conflict between the 
establishment of his identity and his dependence on others.  From this perspective, 
Nakagami Kenji’s autonomy can be described as conditional and perpetual—autonomy 
that rejects absolute universality or the reconciliation of two conflicting interests.  He 
accepts all that happens to us as the human condition, and makes his decisions based on 
the situation at a given time.  However, he is never content with a particular decision 
for a long period; instead, depending on the changing circumstances, he continues to 
modify it frequently. 
Using Nakagami Kenji’s ambivalent attitude towards the act of writing as a starting 
point, this dissertation attempts to illustrate that the notion of autonomy is extended to 
encompass the view that two polarized ideas that are generally regarded as mutually 
exclusive may accommodate one another and can be considered as mutually 
complementary.  According to the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (2000), the 
word autonomy is defined as ‘1. the freedom for a country, a region or organization to 
                                                  
5 Nakagami, ‘Futatsu no kōkyū saron (二つの後宮サロン)’, Goō (牛王) (Vol. 4 2006): 81. 
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govern itself independently; 2. the ability to act and make decisions without being 
controlled by anyone else’.  The dictionary definition clarifies that the concept of 
autonomy can be closely linked to the issue of self-determination or more precisely, the 
freedom of will to choose our actions.  Further, free will is inseparably connected to 
the idea of moral responsibility, because a person’s ability to control his/her destiny 
should always be considered in the context of the social collectives that surround the 
individual.  In this regard, autonomy is a word fraught with antinomy.  It is always 
extended to a discussion of the free will–determinism antinomy.  In Immanuel Kant’s 
moral philosophy, autonomy refers to self-legislation, that is, the determination of will 
that ‘gives itself its law, and is distinguished from a heteronomous will whose law is 
given by the object’.6  The principle of autonomy is closely linked to the discussion on 
the freedom of the will that is ‘independent of any determination by alien causes’.7  
However, the discussion as to whether free will is not influenced by any alien causes is 
one of the continuing metaphysical arguments.  The conflict between free will and 
causal determinism has been one of the most controversial philosophical subjects over 
the centuries.  If determinism is a reality and freedom of will is an illusion, our actions, 
like all other events, can be determined by a cause-and-effect relationship.  They may 
merely be the consequences of prior events.  If this is the case, this view implies that 
we are not responsible for our actions.  Nevertheless, we believe that we are, if only 
partially, responsible for what we have done.  Thus, the issue of whether the individual 
is purely/partially autonomous or dependent on various human collectives, such as 
nation states, firms and households, is always problematic.  In this context, from the 
viewpoint of Nakagami Kenji’s autonomous attitude, which lies in the eternal conflict 
                                                  
6 Caygill, A Kant Dictionary, 88. 
7 Ibid.  
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between autonomy and dependence, this dissertation suggests that personal 
autonomy—which is related to self-determination, self-identification and free will—and 
dependence on the collectives—which is related to a commitment to social 
responsibility or moral law, solidarity with others and the sense of social 
belonging—can indeed coexist and complement each other, rather than competing with 
one another.   
In order to understand the complementary nature of the autonomous attitude in the 
literature of Nakagami Kenji more clearly, this dissertation applies the concept of both 
individual and social autonomy derived from Maruyama Masao’s analysis of Fukuzawa 
Yukichi’s freedom, Karatani Kōjin’s interpretation of Kantian autonomy and 
responsibility and Ferdinand de Saussure’s paradoxical view of langue and parole.  
The subjects these scholars examine are certainly not identical; further, they treat 
entirely different matters.  However, in this dissertation, I attempt to illustrate the 
approaches of these scholars to two polarized values that are considered to be mutually 
exclusive.  All these scholars reject the notion of an ultimate method to demonstrate a 
one-dimensional sense of values and discuss a complementary approach to the treatment 
of the paradox between the individual element and the whole.  The dichotomy between 
the individual and the collective, for instance, autonomy and dependence, the self and 
others, free will and determinism, langue and parole, is regarded to be mutually 
complementary rather than antithetical.  One pole serves as a precondition for the other 
and vice versa.  For example, a Japanese political scientist and theorist Maruyama 
Masao (1914–1996) regards the system of democracy to be paradoxical, and there are 
always ‘difficulties involved in reconciling the individual and the collective in post-war 
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Japan’.8  Maruyama demonstrates two types of autonomy: ‘personal autonomy’, which 
is attained by the individual ‘whose action bears “the principle of self-regulation, or 
responsibility as [its] corollary”’,9 and ‘social autonomy’, which refers to ‘a pluralistic 
society in which multi-dimensional individuals preserve their mobility in society’.10  
Maruyama asserts that successful social autonomy cannot be realized unless it is 
premised on personal autonomy; conversely, successful personal autonomy is achieved 
only when the pluralistic society relentlessly allows the individual to be fluid and 
relative, depending on the existing situations. 
The philosopher and literary critic Karatani Kōjin (b. 1941) reinterprets the concept 
of autonomous freedom posed by Immanuel Kant.  He explains that Kant’s morality is 
attained by bracketing the spheres of the beautiful or happiness.  Moreover, for Kant, 
morality is a matter of freedom rather than goodness or badness.  Karatani goes on to 
explain that freedom is synonymous to being causa sui (jiko-gen’in-teki dearukoto 自
己原因的であること), that is, ‘self-motivated, subjective, and autonomous’.11  Let us 
carry out a more concrete examination of Karatani’s point of view on freedom, which 
for him, is the notion that we should attribute the cause of all occurrences to ourselves.  
In order to be free, should we really attribute the cause of any incident to ourselves?  
According to Karatani, firstly, from a theoretical perspective, we should accept the fact 
that everything that happens is determined by the law of causality; consequently, we do 
not possess the freedom to choose our actions.  However, Karatani emphasizes the fact 
that at the same time, we should be aware that the ideas of freedom and responsibility 
emerge from the practical stance of bracketing external causality.  We are morally 
                                                  
8 Kersten, Democracy in Postwar Japan, 102–104. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 3–4. 
11 Karatani, Transcritique on Kant and Marx, 115.   
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responsible for our actions when causality is bracketed, that is, when we regard 
ourselves to be free agents.  Theoretically, we do not act of our own free will; however, 
practically, we are able to view ourselves as free agents, in order for us to be 
responsible.12  According to Karatani, in order to be free, Kant believed that one must 
obey the command: ‘be free!’.  In this respect, Karatani points out that there is no 
enigma in Kant’s words: ‘“he can do something because he is aware that he ought to do 
it,” which simply means that freedom can spring only from the imperative of being 
free’.13  This interpretation leads Karatani to regard Kant’s transcendental standpoint 
as something that is described as a functionally autonomous alternation between the 
theoretical and the practical attitude.  Based on this account, free will is possible when 
we possess stances that are simultaneously theoretical and practical.  
  Similarly, Ferdinand de Saussure defines language (langue) as an abstract systematic 
collective, whose essence has been continuously evolving from various individual 
utterances (parole), and can be regarded as a mere ‘social product whose existence 
allows the individual to use the language faculty’.14  Consequently, Saussure points out 
that the two objects, language (langue) and individual speech (parole), presuppose each 
other and cannot exist without each other. 
Nakagami Kenji regards his act of writing as a ceaseless attempt to seek autonomous 
freedom and as a means to establish his self-identity.  However, this quest for 
autonomy manifests itself in two ambivalent attitudes, that is, the self-differentiation 
that recognizes his self as absolutely his own and the desire to integrate himself into 
others.  Nakagami believed that the two attitudes coexist in a complementary manner 
                                                  
12 Ibid., 117–118. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Eisuke Komatsu (ed.), Saussure’s Third Course of Lectures on General Linguistics, 66a. 
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when he writes.  In this sense, his act of writing must always be considered to be 
conditional, and it will be renewed endlessly in accordance with the changing values of 
the time.  Where then does Nakagami’s ambivalent attitude towards the act of writing 
stem from?  The ambivalent nature of his writing could be induced by his distrust of 
kotoba (language).15  Nakagami casts grave doubt on the Japanese language as a 
means to write his novels.  He considers the Japanese language as a power apparatus 
that imposes the law/system of the modern nation-state or social morality on the people.  
For Nakagami, the inherent nature of kotoba is such that it leads to the reproduction and 
spread of conventional ideas.  However, at the same time, kotoba is his only means of 
destroying the old order and creating a new sense of values in his writings.  This 
ambivalent perception of kotoba poses a serious dilemma for Nakagami as a 
professional writer.  He stated that ‘Language is deceptive!’ (Kotoba wa uso da!), and 
his distrust of kotoba was evident in his early essays of the 1960s and 1970s.16  Having 
regarded kotoba (the Japanese language) as a modern invention derived from the 
genbun icchi17 movement (the movement for the vernacularization of written Japanese) 
of the early Meiji period, Nakagami observes a flaw in the Japanese language itself: it 
functions as an invisible power apparatus that strengthens the canonization of Japanese 
cultural or national identities in accordance with the historical process of Japan’s 
modern nation-state.  Thus, Nakagami considers modern Japanese as a type of dubious, 
                                                  
15 The Japanese term kotoba is a word with many shades of meaning.  Its definitions range from 
language in general or one’s speech act to a word/term, phrase or expression.  Unless otherwise 
specified, hereafter, I will use the term kotoba to refer to language in general. 
16 For example, see Nakagami Kenji, ‘Hanzaisha Nagayama Norio kara no hōkoku’ and ‘Toki wa 
nagareruּּּ’ both in NKZ Vol.14, 220–242.  In 1996, his literary contribution comprised fifteen 
volumes of complete works, Nakagami Kenji zenshū.  Wherever necessary, I use the abbreviation 
NKZ for Nakagami Kenji zenshū. 
17  The Japanese term 言 文 一 致  is romanized as ‘genbun’itchi’ in Kenkyūsha’s New 
Japanese-English Dictionary, Fifth Edition, Tokyo: Kenkyūsha, 2003.  However, I will use ‘genbun 
icchi’ throughout this dissertation. 
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hastily formed product forged by state power for the benefit of the modern nation-state, 
and makes a sharp distinction between the standard Japanese derived from the genbun 
icchi movement and the indigenous dialect of his birthplace, Kishū.  On this issue, this 
dissertation applies Karatani Kōjin’s discussion on common-sense notions found in 
modern Japanese literature, which are termed as ‘landscape’ or ‘confession’; Haruo 
Shirane’s debate over the cultural formation of the ‘canon’; and Suzuki Tomi’s analysis 
of ‘I-novel discourse’ (shishōsetsu gensetsu).18  Karatani, Shirane and Suzuki reveal 
that what has been considered as common sense or natural in modern Japanese literature, 
such as the I-novel discourse and the notion of landscape or confession, is actually a 
historical and cultural product.  They expose the origins of these common-sense 
notions in Japanese literature, which were concealed as soon as they were produced, as 
though they had always existed.  The process of inventing these types of authorized 
texts or fixed ideas, that is, canons, repeats itself endlessly. 
 
In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, Nakagami Kenji viewed kotoba as a modern 
invention that creates a uniform and monolithic ideological system—in his words, the 
archetype of narrative (monogatari no teikei).  He emphasizes the fact that the 
archetype of narrative hampers the freedom of novels (shōsetsu).  In his series of 
essays entitled ‘Monogatari no keifu’ (Notes on the Genealogy of the Prose Narrative, 
1979), Nakagami displays his ambivalent attitude towards monogatari. 19   The 
Japanese word monogatari refers to a tale, story or narrative in general; nonetheless, it 
is a word with wide-ranging implications.  Although Nakagami attempts to provide a 
                                                  
18 Karatani, Origins of Modern Japanese Literature, translated and edited by Brett de Bary, 11–96.  
The original text, Nihon kindai bungaku no kigen, was published by Kōdansha in 1980.  Shirane 
and Suzuki, Inventing the Classics, 1–27.  Suzuki, Narrating the Self, 1–12. 
19 Nakagami Kenji, ‘Monogatari no keifu’, in NKZ Vol.14, 117–256. 
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definition of monogatari, his definition appears to be a little intricate, ambiguous and at 
times, ambivalent.  He compares monogatari to various terms/expressions that indicate 
a linear narrative of progress: a piece of music with fixed chord progression, 
popularization, dependence on the law/system that becomes more prominent under the 
autocratic rule of a militarist regime, nature (shizen), capitalism and so forth.20  He 
then proceeds to state that this law/system in monogatari can be found throughout the 
country.  It appears that Nakagami is attempting to discuss refraining from the 
extensive usage of this monogatari and to discover a new form of writing that would 
solve the problem of the canon formation of Japanese cultural or national identities, in 
accordance with the historical process of Japanese modernization.  However, at the 
same time, he does not deny his natural inclination towards monogatari.  He fully 
understands that we cannot escape the restrictions placed upon our freedom by the 
law/system, which easily becomes less prominent when we take the existence of the 
law/system surrounding us for granted.  At times, Nakagami enjoys the use of 
monogatari; however, he simultaneously fights the inclination towards monogatari and 
attempts to depart from the extensive use of the archetype of narrative.  He does not 
intend to advocate the disuse of monogatari; rather, he wishes to create an awareness of 
its existence.  He continues his ambivalent, but simultaneously determined, attitude to 
refuse to abide in the same place and be indifferent to the system/law that conceals its 
origin and appears to have an a priori existence almost as soon as it is established. 
Instead of kotoba, which is regarded as an unreliable means to invent an imaginary 
monogatari due to its latent ambiguous, abstract and arbitrary nature, Nakagami Kenji 
recognizes his body as an undeniable object; this, in turn, makes him aware of his own 
                                                  
20 Ibid., 121, 126, 129, 137 and 141. 
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existence as an object in this world.  This awareness creates another dilemma for him, 
namely, that he, as a writer, has to use kotoba to express this awareness, which dawned 
on him by rejecting kotoba.  In order to understand Nakagami’s celebration of his body 
more clearly, I employ Douglas N. Slaymaker’s analysis of Sakaguchi Ango, Noma 
Hiroshi and Tamura Taijirō.  Slaymaker attempts to clarify the manner in which 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s philosophy of existence became equated with the physicality of 
postwar Japan, as expressed in the works of postwar existentialist writers (sengo-ha).  
He asserts that during the immediate postwar years, ‘the body offered antidotes to the 
bankruptcy of the traditional and military values which characterized the previous 
fifteen years of war’, and ‘many Japanese people’s celebration of the carnal body 
(nikutai 肉体) suggests a punning contrast to the national polity (kokutai 国体), the 
focus of their desecration’.21  For Nakagami Kenji, who considers kotoba as a system 
that binds him, nikutai can be a type of asylum to which he escapes.  However, 
ironically, this is a world in which there are no words—only objects before they are 
named.   
Thus, Nakagami Kenji’s ambivalent perception of writing had developed into a 
strong distrust of language and an emphasis on the body, which is perceived as an object 
that has not been given any name, that is to say, an object that has not been tinged with 
the notion of the collective.  In this dissertation, I shall also attempt to extend 
Nakagami’s scepticism towards kotoba and inclination towards nikutai to include 
contemporary artists/writers, and explore whether they had shared or inherited this type 
of perpetual attempt to establish their autonomy or subjective freedom through the 
conflict between kotoba and nikutai.  Therefore, this dissertation further aims to 
                                                  
21 Slaymaker, The Body in Postwar Japanese Fiction, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, 1–2. 
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explore the manner in which Nakagami Kenji’s ambivalent attitude towards kotoba and 
nikutai bears a marked similarity to the thinking of the theatrical artists of the 1960s, 
such as Betsuyaku Minoru, Hijikata Tastumi, Terayama Shūji and Kara Jūrō; and to         
contemporary women writers across different generations, such as Tsushima Yūko (b. 
1947), Takamura Kaoru (b. 1953), Tawada Yōko (b. 1961) and Yoshimoto Banana (b. 
1964).  I will focus on the sense of insecurity and unstable circumstances of these 
writers at the time when they respectively established their autonomous attitude in their 
literary universe in postwar Japan.  Further, I will examine the manner in which they 
face the uncertainty with regard to the language they use and/or how they turn to their 
bodies as the fount of their literary universe.  These writers perceive the profound 
paradox in their written works because their attempts to destroy the fixative or 
conventional nature of language must be expressed by the very language they distrust. 
 
Why is autonomy to be examined in the field of contemporary Japanese literature? 
 
With the advance of globalisation, particularly since the September 11 terrorist attacks, 
there has been a renewed interest in the issue of liberalism.  Mindful of the 
unipolarisation of the world economy around the US, the growing tendency towards 
nationalism and the profusion of a massive consumer culture and the Internet, a 
reappraisal of subjective freedom or autonomy in the name of democracy is now being 
called into question.  In the field of Japanese literature, too, the ethical issues relating 
to autonomous freedom and responsibility have been the subject of controversy.   
In an Asahi newspaper article dated 25 March 2005, Ōe Kenzaburō (b. 1935) quoted 
Maruyama Masao’s remarks on the definition of freedom from his article, ‘Nihon ni 
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okeru jiyū ishiki no keisei to tokushitsu’ (The Formation and Characteristics of Liberal 
Consciousness in Japan), written soon after the end of World War II.  In this article, Ōe 
suggests that we need to remind ourselves of Maruyama’s definition of freedom, which 
is synonymous with personal autonomy, that is to say, the ability of logical 
self-determination (risei-teki jiko kettei) rather than freedom resulting from the 
elimination of man’s environmental constraints.  Ōe introduces Maruyama’s assertion 
that there is more to freedom than that which enables the satisfaction of human desire.  
He emphasises that we should take moral responsibility for our actions when we 
identify freedom as our free will to choose our actions.  Moreover, Ōe described the 
status of contemporary Japanese literature in the 1980s as being in a predicament and 
lamented the fact that there was an absence of an active attitude (nōdōteki na shisei),22 
which Ōe viewed as the attitude that developed from the individual who attempts to 
integrate his/her changes in surrounding familial, social/political and cosmological 
circumstances and to present a model of individual with a vision for the future at the 
time.23  Writers such as Murakami Haruki (村上春樹 b. 1949) in the 1980s were 
criticized for their passive attitudes and were branded as writers creating sub-cultures 
that were mere reflections of Tokyo’s vast consumer culture.  Ōe indicated that this 
crisis of Japanese literature stemmed from the attitudes of young Japanese intellectuals 
and the literati of the 1970s and 1980s who excessively utilized cultural theories based 
on post-structuralism or post-modernism, for instance, the works of figures such as 
Barthes, Foucault, Derrida, Lacan and Kristeva.24  He described this phenomenon as a 
mere transplantation or translation of new Western concepts into Japanese, which is 
                                                  
22 Ōe, ‘Sengo bungaku kara konnichi no kyūkyō made’, in Saigo no shōsetsu, 206–209. 
23 Ibid., 207. 
24 Ōe, ‘Japan’s Dual Identity: A Writer’s Dilemma’, in Japan, The Ambiguous, and Myself, 59–103. 
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similar to ‘the one-way journey from abroad’, and criticized the ‘passive’ attitude of the 
young intellectuals who did not make any efforts ‘to analyze them [new theories] 
carefully in terms of their application to the specific situation in Japan’.25  It is in this 
context that Ōe referred to the necessity of the active attitude, which I read as a form of 
personal autonomy.  As if to prove Ōe’s remarks, there has recently been an increase in 
research into the issue of ‘freedom’ or self-determination (jiko-kettei) in the area of 
contemporary Japanese thought or literature.26  Living in an age that is coloured and 
toned by the legacy of post-modernism—such as the ‘mass consumer culture’ and the 
lack of the ‘I’ notion or autonomy— it would be momentous for us to reconsider the 
issue of ‘autonomy’ or subjective freedom.   
 
The end of grand narrative 
 
Many scholars working in various academic disciplines in the 1980s were influenced 
and stimulated by French post-structuralists or post-modernists such as Michel Foucault 
or Jacques Derrida.  Today, more than twenty-five years after the wide prevalence of 
post-modernistic theory in the groves of academe, there has been some criticism or 
review of those concepts of post-modernism because of their ambiguity of rhetoric and 
terminology.27  This is what Asada Akira has to say on the recent ideological tendency: 
‘[T]he pluralism and territorial transgression that are called post-modernism are 
inevitably assimilated into the capitalistic consumer society as long as they remain a 
                                                  
25 Ibid., 86. 
26 See, for example, Karatani Kōjin, Rinri 21, Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2000; Azuma Hiroki and Ōsawa 
Masachi, Jiyū o kangaeru―9･11 ikō no gendai shisō, Tokyo: NHK Books, 2003; Nakamasa Masaki, 
Derida no yuigon, Tokyo: Sōfūsha, 2005. 
27 Dower, Iwanami kōza nihon tsūshi bekkan, 230. 
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superficial game in semiotics.’28  Ōe Kenzaburō also acutely criticizes the fact that the 
young Japanese intellectuals of the 1970s and 1980s had dealt with the 
structuralism-based cultural ideas as an ephemeral trend.  He states: ‘At the height of 
the ongoing process of accepting and discharging new theories, phrases such as “a 
performance of ideas” or “a playground of texts” came into common usage.  These 
expressions seemed remarkably appropriate for those who could cope only passively 
with the kaleidoscope of ideas.’29  Did the ‘fashion conscious’ intellectuals of ‘Japan’s 
grotesquely bloated consumer society’ in 1980s merely live and die for post-modern 
wordplay as a new cultural fashion from Western Europe and America, as suggested by 
Asada’s or Ōe’s remark?   
Under these circumstances of the prevalence of an inactive attitude, what kind of 
impact did the concepts of post-modernism actually have on the scholarship of Japanese 
Studies today?  John Dower explains that those concepts of ‘decentralization’ or 
‘deconstruction’ related with post-modernism, or rather, the various structuralism-based 
cultural/literary theories, have truly penetrated the whole area of modern Japanese 
studies.  However, it does not mean that those ideas have replaced the past approach.30  
Dower continues to say, however, that because of the baptism of post-modernism, the 
comprehensive and integrated theories or normative models in accordance with the 
historical process of modernization have decayed or may have completely vanished.  
What does Dower really mean by the decay of the comprehensive and integrated 
theories?  Jonathan Culler defines today’s ‘literary theory’ (theories from 
‘post-structuralists’ such as Foucault or Derrida) as ‘a pugnacious critique of 
                                                  
28 Asada, Posuto modan kara posuto modan e, Tokyo: Kobayashi garō, 1990. 
29 Ōe, ‘Japan’s Dual Identity: A Writer’s Dilemma’, 85. 
30 Dower, Iwanami kōza nihon tsūshi bekkan, 234. 
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common-sense notions, and further, an attempt to show that what we take for granted as 
“common-sense” is in fact a historical construction.’31  In this respect, what is known 
by the name of traditional Japanese cultural values or uniqueness were re-examined and 
depicted as nothing but a ‘modern invention’.32  Thus, we see, as Dower has indicated, 
the universal models represented by the Marxian framework or the modernization 
theory were criticized as a manifestation of the cultural hegemony of Western modernity, 
and regarded as the mere classical, chronological causal explanatory scheme in order to 
explain a centre-oriented Western modernization.  The modernizationists, for example, 
viewed Japanese modern history as a process of universal modern transformation, that is, 
a gradual evolutionary progress towards the Western standard of liberal democracy in a 
lineal process.  However, this kind of normative, universal approach was re-examined 
and gradually decayed in the 1980s.  From the point of view of literature, Suzuki Tomi 
summarizes this matter as follows: ‘Since the 1980s, various literary texts as well as 
historiographical narratives have been re-examined with a post-modern scepticism 
towards the notion of the subject as an autonomous, controlling consciousness, and with 
the shared recognition that the subject is culturally and historically constructed within 
specific discursive positions, including differences such as race, gender, and class.’33  
What is more, Aoki Tamotsu explains cultural relativism (bunka sōtai shugi) against 
Western cultural hegemony over and modernization of the world.34  He illustrates the 
dilemma of Western scholars (especially American) who lost their reliable ground or a 
universal model in multifarious societies in the 1980s.  Scholars today are facing a 
cultural pendulum which is swinging so violently between the respect of the 
                                                  
31 Culler, Literary Theory, 1–17. 
32 Vlastos, ‘Tradition: Past/Present Culture and Modern Japanese History’, 2. 
33 Suzuki, Narrating the Self, 186. 
34 Aoki, Bunka no hiteisei, 7–48. 
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self-determination of people, egalitarianism or humanism and overemphasizing cultural 
particularity, ethnocentrism or absolutism.  The notion of ‘undecidability’ asserted by 
advocates of ‘deconstruction’ deprives a contemporary person of normative theories or 
‘grand narrative’.  Concerning this issue, Tessa Morris-Suzuki, denying the paradigm 
based on the view of history as linear progress, takes a similar view.  She points out 
that the body (system) of knowledge that had been constituted in the modern period has 
disintegrated during the past twenty years.  Scholars in the halls of academe today 
have now been asked to begin searching for a new body of knowledge for our time.35  
Furthermore, Jonathan Culler pointed out that ‘as a critique of common sense and 
exploration of alternative conceptions, theory involves a questioning of the most basic 
premises or assumptions of literary studies’ such as ‘What is the “I” or subject who 
writes, read, or acts?’ and the like.36  Moreover, the rational subjectivity or autonomy 
(‘the notion of the subject as an autonomous, controlling consciousness’), which enables 
a modern person to establish ethics (rinri)/morality as theorized by Descartes or 
Immanuel Kant, was decentralized and dismantled into the system of difference, that is, 
multifarious discourses (discursive fields) of various minority groups or individuals 
who dwell on the periphery of our contemporary society.  Carol Gluck describes the 
present situation as ‘messier and more dispersed than before’.37  Having noticed the 
absence of any normative model or ‘grand narrative’, she asks the question how one can 
create a standpoint for his/her assertion. 
Under these circumstances of contemporary thought of the 1970s and the 1980s, Ōe 
Kenzaburō described the situation of contemporary Japanese literature as a 
                                                  
35 Morris-Suzuki, Hihan-teki sōzōryoku no tame ni, 10–35. 
36 Culler, Literary Theory, 4. 
37 Gluck, ‘“Meiji” for our time’, in Helen Hardacre and Adam L. Kim (eds), New Directions in the 
Studies of Meiji Japan, 28. 
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predicament.38  He deplores the fact that Japanese literature in the 1980s had lost its 
power which had enabled it to create a new model of human beings with a vision for the 
future, and that there was an absence of an active attitude among contemporary 
Japanese writers.  Such writers as Murakami Haruki were unsparingly criticized 
because of their passive attitudes as nothing but sub-culture.  In his Nobel Prize speech 
in 1994, Ōe declared himself to be ‘a writer who wishes to create serious works of 
literature distinct from those novels which are mere reflections of the vast consumer 
culture of Tokyo and the subcultures of the world at large.’39  In the meantime, Ōe 
pointed out that the ‘postwar writers’ such as Ōoka Shōhei (大岡昇平 1909–1988), 
Takeda Taijun (武田泰淳 1912–1976), Shiina Rinzō (椎名麟三 1911–1973) and 
Noma Hiroshi (野間宏 1915–1991) were the only “serious” writers in the history of 
contemporary Japanese literature.40  Tsurumi Shunsuke and Kuno Osamu also had a 
high regard for their attitudes, which indicated democratic subjectivity (shutaisei) and 
existential personal autonomy in modern and contemporary Japan.41  As we can see 
from the above, living in the contemporary era which is/has been pervaded by the 
bequest of post-modernism such as ‘a superficial game in semiotics’, ‘mere reflections 
of the vast consumer culture of Tokyo and the subcultures of the world at large’ or the 
lack of grand narrative, ethics, ‘I’-notion or subjectivity, it is extremely difficult for each 
of us to possess an active attitude or personal autonomy and to create a new model with 
a vision for our future as Ōe strongly suggested.  
Let us look more carefully into Ōe’s criticism on the young intellectuals and literati 
                                                  
38 Ōe Kenzaborō, ‘Sengo bungaku kara atarashī bunka no riron o tsūka shite’, in Saigo no shōsetsu, 
197–237. 
39 Ibid., 217–237. 
40 Ibid., 206–207. 
41 Tsurumi Shunsuke and Kuno Osamu, Gendai nihon no shisō, 185–211. 
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of the 1970s and the 1980s and the influx of French cultural theorists’ ideas.  As we 
noted above, as early as in 1986, Ōe had already alerted the young intellectuals of those 
days to the decline of junbungaku and also lamented the almost automatic influx of new 
cultural theories based on post-structuralism and post-modernism, or rather, mere 
transplanting or translating new Western concepts into Japanese, which is like ‘the 
one-way journey from abroad’. 42   Ōe explains that although those new cultural 
theories from France, Russia and America permeated the whole nation’s intellectual 
climate in the latter half of 1970s and the first half of 1980s, the intellectuals at the time 
did not make any effort ‘to analyse them carefully in terms of their application to the 
specific situation in Japan’.  He severely criticized the passive attitude of the young 
intellectuals who merely accepted the new theories and then discharged them without a 
close examination.  Ōe sarcastically describes this one-way process as follows:  
 
[T]hat young Japanese intellectuals, true to our national character, 
analyzed and diachronically systematized the various structuralism-based 
theories and counterarguments in order to “accept” and—to use a term not 
usually considered its antonym—“discharge” those theories.  To accept 
Foucault, Barthes had to be discharged.  Only after Lacan was dismissed 
could Derrida be accepted—but merely to make room for the next thinker.  
[…] Cultural heroes came and went.  However, the curtain dropped on 
this period as soon as these advocates found there was no thinker or 
thought left for them to add to the conveyor belt from Europe and the 
States.43   
 
Here, Ōe deplores the fact that the new theories imported from Western Europe or 
America were not re-examined in the Japanese context, and thus we see the Japanese 
                                                  
42 Ōe, ‘Japan’s Dual Identity: A Writer’s Dilemma’, in Japan, The Ambiguous, and Myself, 59–103. 
43 Ibid., 85. 
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intellectuals were/have been unable to create a cultural theory of their own.  Ōe 
consolidates the issue of the decay of junbungaku in contemporary Japan as follows: 
 
When Japan’s effort to modernize ran into the fatal impasse of the 
Pacific War, the Japanese made a serious search for a set of 
principles to guide them in making a fresh start, and the aim of the 
postwar writers was to give literary expression to such principles.  
However, the intellectuals of the 1970s and 1980s have neither 
followed up on these principles nor taken a critical stance toward 
them.  They have ignored them [the postwar writers], turning 
their backs on the ambitions and actual accomplishments of that 
earlier generation, and severed any connection with it.44 
 
In addition, Ōe considers that because of the prosperity of the subculture in the 1980s, 
young people who reaped the benefits of consumer-driven culture became more 
conservative.45  Ōe criticizes that they are going to discard literary activities because 
they merely consume the new cultural theories one after another and do not internalize 
them as the postwar writers had once done.46 
Ōe’s criticism is not only levelled at cultural trends and the intellectuals at the time 
but also at Japanese contemporary literature itself and its readers today like us.  Ōe 
asserts that the decay of junbungaku and the vogue of new cultural theories should be 
‘viewed not in contrast but as one entity’.47  This should be the problem for each of us, 
the ordinary people dwelling in Japan’s gigantic consumer society today.  However, 
                                                  
44 Ibid., 97. 
45 Ōe, Saigo no shōsetsu, 232–237. 
46  How Ōe can criticize the passive attitude of young literati in the 1980s for the vast 
consumer-driven society is a question which may be too involved a subject to be treated here in 
detail.  See Ōe, ‘Sengo bungaku kara konnichi no kyūkyō made’, in Saigo no shōsetsu, 199–237.  
Ōe discusses the matter from the perspective of sociology, too. 
47 Ibid., 92–93. 
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having felt that a universal model or grand narrative was dismantled by 
post-structuralists or post-modernists, words in language (kotoba) today lose their exact 
meaning and a meaning of a word is considered as a mere historical, cultural product in 
pursuing a consumeristic culture and society.  Under these circumstances, how do we 
actualize our subjective freedom and positive personal autonomy?  How could we 
succeed to a set of principles, which the postwar writers had once proposed, in order to 
create ‘a model of a contemporary age which encompasses past and future’? 
There is much truth in Ōe’s remarks, however, considering the vast consumer culture 
and the subcultures of contemporary Japan at large, there is also much truth in Stephen 
Snyder and Philip Gabriel statement that ‘those who came after, the so-called 
post-postwar generation, invent and inhabit a world with a very different coloration and 
tone and based on a very different experience—one, however, that is perhaps not, a 
priori, reducible to that of the “vast consumer culture of Tokyo”.’48  Then, in terms of 
the discussion of the post-modern time that Ōe fears, what precisely is the coloration 
and tone of the contemporary era that we inhabit?  Philip Gabriel discusses the 
contemporary writer, Shimada Masahiko (b. 1961) and introduces Asada Akira’s 
illustration of our contemporary society: 
 
Asada Akira sketches a vision of capitalism’s “global trajectory” 
encompassing three stages: elderly capitalism, adult capitalism, and 
infantile capitalism.  In contrast to the model proposed by Maruyama 
Masao and others of the formation of the mature adult shutai (individual 
subject) as the enabling condition of Japan’s modernity, Asada identifies in 
contemporary Japan less a process of maturation than a country growing 
“progressively more infantile” at the same time that its capitalist economy 
soars [.] [···] 
                                                  
48 Snyder and Gabriel, ‘Introduction’, in Ōe and Beyond: Fiction in Contemporary Japan, 3. 
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 Contemporary Japan is a country of childlike obsessions — for machines by 
engineers, for wordplay, parody, and “child games of differentiation” by 
advertisers and consumers.  It is both a “playful utopia and at the same 
time a terrible ‘dystopia’,” dystopic in that the image of Japan as mammoth 
theme park describes one reality and conceals another[.]49 
 
In Asada’s article, Japan is viewed as ‘other-oriented’ children who are playing ‘freely’ 
within a certain protective area under the guardianship of some adults, that is, we may 
say, under the protection of U.S. forces.  Asada points out that this protected area is the 
core of the Japanese ideological mechanism, which is described as a ‘“soft” 
subsumption by a seemingly horizontal, centreless “place”.’50  Taken in this light, 
living in the contemporary era which is/has been coloured and toned by the legacy of 
post-modernism such as ‘mass consumer culture’, ‘infantile capitalism’, or the lack of 
‘the mature adult shutai’, the realization of one’s self-determinism or one’s freedom and 
moral responsibility can be considered as a complicated task that defies any single 
approach. 
As we can see from the above arguments, the notion of ‘I’, self, subjectivity or 
autonomy, as theorized by Descartes or Immanuel Kant, has been doubted by 
post-structuralists or post-modernists.  The autonomous subjectivity had been 
dispersed into specific discourses which are culturally and historically constructed.  
Moreover, new theories do not lie in one plot narrated from a diachronic interpretation, 
which produces typical heroes and villains in a history by causality; but in the multiple 
plots or story lines explained by the motives of the historical human actors as a sense of 
                                                  
49 Gabriel, ‘Dream Messengers, Rental Children, and the Infantile: Shimada Masahiko and the 
Possibilities of the Postmodern’, 219–244. 
50 Asada, ‘Infantile Capitalism and Japan’s Postmodernism: A Fairy Tale’, 628–634. 
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synchronic and contingent entities.  In the late 1970s and 1980s, the attention of new 
cultural theorists had shifted or ‘decentralized’ from the nation-state to the periphery of 
modern society: the ordinary people, their resistance to the state and the conflicts 
between them.  The state, groups and individuals could not be ascribed to a monolithic 
or homogenous pattern.  Converging and diverging concurrently, they are all different.  
The new concepts in contemporary (or, if anything, ‘post’-postmodern) Japan which we 
have discussed bring “multifarious Japan” from the past to the place we are standing 
right now, and asks each of us the question of who we are and where we are standing.  
Thus, new theorists surely demonstrate the very interesting interpretation that makes it 
possible for minority groups or people dwelling on the periphery of our society to come 
to the fore of the historiography in our time.  Their attempt is well worth bringing up 
and pursuing as-yet-unrecognized factors in a modern history of Japanese literature.   
On the other hand, as John Dower and Morris-Suzuki indicated, because ‘various 
literary texts as well as historiographical narratives have been re-examined with a 
post-modern scepticism’, or the Japanese language, being considered as a modern 
product, has lost its power as a means for analysis; the comprehensive and integrated 
theories, normative models or grand narrative in accordance with the historical process 
of modernization have declined greatly over the past twenty years, and such notion as 
autonomous subjectivity or self-determination has unsparingly been criticized or may 
have been completely rejected.  Morris-Suzuki describes this conversion caused by the 
influx of new theories brought about by Foucault, Derrida or Benedict Anderson and so 
forth over the last twenty years as the collapse of the body of modern knowledge.51  
Moreover, ‘deconstruction’ gave rise to the excessive, or rather, boundless subdivision 
                                                  
51 Morris-Suzuki, Hihanteki sōzōryoku no tame ni, 22–61. 
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of minority groups on the grounds of differences such as race, gender, and class.  
‘Deconstruction’ fell into the trap it had laid itself, producing a finer subdivision of the 
minority theory, which goes on endlessly.  It is in this context that many scholars 
recently drew our attention to the growing tendency towards nationalism or 
neoconservatism among the young generation not only in Japan but elsewhere in the 
world.52  Karatani gives a concise summary of what was being discussed: 
 
A similar situation [that is, the wartime ideology of “overcoming the 
modern”53] prevails in the Japan of the 1980s.  Japan has become a highly 
developed information-consumption society, in which meaning is 
information and desire is the desire of the Other [tasha], because the 
“subject” of the nineteenth-century West has never existed in Japan, nor has 
there been any resistance to the modern.  In 1980s Japan (a Japan 
“liberated” from its obsession with modernism), parody, pastiche, and 
collage have become dominant trends.  But in the Japanese context, this 
amounts to a rehabilitation of the nineteenth century.  It is a revival of that 
mode within which late Edo society saw itself as a “paradise of fools.”  
There is an almost pathological play with language, with the reign of the 
superficial on the one hand, and the regeneration of ultranationalistic 
ideology on the other.54 
 
Here, Karatani acutely questions the way out from today’s nationalistic tendency as well 
as the ideological/cultural relativity of post-modernism by which Ōe has been 
bewildered in contemporary Japan.  Each of us now needs to confront the fundamental 
issue of how we can perceive our autonomous freedom and moral responsibility as its 
                                                  
52 In Chapter IV, I will discuss about a growing tendency towards linguistic nationalism based on 
the observation of the recent Japanese language boom and Japanese young people’s apathy towards 
the discussion of nationalism. 
53 This famous debate was held during the war time in July, 1942 in Kyoto on the theme of 
overcoming modernity, ‘Kindai no chōkoku’.  Many intellectuals attended the debate, for example, 
Kobayashi Hideo, Kamei Katsuichirō and others.   
54 Karatani, ‘One Spirit, Two Nineteenth Centuries’, 627. 
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basis, so as not to stray off into totalitarianism or ultranationalism.  What is our 
autonomy or freedom?  Who is ‘I’?  What is the meaning of moral responsibility?  
With the storm of cultural relativism and pluralism, it is not an easy task for each of us 
to answer all these questions.   
Morris-Suzuki proposes that we now need to create a new ground of intellect today, 
what she calls ‘critical imagination (hihanteki sōzōryoku)’ in order to stand up to today’s 
growing tendency of cultural nationalism, neo-conservatism or, to use Morris-Suzuki’s 
term, ‘nihilistic form of nationalism’ that is derived from our widespread 
disillusionment with what is called ideal politics.55  She urges us to create a course of 
new language to re-consider, re-evaluate and review the world today.   Having felt that 
a universal model or grand narrative of modern times was dismantled by 
post-structuralists or post-modernists, and the notion of ‘self’ or ‘subject’ had been 
considered as a mere historical, cultural product in pursuing a centre-oriented Western 
modernization; the issue of autonomy can be an issue that needs further consideration.  
The system of modern knowledge collapsed into the post-modern discursive spaces and 
our personal autonomy threatens to be in grave danger.  Being on the verge of a crisis 
of our autonomy, how could we succeed to a set of principles, which it is said the 
postwar writers had once possessed, in order to create ‘a model of a contemporary age 
which encompasses past and future’ or to gain a power of ‘critical imagination’?  The 
examination of personal autonomy may be crucial to the issue of how each of us creates 
a new ethical framework which is associated with the issue of freedom and moral 
responsibility so as not to allow ourselves to drift towards a one-dimensional sense of 
values such as ultranationalism or totalitarianism.  To enhance such a perception of our 
                                                  
55 Morris-Suzuki, Hihanteki sōzōryoku no tame ni, 41–61. 
 
 27
autonomy and nurturing our critical imagination, literature is an area that enables us to 
explore our autonomy in both a theoretically and a practical stance.  I hope to convey 
my belief that the notion of autonomy expressed in the literature of Nakagami Kenji can 
be used as a stepping stone to the examination of our own autonomy in a self-motivated 
way.   
 
Brief summary of each chapter 
 
Chapter I focuses on the examination of Nakagami Kenji’s ambivalent attitude towards 
his act of writing.  We will explore the manner in which his act of writing appears to 
be a paradox between the self-identification and the integration into the collective.  
Nakagami considers that two poles of a dichotomous framework serve as a precondition 
for each other and coexist complementarily.  For this reason, he views this kind of 
dichotomy between the two as his strong impetus to make him write novels endlessly.  
We then observe the possibility in which Nakagami’s ambivalent attitude is extended to 
cover Maruyama Masao’s relative definition of autonomy―the mutual coexistence 
between personal autonomy and social autonomy―which was derived from Fukuzawa 
Yukichi’s understanding of freedom.  Moreover, we will discuss how Nakagami’s 
ambivalent attitude towards the act of writing bears notional resemblance to Karatani 
Kōjin’s interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s notion of freedom and responsibility, which 
emerge from two paradoxical stances that coexist simultaneously―one’s practical 
individual action at any given time and one’s theoretical recognition that one should 
accept the external causalities surrounding the individual.   
In Chapter II, we will look closely at the manner in which Nakagami Kenji’s search 
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for autonomy appears as a never-ending task that confronts the paradox between the 
individual and the collective.  Focusing on Nakagami’s major novels written between 
1976 and 1984, especially, the trilogy of Akiyuki, we will examine how the protagonist, 
Akiyuki, has developed into an individual who possesses autonomy and moral 
responsibility.  In addition, Nakagami’s various attempts to violate the archetype of 
narrative will be examined.  For instance, after Nakagami depicts an archetypical 
relationship between an innocent protagonist and evil others in a novel, he relativizes it 
immediately by representing the similar relationship repeatedly in his successive novels 
with subtle shifts of relationship between the central characters.  Furthermore, 
Nakagami does not reject the tradition of Japanese literature such as monogatari and 
shishōsetsu.  In his anthologies of short stories, Nakagami dares to lay these two 
extremes of Japanese literature and shōsetsu together, demonstrating shōsetsu as a genre 
that may transcend the archetype of monogatari. 
  Chapter III suggests that Nakagami’s endless search for autonomy found in a paradox 
between the individual and the collective may be applied to perceive a similar thought 
that was represented by previous writers.  Various never-ending autonomous attempts 
expressed by Sakaguchi Ango, Miyazawa Kenji and Nakahara Chūya will be examined.   
  Chapter IV portrays the issue of linguistic nationalism and the ongoing canon 
formation through the examination of the recent Japanese language boom in Japan.  
Moreover, we will examine how the national language of Japan was created as an 
ideology of the modern nation-state in Japan.  Then, we speculate on the reason why 
Nakagami Kenji had developed his scepticism towards the Japanese language. 
  Following the contextual examination in Chapter IV of the ideological aspects of the 
modern Japanese language that was formed as an exclusive national language in the 
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process of building a modern nation-state, in Chapter V, we will consider Nakagami’s 
doubt about any fixed notions that were expressed by ambiguous Japanese terms which 
was fraught with internal paradoxes.  We will focus attention on the analysis of how 
Nakagami’s distrust of the modern Japanese language is reflected in his major novels in 
detail, and attempt to extend this observation of distrust of language into the works of 
the theatrical artists in the 1960s such as Betsuyaku Minoru.  We will then examine the 
poems and poetics of Miyazawa Kenji and Nakahara Chūya who also show their 
scepticism towards the Japanese language in their literary universe. 
  Nakagami’s ambivalent attitude towards his act of writing is derived from not only 
his distrust of the Japanese language but also his admiration of the body as an 
undeniable object.  Chapter VI examines the manner in which Nakagami Kenji 
emphasizes the body that has not been tinged with the law/system of the collective in 
his literary works.  We will then discuss how his ardour for the body has much in 
common with Sakaguchi Ango, the postwar existentialist writer and Nakahara Chūya.  
I then attempt to enlarge this argument to include the theatrical artists in the 1960s such 
as Betsuyaku Minoru, Kara Jūrō, Hijikata Tatsumi and Terayama Shūji who display 
their strong distrust of language, which is inextricably linked with their emphasis on the 
body as a means of expression. 
  It is contemporary women writers that display the notion of autonomy in postwar 
Japan.  Chapter VII, we will explore the novels and essays of contemporary women 
writers, Tsushima Yūko, Takamura Kaoru, Tawada Yōko and Yoshimoto Banana.  
These women writers struggled to establish their autonomous freedom as they face the 
conflict between their individual bodies that personifies their personal autonomy and 
the modern Japanese language that confines women in the fixed and submissive roles 
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in present-day Japan. 
  In this dissertation, I would like to arrive at the conclusion that Nakagami Kenji’s 
ambivalent attitude towards his act of writing can be an eternal self-legislation, that is, 
his endless attempt to establish an autonomous freedom, which evolves from the 
paradox between the individual (body) and the collective (language).  Nakagami’s 
attempt is certainly not confined to his works alone.  I hope I will be successful in 
showing that his endless quest for autonomy through his act of writing can be a new 
stepping-stone to reinterpret modern Japanese literature. 
 
 
Notes 
 
Japanese names are written in Japanese order of surname first followed by given name. 
 
Translations into English are by me except where otherwise stated.  Wherever deemed 
necessary, I have given the original Japanese wording of translated excerpts. 
CHAPTER I 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE CONCEPT OF AUTONOMY 
THROUGH THE ANALYSIS OF AN AUTONOMOUS ATTITUDE IN 
THE LITERATURE OF NAKAGAMI KENJI  
 
 
In this chapter, I would like to attempt to examine the notion of autonomy utilizing 
Nakagami Kenji’s ambivalent attitude as it appears in the process of writing his literary 
works.  To put it more concretely, this chapter will analyse how Nakagami’s 
ambivalent attitude towards the act of writing appears to be two kinds of autonomies, 
namely, the autonomy of the individual and the autonomy of the collective, which 
coexist complementarily.  Nakagami felt that his act of writing (novels) creates two 
conflicting attitudes, first to attempt to establish a firm self-identity, and secondly to be 
aware of the external causalities that restrict the personal autonomy.  Nakagami 
became aware that there are the law/system of collective such as, to use Nakagami’s 
term, the logic of the modern nation-state, the archetype of narrative or the 
predetermined progressive code in a piece of music, which inhibits one’s freedom to 
choose one’s actions, that is to say, one’s self-determination.  He did not negate these 
collective limits but accepted them for what they are when he attempted to seek his real 
identities.  Perceiving any collective limit as the external causalities, which inevitably 
surround the individual, Nakagami does not give up his self-determination in order to 
create new values through his act of writing depending on the circumstances of the time.  
He did not attempt to end this dichotomy between the individual and the collective 
because he considered that the two poles served as a precondition for each other, and he 
believed that its binary distribution has been continuing and will continue recursively.  
 32
Nakagami viewed this kind of antinomy as a powerful impetus to make him write 
novels permanently.  Thus, Nakagami recognizes that this conflict between his effort to 
establish his self-identity and his emotional dependence on others served as a 
fundamental driving force for him to keep writing.  On these grounds I have come to 
the conclusion that Nakagami’s continuous search for his self-identity through his act of 
writing may be explained by the notion of autonomy which ties in with the limit of 
external causalities; or Nakagami’s ambivalent attitude towards his act of writing may 
account for the freedom of individual, which is closely related to one’s moral 
responsibility.  When he gave a lecture in 1990 two years before his death, Nakagami 
said that this kind of dichotomy which will be repeated permanently may create an 
exciting narrative (monogatari) and should be considered as one of principles of 
literature (bungaku genron 文学原論).1  I would like to examine the manner in which 
his ambivalent attitude towards his act of writing can be associated with the notion of 
autonomy, and investigate how his perception of writing as eternal conflict between self 
and others can be served as one of today’s literary theories. 
 
Writing as mutually exclusive dichotomy: two ambivalent attitudes of Nakagami 
Kenji in writing novels 
 
According to Immanuel Kant, ‘an autonomous will gives itself its law, and is 
distinguished from a heteronomous will whose law is given by the object because of its 
relation to the will.’2   On the other hand, if the will seeks the law that is not 
determined by itself and ‘goes outside itself and seeks this law in a property of any of its 
                                                  
1 Nakagami, ‘Futatsu no kōkyū saron’, Goō (Vol. 4 2006): 81. 
2 Caygill, A Kant Dictionary, 88.  For further details of autonomy of the will/heteronomy of the 
will, see Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, 240–242.   
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objects―the result is always heteronomy.’3 Thus, according to Kant, ‘Autonomy of the 
will is the property [that] the will has of being a law to itself (independently of any 
property of the objects of volition).’4  If ‘natural necessity is a heteronomy of efficient 
causes’ because ‘every effect was only possible according to the law that something else 
gets the efficient cause to act as a cause’, our freedom (of will) is nothing but autonomy 
(of the will)―that is, ‘the property that a will has of being a law to itself’.5  Howard 
Caygill summarizes this as follows: ‘[T]he will must will its own autonomy and that its 
freedom lies in thus being a law to itself’ and this freedom is ‘independent of any 
determination by alien causes and formal/universal in that it does not stand in any 
relation to an object.’6  Caygill points out that Kant’s autonomy of the will that has no 
influence of any heteronomous principle or object has been a controversial topic since 
Hegel.  A few questions now arise: Are our decisions or acts truly made by our free 
will with no effects of causal determination?  Are our acts merely the necessary effects 
of prior causes?  If so, are we not responsible for any actions of ours?  How are we 
preparing to answer these questions?  Is it possible for us to examine the meaning of 
our autonomy or freedom of the will in more concrete terms from the viewpoint of 
literature?  We shall focus our attention on the meaning of our autonomy (or 
self-determination) using the manner in which Nakagami’s major novels, Misaki, 
Karekinada, Chi no hate shijō no toki, which are well known as the Akiyuki trilogy, 
were written.   
Let us begin by looking at Nakagami’s early essays that show his ambivalent attitude 
towards writing novels, and this may present a good example to explain the notion of 
                                                  
3 Kant, Groundwork, 241. 
4 Ibid., 240. 
5 Ibid., 246. 
6 Caygill, A Kant Dictionary, 89. 
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autonomy as a mutually exclusive dichotomy.  After graduating from the local high 
school in Shingū City, Wakayama prefecture, Nakagami Kenji came to Tokyo in 1965 at 
the age of 19.  Although Nakagami’s parents sent him an allowance to prepare to enter 
Waseda University, he spent his days listening to modern jazz at several underground 
cafés in Shinjuku and indulged in alcohol and drugs for a few years.  Moreover, at the 
height of the storm of the student movement in the 1960s, he tentatively attended 
student demonstrations against the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty.  While young 
Nakagami continued his demoralized way of living, he became a member of a literary 
coterie magazine (dōjinshi) called Bungei-shuto (文藝首都 The Capital of Literature) 
and began his writing career contributing his early works.  During this period, 
Nakagami took an avid interest in Nagayama Norio (1949–1997)7, a juvenile delinquent 
who indiscriminately shot and killed several people in 1968.  Nakagami wrote a 
number of essays on this nineteen-year-old criminal.  In two essays entitled ‘Hanzaisha 
Nagayama Norio kara no hōkoku’ (The report from a criminal, Nagayama Norio, 1969) 
and ‘Toki wa nagareru…’ (Time passes…, 1975), Nakagami, having a glimpse of the 
criminal’s harsh childhood, comments that Nagayama could not help resorting to a 
‘greater’ violence (i.e., murder) because his inner self (naimen) was repeatedly assaulted 
by an unidentifiable irrationality inherent in modern society.8  Nakagami explains that 
there is an antagonism between self and others (tasha 他者)―any kind of collective 
                                                  
7 Nagayama Norio is also well known as a writer.  At the time he was in prison, he wrote a few 
bestselling books.  In 1990, he was recommended to become a member of Nihon Bungeika Kyōkai 
(日本文芸家協会 The Japan Writers Association); however, the recommendation was rejected by 
the board.  Nakagami Kenji protested against this decision and resigned from the association with 
Karatani Kōjin and Tsutsui Yasutaka.  Nagayama’s death sentence was finalised in August 1990, 
and he was executed in August 1997.   
8 Nakagami Kenji, ‘Hanzaisha Nagayama Norio kara no hōkoku’ and ‘Toki wa nagareruּּּ’, in NKZ 
Vol.14, 220–242.  The original text was taken from Nakagami Kenji, Tori no yō ni Kemono no yōni, 
Tokyo: Hokuyōsha, 1976. 
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such as a group of other people, community, nation-state or organization―in one’s life.  
According to Nakagami, self and others naturally repel each other, and sometimes 
others violate one’s individual realm, discourage the individual initiative or infringe on 
one’s autonomous freedom.  Nakagami points out that Nagayama could not identify 
himself by using language (kotoba) because he had been constantly violated by others, 
and for that reason he had lost his substance (naibu).  In life, it is sometimes necessary 
for us to stretch the truth in order to smooth our relationship with others.  We 
sometimes tame our ego and attempt to work with a given situation.  However, 
Nagayama could not accommodate himself to other people’s protocol.  He could not 
go along with the crowd as he rejected any kind deception or any superficial 
relationship with others. 
In this sense, Nakagami admits that Nagayama cast his reflection on Nakagami 
himself, by saying that he could have been in the same position as Nagayama.  There 
are many people, who suffer from social alienation like Nagayama Norio; however, 
most of them get along without committing a crime.  Nakagami also experienced a 
sense of alienation from society, and deemed himself to be just one among many 
Nagayama Norios who could not commit a crime.  However, unlike many Nagayama 
Norios, the only reason Nakagami managed not to commit a crime was due to the fact 
that he sought to vent his feelings in the form of writing, that is, ‘kakukoto (書くこと)’.  
For Nakagami, writing was the ultimate, inevitable means to survive the irrational 
violence of dehumanisation in the current modern society.  He goes on to say: 
 
Look at Nagayama Norio as you would look at yourself, in one way or the 
other.  When you have superficial relationships with others and resolve to 
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end those relationships, you have no choice but to resort to the following 
measures: violence (i.e. crime), suicide, religion, insanity or writing 
(kakukoto) [the creative art of writing].  Estranging yourself from having 
superficial relationships with others is the same as being able to enjoy 
exercising your subjective freedom of private rights to the maximum.  As 
for Nagayama, […] social alienation had inhibited his personal autonomy 
from being linked to the law of nature (as if it were mother), and his inner self 
was alienated from others, perhaps even eroded by them.  In order to end his 
self-alienation, Nagayama had no choice but to choose his last resort from 
violence, suicide, religion, insanity or writing.  Nagayama simply chose 
violence, that is, an indiscriminate murder which you, one of many 
Nagayama Norios, could just not choose yet.9 
 
In this excerpt, we can observe Nakagami’s strong determination to become a 
primordial being (kongenteki sonzai) who is able to exercise the freedom of private 
rights in a true sense so that he can end the superficial relationship with others.  Thus, 
Nakagami cannot stand any diplomatic remarks for the sake of respectability and 
attempts to expose one’s hypocrisy or deception as well as his own in order to have 
heart-to-heart communication with other people.  Nakagami regarded kakukoto as his 
last resort as a means to depart from Nagayama’s fate.  In order to terminate this kind 
of deception (the superficial relationship with others), Nakagami had no choice but to 
choose his last resort from the ultimate options of contemporary society: violence, 
suicide, religion, insanity or writing.   
                                                  
9  Nakagami, ‘Hanzaisha Nagayama Norio kara no hōkoku’, 228–229.  Please note that all 
translations are my own unless otherwise indicated. 
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Thus, Nakagami evaluates the motives behind Nagayama’s crime in a positive 
manner.  In contrast, however, when Nagayama Norio wrote his memoirs (shuki 手記) 
in prison five years later, Nakagami proposed a completely contradictory view.  This 
time Nakagami severely criticised Nagayama’s memoirs on the belief that Nagayama 
depicted himself as a victim of the state, the society and the laws/system of the modern 
nation-state.  In his memoirs, Nagayama blamed his act of murdering four people on 
his wretched, poverty-filled upbringing.  He wrote that his poor living conditions 
drove him to committing crime.  Nakagami could not tolerate the fact that Nagayama, 
who chose writing, attributed the responsibility for his crime to the modern nation-state 
or society and not to his own actions.   
As we have observed, on the one hand, Nakagami positively recognises that his 
motive behind writing is substantially comparable in function to the motives that set 
Nagayama on the path to his crime.  On the other hand, he ultimately rejected his 
findings upon ascertaining the cause of Nagayama’s crime.  What is interesting to me 
here is the contradiction in Nakagami’s attitude towards Nagayama’s actions, that is to 
say, there is a paradoxical view in Nakagami’s positive evaluation of Nagayama’s 
criminal act and his adverse criticism of the latter’s act of writing a memoir.  How 
should we estimate Nakagami’s relative evaluations of Nagayama? 
 
Writing in perpetuity: Writing for aspiring to the Avici Hell (mugen jigoku 無間地
獄) 
 
Nakagami’s ambivalent attitude towards his act of writing generates an eternal conflict 
that he describes as follows:  
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Let’s assume that there is a dichotomy between the individual, a Nakagami 
Kenji (yui’itsusha Nakagami Kenji 唯一者中上健次) and the collective, 
many Nakagami Kenjis (musū no Nakagami Kenji 無数の中上健次).  I 
put this binary frame on the site of writing and attempt to cast this kind of 
dichotomy into words.  Others called readers read my writings and they 
may point out that what ‘I (the individual, Nakagami)’ am thinking about 
can be found everywhere (zara ni arukoto ざらにあること).  Yes, it 
surely is.  There is not much difference of opinion among people.  Many 
Nakagami Kenjis always tease me about my writings.  They look on my 
writings as commonplace and warn me that language itself may fight back 
against what I am writing if we do not give much thought to it.  But, ‘I’, 
the individual Nakagami always think that my mental bruises should be 
only mine.  Many Nakagamis cannot just say that my bruises are not a 
big deal.  To sum up, writing something using language (kotoba) 
connotes two contrasting attitudes.  On the one hand, it connotes my 
desire to act with one heart and mind with everyone (tasha, others), or my 
wish that everyone understands me perfectly.  I tell myself, “Hey, you!  
Please understand me, stark-naked, from the ends of my viscera to the 
secret parts of my sexual desire and hold me tight.”   On the other hand, 
at the same time, there is a firm repellent feeling expressing that “I am 
what I am wherever I go” and rejects an identification with anyone.  This 
dichotomy [between the establishment of self-identity and the integration 
with others] resides in the realm of ‘I’ and this is one of the major factors 
that make me write [novels] perpetually.  This binary frame connotes my 
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own jeremiad (uramitsurami, 恨みつらみ), a state of abject helplessness 
between life and death and the like.  With this kind of dichotomy 
between self and others in Nagayama’s mind, I believe that he said “No!” 
to the structure of modern self (jiga 自我) or a déraciné that modern man 
is said to possess.  I wish to keep denying them, too.10   
 
Here, we can observe two contrasting desires/attitudes of Nakagami in his writing.  
One is the intense craving for the unity of his self and others.  The other is the denial 
of any collusion between his self and others, that is to say, the establishment of his 
self-identity.  For Nakagami, these two attitudes towards writing manifest themselves 
as the strong identification with others and the self-autonomy.  Two attitudes coexist, 
confronting or alternating each other, and this dichotomy lasts forever.  Two poles are 
never unified into one on the site of writing permanently.  Nakagami considers that 
this endless dichotomy between the two became the prime force of his act of writing.  
Nakagami obstinately asks himself a question: “What does writing mean to me?”  He 
goes on to say: 
 
Why am I writing?  For a new application of Japanese literature?  This 
is all crap!  […] I want to destroy everything. […] I would like to build a 
world like Yoknapatawpha County [like William Faulkner had built].  I 
don’t need an everlasting happiness.  I don’t need God’s help.  As 
Nagayama Norio’s crime [the serial murders] aspires to the Avici Hell, I 
                                                  
10 Nakagami, ‘Hanzaisha Nagayama Norio kara no hōkoku’, 232. 
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will keep writing and aspiring to the same ceaseless hell.11 
 
In this early essay, Nakagami defines Nagayama’s crime against all the irrationalities of 
modern Japan (or more concretely, others who violate Nagayama’s self) as ‘the reverse 
crime against modern society (gyaku-hanzai 逆犯罪).12  Nakagami admits that his 
prime mover for writing coincides with an impulse that causes Nagayama to commit 
this kind of reverse crime.  Moreover, Nakagami calls Nagayama’s serial murders ‘the 
Avici Hell’ which means ceaseless hell and he declares that he dares to aspire to this 
ceaseless hell to write permanently.   
As we have seen before, for Nakagami, writing (kakukoto) can be found in the 
dichotomy between the establishment of self-identity and the collusive relation between 
the self and others.  Because Nakagami regards this dichotomy as an everlasting 
confrontation that cannot be resolved by means of a synthesis, this dichotomy between 
the two becomes a factor that leads him to the ceaseless hell of writing perpetually.  
Writing is also his last resort in order to escape from the fate of many Nakagamis.  In 
order to terminate the superficial relationship with others, Nakagami has to employ his 
only means from the ultimate options of contemporary society: violence, suicide, 
religion, insanity or “to write”.  Nakagami cannot tolerate being self-deceiving in 
dealing with people for the sake of artificial socialization.  For Nakagami at the age of 
23, writing is his final, inevitable choice to estrange himself from having superficial 
relationships with others and this act goes on forever.   
 
                                                  
11 Ibid.,236.  For a discussion of difference between Nakagami and Faulkner, see Mats Karlsson, 
The Kumano Saga of Nakagami Kenji, Edsbruk: Akademitryck, 2001. 
12 Ibid., 223. 
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Paradox in the literature of Nakagami Kenji 
 
When Nakagami wrote the essay entitled ‘The report from a criminal, Nagayama Norio’ 
in 1968/1969, it became clear that Nakagami perceived the mutually exclusive 
dichotomy between self and others and recognized it as an endless well for his literature.  
Then, how does this perception of endless dichotomy manifest itself among the major 
works of Nakagami Kenji?  It seems to me that Nakagami’s texts are loaded with 
antithetic concepts or paradoxical facts characterizing his novels.  Tsushima Yūko, who 
made her literary debut in the same decade as Nakagami, made an interesting comment 
on this matter during a discussion at the 2004 Kumano University Seminar (2004 
Kumano Daigaku Seminā) in Shingū as follows:  
 
It is hard to describe it, but I think we can find many contradictions 
(mujun) in all the works of Nakagami Kenji.  They are not resultant 
contradictions but something like self-contradictions that were brought 
about by himself aggressively or subjectively (kōgekiteki mujun 攻撃的
矛盾  or jikakutekina jiko-mujun 自覚的な自己矛盾).  Therefore, I 
presume that it may be very difficult for literary critics to consolidate these 
contradictions into words.  There are always two contrary ideas/states in 
his works, and the two poles keep engaging in a fierce clash and never 
coalesce with each other.  I think Nakagami produced all his works 
through this kind of dichotomous world-view.  For this reason, his works 
reject any kind of commentaries given by literary critics. [ … ]   
Immediately after he improvises an idea in his mind, he denies what he 
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has just mentioned.  This attitude makes his idea contradict itself.  […] 
On the other hand, I think this is a great charm of his fiction.13 
 
In this excerpt, Tsushima acutely points out the contradictions that frequently appear in 
the novels of Nakagami Kenji and the fact that Nakagami himself was aware of it.  She 
gives the favourable view that these contradictions become a positive attribute of 
Nakagami’s works though it is very difficult to describe it in lucid terms.  Similarly, 
the literary critic, Satō Yasutomo clarifies that there is a sentence pattern that frequently 
appears in Nakagami’s major works: “It’s X.  No, that is not only X but also Y.” or 
“It’s X.  No, it is not X; rather Y.” (X da. Iya, Y da.  Xだ。いや、Yだ。)14  The 
following are a few random examples I found in Karekinada: 
 
体の大きなその男蝿の王龍造がここに居る。その子の秀雄がそこに
居る。秀雄の兄ではない。いや腹違いの兄だという気持ちは秀雄と
町で出あう秋幸の心のどこかにあったはずだった。[Emphasis mine] 
Karada no ōkina sono otoko hae no ō Ryūzō ga koko ni iru. Sono ko no 
Hideo ga soko ni iru. Hideo no ani dewa nai. Iya, harachigai no ani da to 
iu kimochi wa Hideo to machi de deau Akiyuki no kokoro no dokoka ni 
atta hazu datta. 
 
The big man, Lord of the Flies, Ryūzō, is here.  His son, Hideo is over 
there.  Akiyuki is not Hideo’s elder brother.  But, he is in a way.  He is 
Hideo’s half-brother born of a different mother.  This sentiment surely 
existed somewhere in his heart whenever Akiyuki came across Hideo in 
                                                  
13  Tsushima, Symposium: ‘Nakagami Kenji to kindai bungaku no owari’, Waseda bungaku 
(November 2004), p.40. 
14 Satō Yasutomo, ‘Chi no hate kara no tegami’ (地の果てからの手紙), Goō (Vol. 3 2005): 
280–283. 
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this town.15 
 
 
土は秋幸だった。いや、土だけでなく土をあぶる日、日を受けた木、
梢の葉、息をする物すべて秋幸だった。[Emphasis mine] 
Tsuchi wa Akiyuki data. Iya, tsuchi dake denaku tsuchi o aburu hi, hi o 
uketa ki, kozue no ha, iki o surumono subete Akiyuki datta.   
 
The soil is Akiyuki.  No, that’s not all of it.  It’s not only the soil but 
the sun warms the soil, the trees glow in the sun, the illuminated leaves.  
All living creatures manifest themselves in Akiyuki.16  
 
 
郁男と秀雄を殺した。仕方がなかった。二人を殺さなければ、秋幸
が殺された。秋幸はそう思った。いや、秋幸は、秀雄が、あの時、
郁男に殺された秋幸自身であり、実際には首を吊って自死する郁男
のような気がした。[Emphasis mine] 
Ikuo to Hideo o koroshita. Shikata ga nakatta. Futari o korosanakereba, 
Akiyuki ga korosareta. Akiyuki wa sō omotta. Iya, Akiyuki wa Hideo ga, 
anotoki, Ikuo ni korosareta Akiyuki jishin de ari, jissaini wa kubi o tsutte 
jishi suru Ikuo no yōna ki ga shita. 
 
Akiyuki killed Ikuo and Hideo.  It was impossible to do otherwise.  If 
Akiyuki did not kill them, Akiyuki could be killed.  That was the only 
way he could think of.  No, not only that!  Akiyuki felt that Hideo 
could have been Akiyuki who might be killed by Ikuo, and also Hideo 
                                                  
15 Nakagami, Karekinada, in NKZ Vol.3, 331. 
16 Ibid., 376. 
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could have been Ikuo who had killed himself in reality.17  
 
It will be clear from these examples that Nakagami set out two paradoxical facts at the 
same time in Karekinada using the word “iya”.  The point I wish to emphasize here is 
that these two facts are always mutually complementary and the antagonism between 
the two will never become unified in Nakagami’s fiction.  Satō also argues that, by 
using “iya”, Nakagami may backtrack and correct what he wrote earlier, implying, 
“Wait a minute, that’s not all of it!”  Immediately after he proposes a certain 
perspective, he is starting to add a different dimension with “iya”.  In other words, 
“iya” can be used to alternate his idea at the moment of his remark by adding to what 
he has just said.  Satō describes this as something like Nakagami’s conjuration that 
will not make him stand still in the same place forever.18   
Eve Zimmerman also found a paradox in the fate of the main characters, ‘six young 
men of the Nakamoto clan, outcasts of the roji (alleyways) of Shingū’, who appeared in 
Sennen no yuraku (A Thousand Years of Pleasure, 1982). 
 
The explanation for the early death of each Nakamoto is as simple as the 
blood that flows through their bodies: sacred but stemming from an 
impure source, this potent combination of opposites can only support life 
for a short time.  In fact the narrative of Sennen no yuraku flows in and 
around a central paradox―that the blood of the Nakamotos is sacred 
because it is thoroughly impure (“jibun no naka ni nagareru sono yodonda, 
iya sore yue ni kiyoraka na chi”).  The power of paradox lies in its ability 
to upset the categories by which we organize our world.19 [Emphasis 
mine] 
                                                  
17 Ibid., 459. 
18 Satō Yasutomo, ‘Chi no hate kara no tegami’, 283. 
19 Zimmerman, ‘In the Trap of Words’, 134. 
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 Thus, Zimmerman also clearly recognizes the paradox in the fiction of Nakagami and 
says that ‘[Nakagami’s] paradox makes every category interchangeable and rational 
ordering of the world impossible’.20 
We have observed some examples of contradictions/paradoxes that frequently 
appeared in Nakagami’s major works, Karekinada and Sennen no yuraku.  Let us now 
look into how Nakagami himself perceive the paradoxical nature characterizing his 
fiction.  On this matter, Nakagami made a very important comment in his lecture in 
1990.  Nakagami established a lecture course open to the public known as Kumano 
Daigaku (Kumano University) in 1990.21  He started its preparatory course in Shingū 
city in 1989 and commenced a reading club to read Inochi to katachi―Nihon bi no 
minamoto o saguru (いのちとかたち―日本美の源を探る―, Anima and Form―
Search for the origin of Japanese beauty―) written by a literary critic, Yamamoto 
Kenkichi (1907–1988).22  During a meeting held in April 1990, Nakagami talked 
about a tug-of-war among the Fujiwara clan in the Heian period and indicated that there 
are two conflicting concepts, tamashii (たましひ／魂) represented by The Tale of 
Genji and zae (ざえ／才) represented by The Pillow Book, in Japanese classical 
literature.  Nakagami explains briefly that while ‘tamashii’ is something that comes 
from one’s spontaneous spiritual nature, ‘zae’ is something that is associated with our 
creative acts of literary forms or esprit.  We shall make no further inquiry into the 
                                                  
20 Ibid., 135. 
21 The summer seminar of Kumano Daigaku continues to be held annually in Shingū City by 
volunteers, mainly Nakagami’s classmates and childhood friends.  I have been attending the 
seminar since 2004. 
22 The lectures from this meeting have been compiled in a book entitled Nakagami Kenji to yomu 
“Inochi to katachi” in 2004.  See, Takazawa Shūji (ed.), Nakagami Kenji to yomu “Inochi to 
katachi” (中上健次と読む『いのちとかたち』), Tokyo: Kawade shobō shinsha, 2004. 
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these terms ‘tamashii’ and ‘zae’; to argue this point would carry us onto another 
discussion from the purpose of this chapter.  Nakagami continues to lead us to his 
main point that we can find this kind of dichotomy not only in Japanese classical 
literature but also, arts, society, politics, in every aspects of our life.  What Nakagami 
emphasizes here is that this binary frame will never be dialectically reconciled.  He 
stresses that it continues perpetually.  He gives the example of the battle between 
Rangda and Barong that appeared in traditional Balinese mythology and explains the 
endless dichotomy as follows: 
 
Yes, that form indicates just what I explained before, the eternal battle 
between Rangda and Barong in Bali.  They keep fighting an indecisive 
battle, sometimes winning, sometimes losing, the battle is never over.  
Rangda can never live in concord with Barong, and thus the endgame of 
this battle is spinning out endlessly.   
So, when all is said and done, the dichotomy between the two (nikō 
tairitsu 二項対立) will repeat its pattern ultimately.  Each end will never 
win or lose.  Two ends will never be reconciled to each other.  They just 
reiterate their own structure forever.  And I think this eternal conflict can 
be considered as one of the principles of literature (bungaku genron 文学
原論).  This kind of endless dichotomy should be the most interesting 
part or the ultimate pleasure [of literary creation].23 
 
As we can observe here, Nakagami regards the dichotomy as a never-ending binary 
                                                  
23 Nakagami, ‘Futatsu no kōkyū saron’, 81. 
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frame.  He further postulates that this eternal dichotomy operates to generate fiction 
and develop it.  Nakagami sees the eternal dichotomy between the two as something 
like a rule of game or what he calls, the archetype of monogatari (物語 narrative).  
He explains that this endless dichotomy as a narrative rule heats up the set of moves 
with regard to characters in the narrative domain and entertains the readers of the 
fiction.  The never-ending battle between a hero and a villain; the war in the most 
archetypal love story, Romeo and Juliet, which is being waged between the Capulet and 
the Montague; the long time rivalry between two grand champions in sumo; these 
examples will suffice to show that the eternal dichotomy works as a stimulant to make a 
narrative more exciting.  Nakagami, however, warns us that, at the same instant, this 
kind of endless dichotomy has a strong effect on our perspective and traps us in a 
certain narrative domain.  He emphasizes that if we make good use of the 
dichotomous nature that functions as a vitalization of monogatari, it functions as a 
facilitator of an exciting monogatari; but if we do not, it turns into something that 
confines us to the world of fantasy.  This perception of the eternal dichotomy as the 
apparatus that generates an exciting monogatari reminds us again of Nakagami’s 
ambivalent perception of writing.  In order to terminate the superficial relationship 
with others and establish his own real identity, Nakgami had been at pains to seek his 
autonomous selfhood through the act of writing.   
However, his search for autonomy seems never to end because he sees the act of 
writing as the eternal dichotomy between the two actions: self-identification and 
dependence on others.  For this reason, he declares that he would keep writing 
aspiring to the same ceaseless hell as Nagayama Norio did when he repeated his crime 
of murder, that is, the Avici Hell.  Combined with Tsushima and Satō’s points of view 
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on the dichotomous nature of Nakagami’s fiction, we may summarize Nakagami’s 
ambivalent attitude towards the act of writing as a continuing will to search for his 
autonomy which vacillates between two desires: desire to search for his own identity 
and desire to integrate himself with others.  Having his consciousness that every being 
is in an eternal dichotomy between the individual and the collective, it would appear to 
me that Nakagami continues to seek his autonomy through writing for ever. 
 
Maruyama Masao’s two autonomies: Personal autonomy and social autonomy 
 
Let us then consider how we can relate Nakagami Kenji’s continuous literary act as a 
source of a new value judgment on the notion of autonomy.  At this juncture, it is 
relevant to regard the notion of autonomy developed by a Japanese political scientist 
and political theorist, Maruyama Masao (1914–1996).  In an Asahi newspaper article 
dated 25 March 2005, Ōe Kenzaburō24 quoted Maruyama Masao’s remarks on the 
definition of freedom (jiyū) from his article, ‘Nihon ni okeru jiyū ishiki no keisei to 
tokushitsu’ ( 日 本 に お け る 自 由 意 識 の 形 成 と 特 質  The Formation and 
Characteristics of Liberal Consciousness in Japan), written soon after the end of World 
War II.25  Ōe believes that it is necessary to re-evaluate Maruyama’s definition of 
freedom, which is synonymous with personal autonomy, that is, ‘the ability of logical 
self-definition (risei-teki jiko kettei 理性的自己決定)’26 rather than freedom resulting 
from the elimination of man’s environmental constraints (kōsoku no ketsujo 拘束の欠
如).  Maruyama asserts that there is more to freedom than that which enables the 
                                                  
24 Ōe, ‘Tsutaeru kotoba, Jiyū wa “risei-teki na jiko kettei”’, Asahi Shinbun, 25 March 2005, p.10. 
25 Maruyama, Maruyama Masao zenshū dai 3 kan, 153–160.  Original in Teikoku daigaku shinbun, 
August 1947. 
26 Kersten, Democracy in Postwar Japan, 103. 
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satisfaction of human desire.  He emphasises that freedom should be identified as an 
autonomous ‘action on the part of value-consistent individuals’ who assume 
responsibility for it. 27   What does the notion of personal autonomy posed by 
Maruyama over half a century ago mean to Ōe or Japanese literature today?  Why did 
Ōe, one of the most influential contemporary Japanese writers, demonstrate the 
necessity of having the ability of logical self-definition proposed by Maruyama Masao 
who is eminent as a political theorist?   
As early as 1986, Ōe had already criticised young Japanese intellectuals and literati of 
the 1970s and the 1980s who excessively utilised cultural theories based on 
post-structuralism and post-modernism, for instance, the works of Barthes, Foucault, 
Derrida, Lacan, Kristeva and the like.28  He deplores the fact that new theories were 
not re-examined in the Japanese context; as a result, it is observed that the Japanese 
intellectuals were/have been unable to create a cultural theory of their own.  
Furthermore, Ōe describes the status of Japanese literature in the 1980s as a 
predicament and lamented the fact that there was an absence of an active attitude 
(nōdōteki na shisei 能動的な姿勢), that is, the active attitude maintained by an 
individual who is involved in his/her surroundings such as family, society and universe, 
among contemporary Japanese writers.  In addition, he stated that Japanese literature 
had lost the power that had enabled it to create a new model of human beings with a 
vision for the future.  Writers such as Murakami Haruki were unsparingly criticised for 
their passive attitudes and were branded as members of the sub-cultures that were mere 
reflections of Tokyo’s vast consumer culture.29  It is in this context that Ōe referred to 
                                                  
27 Ibid.,102. 
28 Ōe, ‘Japan’s Dual Identity: A Writer’s Dilemma’, in Japan, The Ambiguous, and Myself, 59–103. 
29 It must be debatable whether the works of Murakami Haruki should be branded as ‘sub-cultures’.  
We need mention here only why we need to go into the details about the notion of autonomy 
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the necessity of an active attitude as a personal autonomy.  Living in an age coloured 
and toned by the legacy of post-modernism such as the ‘mass consumer culture’ and the 
lack of the ‘I’ notion or autonomy, Ōe sounded the alarm to alert us that this is the time 
to reconsider the issue of ‘autonomy’ or subjective freedom.  As we have observed in 
the previous section, when Nakagami questioned himself what writing meant to him, he 
perceived writing as his endless attempt to seek his own identity with the awareness of a 
mutually exclusive dichotomy between self and others.  Though Ōe Kenzaburō 
lamented that he could not find the active attitude which I consider a form of autonomy 
in the works of contemporary Japanese writers, it seems to me that Nakagami’s literary 
works between late 1970s and early 1980s that reflected his endless attempt as above 
may provide a clue to perceive the notion of autonomy that Ōe searched for.  With 
these points in mind, let us now attempt to extend the observation of Nakagami Kenji’s 
ambivalent attitudes found in his act of writing into the notion of autonomy proposed by 
Maruyama Masao. 
  Being dissatisfied with Japanese Marxists’ unidimensional way of viewing existence 
and value,30 Maruyama’s notion of autonomy is derived from his earlier study on John 
Locke and Fukuzawa Yukichi.31  Maruyama makes a comparison between Locke’s 
interpretation of freedom and those proposed by Thomas Hobbes, Sir Robert Filmer and 
others.  Whereas Maruyama views Hobbes’s freedom being a ‘passive version of 
freedom’ as the absence of external constraint, he sees Locke’s freedom as a more active 
or ‘positive freedom’ which ‘included in its meaning “a more positive, rational capacity 
                                                                                                                                                  
proposed by Maruyama Masao. 
30 See, for example, Inoue Kiyoshi, Tennō no sensō sekinin, Tokyo: Gendai hyōronsha, 1975. 
31 Kersten, Democracy in Postwar Japan, 10–105.  See also Victor Koschmann, Revolution and 
Subjectivity in Postwar Japan, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1996, 
17–193. 
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for self-determination”’.32  Influenced by Locke’s interpretation of freedom which 
‘stressed the rational, active individual as its vehicle’, 33  Maruyama develops his 
perspective which emphasized individuals who have democratic subjectivity (shutaisei) 
and personal autonomy which has to be understood as a form of self-limitation, 
especially as self-legislation.  This is also defined by Victor Koschmann as follows: 
‘By raising the concept of “freedom” from a passive perception of the “absence of 
restraint” to a positive, constructive concept of self-legislation ― the subjective 
freedom by which people impose norms upon themselves ―’.34   
Koschmann illustrates well how Maruyama finds a complementary relation between 
the individual and the state in the work of Fukuzawa Yukichi.35  Koschmann points out 
that in Maruyama’s short essay on Fukuzawa, which was written during World War II 
(1943), Maruyama poses a question of ‘both the nature of the Japanese state and the 
degree of autonomy displayed by people’, as can be seen in the following quotation: 
 
 [U]nless the state is such that each member of the nation feels in close touch 
with it, makes it his own, and is conscious of its course as his own destiny, 
how will the state be able to maintain sturdy independence under trying 
international circumstances. [···]  Fukuzawa saw that what was missing 
above all from Japan’s traditional consciousness was the spirit of autonomous 
personality [···] [H]e could never conceive of national independence in the 
absence of individual autonomy.36 
                                                  
32 Koschmann, Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan, 171. 
33 Kersten, Democracy in Postwar Japan, 103. 
34 Koschmann, Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan, 171. 
35 Ibid., 178–189. 
36 Ibid., 178–179.  Koschman has scrutinized the issue of subjectivity in both prewar and postwar 
Japan including the issue of how the notion of subject had been treated by Marxist theorists.  As the 
fuller study of the genealogical study of subjectivity in modern Japan lies outside the scope of this 
thesis, I shall make no further discussion on ‘subjectivity’ at this point.  See also Maruyama Masao, 
‘Fukuzawa ni okeru chitsujo to ningen’, in Matsuzawa Hiroaki and Uete Michiari (eds), Maruyama 
Masao shū, dai 2 kan, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1996, 219–222.   
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 This perception of the complementary relation between the individual and the state laid 
paradigmatically the firm foundation of Maruyama’s later works during the early 
postwar period, which were relevant to the concept of autonomy.  Rikki Kersten 
lucidly summarises Maruyama’s perception of autonomy in the early postwar period.  
She states that Maruyama points out the fact that ‘democracy is a system founded on 
paradox’ and there always exist ‘difficulties involved in reconciling the individual and 
the collective in post-war Japan’.  Thus, Kersten distinguishes between two types of 
autonomy advanced by Maruyama: ‘personal autonomy’, which is attained by the 
individual whose action carries ‘the principle of self-regulation, or responsibility as the 
corollary of his/her action’,37 and ‘social autonomy’, which refers to ‘a pluralistic 
society in which multi-dimensional individuals preserve their mobility in society’.38  
This characteristic complementarity of autonomy is best expressed by Kersten in the 
following words: 
 
Essentially, successful social autonomy was not possible unless it was 
premised on personal autonomy.  However, the affinity between social 
autonomy and the collective threatened to violate personal autonomy.  
Conversely, personal autonomy only fulfilled a democratic role when it 
connected with the public realm via active social autonomy.39 
 
Maruyama also stresses that Fukuzawa found a basis of argumentation in the relativity 
of value judgments.  Koschmann summarizes this well: 
 
                                                  
37 Kersten, Democracy in Postwar Japan, 102–104. 
38 Ibid., 3–4. 
39 Ibid., 4. 
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Fukuzawa virtually never makes a value judgment in the abstract and 
never treats value as an entity fixed a priori.  His perceptions, therefore, 
must always be understood to be conditional.  Maruyama expresses this 
by saying that Fukuzawa’s statements always need to be taken as if they 
were “in brackets” (kakkotsuki 括弧付き).  That is, they are valid only 
within the limits of a particular situation or point of view, and should not 
be taken as universally applicable or absolute.40 
 
Koschmann adds that, at the same time, Maruyama never views Fukuzawa as ‘merely a 
thoroughgoing relativist’ who does not translate one’s ideas into action.   
 
Fukuzawa emphasized that one should always establish a “basis of 
argumentation”―take an autonomous position towards the world in order 
to grasp its significance.  Maruyama says that Fukuzawa was saved from 
“aimless opportunism” by an inner “truth principle” that provided the 
degree of detachment sufficient to allow an independent judgment.  Yet, 
according to Maruyama, Fukuzawa never grounded this principle in any 
metaphysical system.  He “certainly did not reject the notion of objective 
truth; however, he denied that this ‘true principle’ confronts us as an 
already fixed and stationary existence.  Rather, his basic way of thinking 
was that it assumed specific form only within a particular situation.”41 
 
Koschmann cites a good example from Maruyama’s 1947 essay, ‘Fukuzawa Yukichi no 
tetsugaku’ (The philosophy of Fukuzawa Yukichi)42 and explains how ‘Maruyama’s 
emphasis shifts from the relativity of value judgments to the quality of the subjectivity 
that is capable of making such judgments.’  The significant part is translated by 
Koschmann: 
                                                  
40 Koschmann, Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan, 182. 
41 Ibid., 182. 
42 I also refer to the original from Maruyama, ‘Fukuzawa Yukichi no tetsugaku’, in Matsuzawa 
Hiroaki and Uete Michiari (eds), Maruyama Masao shū, dai 3 kan, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995, 
163–204. 
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 [For Fukuzawa] only a tough, subjective spirit can resist treating values as 
fixed a priori, and instead constantly allow them to be fluid and relative to 
the concrete situation.  While assessing each particular circumstance, and 
establishing an approach and a standard for action according to that 
assessment, it is also necessary to avoid becoming caught in a single 
perspective; one constantly has to maintain the spiritual composure 
necessary to rise above the existing conditions, and to adjust to the 
formation of a new situation.  In contrast, a spirit poor in such 
subjectivity becomes firmly rooted in a particular situation and set in one 
view, and as a result abstractly absolutizes a single value standard that is 
actually bound to a particular context.43 
 
The point I wish to stress from these excerpts is that the concept of autonomy which 
Maruyama found in Fukuzawa’s various writings such as Bunmeiron no gairyaku (An 
Outline of a Theory of Civilization) shows two contrasting autonomies between the 
individual and the collective.  Here, personal autonomy is premised on the active 
operation of social autonomy and vice versa.  The two autonomies are premised on 
each other’s active operations.  For this reason, one’s autonomous decision-making can 
always be relative to the concrete situation at the time.  It will never be fixed on the 
idea, which is a priori.  When the autonomy that Maruyama saw in Fukuzawa’s 
philosophy operates actively, it is possible for an individual to exercise his/her freedom 
to create new values depending on the given situation at the time, getting actively 
involved with his/her collective such as family, firm, society, social organization or the 
nation-state and the like.  Koschmann also explains that ‘as the capacity to make 
judgments according to standards that arise in relation to lived, historical situations, it 
                                                  
43 Koschmann, Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan, 183. 
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implies tireless engagement with a historically changing environment.’44   
Viewed in this light, we notice that there is an interesting analogy between 
Nakagami’s ambivalent attitude towards his act of writing and Maruyama’s relative 
discussion on the discourse of autonomy in postwar Japan.  We may recall that 
Nakagami finds an eternal conflict between the individual (the establishment of 
self-identity) and the collective (the integration with others) when he writes his works.  
Nakagami’s act of writing is seen as a means to establish his autonomous selfhood, 
rejecting others or the law/system of the collective while clinging to them.  For this 
reason, he regards writing as something endless like a ceaseless hell.  We can observe 
here that his act (of writing) like a ceaseless hell is analogous with Maruyama’s notion 
of autonomy: one’s continuous attempt described as ‘tireless engagement’ to ‘make new 
judgments with a historically changing environment’, that is, the mutual exclusive 
dichotomy between the individual and the collective, which functions as an apparatus 
for a precondition to each other.  Of course, Nakagami’s ambivalent attitude towards 
writing and Maruyama’s notion on autonomy are not the same, however what I wish to 
suggest in this dissertation is that the two paradoxical notions such as autonomy and 
dependence, the individual and the collective, self and others, can be seen as not only 
mutually exclusive opposites but also complementary opposites.  In this 
complementary dichotomy, each end can be served as the other’s precondition.  The 
individual should be aware of the importance of being a member of the collective, with 
its respect for national or cultural attachment, the commitment for moral responsibility 
and so forth.  Conversely, any collective that consists of individuals should recognize 
the value of freedom to choose one’s action, personal autonomy and so forth.  In the 
                                                  
44 Ibid. 
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sight of complementary dichotomy, one’s decision-making can always be in motion, 
fluid and relative according to its historically changing environments rather than held in 
the solid, absolute stasis.  In my reading of Nakagami’s essays and fiction, it may 
safely be assumed that the points made so far apply in principle to any dichotomy 
between the two as well as Nakagami’s ambivalent attitude towards the act of writing. 
Let us think back to what Nakagami says about Nagayama Norio’s memoirs.  
Nakagami severely criticises Nagayama’s act of writing in the belief that he depicted 
himself as a victim of the state, the society and the laws/system of the modern 
nation-state.  Nakagami questions him critically: ‘If you want to use our language 
(kotoba) as your last resort, it should at least be utilised to penetrate into your inner self! 
(Semete soono kotoba wa uchigawa ni sasattekure. せめて、その言葉は内側に刺さっ
てくれ)’45  In this excerpt, Nakagami criticises Nagayama, whose kotoba employs the 
logic of the nation-state (kokka no ronpō) that Nagayama ironically regarded as his 
enemy.  For Nakagami, on the one hand, his own writing operates to oppose the logic 
of the nation-state or the superficial relationship with others, which encroaches on one’s 
private sphere.  For this reason, his writing operates as ‘the creator of value’, which is 
maintained only by autonomous individuals who bear ‘the ability of logical 
self-definition’ and assume ethical responsibility for their actions.  But simultaneously, 
his writing entails the risk of falling into the totalitarian inclination or centralization.  
Thus, when Nagayama Norio justifies his crime by means of writing and thus evades his 
responsibility, Nakagami dismisses his act of writing as a deception.  When Nagayama 
states that it was inevitable for him to murder four people because of his poverty, 
Nakagami questions him unsparingly as to the manner in which he made a way into his 
                                                  
45 Nakagami, ‘Toki wa nagareruּּּ’, 239–242. 
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inner self and evaded his moral responsibility.46 
Nakagami points out that people possess a kind of guilty conscience towards social 
dropouts because people who are defined by the notion of the nation-state or the 
law/system do not take any measures against dehumanization caused by the modern 
nation-state and turn a blind eye to it, and this guilty conscience arouses people to 
delude themselves into believing that social dropouts are something formidable,47 and 
finally this thought evolves into a fantastic ideology or rather, the sense of 
discrimination as an invented system or paradigm of modern society, what he calls, the 
invented monogatari (narrative).  He denounces this kind of fantastic ideology, saying, 
‘Language is deceptive! (Kotoba wa uso da!).’  If people use this kind of delusive 
language, there is simply no truth.  It is easy for us to blame the nation-state, what 
Benedict Anderson had called an ‘imagined community’.  Nakagami incisively 
criticizes Nagayama who blames the modern nation-state or contemporary society for 
the violence of alienation or poverty but does not scrutinize his act of violence.  As it 
turned out, Nakagami realises that what Nagayama told of his experiences may be 
another ‘imagined’, invented monogatari where Nagayama can live in peace and 
reiterate constantly.  Thus, the invented monogatari acts like ‘canon’ that appears as if 
it existed a priori as soon as it was produced and is re-produced endlessly.  Thus, while 
Nakagami began to formulate his deep scepticism towards language (kotoba) during the 
early years of his career, language can be ironically his only reliable last resort as a 
means to terminate his self-deception that originated from his superficial relationship 
with others.  Here, it seems reasonable to suppose that Nakagami’s act of writing 
                                                  
46 Ibid. 
47 This explanation is more fully developed in Mark Morris, ‘Gossip and History: Nakagami, 
Faulkner, García Márques’, in Japan Forum (8:1 1996), 35–50.  
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appears to be two kinds of autonomies, namely, the autonomy of the individual who 
continues to make new judgments according to the concrete situations on the spot and 
the autonomy of the collective that allows individuals to reject ‘true principle’ made by 
others (the law/system of the nation-state) as ‘an already fixed and stationary existence’.  
For both Nakagami and Maruyama, the dichotomy between the two coexists 
complementarily and eternally. 
 
Autonomy and responsibility: Karatani Kōjin’s interpretation of Kantian 
autonomy 
 
Let us now attempt to look deeper into the notion of autonomy that was characterized 
by its complementary aspect through the examination of Immanuel Kant’s concept of 
freedom and responsibility.  Karatani Kōjin reinterprets Kantian ethics relating to 
autonomous freedom and responsibility in his book, Transcritique On Kant and Marx 
(2003).  He explains that ‘when one considers a certain thing to be universal, it is 
always merely based upon historically engendered common sense’, that is, the 
‘community’s codes’ (kyōdōtai no kisoku 共 同 体 の 規 則 ).  If morality is 
conceptualised from such a ‘community’s codes’, then it is heteronomous (taritsu-teki 
他律的) and not autonomous (jiritsu-teki 自律的).  Let us once again return to the 
discussion of Nakagami Kenji’s attitude towards Nagayama Norio.  When Nagayama 
Norio composed his memoirs in prison, he recorded his life, depicting himself as a 
victim of the state, society and its laws/system.  Nakagami considers Nagayama’s 
narrative, which attempted to evade the responsibility for his crime, to be spurious.  He 
may have instinctively perceived that there is no difference between Nagayama’s act of 
writing and the system of the modern nation-state, civil society or ‘community’s codes’, 
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which violate the autonomous freedom of individuals.  This is because, in this context, 
Nagayama treats morality as something that exists a priori and that transcends 
individuals.  Once Nagayama begins justifying himself in his crime using language 
supported by this morality, that is, the logic of the nation-state, his autonomy is vested 
in the ‘community’s codes’.   
Let’s recall that Maruyama’s stress on Fukuzawa Yukichi’s relative statements that 
‘always need to be taken as if they were “in brackets”’.  ‘That is, they are valid only 
within the limits of a particular situation or point of view, and should not be taken as 
universally applicable or absolute.’  Similarly, Karatani argues how modern science, 
moral and aesthetic judgments come into existence:  
 
When we confront the world, we have at least three kinds of judgment at 
the same time: cognitive judgment of true or false, ethical judgment of 
good or bad, and aesthetic judgment of pleasure or displeasure.  In real 
life, they are intermixed and hard to distinguish.  Scientists make 
observations by bracketing ethical and aesthetic judgments: Only by this 
act can the objects of cognition come into existence.  In aesthetic 
judgment, the aspects of true and false and good or bad are bracketed, only 
at the precise moment that artistic objects come into existence.  These 
operations are emphatically not done naturally.  Rather one is always 
ordered to bracket by the external situation.  And being accustomed to it, 
one forgets that one brackets, and thinks that the objects — scientific or 
artistic or moral — exist by themselves. 
  Morality appears to exist objectively.  At least that is the way we are 
taught.  But the morality considered in this manner is unequivocally one 
that belongs to community’s codes.  Therein moral norms are 
transcendent to individual.48 
 
                                                  
48 Karatani Kōjin, Transcritique on Kant and Marx, translated by Sabu Kohso, Cambridge and 
London: The MIT Press, 2003, 114–115. 
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In Nagayama’s memoirs, he re-narrates his life, placing himself in the position of victim 
of the state, society and the law/system.  When Nakagami sees Nagayama’s 
monogatari as a spurious one which seeks to evade the responsibility for his crime, he 
thinks that there is no difference between Nagayama’s manner to blur his responsibility 
and the system/law invented by the modern nation-state or the civil society, that is, 
‘community’s codes’.  Here, Nagayama sees the moral as something that exists a 
priori.  Once Nagayama begins justifying himself in his crime using language backed 
by the morality, that is, the logic of the nation-state or the logic of the citizens; his 
morality is the one that belongs to the ‘community’s codes’ and is not autonomous.  
Nakagami condemns Nagayama’s act of writing in such a manner as self-deception. 
  With this kind of ‘bracketing’ in mind, Karatani further drives us to the important 
definition of autonomous freedom: ‘Kant’s moral world is attained by bracketing 
[feelings of pleasure/displeasure or happiness]. […] for Kant, morality is finally a 
matter of freedom rather than goodness or badness.  If not for freedom, there is no 
good or bad.  Freedom is synonymous to being causa sui, self-motivated, subjective, 
and autonomous.’49  According to Karatani’s interpretation, we should trace the cause 
of any incident to our free will to choose our actions.  
The question then arises regarding where we can find such freedom.  Karatani goes 
on to elaborate that Kant actually approves the fact that what we consider as 
determination of free will is always already determined by complex causalities.50  If 
that is the case, then how can we possibly be primarily responsible for our own acts?  
Karatani explains this antinomy, one of the ongoing philosophical antinomies between 
the laws of nature (causality), that is, ‘Spinozian determinism’ and freedom, which is 
                                                  
49 Ibid., 115.   
50 Ibid. 
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also proposed by Kant: 
 
We do things differently from our intentions, and it is extremely rare that 
what we intend is actually realized.  The most crucial point here is that of 
responsibility, the responsibility for the result.  Only when we are 
considered free agents, though we are not at all in reality, do we become 
responsible. […] When we have done something wrong without knowing 
that it would be harmful (or sinful), are we still responsible even if we did 
not know it?  Those who have the potency to know that it was harmful 
are said to be responsible.51  
[…] 
In reality, we can have various choices, and without knowing to what 
extent the choices are compelled by the necessity of nature.  As a result, 
we come to acknowledge, to a certain degree, decisions determined by 
causality and, to a certain degree, those determined by free will.  Suppose 
there is a criminal.  There are many causes for his crime, personal as well 
as social.  If one named every possible cause, it would turn out that he 
had no free subject [jiyū na shutai 自由な主体 ], and thus no 
responsibility.  Upset by such a defense and vindication, people would 
claim that he must have also had freedom of choice.  Therefore, common 
sense would be to accept that humans are determined by various 
                                                  
51 Ibid., 117.  For detailed arguments on this, see Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 544.  
For example, I would like to quote some of the very important remarks made by Kant: ‘In order to 
clarify the regulative principle of reason through an example of its empirical use—not in order to 
confirm it (for such proofs are unworkable for transcendental propositions)—one may take a 
voluntary action, e.g. a malicious lie, through which a person has brought about a certain confusion 
in society; and one may first investigate its moving causes, through which it arose, judging on that 
basis how the lie and its consequences could be imputed to the person.  With this first intent one 
goes into the sources of the person’s empirical character, seeking them in a bad upbringing, bad 
company, and also finding them in the wickedness of a natural temper insensitive to shame, partly in 
carelessness and thoughtlessness; in so doing one does not leave out of account the occasioning 
causes.  In all this one proceeds as with any investigation in the series of determining causes for a 
given natural effect.  Now even if one believes the action to be determined by these causes, one 
nonetheless blames the agent, and not on account of his unhappy natural temper, not on account of 
the circumstances influencing him, not even on account of the life he has previously; for one 
presupposes that it can be entirely set aside how that life was constituted, and that series of 
conditions that transpired might not have been, but rather that this deed could be regarded as entirely 
unconditioned in regard to the precious state, as though with that act the agent had started a series of 
consequences entirely from himself.  This blame is grounded on the law of reason, which regards 
reason as a cause that, regardless of all empirical conditions just named, could have and ought to 
have determined the conduct of the person to be other than it is.’ 
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causalities, while acknowledging their free will.  Kant, however, rejected 
this kind of middling solution.  First we should think that there is no such 
thing as free will.  When we think we do something by our free will, we 
do so only because of our unawareness of its being determined by external 
causes.  After realizing this, it is finally possible to ask how freedom is 
possible.  From the beginning, neither freedom nor responsibility 
emerges out of the theoretical stance that queries the cause.  According 
to Kant, the criminal’s responsibility arises when the causality is bracketed, 
that is, when he is a free agent.  In reality, he does not have freedom 
sensu stricto [jijitsujō 事実上].  But, he has to be deemed free in order 
for him to be responsible.  Such is the practical standpoint.52 
Kant thought that freedom lay in the duty to obey (or command).  This 
is a tricky point where logic tends to falter, because obeying commands 
seems to be the opposite of freedom.  (As I return to later, many 
accusations concentrate on this point.)53  But it is clear that Kant did not 
identify duty with that which is imposed by the community’s code.  If the 
command of duty is of community, to obey it is a heteronymous act, and 
not free.  In order to be free, then, what kind of command does one have 
to obey?  That is no other than the command: “be free!”  There is no 
contradiction here.  Neither is there any enigma in Kant’s word: “he can 
do something because he is aware that he ought to do it,” which simply 
means that freedom can spring only from the imperative of being free.54 
 
It is natural for us to blame the nation-state, community or society—what Benedict 
Anderson termed an ‘imagined community’.  When Nagayama Norio investigates the 
cause of his acts of violence, he, too, ends in blaming the modern nation-state or 
contemporary society to which he attributes responsibility for his crime on many counts.  
In these circumstances, Nagayama’s choices are compelled by the necessity imposed by 
the law of nature, and his decisions are determined by causality.  Thus, when 
                                                  
52 Ibid., 118. 
53 On this accusations, see Karl Ameriks, Kant and the Fate of Autonomy, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000. 
54 Karatani, Transcritique on Kant and Marx, translated by Sabu Kohso, 118. 
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Nagayama writes a story of an ill-fated life bracketing his freedom that is caused by the 
individual act, he simultaneously surrenders his freedom or autonomy that exists side by 
side with the moral responsibility.  For Nakagami, such writings by Nagayama are 
transformed into a fantastic ideology, an invented monogatari, and he is instinctively 
aware, as a contemporary writer, that if people employ this kind of delusive monogatari, 
they unwittingly surrender their autonomy to complex causalities.  
At this point, it is necessary for us to deal more carefully with the significant question 
of Kant’s transcendental attitude: a discussion of where the command, ‘be free!’ that is, 
the imperative of being free, comes from.  Karatani Kōjin draws out an answer to this 
question by referring to Kant’s moral law as follows: 
 
This imperative “be free!” ultimately contains the imperative to treat others 
[tasha 他者] as free agents.  Kant’s moral law is little more than the 
command: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in 
the person of any other, always at the same time as an end [mokuteki 目的], 
never merely as a means [shudan 手段].” And it is only thanks to the 
imperative that the personalities of the others come into existence.  Within 
the theoretical stance [to clarify the regulative principle of reason], neither 
my personality nor that of any others [as free agents] can exist.  Only in the 
practical domain do they appear.  Thus Kant’s laws of morality are 
synonymous to being practical.55  
 
Thus, Karatani stresses that Kant’s transcendental standpoint comes from ‘the existence 
of the others’ (tasha) and goes on to say that this imperative (of being free) comes from 
                                                  
55  Ibid., 119.  For detailed arguments on this, see Immanuel Kant, ‘Groundwork for the 
Metaphysics of Morals’, in Thomas E. Hill Jr. and Arnulf Zweig (eds), Oxford Philosophical Texts, 
Kant Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, 229.  
Kant argues: ‘Now I say, a human being, and in general every rational being, does exist as an end in 
himself, not merely as a means to be used by this or that will as it pleases.  In all his actions, 
whether they are directed to himself or to other rational beings, a human being must always be 
viewed at the same time as an end.’ 
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Kant’s transcendental attitude itself―that entails the imperative: ‘bracket it!’ [bracket 
the natural causes, that is, the theoretical stance that queries the cause]  This 
interpretation leads Karatani to regard Kant’s transcendental standpoint as something 
that is called functionally autonomous alternation between the theoretical attitude and 
the practical attitude by saying that ‘Kant’s ethics cannot be sought only in his accounts 
of morality.  Being theoretical at the same time as being practical―the transcendental 
stance itself is ethical.’ 56   And he concludes: ‘[T]he lesson of the Kantian 
transcendental critique is to keep both stances at the same time.  One has to know how 
to bracket and unbracket at the same time.’57  For reasons mentioned above, Karatani 
points out that ‘the causes of the criminal case come not only from personal feelings 
[that derived from the practical stance] but also from social relations [that were based on 
the theoretical stance].’58   Here, as Nakagami sees the conflicting dichotomy between 
self-identity and integration with others, we can observe the conflict between self and 
others as well.  First, we should be aware that we do not have any freedom to choose 
our actions because we are indeed bound by the external causalities―the cause and 
effect relationship―from the theoretical standpoint.  However, at the same time, we 
are still able to decide to be free to choose our actions from the practical standpoint.  
But we must not forget that, at this time, we should take full responsibility for our 
actions in order to have freedom.  
  As expressed by Karatani’s reinterpretation of Kantian ethics, in order to be free, we 
ought to obey the command: ‘be free!’ or ‘be causa sui, self-motivated, subjective, or 
                                                  
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., 121.  See also Immanuel Kant, ‘Critique of Practical Reason’, in Mary Gregor (ed.) 
Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, Kant Critique of Practical Reason, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997, 60: ‘The rule of judgment under laws of pure practical reason is 
this: ask yourself whether, if the action you propose were to take place by a law of the nature of 
which you were yourself a part, you could indeed regard it as possible through your will.’ 
58 Ibid., 119. 
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autonomous!’  In concrete terms, we ought to accept our fate, which is determined by 
the law of nature, that is, the external causalities, as if it is deemed to be something that 
is causa sui in order to attain our freedom and accept responsibility.  Considered in this 
light, Nakagami Kenji accepted the very fact that he was a contemporary writer born in 
the buraku, outcast community, in Kishū at any given time and space, but he never stays 
in a convergent state of burakumin for long in order to be free, thereby ‘becoming’ a 
new entity that is not required to return to its origin as a place fixed a priori, which was 
fabricated by the syntax of modern language or the logic of the collective such as the 
modern nation-state or society.   
CHAPTER II 
SEARCH FOR THE AUTONOMY THAT GROWS OUT OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL/COLLECTIVE DICHOTOMY IN THE FICTION OF 
NAKAGAMI KENJI 
 
 
Nakagami Kenji’s family background was very complex.  He had two half-brothers 
and three half-sisters with a different father, and two half-brothers and two half-sisters 
with different mothers.  Nakagami at the age of eight moved to a new house with his 
mother who started to cohabit with another man who became his stepfather eight years 
later.  Moreover, the most profound trauma for Nakagami was his half-brother’s 
suicide when Nakagami was thirteen years old.  Nakagami’s own eventful life 
experiences had provided motifs for his works, and were repeatedly manifested in his 
works, namely, Misaki (1976), Karekinada (1977), Chi no hate shijō no toki (1983).  
These are well known as the trilogy of Akiyuki who is the protagonist throughout them.  
Furthermore, there were Keshō (Makeup), written between 1974 and 1977; Sennen no 
yuraku (1982), Kumano-shū (1984) and so forth.  In these novels, the same events such 
as the suicide of Nakagami’s half-brother appear again and again.  Moreover, 
immediately after he proposes a certain perspective in a novel, he starts to make a 
different dimension of it in the following novel.  Many of leitmotifs and characters in 
these novels recur frequently with the topos of Nakagami’s text, in Nakagami’s term, 
the roji (路地, alleyway) in Kumano.  In most of Nakagami’s text, the roji is used as 
the metaphorical term for the hisabetsu buraku (the discriminated communities) which 
were formed by a descendant group of outcast people known as burakumin in 
premodern Japan.  Under the Tokugawa Shogunate system, outside the four castes of 
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shi-nō-kō-shō (warrior-farmer-artisan-merchant) were the outcast groups of burakumin, 
that is, eta and hinin (literally ‘plentiful dirt’ and ‘not human’) such as the certain 
occupational groups of people who butchered animals for food or leather, people who 
carried corpses and some of travelling entertainers.  During the round-table discussion 
with Yasuoka Shōtarō and Noma Hiroshi in 1977, Nakagami made reference to the 
ongoing issue of hisabetsu buraku for the first time and touched on the fact that his birth 
house was situated in an outcast ghetto in Shingū City. 1   His concerns about 
discrimination against burakumin may have provoked Nakagami to continue to seek his 
identity in his literary universe.   
As the fundamental standpoint of his writing, we have observed that Nakagami’s act 
of writing creates two ambivalent attitudes, first to establish a firm self-identity, and 
secondly to identify himself with others (tasha).  Nakagami did not attempt to end this 
dichotomy between the two by assuming that two poles function as a precondition for 
each other.  For this reason, his act of writing seems to manifest itself in two kinds of 
attitudes simultaneously, that is to say, the autonomy of the individual and the 
dependence on the collective, which coexist complementarily.  In this sense, his act of 
writing must always be considered to be conditional.  Nakagami viewed this kind of 
antinomy as a powerful impetus to make him write novels perpetually.  In this respect, 
the literature of Nakagami Kenji may provide an excellent means for transformation 
into autonomous individuals who bear ‘the ability of logical self-definition’ and the 
moral responsibility as Nakagami depicts an individual who can possess the continuous 
self-determination in the trilogy of Akiyuki.  This chapter suggests that Akiyuki’s 
attitude towards the end of Chi no hate shijō no toki resembles Kant’s transcendental 
                                                  
1 Takazawa, Nakagami Kenji jiten, Tokyo: Kōbunsha 21, 2002, 247–248. 
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attitude which displays both theoretical and practical standpoints at the same time.  
Akiyuki’s awareness of his own crime in Chi no hate, which I interpret as his 
continuous self-determination and moral responsibility, may provide some instruments 
for the active attitude proposed by Ōe Kenzaburō as we have discussed in the 
Introduction.  In this chapter, I would like to examine how Nakagami’s search for 
autonomy that appeared as an ambivalent, endless strife was reflected in his major 
novels written between 1977 and 1984. 
 
Nakagami Kenji’s attempt to break the archetype of monogatari through the 
Akiyuki trilogy 
 
After he published Karekinada in 1977, Nakagami Kenji started to show his concerns 
with the issue of monogatari, especially, the archetype of monogatari.2  Although the 
word monogatari can be a word with many impalpable shadows of meaning, it is simply 
defined in Kenkyusha English-Japanese Dictionary 5th Edition as ‘a tale; a story; a 
narrative; a talk’.  In addition, the Japanese word monogatari refers to the classical 
literary genre as typified by Genji monogatari (The Tale of Genji).  The term 
monogatari also indicates a field of literature, monogatariron (narratology). 3   
Nakagami often uses the term monogatari to refer to a discourse which has a fixed, 
stylized form that determines a set of narrative statements.  However, his definition of 
monogatari is also usually elusive and sometimes paradoxical.  As we have examined 
                                                  
2 See, for example, Nakagami Kenji and Matsuda Osamu, ‘Taidan―Monogatari no teikei to iu koto’, 
Kokubungaku kaishaku to kyōzai no kenkyū (23:16 December 1978): 16–35. 
3 Eve Zimmerman has discusses in detail the term monogatari with shōsetsu, see Zimmerman, ‘A 
Language of Rebellion: Myth, Violence and Identity in the Fiction of Nakagami Kenji’, PhD Dissertation, 
Columbia University, UMI Dissertation Services, 1997.  For the differences between monogatari and 
shōsetsu, see also Noguchi Takehiko, Ichigo no jiten―shōsetsu (Dictionary of One Word: Fiction), 
Tokyo: Sanseidō, 1996. 
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in Chapter I, Nakagami emphasizes that any type of binary distribution will never be 
dialectically reconciled and it continues perpetually.  He explains that this eternal 
dichotomous framework operates to generate and develop fiction, the rule of the game 
or what he calls, the archetype of monogatari.  He explained that this dichotomy 
between the two as a narrative rule provokes the narrative domain and thrills the readers 
of the fiction with it.  However, at the same time, this kind of dichotomy has a strong 
effect on our perspective and locks us into a certain narrative domain.  He emphasized 
that if we treat this dichotomy carefully, it functions as a facilitator of an exciting 
monogatari, but if we do not, it confines us to the visionary world of monogatari.  
Being well aware of this kind of spell of monogatari at that time, Nakagami attempted 
to escape from the snare of monogatari which can be sometimes regarded as the 
law/system of the collective.  His love and hate sentiment towards Tanizaki Jun’ichirō 
(1886–1965) who is dubbed a great monogatari writer indicates well Nakagami’s 
antinomic observation towards the archetype of monogatari.  In Nakagami’s series of 
essays entitled ‘Monogatari no keifu’ (Notes on the Geneology of the Prose Narrative, 
1979), while Nakagami critisizes Tanizaki as the writer who unconsciously adapted 
himself to the law/system of monogatari, he recognizes Tanizaki as a monogatari writer 
of the highest calibre in the history of modern Japanese literature.4  Mark Harbison 
also describes Nakagami’s dilemma as follows: 
 
Shortly after winning the Akutagawa Prize, Nakagami began to say that he 
has fallen into a dilemma, that he is trapped on a pendulum that swings 
between two extremes: in thrall to the Japanese monogatari, at the same 
time he is obsessed with demolishing “the law, the system, the monogatari 
                                                  
4 Nakagami , ‘Monogatari no keifu Tanizaki Jun’ichirō’, in NKZ Vol. 15, 145–156. 
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of Japanese literature”.5 
 
In this section, I would like to enter into a detailed discussion of how Japanese 
monogatari as one of ‘tradition’ of Japanese literature was understood by Nakagami and 
how ‘he deconstructs the law, the system, the monogatari of Kumano as brutally as he 
explodes his vision of the Ally [roji] in the I-novels.’6   
Nakagami’s complex understanding of the archetype of monogatari is well portrayed 
in ‘Monogatari no keifu’.  Nakagami examines the works of the writers such as Satō 
Haruo (1892–1964), Tanizaki Jun’ichirō, Ueda Akinari (1734–1809), Orikuchi Shinobu 
(1887–1953) and Enchi Fumiko (1905–1986).  From the diligent perusal of their works, 
Nakagami attempts to search the true colours of monogatari.7  Nakagami finds a kind 
of narrative grammar, a linear narrative of progress, as it were, the law/system of the 
collective in monogatari.  His definitions of monogatari cover a lot of ground: the 
dichotomy between discriminating and being discriminated against, a piece of music 
which has the fixed chord progression, popularization (tsūzoku-ka), one’s attitude that 
depends on the law/system which becomes visible under the autocratic rule of a 
militarist regime, capitalism, and nature (shizen), that is to say, the law of external 
causality.8  Some of these perceptions of discourse were probably influenced by what 
                                                  
5 Mark Harbison, ‘The Immortal’, in Van C. Gessel and Tomone Matsumoto (eds), The Shōwa 
Anthology, Modern Japanese Short Stories 2, 1961–1984, Tokyo: Kōdansha International, 1984, 
413–414. 
6 Ibid., 414. 
7 Nakagami , ‘Monogatari no keifu’, in NKZ Vol. 15, 117–230.  The original texts first appeared in 
Kokubungaku, (24:2, 3, 5, 6, 9 and 13 February–October 1979). 
8 Ibid., 121, 126, 129, 137 and 141.  On this matter, some scholars indicate that what comes in 
conflict with self or the individual in premodern Japan should be not others or the collective such as 
community, social organization or nation-state but nature (shizen).  To follow up this matter further 
would involve us in other factors than the paradox between the individual and the collective.  It 
may not be necessary for the purpose of this dissertation to enter into a detailed discussion of the 
relationship between an individual and nature.  For detailed arguments for this matter, see, for 
example, Noda Ken’ichi (野田研一), Shizen o kanjiru kokoro―Neichā raitingu nyūmon (自然を感
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Karatani Kōjin calls ‘fūkei (landscape)’, ‘naimen (interiority)’, and other invented 
ideological concepts found in the mind of an introverted modern man, which is what we 
take for granted as ‘common-sense’ or concepts taken as natural.9  Nakagami goes on 
to say that this law/system in monogatari can be found throughout the length and 
breadth of the country.  Referring to Lévi-Strauss who revealed the close affinity 
between the structure of myths and that of musical scores or formula which is perceived 
as something unfolding itself horizontally in a linear manner, Nakagami found the same 
hidden structure in monogatari depicting its structure as a fixed discourse like a chord 
progression, for example, jo-ha-kyū (beginning, break out, tangent) or ki-shō-ten-ketsu 
(the four-part organization of Chinese poetry; introduction, development, turn and 
conclusion).10   
Nakagami often compares the dismantlement of monogatari with free jazz developed 
in the 1960s.  He appreciates the music of Albert Ayler or John Coltrane.  In his 
collected essays, Hakai seyo to Airā wa itta (Ayler said, ‘Destroy!’ 1979), Nakagami 
equates John Coltrane with James Joyce.  In an essay entitled ‘Toki wa nagareru…’, 
Nakagami also states, ‘Even if we could write a novel in the same way as Joyce’s 
Finnegans Wake, we are still bound by the chord progression.  As long as we possess 
the fixed chord progression, there is no longer essence.  The same can be said for 
language.  Language with the fixed chord progression is also deceptive.’ 11   He 
focuses on the fixed chord change in music and points out that there is the law/system 
called the fixed chord change in jazz music, too.  He portrays some free jazz musicians 
                                                                                                                                                  
じるこころ ネイチャーライティング入門), Tokyo: Chikuma purikē shinsho, 2007; Kawamura 
Jirō (河村次郎), Jiga to seimei (自我と生命), Tokyo: Moe shobō, 2007. 
9 Karatani, Origins of Modern Japanese Literature, translated and edited by Brett de Bary, 11–96.  
Fuller discussion about this matter will be presented in Chapter V. 
10 Nakagami, ‘Monogatari no keifu’, 209. 
11 Nakagami Kenji, ‘Toki wa nagareruּּּ’, in NKZ Vol. 14, 242. 
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who cozy up to it or conversely some musicians who destroy the chord progression.12  
The first scholar to give much attention to this matter was Alan Tansman.  He 
commented as follows: 
 
Akiyuki’s attempted escapes into music have the theoretical backing of 
Nakagami the critic.  In a series of essays on John Coltrane, Miles Davis, 
Thelonius Monk, and other jazz musicians, Nakagami likens the tale 
(monogatari) to a musical form in which one creates new chords to 
destroy old ones.  To destroy the tale, which both provides an escape 
from modernity and can also become another prison, he must blow apart 
all chords and get as far as possible, as quickly as possible, from law and 
system (hō, seido).  Nakagami insists that he must play a free jazz like 
Coltrane’s, which blows to a limit one cannot even sense as a limit, and 
destroys the chords from which free jazz develops.  Free jazz is “nothing 
but destruction.”  It is the free jazz of Coltrane that allows Nakagami to 
attack his enemy (and his friend), the tale, by ignoring the progression of 
chords that develop the tale and twisting them: free jazz “attempts to 
become endlessly free from all past chords”.  Akiyuki, too, attempts to 
become endlessly free of all past chords.  The endless repetition of his 
digging records his attempted escape from the land and the tales that hold 
him prisoner―as do Nakagami’s repetitions record his attempted escape 
not only from modern literature, but from language itself.13 
  
In Misaki and Karekinada that were written in 1976 and 1977, the protagonist, Akiyuki 
is absorbed in doing physical labour everyday, that is, ‘digging’ the ground.  He 
immensely enjoys blending with the soil which he digs, his physical labour itself.  
Tansman depicts monogatari as ‘all past chords’ which confine Akiyuki in the certain 
                                                  
12 Nakagami, ‘Kōdo to no tatakai’, in NKZ Vol. 15, 27–31.  On this topic, see also Michael 
Molasky, ‘Nakagami Kenji no hakai shinwa’, in Sengo nihon no jazu bunka: Eiga･ bungaku･ 
angura (戦後日本のジャズ文化 映画・文学・アングラ), Tokyo: Seidosha, 2005, 254–264. 
13 Alan Tansman, ‘History, Repetition, and Freedom in the Narratives of Nakagami Kenji’, Journal 
of Japanese Studies (24:2 1 998): 271. 
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discourse of modernity, and portrays Akiyuki’s repetitions of ‘digging’ the earth as 
Akiyuki’s (or Nakagami’s) attempted escape from the concealed law/system of 
modernity or modern language itself.  In his early essays that were written in the late 
1960s and the early 1970s, Nakagami equated the physical labour with the return to the 
world of the object, which is considered to be free from the law/system of modern 
language.14  Nakagami calls this his half suicide because the writer has to cling to the 
language despite of his/her disbelief in it.  In this sense, Akiyuki’s repetitions of 
‘digging’ can truly be considered to be a form of his escape from the law/system of 
kotoba.  However, at the same time, Akiyuki’s repetitions of physical labour can be 
seen as his obedience to the world of object which is still bound by the larger collective 
notion, that is, the law of nature or the external causalities.  In addition to this, here, we 
can notice the striking discrepancy in Nakagami’s attempt to be free from kotoba as his 
repetitions of his physical labour, that is, his attempt to escape from language itself is 
written in the language itself.  In this sense, no matter how Akiyuki attempted to 
escape from monogatari, he could not be completely free from the certain discourse of 
collective notion as long as it is expressed by the language.  In this sense, Akiyuki’s 
escape written by kotoba never seems to end.  Yet Nakagami did not stop writing in 
spite of this discrepancy between the practical and theoretical aspects of language.   
 
Nakagami sees the concealed structure of monogatari or the progression of chords in 
the modern language itself, and he assumes that the defined words that grew out from 
the genbun icchi system of the Meiji period is unconsciously bound by the logic of the 
                                                  
14 We shall to return this point in Chapter VI.  See, for example, Nakagami, ‘Sakka to nikutai’ (作
家と肉体), in NKZ Vol. 14, 199–204 or Nakagami, ‘Shohatsu no mono’ (初発の者), in NKZ Vol. 14, 
193–195. 
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modern nation-state or the rule of the Emperor.  In ‘Monogatari no keifu’, Nakagami 
regards writers who resign themselves into the hands of monogatari as writers who are 
heavily dependent on the law/system of the collective such as the military nation.15  
Thus, he developed this kind of radical perception of monogatari as a matter of nature, 
nation, law or morality itself, which generates the ongoing canon formation.   
What is, then, the law/system of monogatari, or rather, the discourse (the progression 
of chords) of monogatari that Nakagami understood?  In the series of seminars, 
Buraku seinen bunka-kai (The Cultural Society for Outcast Youth) in 1978, Nakagami 
explains thoroughly what is the set of narrative statements to every monogatari ― an 
archetypal pattern.16  Having been inspired by Utsuho monogatari (The Tale of Utsuho, 
984), Nakagami explains that utsuho literally means a cavern or hollow depicted as a 
mythical space, which sharpens our feelings of awe or reverence for our unknown 
territories.17  Nakagami indicates that he cannot find this kind of mythical space, 
utsuho, in one of the most famous Japanese classics, The Tale of Genji.  Utsuho 
monogatari is a story of an unmarried noble woman who is a daughter of the poetical 
genius, Kiyohara no Toshikage, and her son, Fujiwara no Nakatada, who was born out 
of wedlock.  In this respect of the illegitimate child, Utsuho monogatari can be 
regarded as a kishu-ryūri-tan (noble exile myth).  Nakatada’s mother lost her parents as 
well as her nanny when she was young, and lived with an old woman who was a servant 
of her nanny.  She accidentally spent a night with a court noble of high position, 
Fujiwara no Kanemasa, and gave birth to a boy.  However, the mother and son who 
                                                  
15 Nakagami, ‘Monogatari no keifu’, 121. 
16 Nakagami, ‘Hirakareta yutakana bungaku’, in Karatani and Watanabe (eds), Nakagami Kenji to 
Kumano, 36–106. 
17 It would be interesting to compare this perception of utsuho with, what Asada calls, “a seemingly 
horizontal, centreless place” or Nishida Kitarō’s philosophy, “mu no basho”, a place of nothingness, 
or emptiness in Zen Buddhism.  There is, however, no space here to discuss this in detail. 
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lost their servant a few years later wandered in the mountains to look for food, and 
finally came upon a hermit at a mountain hollow (utsuho) in Yoshino.  After a lapse of 
another several years, Kanemasa happened to see the mother and son when he was 
hunting with a falcon in the mountain of Yoshino, and he took them to Kyoto.  
Nakatada amazed his father, Kanemasa, with his talent for playing a Japanese harp 
inherited from his grandfather, Kiyohara no Toshikage.  Nakatada’s extraordinary 
musical talent for playing the harp allowed him to rise through the ranks in court.18 
With this perception of utsuho, Nakagami creates a model of protagonists in his 
novels.  That is a ‘pure’ or ‘innocent’ child who has had an experience of his/her life 
being threatened or with abandonment, and has been deeply hurt by someone from 
his/her affinity group.  Thus a protagonist will appear in the figure of an orphan or an 
illegitimate child (or a prince) who unconsciously or fatalistically falls into a crime/sin 
such as incest or patricide/matricide.  Nakagami goes on to say that from this 
‘innocent’ child’s point of view, the world of adults or parents (or a king), which is an 
enigma to children, can be narrated as an archetype of monogatari.  These adults 
always appear to be something ‘black-hearted and mysterious’ to the ‘innocent’ children.  
In a monogatari or a myth like the story of Oedipus, this adult may often make his 
appearance as a king or an emperor and the child as a prince or an imperial prince.  
Nakagami concludes that this kind of relationship between a ‘pure’ child (prince) and an 
‘evil’ adult (king) can be one of the powerful archetypes of monogatari.  To put it more 
concretely, this archetype can be regarded as the process of how this innocent child 
(prince) became aware of his own crime and how he exposed the secret of the adult 
(king).  Nakagami says that exposing the secret of the king could be the same as 
                                                  
18 Nakagami, ‘Utsuho kara no hibiki’, in Nakagami Kenji to Kumano, 39–40. 
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exposing the very secret of ‘monogatari’, which is equalized to ‘shizen’, laws of nature, 
the cause and effect relationship, which gives rise to all sorts of phenomena in the world 
including the social discrimination against burakumin.  Nakagami does not negate the 
deeds of the adult no matter how evil they are.  He exposes them and accepts them as 
the part of external causalities.  At this moment, the pure child may become aware that 
the one to blame is not only the evil others but also himself/herself in varying degrees as 
s/he realizes that all events between the individuals and others are regulated by the 
complex external causalities surrounding us.  While the pure child theoretically accepts 
the deeds of others as the part of the cause and effect relationship, the child also 
practically reflects on what s/he has done and the moral responsibility made of his/her 
own free will.  In my reading of Chi no hate shijō no toki that was written in 1983, the 
pure child, Akiyuki, recognizing the responsibilities for his own harmful acts, turns into 
an adult subject who exercises autonomous freedom and takes moral responsibility.  
This dichotomy between a pure child and an evil adult may permeate various aspects 
of our life.  For example, let us put this archetypal relationship between an ‘innocent’ 
self and ‘evil’ others into the context of the student riots in the 1960s.  In the conflict 
between students and the University authorities, we can see the similar archetype 
between the students who regarded themselves as a pure and righteous entity and the 
‘corrupt’ authorities.  The theatrical dramatist, Yamazaki Tetsu describes the so-called 
‘All-Campus Joint Struggle Committee’ (known as ‘Zen-kyō-tō’ 全共闘) as a kind of 
students’ representation of their innocence, putting the blame on the ‘corrupt’ (kitanai) 
university authorities, the kitanai nation-state or kitanai society.19   
The same observation applies to John Dower’s illustration of Japanese modes of 
                                                  
19 Yamazaki Tetsu, Shōnen jiken bukku, ibasho no nai kodomotachi, 38–39. 
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thoughts during the war.  He talks about the uniqueness of Japanese modes of 
perception: elaborating mythohistory, which emphasizes the divine origins of the 
Japanese imperial line and the exceptional racial and cultural homogeneity of the 
Japanese people.20  The Japanese declared themselves to be inherently virtuous and 
‘pure’ or to be purer than others.  The war in Asia and the Pacific was, for example, a 
‘holy war’ or ‘total war’ to create a ‘new world order’ which enabled all nations and 
races to assume their ‘proper place’ in the world, and which was traced back to the 
founding of the Japanese state and ‘Yamato race’ by the Emperor Jimmu 2600 years 
ago.21  The war was regarded as an act that could purify the self, the nation, Asia, and 
the whole world.22  Here, the same archetype of monogatari (i.e. a dichotomy between 
a pure child and evil others) may be evidence, no doubt, of this wartime prejudice: the 
Japanese whose national character is cloudless, pure, and honest versus the Westerners 
whose hearts are filthy and impure.  These dichotomies between the pure and the evil 
in our everyday life may help us seize Nakagami’s understanding of the law/system in 
monogatari more clearly, being closely linked with any ‘sabetsu/hisabetsu’ dichotomy 
(the dichotomy between discriminating and being discriminated against) or the 
nationalistic leanings in contemporary Japan.  As we have discussed, we cannot place 
the entire responsibility of social problems on the extreme poles such as the people who 
discriminate against social minorities or ultranationalists.  In order to identify the 
causes of any social problems, we should keep making our new judgments practically 
while we theoretically observe the individual circumstance of each problem in a society 
                                                  
20 Gender perspective should be considered in future study of Nakagami Kenji. 
21 According to Nihon shoki (The Chronicle of Japan), the Emperor Jimmu was the first emperor of 
Japan.  However, it is now accepted that this can be regarded as a myth and cannot be regarded as a 
fact. 
22 John W. Dower , War Without Mercy, 203–233. 
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from the viewpoints of both the perpetrators and victims.  Nakagami explains that the 
archetype of monogatari may heat up and fortify one’s one-sided judgment that is often 
found in a story such as kanzenchōaku (rewarding the good and punishing the bad).23  
However, Nakagami considers that the archetype of monogatari should not be rejected 
but recognized as the part of the law of nature, that is, the external causalities which 
always coexist with our autonomous freedom to choose our actions.  Now that we are 
sure about the archetype of monogatari that Nakagami was confronted with, we can go 
on to consider the manner in which Nakagami actually attempted to expose it through 
his entire writing career. 
 
In the first novel of the Akiyuki trilogy, Misaki, the protagonist, Akiyuki, who is a 
24-year-old labourer, lives with his mother, stepfather and stepbrother in the roji of a 
city by the sea.  Akiyuki’s biological father, Ryūzō, is also living in the same city as 
well as Akiyuki’s two half-sisters with different mothers, whom Akiyuki has not met yet.  
Although Akiyuki ignored his biological father whenever Akiyuki came across him, he 
could not help but feel the weight of Ryūzō’s eyes no matter where he went in the city.  
The existence of Ryūzō and the rumours about his misdeeds in the past constantly rasp 
on Akiyuki’s nerves and upset Akiyuki’s equilibrium.  Akiyuki also felt and was 
irritated that he was a chip off his biological father, and wished to sever all ties with 
Ryūzō.  In Misaki, Akiyuki is illustrated as a young man who wishes to be immaculate 
and pure.  For this reason, Akiyuki even preserves his virginity.  The following are 
three random examples from Misaki: 
 
                                                  
23 Nakagami, ‘Futatsu no kōkyū saron’, Goō (Vol. 4 2006): 80. 
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離れの四畳半が、彼の部屋だった。壁に一枚、女優のグラビアが
貼ってあった。他になにもなかった。[･･･] 部屋を飾りたてたり、
部屋に物を置くのは、彼の性に合わなかった。[･･･] 部屋で、寝て、
起きる。今でもそうだった。女のことさえ、考えたくなかった。や
っかいな物一切を、そぎ落としてしまいたかった。24 
 
Akiyuki lived in a four-and-a-half-mat room detached from the rest of 
the house. On one wall was a poster of an actress. That was it. […] [H]e 
wasn’t the type to decorate or buy furniture. […] He went to bed in his 
room and woke up in his room. It was the same now. And women? They 
didn’t even cross his mind. He would remove all impurities.25 
 
 
彼は苦笑した。一人、妙にさめた。どこへ行っても、男と女のわ
いせつな話ばかりだと思った。[･･･]  
 木がゆれていた。ゆっくりと葉をふるわせていた。余計なものを
そぎ落としたい。夢精のたびに、そう思った。26 
 
Wherever he went, all anybody talked about was sex. […]  
  The trees were swaying, giving their leaves a gentle shake. Rid yourself 
of all excess―that’s what he thought every time he had a wet dream.27 
 
 
「お兄ちゃん、ちょっと寄らへん」と女の一人が声を掛けてきた。
彼は、返事をしなかった。「寄っていってよ」と女は、彼の腕に手を
まわした。酒に化粧のにおいがした。金はあった。酒を飲み、女を
買う相場の金は持っていた。だが、女を知らなかった。知りたくな
かった。余計なもの、やっかいなものに自分をかかわらせ、汚した
くなかった。いや、ひとたびそれを知ると、とめどなくのめり込み、
どろどろになり、女とみれば見境いなしに手をつけたあの男と同じ
                                                  
24 Nakagami, Misaki, in NKZ Vol. 3, 174. 
25 Nakagami Kenji, The Cape, translated by Eve Zimmerman, 19–20. 
26 Nakagami, Misaki, in NKZ Vol. 3, 180. 
27 Nakagami Kenji, The Cape, translated by Eve Zimmerman, 27. 
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になってしまいそうな自分が不安だった。28 
 
  “Come here, handsome,” a woman called to him [Akiyuki]. He didn’t 
answer. “Stop in for a while,” said the woman, now taking him by the arm. 
He could smell makeup and liquor. He had money. Enough money to get 
drunk and buy a woman. But he’d never had a woman and he didn’t want 
one now. Didn’t want to dirty himself in something pointless and messy. 
No, no, he worried that if he did it just once, he’d become obsessed with it 
and end up with his mind in the sewer just like that man [his biological 
father, Ryūzō], who couldn’t keep his hands to himself.29 
 
What these excerpts make clear at once is that the protagonist, Akiyuki, is depicted as 
an illegitimate, innocent child who seeks his biological father’s enigma, which faithfully 
reflected the archetype of monogatari as we have discussed before.  Through Misaki, 
Akiyuki’s biological father was indicated not by his name, Ryūzō, but ano otoko (that 
man) from Akiyuki’s point of view.  Moreover, Misaki ends with Akiyuki and his 
half-sister (Ryūzō’s daughter) entering into an incestuous relationship.  We can be 
fairly certain that Misaki is a monogatari that depicts a relationship between a ‘pure’ 
child (prince) and an ‘evil’ adult (king), and this can be the beginning of the monogatari 
about an abandoned child of virginal innocence, who is fatalistically falling into a sin 
such as incest or patricide/matricide.  
 
The sequel to Misaki, Karekinada (Sea of Dead Trees) was written between October 
1976 and March 1977.  It depicts the summer long experiences of Akiyuki who was 26 
years old.  Akiyuki does physical work for a construction company that Akiyuki’s 
stepbrother inherited from his father (Akiyuki’s stepfather).  The discourse of 
                                                  
28 Nakagami, Misaki, in NKZ Vol. 3, 187. 
29 Nakagami Kenji, The Cape, translated by Eve Zimmerman, 36. 
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Karekinada also faithfully observes the archetype of monogatari of an innocent child.  
In Karekinada, we are shown a vivid illustration of Akiyuki’s biological father as a man 
of flesh and blood with his name, Hamamura Ryūzō.  It provides a more realistic and 
graphic portrait of ‘evil’ Ryūzō who is tainted with scandalous images and is called 
Lord of the Flies (Hae no ō)30 behind his back by the people of the city.  Akiyuki 
constantly hears a series of rumours about Ryūzō’s evil deeds: he was a vagabond who 
wandered into the town and started to work under a parvenu of the city; he set houses on 
fire and defrauded the roji squatters of land; he cheated heavily indebted forest holders 
out of large parts of their forest lands, and so on.  Ryūzō even dismisses Akiyuki’s 
tearful confession with a laugh when Akiyuki and his half-sister, Satoko (Ryūzō’s 
daughter out of wedlock), came to see Ryūzō to confess their incestuous affair.  At one 
period, Ryūzō started to trumpet his lineage by saying that he is descended from 
Hamamura Magoichi, who was regarded by Ryūzō as a feudal warlord who was routed 
in a pitched battle against Oda Nobunaga.31  Ryūzō asserted that Hamamura Magoichi 
exiled himself to Arima in Kumano, 32  and Ryūzō erected a monument of the 
Hamamuras to his ancestral memory on a top of a hill in Arima.  Akiyuki listened to 
his tale, and attempted to reveal the deception of Ryūzō’s descent story.  Akiyuki went 
to Arima to ascertain whether what Ryūzō was saying was true, and there he found that 
people in Arima were scoffing at Ryūzō’s belief.  Akiyuki realized bitterly that 
Ryūzō’s claim turned out to be a big joke. 
  On the other hand, Nakagami depicts Akiyuki as a being in communion with nature.  
                                                  
30 Lord of the Flies (Hae no ō), or sometimes, a shit of flies (hae no kuso), is Nakagami’s 
metaphoric expression for someone who is abominated by others in Karekinada. 
31 Oda Nobunaga is one of the most powerful feudal rulers in the Sengoku era (the Warring States 
period) of the 16th century. 
32 Kumano is one of the settings of the Akiyuki trilogy.  It is well known as a sacred site to both 
Shinto and Buddhism since ancient times. 
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Akiyuki, working in perfect harmony with nature in mountains, seems to purify himself 
with his manual labour.33  Examples of Akiyuki’s close association with nature abound 
in Karekinada as follows: 
 
川は光っていた。[･･･] 明るく青い水が自分の開いた眼から血管に
流れ込み、自分の体が青く染まっていく気がした。そんな感じはよ
くあった。土方仕事をしている時はしょっちゅうだった。汗を流し
て掘り方をしながら秋幸は、自分が考えることも判断することもい
らない力を入れて掘りすくう動く体になっているのを感じた。土の
命じるままに従っているのだった。硬い土はそのように、柔らかい
土にはそれに合うように。秋幸はその現場に染まっている。34 
 
The river shines. […] Akiyuki felt the bright, shining water flowing 
through his wide-open eyes into his blood vessels, and felt his body 
turning bright blue.  He often had the same sensation.  It occurred a lot 
when he worked at the construction site.  When he dug in the soil with 
beads of sweat, Akiyuki felt his body moving, digging, turning the soil 
over as if the labour was second nature to him or his body was controlled 
by something beyond the limits of his judgment.  Akiyuki was at the 
mercy of the soil.  He conformed in full with the needs of hard ground as 
well as soft ground.  He was steeped in the construction field.   
 
What is immediately apparent in this excerpt is that Akiyuki, in Karekinada, not only 
feels in union with nature but also has an unconscious obedience to the external 
causalities that embrace the archetype of monogatari as we have discussed before.  
                                                  
33 This point is argued by Eve Zimmerman as well.  See, Zimmerman, ‘In the Trap of Words’, 
143–145. 
34 Nakagami, Karekinada, in NKZ Vol. 3, 248–249. 
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Whatever he does seems to arise spontaneously beyond Akiyuki’s will.  In this respect, 
it is not possible to affirm that, in Karekinada, Akiyuki is depicted as an individual who 
establishes his own autonomy.  He was bound by the fixed narrative discourse, that is, 
the law/system of monogatari, which portrays the predetermined conflict between an 
innocent self and evil others.  As if he was guided by the chord progression that is 
premeditated by the archetype of monogatari, Akiyuki, in a fit of rage, killed his 
younger half-brother, Hideo, when he encountered Ryūzō and Hideo on the night of a 
lantern festival.  Akiyuki pours out his heart as follows: 
 
その男は、いま何が起こったのか知っただろうか？ 男にはっきり
と教えてやりたかった。その男の子供を、その男の別の腹の息子が
殺した。その男の遠つ祖、浜村孫一の血の者が、浜村孫一の血の者
を殺した。すべてはその男の性器から出た凶いだった。35 
 
That man [Ryūzō] knows what happened right now?  Akiyuki wanted to 
let him know clearly.  Ryūzō’s son was killed by another son with a 
different mother.  A man who is in Hamamura Magoichi’s blood killed a 
man in the same bloodline.  All evil came from the genitalia of that man. 
 
Thus, in Karekinada, Akiyuki is depicted as a man who abandoned his freedom of 
choice of action to his father, Ryūzō, which made it appear as if it were the law of 
nature that ruled over his actions, and consequently he did not develop any sense of 
moral responsibility.  All he does is to coexist with nature that subsumes both good and 
evil deeds and to cling to its law.  He remains an innocent child who was abetted by 
the spell of monogatari in all his deeds, even siblicide. 
                                                  
35 Ibid., 454–455. 
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 It seems to me that the most outstanding achievement of Nakagami Kenji is the 
manner in which he wrote Chi no hate shijō no toki, the sequel to Karekinada, in 1983.  
In Chi no hate shijō no toki, Nakagami attempts to relativize the archetype of 
monogatari which exercises strong control over Akiyuki’s actions in Misaki and 
Karekinada.  Akiyuki came back to the roji as an individual who has established his 
own autonomy.  Chi no hate shijō no toki begins with the description of Akiyuki who 
was now 29 years old, and had just walked out of prison after serving three years.  
During the time Akiyuki spent in prison, a redevelopment project started in the city and 
it destroyed the community of people who lived in the roji.  Akiyuki forced back a 
shriek when he found that the hill where the roji was situated had been levelled and had 
become a vacant lot.  However, he also noticed a change in his way of looking at 
things: 
 
朝の歓楽街を歩いていると秋幸は、二十六の時とはまるっきり異な
ったもう一人の秋幸のような気がした。二十六の時の今時分は朝の
四時には起きて働いていた。夏は夏の、冬は冬の季節の中で絶えず
自分の周囲にあった日の光をもう二度と見る事も感じる事もない。
朝の日は今もあったが、単なる風景のようで物足りなかった。36 
 
Walking on the street of the amusement area in the morning, Akiyuki felt 
that he was not the same as his old self at 26 and became another self in a 
completely different way.  Akiyuki woke up and started to work by four 
o’clock in the morning at that time.  He felt that he would neither see nor 
sense the sunlight that used to coexist with him regardless whether it was 
                                                  
36 Nakagami, Chi no hate shijō no toki, in NKZ Vol. 6, 43. 
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winter or summer.  Though Akiyuki is still able to sense the sunlight now, 
he feels empty inside as the sunlight appears to be a mere landscape. 
 
Here, we notice that Akiyuki can no longer enjoy the sense of oneness with nature.  
Akiyuki now pauses to realize that nature with which he strove for oneness reappears to 
be external to him for the first time.  Akiyuki's eyes turned away from the amoral 
world of the roji that subsumes everything around him and opened to the outside world.   
He accepted it as reality and started to interact with society from the perspective of his 
own interaction with the outside world.  In Chi no hate shijō no toki, Akiyuki 
speculates about what other people experience in the world and how they are thinking or 
feeling.  He also begins to observe the changes in the world and in individual lives.  
Akiyuki questions himself about a range of matters that are related to the relationship 
between the individual and the environment: history, discrimination against the people 
in the roji, religion, nature, economic value of labour and so forth.  He admits that all 
of us, being associated with the outside world, are constrained by all of these external 
causalities in varying degrees.  One day, Akiyuki interrogated Ryūzō as to whether he 
committed the evil deeds that people gossiped about.  Ryūzō attempted to offset his 
evil deeds by saying that: 
 
「悪じゃけど、どっちもまた正しい事じゃと思うんじゃ。切手ほど
の土地からはじめて、息子のおまえに後をついでくれと胸張って頼
めるほどの山も土地も持った。わしとの競争で落ちた者がどっさり
おる。[･･･] 地主のとこへ行て頭下げ、お世辞を言うた。そうやっ
て軌道に乗せて来たわしも悪じゃけど、混じりっ気ないど。無垢じ
ゃと思わんかい？」37 
                                                  
37 Ibid., 332–333. 
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 ‘I must admit that both [the logging and the protection of old growth 
forest] were evil, but at the same time, I think that both deeds were right.  
I began with the tiny plot of land like a stamp, but now I have so many 
forests and so much land that I can take great pride in announcing that I 
will ask you to take them over.  I have got ahead by riding roughshod 
over many rivals.  I went around land owners, threw myself at their feet 
and fawned on them.  By doing so, I got my business on track.  I was 
evil, but I was pure in my intention.  Don’t you think that I am innocent?’ 
 
Akiyuki felt that Ryūzō’s remark recognizing himself as not only an evil man but also 
an innocent man might be a deliberate provocation to make Akiyuki angry.  Akiyuki 
considered that Ryūzō may attempt to lead Akiyuki to kill him.  At this moment, 
Akiyuki was about to obey one of the most powerful and classical narrative discourses, 
that is, patricide which is found in the plot of Oedipus the King.  However, Akiyuki did 
not rise to this bait.  Here, Nakagami nullifies the narrative grammar of monogatari by 
inverting the relationship between an innocent child and an evil father.  In this crucial 
moment, Akiyuki emerges not as an innocent child but as an adult subject who 
possesses the sense of both autonomy and responsibility.  Akiyuki reflects on himself: 
 
刑務所の中で秋幸は自分のしてしまった取りかえしのつかない行為
を反復し、本質的には無垢で何も知らない弟の秀雄に秋幸がやった
事を、言葉の説明をつけず心にそっくりそのまま彫り込んで、自分
に生のある限り持ちつづけて行こうと決意した。浜村龍造のせいで
もなかったし、ましてや、二十四の歳で路地の家の柿の木で首をつ
った種違いの兄の郁男のせいではなかった。ただ、秋幸が秀雄を石
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で打ち殺した。38 
 
In prison, Akiyuki regarded what he had done to his intrinsically innocent 
half-brother, Hideo, as an irreparable crime and had replayed the incident 
in his mind many times.  He felt that it could not be explained by words, 
for that reason he tried to imprint the incident for what it was in his 
memory forever.  Here, Akiyuki had a strong determination to hold on to 
it as long as he lived.  That was not Hamamura Ryūzō’s fault.  Nor the 
fault of Ikuo, Akiyuki’s 24-year-old elder half-brother, who hung himself 
on the persimmon tree at their old house in the roji.  It was none other 
than Akiyuki who stoned Hideo to death. 
 
Being aware of the law/system of collectives that undermines one’s freedom of action, 
Akiyuki determines to be an individual who has the freedom to choose his actions, 
which can be morally evaluated.  Here, Akiyuki shows two abilities that coexist 
complementarily: to observe the outside world from a theoretical stance and to continue 
to make his own decision from a practical stance.  We can say with fair certainty that 
Nakagami Kenji succeeded in portraying the process of an individual who not only 
perceives the various environmental constraints surrounding him but also continues to 
search for the autonomous self through writing the Akiyuki trilogy. 39  
 
                                                  
38 Ibid., 334. 
39 There is no space for an extended discussion on Nakagami’s Chi no hate shijō no toki, however, 
the Akutagawa Award-winning novelist and literary critic, Okuizumi Hikaru points out that in Chi no 
hate shijō no toki, the protagonist, Akiyuki, having perceived his sin, is depicted as a mature adult 
shutai (individual subject) who possesses others (tasha).  See Okuizumi Hikaru et al., ‘Sai/sabetsu, 
soshite monogatari no seisei: Hanmo suru ‘roji’ no tekusuto o megutte’, in Karatani Kōjin and 
Watanabe Naomi (eds), Nakagami Kenji to Kumano, Tokyo: Ōtashuppan, 2000: 216–259.  
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Breaking the spell of monogatari: Shōsetsu, shishōsetsu and monogatari 
 
When Karekinada, Nakagami Kenji’s first full-length novel, was published in 1977, the 
literary critic, Etō Jun (1933–1999) praised its achievement highly, saying that: 
‘Reading Karekinada, I couldn’t help feeling that after seventy years Japanese 
naturalism had finally fulfilled its promise.  However, Nakagami’s is not a borrowed 
naturalism; he creates characters through the pulse of his own heart, which drinks in 
earth and blood.  […] he is able to sing about the pain people feel in this world.’40  
Karatani also called the work ‘one of the most outstanding masterpieces in the history 
of modern Japanese literature’.41  What was the ‘promise’ which Japanese naturalist 
writers could not fulfil but Nakagami carried through?  Has he added some new value 
to Japanese naturalism?  These questions will lead us further into a more radical 
consideration of ‘modern’ Japanese literature itself.  Did modern Japanese literature 
leave something important behind?  What is Japanese naturalism, which bloomed as 
shishōsetsu, (the I-novel), in the process of the development of modern Japanese 
literature?  How practically did Nakagami attempt to break the spell of monogatari, 
which we discussed in the previous sections?  As a contemporary writer, where was 
Nakagami’s standpoint and what did he attempt to do from there? 
Karatani explains that Japanese naturalism is different from its European origin.  He 
says that, if anything, it is a mixture of shishōsetsu and monogatari, for example, an 
amalgam of Shimazaki Tōson’s (shishōsetsu) and Izumi Kyōka’s (monogatari) works.42 
                                                  
40 Translated by Eve Zimmerman.  See Eve Zimmerman, ‘Afterword’, in Nakagami Kenji, The 
Cape, translated by Eve Zimmerman, 180.   
41 Karatani, ‘Sanjussai, Karekinada e’, in NKZ Vol. 3, Geppō, May, Tokyo: Shūeisha, 1995. 
42 Karatani, ‘Sanjussai, Karekinada e’, 5–7.  See also Irena Powell, Writers and Society in Modern 
Japan, London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1983, 61–62.  On this matter, to define the Japanese 
naturalist’s mode of thought, it is useful to quote from Itō Sei’s analysis of Shimazaki Tōson, 
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Karatani points out that both shishōsetsu and monogatari were a kind of mutation, 
which stemmed from Western modern literature.  Japanese off-springs of Western 
literature, shishōsetsu and monogatari, and Western literature are alike but quite 
different in nature.  That is why both shishōsetsu and monogatari have been criticized 
by the critics who espouse Western logic.  However, they continue to exist up to the 
present.  On this account, both écritures can be defined as the mainstream that makes 
the foundations of modern Japanese literature today.  Karatani concluded that no 
matter how deviant from its European origin they are, Nakagami did not ignore these 
basic grounds for Japanese literature and dared to confront them of his own accord.43  
On the one hand, Nakagami dared to utilize two extremes of Japanese literature―
shishōsetsu and monogatari―in his works, on the other hand, he tried to find ‘shōsetsu’ 
(novel) that he regarded as a new form of literature which was considered to be different 
from shishōsetsu and monogatari.44  Nakagami clung to the institutional form of 
Japanese literature, that is, shishōsetsu and monogatari, but at the same time, he posed a 
new form, shōsetsu, in order to continue to make new judgments, adjusted for 
individual circumstances. 
This is well illustrated in Nakagami’s two anthologies of short stories, namely, Keshō 
and Kumano-shū.  Keshō was written between 1974 and 1977.  In this anthology, 
Nakagami deliberately placed mythical monogatari and shishōsetsu style stories based 
on facts alternately.  In Keshō, the protagonist appears in a number of different guises.  
                                                                                                                                                  
introduced by Irena Powell as follows: ‘…his [Tōson’s] mode of thought, revealed in his style, “was 
neither purely rational [as in the Western logic], nor meekly submissive to the old conventions, but 
proceeded along the middle ground without destroying either side, and yet enabled the author to 
assert himself to gain fulfilment,” and there lies his strength.’ 
43 Karatani, ‘NKZ Vol. 3, Geppō, May’, 5–7. 
44 Karatani Kōjin and Sekii Mitsuo, ‘Taidan: Tōsō suru chisei to bungaku’, in Karatani, Sakaguchi 
Ango to Nakagami Kenji, 282.  See also Karatani Kōjin, ‘Monogatari・shishōsetsu・shōsetsu’, in 
Gunzō nihon no sakka 24 Nakagami Kenji, Tokyo: Shōgakukan, 1996, 242–275. 
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In the narrative (monogatari) style stories, for example, he manifested the protagonist as 
a mendicant monk in an old tale or a lumber worker and the like, while in the 
shishōsetsu style stories, as a man (based on Nakagami himself) whose wife and 
children run away from him reminiscing repeatedly about his dead brother or the 
hundreds of birds he kept.  Wandering from mountain to mountain in Kumano, these 
protagonists from both styles of story are intertwined with other stories’ events or 
personages in the mythical landscape of Kishū.  Nakagami, then, wrote Karekinada as 
‘shōsetsu’ in which he attempted to employ a new style, the narrative of old women who 
lived in the roji,45 after publishing Keshō in 1977.  Similarly, in 1984, he wrote the 
shōsetsu, Chi no hate shijō no toki after publishing Kumano-shū, a collection that mixed 
alternately a story of the shishōsetsu-style and one of the monogatari-style.  
 
Breaking the spell of monogatari: Repetition of archetype in Akiyuki trilogy 
 
Thus, because his style utilized both shishōsetsu and monogatari, a few critics 
sometimes viewed Nakagami as a naturalist writer.  Though Karatani did not deny this 
kind of evaluation of Nakagami, he, however, advanced his idea a little further.  
Nakagami’s first novella, Misaki, is a story about a young man called Akiyuki, who is 
growing up in Shingū in the Kii Peninsula.  Nakagami employed many materials for 
Misaki from his own intricate life as we have seen at the beginning of this chapter.46 
These motifs that originated from the incidents in Nakagami’s childhood reappeared 
through his following long novels and were examined again and again especially in 
                                                  
45 In Chapter V, I will attempt to give a more precise account of the narrative of old women in the 
roji. 
46 Nagashima, ‘Nakagami Kenji Shōden’, in Gunzō nihon no sakka, 288–298.   
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Karekinada, Chi no hate shijō no toki, Keshō, Sennen no yuraku and Kumano-shū.  
These works had continuously treated the same incidents as leitmotifs of Nakagami’s 
literary universe.47  Central to this issue is the recurrence of a basic form to every story 
― an archetypal pattern or genkei ― in his works.48  Throughout the trilogy of Misaki, 
Karekinada and Chi no hate shijō no toki, the ‘archetype (genkei)’ of these stories, that 
is, a fratricide as in the story of Cain and Abel, an incestuous relationship with one’s 
own sister and conflict with the father were reiterated over and over and eventually 
shifted from the protagonist, Akiyuki, to other characters. 49   Nakagami boldly 
describes an incident from a certain perspective, however he never adheres to the same 
view.  Alan Tansman summarizes Akiyuki’s repetitions as follows:  
 
Nakagami’s constant use of repetitions, in his novels, of images and 
stories makes us feel that his writing is a performance, a reiteration 
of itself and of nothing else, a copy of copies.  Ironically, his 
repetitions also seem to be repeating something prior to language, 
giving the illusion of recollection, not merely reiteration.  They 
give the illusion of―indeed, they create―nostalgia.50   
 
Karatani clarifies that this repetition of an archetype leads us to a form of ‘kankei no 
kankei’ (a relation of relations), which enable all characters to identify themselves as the 
same human being after all.  Each person and each event is different, but through the 
                                                  
47 Zimmerman, ‘Biographical Note’, in Nakagami Kenji, The Cape, translated by Eve Zimmerman, 
191.   
48 Zimmerman, ‘In the Trap of Words’, 133–134.  Nakagami uses the word teikei (定型) or genkei 
(原型) to describe the archetype of narrative.  Genkei was used in Zimmerman’s interview with 
Nakagami in 1989. 
49 See Zimmerman, ‘In the Trap of Words’, 140–142.  See also Karatani, ‘NKZ Vol. 3, Geppō, 
May’, 10–13.  
50 Tansman, ‘History, Repetition, and Freedom in the Narratives of Nakagami Kenji’, 265. 
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lens of this form, the same process repeats itself ubiquitously beyond time and space.51  
This reminds me of Betsuyaku Minoru’s viewpoint of ‘anonymous malice (mukimei-sei 
no akui) in which a nonexistent individual subject or a causal correlation within a closed 
system acts like a protagonist in his plays.52 
As Zimmerman and Yomota Inuhiko closely analysed the shifts of many relationships 
among various personages in Kumano saga, I will not repeat them fully for the 
moment.53  Zimmerman, for example, examines a few shifts in conflicts between 
brothers: the conflict between Akiyuki and an elder half-brother, Ikuo who was the son 
of Akiyuki’s mother Fusa, by her first husband; and the conflict between Akiyuki and 
his younger half-brother, Hideo who shares Akiyuki’s biological father.  This repetition 
of the archetype of monogatari is expressed best by the following quotation when 
Zimmerman says: 
 
When Akiyuki smashes Hideo’s head with a rock, he becomes his elder 
brother, Ikuo: 
 
Suddenly Akiyuki realized it.  His body shook.  He was exactly 
like Ikuo who had died at the age of twenty-four when Akiyuki was 
only twelve.  In place of Ikuo, Akiyuki had killed Akiyuki. 
[Akiyuki wa Akiyuki o koroshita.54]   
··· 
By doubling the mythic archetype back upon itself and using it as a tool 
of liberation, Nakagami finds a solution to the dilemma of repetition and 
the problem of the archetype (genkei).  Through the fluid identities of 
                                                  
51 Karatani, ‘NKZ Vol. 3, Geppō, May’, 12. 
52 We will discuss this matter fully in Chapter V.  Betsuyaku Minoru (別役実, 1937) is one of the 
leading dramatists in Japan.  See, Betsuyaku, Beketto to ijime (ベケットといじめ), Tokyo: 
Iwanami shoten, 2005, 40–87. 
53 See Zimmerman, ‘In the Trap of Words’, 140–142.  See also Yomota Inuhiko, Kishu to tensei・
Nakagami Kenji, Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1996, 151–187. 
54 Nakagami, ‘Karekinada’, 457. 
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Akiyuki, Ikuo, and Hideo, Nakagami has managed to shift and transform 
the narrative that binds us.  Moreover, through the manipulation of 
mythic archetypes Nakagami has written a shishōsetsu that has no 
authoritative consciousness: it is a pseudo-autobiography that lacks a 
center.55   
 
Thus, in Karekinada, Akiyuki, the protagonist, has become aware of the existence of the 
repetition of the old archetype.  To do this, Nakagami hung on to monogatari tightly to 
the end, but he tried to release the spell of monogatari at the last minute.  Nakagami 
attempts to dismantle the law/system in monogatari in writing novels (shōsetsu).  In 
this respect, Yomota or Hasumi Shigehiko first observed in full detail how Nakagami 
tried to liberate shōsetsu from the barren circuit of recurrence of the same archetype of 
monogatari.56  Yomota, for example, explains that one’s novel is to say ‘no’ to his/her 
own previous novel and Nakagami is one of the few contemporary writers who actively 
put this into practice.  With his perception of the endless recurrence of old archetype, 
Nakagami releases the firm framework of monogatari through shifting the position of 
monogatari itself little by little in his polyphonic series of works.  Although 
monogatari incessantly tried to induce Akiyuki (or Nakagami himself) to trace the 
recurrence of the archetype of monogatari as in the plot of Oedipus, unlike most 
modern and contemporary writers, Nakagami did not fall into the trap which was 
prepared by monogatari.  He was well aware of its existence, and dared to plunge into 
the archetype of monogatari and tried to disintegrate it.  
Moreover, this conception of recurrence makes it possible for a lower-class person to 
                                                  
55 Zimmerman, ‘In the Trap of Words’, 142.  
56 A close study on this matter was made by Yomota, Kishu to tensei・Nakagami Kenji, or Hasumi 
Shigehiko, Shōsetsu kara tōku hanarete, Tokyo: Kawade bunko, 1994.  (The original text was 
published by Nihon bungeisha in 1989.). 
 94
transform into a noble entity without changing his/her status.  It makes it possible to 
create ‘sen ni shite ki naru mono’ (being menial and sacred at the same time).57  Thus, 
in Sennen no yuraku, Nakagami succeeded in creating a hollow space, utsuho, which 
erased the boundary between noble and humble, high and low, and morality and 
immorality on the same ground in the outcasts’ community, which Nakagami calls in his 
works the roji, alleyway.  In the novel, despite her illiteracy, Oryū no oba, a midwife in 
the roji, remembers the whole of people’s lives from their birth and narrates the stories 
of six young men of the Nakamotos.  ‘The blood of the Nakamotos is sacred because it 
is thoroughly impure (“jibun no naka ni nagareru sono yodonda, iya sore yue ni 
kiyoraka na chi”).’58  Oryū no oba tells about eminently beautiful young men who had 
to suffer premature death as libertines because of that bloodline.  The six young men 
are described as if they were semi-divine entities.  Eve Zimmerman pointed out that 
the Nakamotos (中本), as their name indicates “origin of the middle”, straddle the 
categories pure/impure, sacred/profane, male/female or human/ animal.59   On this 
account, the roji itself here converted into the space where ‘the moral dimension seems 
irrelevant’, ‘traditional categories lose their weight’ or, to use Nakagami’s term, ‘utsuho’ 
or ‘a neutral place hanging in midair’.60  It is useful to quote from Zimmerman’s 
remark here as follows:  
 
Although Miyoshi, the thief, commits murder, Oryū no oba claims that he 
is innocent; and when Miyoshi tells Oryū that he wants to settle down and 
                                                  
57 See Watanabe Naomi, ‘Akiyuki to “roji”’, in Gunzō nihon no sakka 24 Nakagami Kenji, 65–71.  
The original text can be also found in Watanabe Naomi, Nihon kindai bungaku to sabetsu, Ōta 
Shuppan, 1994. 
58 Zimmerman, ‘In the Trap of Words’, 134. 
59 Ibid., 134–140. 
60 Nakagami, ‘Shōsetsu o sogai suru mono’ (小説を阻害するもの), in Takazawa Shūji (ed.), 
Gendai shōsetsu no hōhō (現代小説の方法), Tokyo: Sakuhinsha, 2007, 34–35. 
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reform, she nearly tells him that ‘his world is no more than a fretful 
dream; no matter how free we believe ourselves to be, our actions do not 
matter—we are all dancing on the Buddha’s palm’.   
 
As we can see from this example, the repetition of the archetype leads every entity into 
the state of interchange and makes a rational order in the normative logic irrelevant.61  
Yomota also describes this space as if it were a maternal space in the archaïque time.62 
These works struck Etō Jun who said at the time: ‘What a radical denial of modern 
Japan this is!’63  However, what makes Nakagami a prodigy of contemporary Japanese 
literature dose not confine itself to the achievement creating such a mythical utopia, roji.  
Nakagami published Chi no hate shijō no toki in 1983, just one year after Sennen no 
yuraku had been published.  In Chi no hate shijō no toki, the roji was razed to the 
ground and had completely vanished because it was reserved for a redevelopment area.  
The theme, conflict with the father, had become suspended in midair because of the 
suicide of the protagonist’s (Akiyuki’s) biological father, Ryūzō.  The archetype 
repeated from Misaki disintegrated here.  Karatani explained that modernity always 
subsumes the normative model such as ‘father’ for us to overcome, however, in Chi no 
hate, this kind of normative model has been destroyed by itself.64  Asada Akira, 
                                                  
61 The tales of the Nakamotos in the roji seem to create the utopia before history or words, that is, 
the ‘myth’.  In 1978, in his path-breaking study of the temples (i.e. enkiridera), market-places (i.e. 
raku), guilds, autonomous cities, which severed their connection with the authorities, during the 
medieval period in Japan, Amino Yoshihiko shed a new light on the perception of “asyl” or a haven 
in society.  This perception of “muen” (severing their connection with the authorities) in asyl might 
give a good account of Nakagami’s “roji.”  Creating such a mythical world — the roji in Sennen no 
yuraku — it seems to me that Nakagami brought “asyl” back to life in the present day.  See Amino 
Yoshihiko, Muen·kugai·raku (zōhoban), Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1987.  (The first edition was published 
in 1978.).  Both Amino and Zimmerman pointed out that this kind of entity that is unrelated to the 
state power was examined in Victor Turner, ‘Liminality and Communitus’, The Ritual Process, 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969, 95–130. 
62 Yomota Inuhiko, Kishu to tensei, 156–159. 
63 Watanabe Naomi, ‘Akiyuki to “roji”’, 70. 
64 Karatani, ‘Shōsetsu to iu Tōsō’, in Gunzō nihon no sakka 24 Nakagami Kenji, 197–199.   The 
original text first appeared in Gunzō (June 1989). 
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sharing his analysis with Karatani, pointed out the post-modern nature of Nakagami’s 
work.  Asada explains that after the disappearance of modern criterion, the reiteration 
of the mythical story that possesses no historicity is the only way in the post-modern 
period.65  He stresses that this perception is clearly reflected in the trilogy of Misaki, 
Karekinada and Chi no hate shijō no toki.  This is what Zimmerman has to say on the 
matter: ‘[In Sennen no yuraku,] Perhaps by playing with the mythical archetype and the 
problem of belief, Nakagami hoped to find a place of perfect rest, a place where one 
could dwell at peace with words, a place beyond time, history, and problem of identity.  
Yet at the same time, he realized that such a wish was a utopia fantasy: one could never 
recapture the point of origin.’  The reflection of this view seems to lead Nakagami to 
destroying the roji in Chi no hate.  Karatani pointed out that the power of affirmation 
in the world of Oryū no oba could not conceal the world of Akiyuki any longer.66 
Through Misaki to Sennen no yuraku, the focus of Nakagami’s thought was 
‘decentralized’ from the centre to the periphery of modern Japan, and created a utopia 
without a boundary between high and low, the innocent and the malicious.  However, 
immediately after he achieved that, in Chi no hate, he then completely ‘deconstructed’ 
the whole world he created.  Nakagami was aware of those concepts of 
‘decentralization’ or ‘deconstruction’ related with postmodernism before they had truly 
penetrated the whole area of modern Japanese literature in the beginning of 1980s.67  
On this account, the works of Nakagami may have awoken each of us to the spell of the 
fixed discourse of monogatari or the modern myths as if they had existed a priori from 
                                                  
65 Asada Akira, ‘Nakagami Kenji o sai-dōnyū suru’, in Gunzō nihon no sakka 24 Nakagami Kenji, 
29–30.  The original text first appeared in Hihyō kūkan, (No. 1 1994). 
66 Karatani, ‘NKZ Vol. 3, Geppō, May’, 15. 
67 See the conversation between Karatani and Kawamura Jirō, ‘Nakagami Kenji: Jidai to Bungaku’, 
in Gunzō, nihon no sakka 24 Nakagami Kenji, 153. 
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the ancient period.  I agree with Alan Tansman in thinking that Nakagami’s attempt to 
battle against a voice that speaks for a unified identity is never completely successful.68  
It seems to me, however, that Nakagami’s attitude or rather his approach towards 
writing his novels still presents us with the possibility of shaping our autonomous 
freedom and the power of self-determination through ‘his battle to extricate himself 
from narratives of the past while yet clinging to them’,69 and continues to call on us to 
be on the alert for the process of forming ‘canon’ which are often backed by the 
masterpieces of Japanese classics found in school textbooks, being regarded as 
utsukushii nihongo (beautiful Japanese language).  In Chapter IV, I shall try to give a 
more detailed account of the process of canon formation in contemporary Japan and 
how Nakagami perceived this matter. 
 
68 Tansman, ‘History, Repetition, and Freedom in the Narratives of Nakagami Kenji’, 275. 
69 Ibid., 258. 
CHAPTER III 
NAKAGAMI KENJI’S AUTONOMY AS A STANDPOINT 
ELICITING A NEW PERSPECTIVE OF MODERN JAPANESE 
LITERATURE 
 
 
In Chapter II, we have examined the manner in which Nakagami ceaselessly searched 
for autonomy that appeared as an ambivalent attitude towards the act of writing, and 
how it was reflected in his major novels, Misaki, Karekinada and Chi no hate shijō no 
toki.  It may be safely assumed that Akiyuki’s awareness of his own crime in Chi no 
hate can be regarded as his continuous self-determination and moral responsibility.  If 
we take another look at contemporary/modern Japanese literature through the lens of 
Nakagami’s complementary autonomy, that is, this continuous act of autonomy found in 
a conflicting binary frame between self and others, we may observe that a new 
perspective of Japanese literature comes to the fore.  It may indicate the possibility of a 
new genealogical study of modern Japanese literature.  The aim of this chapter is to 
look at modern Japanese literature and to determine whether Nakagami’s endless 
autonomous action found in a mutually exclusive dichotomy could be traced back to the 
thought expressed by previous writers.  In my readings of modern Japanese literature 
apart from Nakagami Kenji, I would like to propose that there are some writers who 
perceived and seriously contemplated the notion of autonomy in the past: Nakahara 
Chūya (中原中也 1907–1937), Miyazawa Kenji (宮沢 賢治 1896–1933), Sakaguchi 
Ango (坂口安吾 1906–1955) and the postwar existentialist writers.  My findings are 
not by any means a complete list of all writers who demonstrate the idea of autonomy, 
however, I am hoping that my view serves as a stepping-stone to further study on the 
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degree of autonomy expressed in modern Japanese literature. 
 
Postwar existentialist writers: Intersubjectivity, configurations, and simultaneous 
presence of freedom and responsibility 
 
Let us examine the works of other contemporary/modern Japanese literati who may 
possess the notion of autonomy.  Ōe Kenzaborō, Tsurumi Shunsuke and Kuno Osamu 
are all of the firm opinion that, in the history of modern Japanese literature to date, the 
so-called postwar existentialist writers (sengo ha/sengo jitsuzon shugi sakka 戦後派／
戦後実存主義作家) were the only people who possessed a positive personal autonomy 
that was associated with the moral responsibility for their actions.  I agree with their 
point that the postwar existentialist writers successfully demonstrated the idea of 
autonomy, however I cannot bring myself to accept the point that they are the ‘only’ 
practitioners of autonomous self in modern Japanese literature.  This chapter suggests 
that their notion of autonomy is not limited to their school of writers but resembles the 
endless autonomous action found in the mutually exclusive dichotomy as expressed by 
Nakagami Kenji. 
In his Nobel Prize speech in 1994, practicing what he preached above, Ōe declared 
himself to be ‘a writer who wishes to create serious works of literature distinct from 
those novels which are mere reflections of the vast consumer culture of Tokyo and the 
subcultures of the world at large’.1  In the meanwhile, he also pointed out that, in the 
history of contemporary Japanese literature, the postwar writers (sengo-ha) such as 
Ōoka Shōhei, Takeda Taijun, Shiina Rinzō and Noma Hiroshi were the only ‘serious’ 
writers who were rich in diversity and possessed an active attitude and personal 
                                                  
1 Ōe, Japan, The Ambiguous, and Myself, 121. 
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autonomy.  Ōe highly praised the role played by these writers in initiating a literary 
movement.  He explained that although this literary movement began immediately 
after Japan’s defeat in the War and lasted only about ten years, it had widened the scope 
of contemporary Japanese literature and had promoted its diversification. 2   It is 
important to bear in mind that their literary movement took place around the same time 
as Maruyama Masao proposed two types of autonomy: personal autonomy and social 
autonomy, which were argued in Chapter I.  While personal autonomy is attained by 
the individual whose action carries ‘the principle of self-regulation, or responsibility as 
the corollary of his/her action’, social autonomy refers to ‘a pluralistic society in which 
multi-dimensional individuals preserve their mobility in society’.3  We must not forget 
that Maruyama pointed out the fact that ‘democracy is a system founded on paradox’ 
and ‘difficulties involved in reconciling the individual and the collective in post-war 
Japan’ have always existed.  As we have seen before, Ōe stresses the necessity of 
having the ability of logical self-definition proposed by Maruyama Masao.  
Ōe examines the literary movement that was brought about by the postwar writers 
who attempted to revive what the Japanese had abandoned in the process of pursuing a 
centre-oriented modernization.  Ōe believes that this may show us a set of principles or 
ethics that make it possible for us to create ‘a model of a contemporary age which 
encompasses past and future’.4   If so, what exactly were the principles that the 
contemporary writers could not propose but the postwar writers did?  For example, Ōe 
points out the fact that soon after experiencing the War as a real event, the postwar 
writers tried very hard to ‘“relativize” the value of the emperor, who had had absolute 
                                                  
2 Ōe, Saigo no shōsetsu, 206. 
3 Kersten, Democracy in Postwar Japan, 102–104. 
4 Ōe, ‘Japan’s Dual Identity: A Writer’s Dilemma’, in Japan, The Ambiguous, and Myself, 66. 
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power, and free the Japanese from the course of a system that had haunted their 
minds’. 5   Noma Hiroshi, for example, attempted to liberate former outcast 
communities in the novel in five volumes, Seinen no wa (Ring of Youth, five volumes, 
written between 1947 and 1971).  Thus, a number of postwar writers ‘actively sought a 
direction for their country contrary to that which it had taken in the past’: a way for us 
to re-evaluate the periphery of Japan such as Okinawa or the burakumin, or a way for us 
‘to live as an integral part of the third world, in Asia’.6  Such principles sought by the 
postwar writers are expressed best by Ōe when he says:  
                                                 
 
In the history of modern Japanese literature, the writers most sincere in 
their awareness of a mission were the ‘postwar school’ of writers who 
came onto the literary scene deeply wounded by the catastrophe of war yet 
full of hope for a rebirth.  They tried with great pain to make up for the 
atrocities committed by Japanese military forces in Asia, as well as to 
bridge the profound gaps that existed not only between the developed 
nations of the West and Japan but also between African and Latin 
American countries and Japan.  Only by doing so did they think that they 
could seek with some humility reconciliation with the rest of the world.  
It has always been my aspiration to cling to the very end of the line that 
literary tradition inherited from these writers.7  
 
In their book Gendai nihon no shisō (The Thought of Contemporary Japan, 1956), 
Tsurumi Shunsuke and Kuno Osamu also have a high regard for the postwar writers 
known as ‘postwar existentialists’ such as Haniya Yutaka (埴谷雄高 1909−1997), 
Takami Jun (高見順 1907–1965), Shiina Rinzō, Takeda Taijun on the grounds that they 
were the only practitioners who could demonstrate not only their personal freedom but 
 
5 Ibid., 75. 
6 Ibid., 97. 
7 Ōe, Japan, The Ambiguous, and Myself, 117–118. 
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also self-responsibility for their actions.8  Let us review carefully the manner in which 
the concept of Japanese existentialism is expressed among the sengo-ha people in their 
teens and early twenties at the end of War.  First of all, Tsurumi and Kuno point out 
that crime (hanzai) epitomises Japan’s postwar devastation following the defeat in the 
War.  They go on to explain that: ‘In order to survive in the burned-out ruins after the 
war and depending on black market commodities, ordinary citizens found themselves 
with no other choice but to break the law.’9  Tsurumi and Kuno investigates the 
examples of the crime committed by the ordinary people of this generation and depicts 
them as follows: 
 
In that way, the crime of sengo-ha derived from the belief that all of 
society is irredeemably bad.  Seen in this way, they commit a crime with 
the motivation to try to pursue the responsibility for these unlawful actions 
in their very own way.  They do not content themselves with simply 
being violated by society, quite on the contrary, their philosophy is to 
recriminate on society.  In that manner, crime becomes a tool for 
self-affirmation.10  [･･･] No matter how they dare to act, they assume 
full responsibility for their action.  No matter what adversity they 
experienced, they never shifted the responsibility to others.  [･･･] In 
their attitude, freedom and responsibility appear simultaneously.  This 
simultaneous presence of freedom and responsibility distinguishes 
sengo-ha from other groups of varied times, and this is the very reason 
                                                  
8 Tsurumi and Kuno, Gendai nihon no shisō, 184–185.  
9 Ibid., 191–192. 
10 Ibid., 194. 
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why we regard the sengo-ha as ‘postwar existentialists’. 11  [･･･] The 
sengo-ha shows instinctive animosity towards any other group of people 
who say that they have been aware of the essence of the entire world.  
‘Postwar existentialists’ locate themselves on the antipodes (tairitsu 
chiten) between any kinds of dogmatism such as the one between leftists 
and rightists.12 
 
Judging from this excerpt, it seems reasonable to suppose that sengo-ha’s unlawful acts, 
which indicate the simultaneous presence of freedom and responsibility, resemble the 
form of Nakagami Kenji’s ambivalent attitude towards writing, facing the simultaneous 
presence between the search for self-identity and integration with others.  Sengo-ha’s 
unique moral responsibility that locates themselves on the antipodes where they never 
unipolarize any regime has much in common with Nakagami Kenji’s perception of 
writing as an endless attempt to seek freedom in a dichotomy between self and others.  
Their notion characterized with the simultaneous presence of freedom and responsibility 
also resembles Kant’s notion of freedom that is synonymous to taking personal 
responsibility for the actions they choose because both notions stress that we ought to 
make ourselves responsible for our own deeds.  The literary critic, Odagiri Hideo 
indicates that these postwar existentialists were strongly influenced by Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s existentialism, which was introduced to Japanese academics around 1947.13  
Here, it may be useful for us to explore the manner in which Sartre defined 
existentialism at that time by reviewing the record of his lecture, ‘Existentialism and 
                                                  
11 Ibid., 196. 
12 Ibid., 197. 
13 Odagiri, Gendai bungaku-shi, gekan, 565. 
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Human Emotions’ which was held in 1945.   
 
The philosophies of Descartes [･･･] to the contrary, through the I think we 
reach our own self in the presence of others, and the others are just as real 
to us as our own self.  Thus, the man who becomes aware of himself 
through the cogito also perceives all others, and he perceives them as the 
condition of his existence.  He realizes that he can not be anything (in the 
sense that we say that someone is witty or nasty or jealous) unless others 
recognize it as such.  In order to get any truth about myself, I must have 
contact with another person.  The other is indispensable to my own 
existence, as well as to my knowledge about myself.  This being so, in 
discovering my inner being I discover the other person at the same time, 
like a freedom placed in front of me which thinks and wills only for or 
against me.  Hence, let us at once announce the discovery of a world 
which we shall call intersubjectivity; this is the world in which man 
decides what he is and what others are.14 
 
Sartre’s ‘intersubjectivity’ finds not only the presence of himself but also the presence 
of others in Cartesian cogito.  His individual acts as endless practice as well as his acts 
in relation to others are both intricately intertwined and depend on each other.  On this 
account, we can find a good reason for the similarity between sengo-ha’s attitude and 
Nakagami Kenji’s attitude or Kant’s moral responsibility interpreted by Karatani Kōjin.   
Moreover, Sartre also argues that we cannot find in every man ‘some universal 
essence’ represented by human nature.  He goes on to explain, ‘What does not vary is 
the necessity for him [a man] to exist in the world, to be at work there, to be there in the 
midst of other people, and to be mortal there.  The limits are neither subjective nor 
objective, or, rather, they have an objective and a subjective side.’15  Sartre further 
                                                  
14 Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions, 37–38. 
15 Ibid. 
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explains the manner in which our practical actions could take place within these a priori 
limits that outline man’s fundamental situation in the universe as follows: 
 
Objective because they are to be found everywhere and are recognizable 
everywhere; subjective because they are lived and are nothing if man does 
not live them, that is, freely determine his existence with reference to them.  
And though the configurations may differ, at least none of them are 
completely strange to me, because they all appear as attempts either to 
pass beyond these limits or recede from them or deny them or adapt to 
them.  Consequently, every configuration, however individual it may be, 
has a universal value.16 
 
Sartre stresses that ‘every configuration has universality in the sense that every 
configuration can be understood by every man.’  He, therefore, defines configuration 
as something that is not given a priori, but something that are perpetually being made 
now in this time and this space.  We may also agree with a fair certainty that this 
perception of Sartre’s configuration that is being made perpetually bears a close 
similarity to Nakagami Kenji’s perception of the act of writing as continuous 
self-determination as if it were aspiring to the ceaseless hell. 
At this juncture, on the issue of the endless search for autonomy, it is relevant to 
consider Richard Rorty’s definition of a ‘liberal ironist’ who ‘regard[s] the realization of 
utopias and the envisaging of still further utopias, as an endless, proliferating realization 
of Freedom, rather than a convergence towards an already existing Truth.’17  Rorty 
points out that the recent historicist turn that stemmed from those concepts of 
decentralization or deconstruction related with post-modernism ‘helped us substitute 
                                                  
16 Ibid., 38–39. 
17 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, xiii. 
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Freedom for Truth as the goal of thinking and or social progress.’  He emphasizes, 
however, that even after this substitution has taken place, ‘the old tension between the 
private and the public remains.’  He goes on to say that there is no way in which 
philosophy, or any other theoretical discipline, will ever let us combine two quests such 
as self-creation and justice, private perfection and human solidarity in a single vision.  
Thus, he leads us to the idea of the ‘liberal ironist’ by saying that his attempt is ‘to show 
how things look if we drop the demand for a theory which unifies the public and private, 
and are content to treat the demands of self-creation and of human solidarity as equally 
valid, yet forever incommensurable.’18   
The sociologist, Miyadai Shinji (b. 1959) and the intellectual social historian, 
Nakamasa Masaki (b. 1963) also talk about this issue in their book, Nichijō, kyōdōtai, 
aironī―jiko-kettei no honshitsu to genkai (日常･共同体･アイロニー 自己決定の本
質と限界  Everyday Life ･Community･ Irony―The Essence and Boundaries of 
Self-determination), which was published in 2004.  They describe this matter as the 
recursive social structure that ensures our freedom, that is, relative self-determination 
depending on our daily on-site observation of a changing social context.19  We have no 
choice but to act, accepting and discarding the ‘community’s codes’ simultaneously.  
Rorty indicates that the novel is one of the genres that makes us see others as ‘one of us’ 
rather than as ‘them’ and makes us see ‘the detailed description of what unfamiliar 
people are like and of redescription of what we ourselves are like.’  In this sense, recall 
our earlier example in which Nakagami Kenji also perceives an act of writing as the 
                                                  
18 Ibid., xv. 
19 Miyadai and Nakamasa, Nichijō, kyōdōtai, aironī, 212–217: ‘shakai-teki bunmyaku no henka o 
eikyū ni kansatsu shitsutsu senbiki no sentakusei o ishiki shitsuzukeru owarinaki saikisei 社会的文
脈の変化を永久に観察しつつ線引きの選択性を意識し続ける終りなき再帰性’ or ‘hito no 
nasu kubetsu o ukeiretsutsu eikyū ni shinjizu ni jissen suru shika nai 人のなす区別を受け入れつ
つ永久に信じずに実践するしかない’ 
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endless search for autonomy within the universal condition of human beings (the 
external causalities). 
 
Sakaguchi Ango’s paradox: The theory of farce 
 
In Chapter I, we discussed the affinity between Nakagami Kenji’s ambivalent attitude 
towards writing facing the simultaneous presence between the search for self-identity 
and the integration with others and Karatani Kōjin’s interpretation of Kantian 
autonomous freedom and responsibility that is synonymous to being causa sui.  Their 
endless autonomous act of being causa sui leads us further into a consideration of 
Nakagami’s appreciation of the novelist, Sakaguchi Ango (1906–1955).  Nakagami 
considers Ango as a writer who accepts any kind of bare, sobering reality for what it is.  
In his essay written in 1976, ‘Sakaguchi Ango: sora kakeru ahōdori’ (坂口安吾 空翔け
るアホウドリ Sakaguchi Ango: Albatross in Flight), Nakagami quotes Ango’s essay, 
‘Kyōso no bungaku’ (教祖の文学 Literature of the Guru).20 In this essay, Nakagami 
acclaimed Ango’s criticism of one of the most prominent literary critics, Kobayashi 
Hideo.  Nakagami cites the following from Ango’s essay: 
 
本当に人の心を動かすものは、毒に当てられた奴、罰の当たった奴
でなければ、書けないものだ。思想や意見によって動かされるとい
うことのない見えすぎる目などには、宮沢賢治の見た青ぞらやすき
とおった風などは見ることができないのである。21 
 
                                                  
20 Nakagami, ‘Sakaguchi Ango Sora kakeru ahōdori’, in NKZ Vo. 14, 400–403.  Sakaguchi, ‘Kyōso 
no bungaku’, in Sakaguchi Ango zenshū 15, Tokyo: Chikuma bunko, 1991, 147–168. 
21 Nakagami, ‘Sakaguchi Ango Sora kakeru ahōdori’, in NKZ Vol. 14, 402.  Sakaguchi, ‘Kyōso no 
bungaku’, 161. 
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A manuscript that touches one’s heartstrings deeply must be written only 
by people who have been poisoned or received divine punishment.  If 
someone has far too penetrating eyes that are utterly unmoved by one’s 
thought or opinion, it will be impossible for him/her to see the blue sky or 
clear crystal breeze that Miyazawa Kenji had seen.  
 
Ango implies here that Kobayashi will not be able to understand what was written by 
Miyazawa Kenji.  Ango also severely criticizes Kobayashi’s critiques of Saigyō or 
Minamoto Sanetomo22 as being too aesthetic, and regards him as a guru who has been 
enlightened to the truth with an excessive degree of perception.23  However, Ango 
stated that our life should be filled with much more conflict and contradiction than 
Kobayashi perceives.  For this reason, he was irritated at Kobayashi’s self-consistency 
in writing his critiques and his coherent explanation in which he perceived the sense of 
loneliness in the works of Saigyō and Sanetomo.  What has to be noticed here is that 
the poem that Ango quoted from Miyazawa’s book markedly reflects a paradoxical 
perspective.  Here is Roger Pulvers’s translation: 
 
Speaking with the Eyes (Me nite iu 眼にて云う) 
 
It’s not long now 
It just won’t stop 
Gurgling and gushing up 
I haven’t slept all night and the blood keeps flowing and flowing 
It’s blue and still out there 
                                                  
22 For this, see Kobayashi, ‘Saigyō’ and ‘Sanetomo’, in Kobayashi Hideo zensakuhin 14: Mujō 
toiukoto, 171–219. 
23 As Deguchi Yūkō indicated that Ango received an infamous reputation for his outspoken opinions 
about his senior writers, this evaluation of Kobayashi might be written with his pungent humour.  
See Deguchi, Sakaguchi Ango hyakusai no itanji (坂口安吾 百歳の異端児), 23. 
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It looks like death…and very soon at that  
And yet I feel the most magnificent breeze 
The pure light is within reach 
As this clear wind rushes toward me 
Swelling from a blue sky 
The blue is the blue of a rush mat scarred by fire 
Of waves of autumn blossoms formed 
In flowers like hair, like young maple buds 
Dressed in your black frock coat 
Could you be on your way home from a medical conference 
If death takes me now I cannot complain 
Seeing how diligently and cleverly you have attended me 
Could my indifference to suffering 
Despite the constant flow of blood 
Be a sign that the soul is now half-departed from the body 
My soul torment is that because of this blood 
I am unable to tell you this 
In your eyes I am no doubt a wretched sight 
But from here…after all 
All I can see is that clear blue sky 
And a transparent wind 24 
  
What this excerpt makes clear at once is Miyazawa’s paradoxical viewpoint.  We can 
easily find a lot of paradoxes in this poem.  The ghastly grotesque sight of a man lying 
in a pool of blood is quite a contrast to ‘the most magnificent breeze’ ‘swelling from a 
blue sky’.  A dying man whose ‘blood keeps flowing and flowing’  (gabugabu 
waiteiru がぶがぶ湧いている) cannot see anything but ‘a blue sky’ and ‘a clear, 
transparent wind’.  Nakagami, Ango and Miyazawa seem to share a paradoxical 
perspective of their surrounding world, which may be considered as one of the 
                                                  
24 ‘Speaking with the Eyes’ is translated by Roger Pulvers in Eigo de yomu Miyazawa Kenji shishū, 
Tokyo: Chikuma bunko, 1997, 80–83.  Miyazawa Kenji, ‘Me nite iu’ (眼にて云う), in Miyazawa 
Kenji zenshū 2, Tokyo: Chikuma bunko, 1986, 506–507. 
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characteristics of their literature.  Nakagami Kenji, in his essay titled ‘Sakaguchi 
Ango: Minami kara no hikari’ (坂口安吾･南からの光 Sakaguchi Ango: The Light 
from the South, 1985), stated that Ango considered himself as evil personified, and for 
that reason he could penetrate deeply into the good/innocent side of human nature as 
well as the odious side of it.  He also stated that this kind of sheer perception of our 
real world could also be found in the works of Miyazawa Kenji.25  Thus, Nakagami 
shared his paradoxical world-view as seen in phrases such as ‘The blood of the 
Nakamotos is sacred because it is thoroughly impure (Sennen no yuraku)’ with Ango 
and Miyazawa.   
Nakagami Kenji shows us another good example of Ango’s paradoxical viewpoint in 
another essay on Ango, ‘Sakaguchi Ango: Farusu no kōsen’ (坂口安吾 ファルスの光
線 Sakaguchi Ango: A Ray of Farce, 1976).  Nakagami quotes Ango’s essay, ‘FARCE 
ni tsuite (On Farce, 1932)’ in which Ango advocates that ‘the best appearance of art is 
reflected in “farce”.’ 
 
Farce is something that tries to acknowledge the existence of the whole 
about human beings affirmatively.  It accepts no matter what it is as long 
as it is concerned with the reality of human beings, for example, fantasy, 
dream, death, anger, contradiction, dumbhead or mumbling goof, just 
anything and everything.  Thus, farce is to accept anything affirmatively 
making no judgment either “yes” or “no,” that is something to affirm the 
denial as well as the affirmation, or even the things that had already been 
affirmed, that is to say, to affirm the affirmation of the affirmations, 
                                                  
25 Nakagami, ‘Sakaguchi Ango: Minami kara no hikari ’, in NKZ Vol. 15, 510–511. 
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moreover, that is to continue eternally and everlastingly to affirm anything 
and everything about human beings. [･･･] To sum up the matter, to affirm 
everything about human beings means to take in at one go an amalgam of 
all the raging chaos and glaring contradiction that we find.  No one can 
resolve the contradiction, that is, no one but an enthusiastic admirer of 
his/her eternal and indomitable perseverance in affirming the chaotic 
condition of human nature in the raw. 26  
 
What Nakagami sees in this quotation is Ango’s firm standpoint which accepts the bare 
naked existence of human beings no matter what it is.  From this point of view, 
Nakagami understands that the protagonists in Ango’s novels who are depicted as an 
idiot, a prostitute or a madman, a disabled person or any suppressed person are simply 
everyday people who arise in our society.  There is no empty rhetoric or exaggeration 
in his words.  Ango depicts all human beings with their warts.  There is a sheer reality 
in the lives of these people.  Nakagami quotes in this essay a few verses from Sakura 
no mori no mankai no shita (桜の森の満開の下 In the Forest, under Cherries in Full 
Bloom, 1947), Yonaga hime to mimio (夜長姫と耳男 The Princess Long-night and the 
Big Ears Man, 1952) or Hakuchi (白痴 The Idiot, 1946).27  Similar examples of the 
paradox between evil/impure and good/sacred are abundant.  In Nakagami’s works, too, 
we can observe his vivid representation of the unprivileged people on the periphery of 
modern society such as burakumin, Korean residents in Japan (zainichi Korian) or Ainu 
                                                  
26 Nakagami, ‘Sakaguchi Ango: Farusu no kōsen’, in NKZ Vol. 14, 410.  The original text first 
appeared in Nakagami Kenji, Yume no chikara, Tokyo: Hokuyōsha, 1979. 
27 Idib., 407–412.  Hakuchi was translated by George Saitō as ‘The Idiot’ in Ivan Morris (ed.), 
Modern Japanese Stories, Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1962, 383–410.  Sakura no mori no 
mankai no shita was translated by Roger Pulvers as ‘In the Woods Beneath the Cherry Blossoms in 
Full Bloom’ in Eigo de yomu Sakura no mori no mankai no shita, Tokyo: Chikuma bunko, 1998. 
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people, which may be derived from this sheer perception of human beings.   
  Karatani Kōjin also highly praises Ango’s perspectives in his article entitled ‘“Nihon 
bunka shikan” ron (An Essay on “A Private View on Japanese Culture”, 1975)’.  He 
introduces Ango’s farsighted criticism of A Rediscovery of Japanese Beauty by Bruno 
Taut.  Karatani sees Taut’s viewpoints as nothing but one of those so-called 
nihonjinron (the conceptual discussion about the Japanese) that places Japan in a single 
cultural mould.  Ango, examining whatever the problem in question and reflecting on 
himself, establishes here a firm footing as a modern writer who has a diverse perception 
of Japanese culture and penetrates nihonjinron as a fantastic ideology, perceiving it in 
the same way as the invented monogatari or canon formation. 
  Ango’s affirmation of sober human reality can be considered as Karatani’s 
interpretation of Kantian notion of freedom and responsibility as we have seen in the 
previous chapter.  We may recall that, according to Kant, ‘the rule of judgment under 
laws of pure practical reason is this: ask yourself whether, if the action you propose 
were to take place by a law of nature of which you were yourself a part, you could 
indeed regard it as possible through your will.’  Karatani interprets this notion as 
follows: our freedom/autonomous action (and responsibility) only spring out when we 
act as if we follow our free will, applying the practical stance at the same time 
bracketing the theoretical stance.  First, we must admit the fact that ‘what we consider 
as determination of free will is always already that by the complex causalities.’  With 
all that affirmation of sheer reality on the theoretical stance, we, at the same time, are 
able to be free if we are deemed to be free and to be responsible for our action on the 
practical stance.  Let me stress again that ‘freedom is synonymous to being causa sui, 
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self-motivated, subjective, and autonomous.’28  
  Similarly, Maruyama Masao recognizes the paradoxical world-view in Fukuzawa 
Yukichi’s perception of human beings.  He points out that while Fukuzawa regards 
human beings as nothing but a small maggot (ujimushi) among the vast region of space, 
he suggests that we should be proud of ourselves as we should be regarded as the very 
spirit of all things’29 (banbutsu no rei 万物の霊).  On the one hand, he asserts that our 
life is deemed to be just frivolous play (tawamure 戯れ), on the other hand, he regards 
our conduct to be a serious duty.  Victor Koschmann summarizes well Maruyama’s 
positive recognition of Fukuzawa’s paradoxical statements:  
 
Maruyama argues that if one were to adhere single-mindedly to the 
viewpoint that life is play, he or she would most likely turn eventually to 
religious escapism or nihilistic hedonism; if, on the other hand, one 
absolutized the serious dimension, the results would be fetishism and loss 
of autonomy.  “It is only when the seriousness of life and frivolity of life 
augment and functionalize each other there can truly be an autonomous 
and independent spirit.”  A functionally productive alternation between 
these dimensions is possible only when one is able to act “as if”―as if life 
were play in order not to become immobilized by the gravity of it all, and 
as if life were serious in order to resist the temptation of escapism or 
opportunism.  Only thus, Maruyama seems to suggest, can one conceive 
of a socialized but independent, democratic subject without resorting to 
theological guarantees.30 
 
On this account, in the same way as Karatani’s analysis of making observations by 
bracketing, ‘Maruyama expresses this by saying that Fukuzawa’s statements always 
need to be taken “as if” they were “in brackets”’.  We may recall here again that 
                                                  
28 Karatani Kōjin, Transcritique on Kant and Marx, translated by Sabu Kohso, 114–115. 
29 Koschmann, Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan, 185. 
30 Ibid., 186. 
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Nakagami Kenji built up his ambivalent attitude towards writing, and his ambivalent 
attitude was considered as the impetus for him to write novels perpetually.  Nakagami 
perceived that writing arises from an eternal conflict between one’s logical 
self-definition and the collective notion, and is formed by the sum of individual acts, 
that sometimes act as if they existed a priori.  In this respect, in a way similar to 
Maruyama’s notion of autonomy, we may consider his act of writing as a ‘tireless 
engagement’ to ‘make new judgments with a historically changing environment’.  This 
dichotomy between the two never ends and has a way of repeating itself.  With this 
dilemma between identification and differentiation, Nakagami continues to seek his real 
identity because he wishes to break off the superficial relationship with others and enjoy 
exercising his autonomous freedom.  Nakagami Kenji attempted to make a painstaking 
effort to encounter his own self, at the same time, to recognize others (tasha) as 
differences (sai 差異) surrounding his self and find his sincere relationship with them 
without feigning.  For Nakagami, writing subsists on this conflict between one’s 
realization of autonomy and one’s awareness of dependence on others.  In a similar 
manner, it seems to me that Ango’s notion of ‘farce’ recurs ceaselessly in affirming the 
chaotic human condition filled with contradictions. 
 
Sakaguchi Ango’s decadence and the home of literature 
 
In addition to the discussion above, Karatani Kōjin examines Ango’s essay, ‘Bungaku 
no furusato’ (文学のふるさと The Home of Literature, 1941) which refers to Charles 
Perrault’s well-known tale, Little Red Riding Hood.  As it is well known, this story 
ends with the scene of the wolf, disguised as a grandmother, eating the little girl who 
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visited her grandmother.  Ango describes this scene as follows: ‘In this, all of sudden, 
we are thrust off and perplexed by the broken promise.  But in this empty margin of 
sudden termination, by a sudden blow to the eye, don’t we see a very tranquil and 
transparent home, a heartbreakingly tender home.’31   In this passage, Ango calls 
something that thrusts us away as ‘furusato (home)’, in Karatani’s phrase, that is ‘the 
other’ (tasha) who dwells in our domain of ‘exteriority’ (gaibu 外部).  Here, what 
Karatani turns his attention to is to consider ‘being thrust away by the other (tasha ni 
yotte tsukihanasareru koto 他者によって突き放されること)’.  Karatani points out 
this kind of vivid perception of otherness (tashasei 他者性) or the veracity of 
confronting others is a truth little understood in our time but it is a very essential one 
when one differentiates one’s self against others.  Here, we may observe Ango’s 
paradoxical attitude towards self-discernment and the search for others which thrusts us 
away but for that reason it can be defined as our home of literature.32   
Nakagami, sharing these paradoxical perceptions of Ango’s literature with Karatani, 
describes Ango as a writer who stands no comparison with the other writers in the 
history of Japanese literature, and admits Ango’s strong influence on his own later 
works. 33   Thus, Nakagami inherited the notion of ‘farce’, which opposes any 
centripetal force that represents the convergence with the emperor ideology (tennōsei 
ideology) and what Karatani calls a quest for others or exteriority, from Ango.  This 
perception of a recurring paradox is well illustrated in Nakagami’s following remarks in 
Tori no yō ni Kemono no yōni: 
                                                  
31 Karatani, ‘Buddhism, Marxism, and Fascism ― On Sakaguchi Ango and Takeda Taijun’ (trans. 
Sabu Kohso) taken from Internet Homepage, Karatni Forum 
(http://www.karataniforum.org/index.html) on 25 August 2001. 
32 Karatani, ‘ “Nihon bunka shikan” ron’, in Karatani Kōjin, Sakaguchi Ango to Nakagami Kenji, 
Tokyo: Ōta shuppan, 1996, 10–53. 
33 Nakagami, ‘Sakaguchi Ango: Minami kara no hikari’, in NKZ Vol. 15, 499–511. 
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 I have been denying everything.  And now I came to know the fact that 
my body and soul as a professional writer had been cultivated by that 
continuous denial.  However, now, I realized that in my inner world, 
there occurred a complete reversal of the plot from denial to affirmation.  
Jumping illogically to a conclusion, but neither new novels nor new 
novelists exist anywhere.  All things remain in the old shape.  The old 
shape merely reappears in a different figure.  It sounds as if it won’t get 
anywhere, but I believe so.34  
 
As we have observed in Chapter II, Watanabe Naomi also explains that the perception 
of Nakagami shook the identification in modern thought that reconciles such conflict 
between pure and impure or sacred and profane, and integrates the two contradictory 
elements into a state of equilibrium.35  Watanabe portrays such an equilibrium as 
nothing but a product of a modern structure which has been ignoring the substance of 
burakumin or sabetsu in modern Japanese history.  This is well illustrated in 
Nakagami’s reportage, Kishū: Ki no kuni ne no kuni monogatari (紀州 木の国・根の国
物語 Kishū: Stories of the Land of Trees and Roots, 1977/1978).  Nakagami travelled 
in Kishū and faced the realities of discrimination against the burakumin there in 1977.  
In Asso, Nakagami witnessed a young man pulling out every hair from the tail of a 
rotten rump of horse-flesh.  This experience made a dramatic impact on Nakagami, 
who describes it as more than a hideous shock, rather, as being struck by awe (ifu 畏
                                                  
34 Nakagami Kenji, ‘Shōsetsu no atarashisa to wa nanika’, in NKZ Vol. 14, 339.  The original text 
first appeared in Nakagami, Tori no yō ni Kemono no yōni, Tokyo: Hokuyōsha, 1976. 
35 Watanabe Naomi, ‘Akiyuki to “roji”’, 65–86. 
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怖 ). 36   Watanabe points out that, confronting burakumin’s sheer naked reality, 
Nakagami was deeply aware of some kind of ugly entity which modern logic or modern 
language could not capture because of its fierce imbalance.  For Nakagami, this 
experience can be regarded as, in Ango’s phrase, ‘being thrust away by the other’, and 
this may enlarge Nakagami’s perception of others as a home of his literature.  
Nakagami admits that the life is the abominable.  Nakagami sees that it is possible for 
the people who could perceive this kind of fierce imbalance as a sheer reality of others 
to differentiate differences against discrimination in a true sense.  Nakagami accepts 
the harsh discrimination against burakumin because he considers that the discrimination 
also grows out of the law of nature, which regulates the cause and effect relationship in 
the universe.  For Nakagami, his ultimate aim may be not to eliminate it (it may be 
synonymous ‘to cover up’ or ‘to conceal’) but to make its presence recognized as 
difference everywhere in the world. 
Sharing the perception of the theory of farce with Ango who affirms here and now, 
Nakagami accepts the bare existence of human beings no matter what it is.  We should 
not overlook that Kantian autonomous freedom interpreted by Karatani could be a moral 
law ‘as if’ we are deemed to be responsible not only for our immediate actions but also 
some indirect incidents, which we have no intention to direct.  In his best known essay 
written in 1946, Daraku-ron (堕落論 On Decadence), Ango made a statement similar 
to Sartre’s notion of ‘the configurations’ that are not given a priori, but that are 
perpetually being made now in this time and this space.  Ango attempted to answer the 
question of how our practical actions could take place within a priori limits which 
outline man’s fundamental situation in the universe.  Ango states: 
                                                  
36 Nakagami, ‘Kishū: Ki no kuni, ne no kuni monogatari’, in NKZ Vol. 14, 545–546. 
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 After the war ended our freedom was completely restored, but when that 
freedom was restored we began to notice our own inscrutable limitations 
and the way they impinged on our freedom.  Mankind cannot live in 
eternal freedom.  The reason why is simply that we live, we die, and we 
think. [･･･] Humanity does not change.  We have simply gone back to 
being human.  Humanity will fall into decadence.  [･･･] Our fall cannot 
be prevented; we cannot be saved.  Humanity will live and humanity will 
fall.  There are no simple paths to salvation.37 
 
Immediately after stating this, Ango contrariwise asserts, ‘We are not going to fall 
because we lost the war.  We are going to fall because we are human, simply because 
we are alive.  But can we save humanity from an eternal decline?  [･･･] We are too 
weak to keep falling into decadence.’  As we can see, Ango expresses a paradox here 
again.  On the one hand, he suggests that we must save ourselves by discovering 
ourselves once we have fallen to the depths of decadence; on the other hand he points 
out that ‘we are too weak to keep falling into decadence.’  Or what does he mean by 
saying that we come to realize the fact that we are not really free when we have 
obtained all of our freedom?  If we consider Ango’s daraku (to keep falling into 
decadence) as ceaseless hell, that is, the continual rejection of ‘true principle’ made by 
others as ‘an already fixed and stationary existence’, then, it is only natural that Ango 
indicates that we are not able to fall into the depths of decadence simply because it is 
only when the self-legislation (aspiring to the state of decadence) and the integration 
with ‘our own inscrutable limitations’ functionalize each other, can there be autonomous 
freedom in a true sense. 
                                                  
37 Sakaguchi Ango, ‘Darakuron’ in Shinchō (April 1946), translated by Ian Smith as ‘On Decadence’  
taken from Internet Homepage, Sakaguchi Ango and the Morality of Decadence  
(http://mcel.pacificu.edu/aspers/sholars/Smith/SAKAGUCHI.html) on 07 July 2006.  Sakaguchi, 
‘Daraku-ron’, in Sakaguchi Ango zenshū 14, Tokyo: Chikuma bunko, 1990, 511–522. 
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Miyazawa Kenji’s paradox: Writing as four dimensional-art  
 
For the present, we may recall that Ango quoted Miyazawa’s poem, ‘Speaking with the 
Eyes’ (‘Me nite iu’) from Haru to shura (Spring and Ashura) and observed Miyazawa’s 
paradoxical view in it by stating that only a sinful person can see what Miyazawa 
portrays, that is, a transparent blue sky.38  It may be useful to look more closely at 
some of the paradoxical features of the literature of Miyazawa Kenji.  Reading the 
poems and essays written by Miyazawa, I would like to suggest that his literature may 
serve a good example of autonomy that arises from the eternal dichotomy between the 
individual and the collective as in the examples of Nakagami and Ango.  A Japanese 
poet and children’s literature writer, Miyazawa Kenji wrote numerous short stories and 
poems in his short life of 37 years.  His short stories have been widely read not only 
by children but by people of all ages.  Nakamura Miharu points out in his book, Keisō 
chū no shutai: Sōseki･Dazai･Kenji (係争中の主体 漱石・太宰・賢治 The Subject in 
Process―Sōseki, Dazai, Kenji, 2006) that Miyazawa’s texts are a vast repository of 
paradox in a broad sense.39  He gives a few examples that seem to support this.  
Donguri to yamaneko (どんぐりと山猫 Wildcat and the Acorns, 1921),40 for example, 
provides a good example to indicate the paradoxical viewpoint that appeared in the 
works of Miyazawa.  One day, the protagonist Ichirō receives a postcard from the 
presiding judge, Wildcat who asks Ichirō to help him in a difficult case.  When Ichirō 
                                                  
38 Sakaguchi, ‘Kyōso no bungaku’, in Sakaguchi Ango zenshū 15, 159–161.  I use Miyazawa for 
the term referring to Miyazawa Kenji so that readers will not mistake Miyazawa Kenji for Nakagami 
Kenji. 
39 Nakamura, Keisō chū no shutai, 195. Nakamura explains that he was inspired by Julia 
Kristeva’s term, subject en procés (subject in process). 
40 Miyazawa, ‘Donguri to yamaneko’, in Miyazawa Kenji zenshū 8, Tokyo: Chikuma bunko, 1986, 
17–28.  Its first impression appeared in Chūmon no ooi ryōriten (注文の多い料理店 The 
Restaurant of Many Orders) in 1924.  ‘Donguri to yamaneko’ was translated by John Bester as 
‘Wildcat and the Acorns’ in The Tales of Miyazawa Kenji, Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1996, 22–43. 
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finds his way to Wildcat’s court, Ichirō sees Wildcat struggling to try the case that 
involves a dispute among the acorns.  They are having a feud over who is the best 
acorn among them.  The one with the most pointed head?  The roundest one?  The 
biggest one?  The tallest one?  When Ichirō suggests a solution, Wildcat accepts his 
offer with great pleasure and speaks to the acorns as follows: 
 
よろしい。しずかにしろ。申しわたしだ。このなかで、いちばんえ
らくなくて、ばかで、めちゃくちゃで、てんでなっていなくて、あ
たまのつぶれたようなやつが、いちばんえらいのだ。41 
 
Right!  Be quiet now!  Here is my verdict.  The best of you is the one 
who is least important, most foolish, most ridiculous, absolutely 
good-for-nothing, and completely crack brained! 
 
Nakamura Miharu indicates that similar examples are abundant in the works of 
Miyazawa.  He points out that this kind of paradoxical rhetoric, which has two 
conflicting meanings, can be observed quite frequently in the texts of Miyazawa.  
Although it cannot be introduced here for lack of space, Nakamura exemplifies the 
manner in which the paradoxical binary is expressed in other of Miyazawa’s texts and 
poems from his book of poetry, Haru to shura (春と修羅 Spring and Ashura, 1924), 
mainly analysing his process of revising three poems.42   
In addition to this, I would like to illustrate his paradoxical/ironical approach in 
elaborating his short stories by an unrepresented example, ‘Neko no jimusho’ (猫の事
                                                  
41 Miyazawa, ‘Donguri to yamaneko’, translated by John Bester as ‘Wildcat and the Acorns’, 37–38. 
42 Nakamura, Keisō chū no shutai, 195–220. 
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務所 Cats’ Office),43 which appeared originally in a literary magazine, Getsuyō, (月曜 
Monday) in 1926.  This short story is set in a cats’ office that deals with cats’ public 
affairs in general.  The official duties are exercised by Secretary-General, Black Cat 
and four clerks, namely, First Secretary, White Cat, Second Secretary, Tabby Cat, Third 
Secretary, Calico Cat, and finally, the protagonist cat, Fourth Secretary, Fireplace Cat 
(Kama-neko かま猫).  Fireplace Cat has a habit of sleeping in a fireplace because he 
needs to warm himself.  He cannot help doing it just because he has a thinner skin than 
other cats.  For this reason, he is always blackened by chimney soot, and he has been 
severely bullied and harassed by the other three colleagues because of his scruffy 
appearance.  Secretary-General, Black Cat, is the only one who is sympathetic about 
his nature and habit.  Moreover, the other three cats are also very jealous of Fireplace 
Cat as he is a highly qualified and diligent member of staff.  One day the other three 
cats made up a story to lead Black Cat to believe that Fireplace Cat has been seeking the 
post of Secretary-General.  On this day, the three cats as well as the angry 
Secretary-General, Black Cat, did not give any work to Fireplace Cat, ignoring him all 
day.  Fireplace Cat was so upset that he started crying.  At the end of this short story, 
a huge mythical golden lion (shishi 獅子 Singh) suddenly appeared and ordered the 
office to disband.  Interestingly, we can observe two different endings to this story 
because the initial manuscript was preserved.  In his initial ending, Miyazawa wrote: 
 
釜猫はほんたうにかあいさうです。それから三毛猫もほんたうにか
あいさうです。虎猫も実に気の毒です。白猫も大へんあはれです。
事務長の黒猫もほんたうにかあいさうです。立派な頭を有った獅子
も実に気の毒です。みんなみんなあはれです。かあいさうです。か
                                                  
43 Miyazawa, ‘Neko no jimusho’, in Miyazawa Kenji zenshū 8, Tokyo: Chikuma bunko, 1986, 
198–207. 
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あいさう、かあいさう。44 
 
I feel very sorry for Fireplace Cat.  And, I feel very sorry for Calico Cat, 
too.  My heart bleeds for Tabby Cat as well.  I have a great pity on 
White Cat.  I feel awfully sorry about the Secretary-General, Black Cat.  
I sincerely sympathize with the Lion who has a splendid head.  I feel 
sorry for all of them.  So pitiful…  So sad…  
 
Compared with this subjective and emotional ending, his final manuscript goes on as 
follows: 
 
かうして事務所は廃止になりました。 
ぼくは半分獅子に同感です。45 
 
This is how the cats’ office went out of existence.   
I half agree with Lion's order. 
 
From these excerpts, we can observe how Miyazawa denied the decision made by an 
absolute being or universal truth, which was expressed by the huge mythical golden lion 
in this short story.  While he proposed a one-dimensional sense of value judgments by 
saying that every character is pitiful in his first draft, Miyazawa, in his final manuscript, 
rewrote the ending and left the final decision on the survival of the cats’ office to us 
(readers) by saying, ‘I half agree with Lion's order.’  On this matter, Nakamura Miharu 
analyses the texts of Bijiterian taisai (ビヂテリアン大祭 Vegetarian Festival)46  
thoroughly and derives a similar view of the indecisive nature of Miyazawa’s texts.  
                                                  
44 Miyazawa, ‘Neko no jimusho―Shokikei’ (猫の事務所―初期形), in Miyazawa Kenji zenshū 8, 
Tokyo: Chikuma bunko, 1986, 477. 
45 Miyazawa, ‘Neko no jimusho’, in Miyazawa Kenji zenshū 8, Tokyo: Chikuma bunko, 1986, 209. 
46 Miyazawa, ‘Bijiterian taisai’, in Miyazawa Kenji zenshū 6, Tokyo: Chikuma bunko, 1986, 
60–108. 
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The protagonist, watashi (I), took part in a long debate on the pros and cons of 
vegetarianism at an international Vegetarian Festival as a representative of vegetarians 
in Japan.  The protagonist made an effective speech in defence of vegetarianism and 
finally succeeded in converting all opponents to vegetarianism.  However, at the end of 
the debate, he was shocked to find that all the supporters and opponents were acting as a 
clique.  All participants except watashi in the debate were actually hired by the 
organizers in order to make the event successful.  All debates turned out to be a farce.  
Here is the ending of Bijiterian taisai: 
 
けれども私はこのあっけなさにぼんやりしてしまひました。あんま
りぼんやりしましたので愉快なビヂテリアン大祭の幻想はもうこわ
れました。どうかあとのところはみなさんで活動写真のおしまゐの
ありふれた舞踏か何かを使ってご勝手にご完成をねがふしだいであ
ります。47 
 
My mind, however, went completely blank because of the anticlimax of 
this sudden ending.  My mind was so blank that my delightful illusion 
about the Vegetarian Festival was shattered.  I sincerely wish you would 
make up your own ending, using something like an ordinary ending such 
as a ballroom scene like those in the classic film musicals.  
 
This example from Bijiterian taisai makes it clear that any kind of persuasive rhetoric, 
any kind of logical argument or assertion are farces and meaningless in this text.48 Thus, 
a philosophy of enlightenment in Miyazawa’s texts is destroyed by itself due to the 
anticlimax of a sudden reversal at the end.  For this reason, Nakamura comes to the 
conclusion that this text will never be completed.  He describes the ending as hanging 
in midair and says the dispute will never end, not finding any decisive conclusion.  The 
                                                  
47 Ibid., 108. 
48 Nakamura, Keisō chū no shutai, 251. 
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gaps between vegetarians and opponents are never filled and its binary frame and 
incommensurability lasts forever.  Viewed in this light, this lasting incommensurability 
or indecisiveness in Miyazawa’s texts may be equated with Nakagami Kenji’s 
conflicting attitude towards writing that will last forever like ceaseless hell.   
In addition, Nakamura points out that Miyazawa’s best known story, Ginga tetsudō 
no yoru (銀河鉄道の夜 Night on the Milky Way Train),49 contains the same indecisive 
discourse in its ending.  Four different manuscripts of Ginga tetsudō no yoru exist.  
The first, the second and the third manuscript are categorized as early drafts written 
around 1924, and the fourth draft is currently regarded as the final manuscript which 
Miyazawa elaborated by 1931.  The poet, Irisawa Yasuo (b. 1931) is well known for 
his expertise on Miyazawa,50 and is one of the most active members who compiled the 
complete works of Miyazawa Kenji.  In the same manner as Nakamura, through his 
long involvement with compiling Miyazawa’s complete works and the full-scale 
investigation of his posthumous papers, Irisawa acutely points out the fact that we 
should not consider Ginga tetsudō no yoru that appeared in the compiled book as a final 
manuscript although it is based on the fourth manuscript.  He emphasizes that the 
manner in which Miyazawa built up his literary works, as it were the essence of his 
literature, has a kind of characteristic that refuses any concept of ‘final manuscript’ or 
‘authorized edition’.51  While most writers elaborate their draft, investing a good deal 
                                                  
49 Miyazawa, ‘Ginga tetsudō no yoru’, in Miyazawa Kenji zenshū 7, Tokyo: Chikuma bunko, 1985, 
234–298.  ‘Ginga tetsudō no yoru’ (Night on the Milky Way Train) is translated by Roger Pulvers 
in Eigo de yomu ginga tetsudō no yoru, Tokyo: Chikuma bunko, 1996, 8–240.  Also translated by 
the following translators or scholars: By John Bester as ‘Night Train to the Stars’, in Night Train to 
the Stars and Other Stories, Tokyo: Kōdansha International, 1992, 7–97.  By Sarah M. Strong and 
Karen Colligan as ‘Night of the Milky Way Railway’, in Masterworks of Miyazawa Kenji―Poems 
and Fairy Tales, Tokyo: Sanmark shuppan, 2002, 19–112.  By Joseph Sigrist and D. M. Stroud as 
Milky Way Railroad in a book form, Berkeley: Stone Bridge Press, 1996.  
50 For a discussion of Irisawa Yasuo (入沢康夫), see, Claremont, Japanese Prose Poetry, 72–74. 
51 Irisawa, ‘ “Ginga tetsudō no yoru” no honbun no hensen ni tsuite no taiwa’ (「銀河鉄道の夜」の
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of time and effort to it, with the aim to complete the final draft, Miyazawa regards each 
draft as a completed manuscript at the time, and immediately after its completion he 
attempts to move away from it and to step towards the next completion simultaneously.  
As Irisawa scrutinized closely Miyazawa’s posthumous papers and reached the 
persuasive result in his article, I do not repeat it here.52  What is important particularly 
from Irisawa’s findings is that Miyazawa was clearly aware of this concept as one of his 
literary principles, and named this concept as four-dimensional art (yojigen-geijutsu 四
次元芸術).  Irisawa indicated that this notion is clearly epitomized in ‘Outline of the 
Essentials of Peasant Art’ (Nōmin geijutsu gairon 農民芸術概論)53 and ‘Introduction 
to “Spring and Ashura”’ (“Haru to shura” Jo 『春と修羅』序).54  Roger Pulvers 
translated ‘Introduction to “Spring and Ashura”’ as follows: 
 
Introduction to “Spring and Ashura” 
 
The phenomenon called I 
Is a single green illumination 
Of a presupposed organic alternating current lamp 
 (a composite body of each and every transparent spectre) 
The single illumination 
Of karma’s alternating current lamp 
Remains alight without fail 
Flickering unceasingly, restlessly 
                                                                                                                                                  
本文の変遷についての対話), in Miyazawa Kenji―Purioshin kaigan kara no hōkoku (宮沢賢治―
プリオシン海岸からの報告), Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1991, 167–177.  On this point, see also 
Mita Munesuke (見田宗介), ‘ “Ginga tetsudō no yoru” no kōzō’, in his Miyazawa Kenji―Sonzai no 
matsuri no naka e (宮沢賢治―存在の祭りの中へ), Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2001,46–56, and 
Kamata Tōji (鎌田東二), Miyazawa Kenji―“Ginga tetsudō no yoru” seidoku (宮沢賢治―「銀河鉄
道の夜」精読), Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2001. 
52 Irisawa, ‘ “Ginga tetsudō no yoru” no honbun no hensen ni tsuite no taiwa’, 167–177. 
53 Miyazawa, ‘Nōmin geijutsu gairon’, in Miyazawa Kenji zenshū 10, Tokyo: Chikuma bunko, 1985, 
15–32. 
54 Miyazawa, ‘Haru to shura’, in Miyazawa Kenji zenshū 1, Tokyo: Chikuma bunko, 1985, 15–32. 
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Together with the sights of the land and all else 
(the light is preserved…the lamp itself is lost) 
 
These poems are a mental sketch as found 
Passage by passage of light and shade 
Maintained and preserved to this point 
Brought together in paper and mineral ink 
From the directions sensed as past 
For these twenty-two months 
  (the totality flickers in time with me  
   All sensing all that I sense coincidently) 
 
As a result people and galaxies and Ashura and sea urchins 
Will think up new ontological proofs as they see them 
Consuming their cosmic dust…and breathing in salt water and air 
In the end all of these make up a landscape of the heart 
I assure you, however, that the scenes recorded here 
Are scenes recorded solely in their natural state 
And if it is nihil then it is nothing but nihil 
And that the totality is common in degree to all of us 
 (just as everything forms what is the sum in me 
  So do all parts become the sum of everything)  
 
These words were meant to be transcribed faithfully 
Within a monstrous accumulation in the brightness of time 
In the confines of the present geological era 
Yet they have gone ahead and altered their construct and quality 
In what amounts to a spark of sharply constructed light 
      (or alternatively a billion years of Ashura) 
Now it is possible that both the printer and I  
Have been sharing a certain turn of mind 
Causing us to sense these as unaltered 
In all probability just as we are aware of our own sense organs 
And of scenery and of people’s individuality through feeling 
And just as what is but what we sense in common 
So it is that documents and history…or the earth’s past 
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As well as these various data 
Are nothing but what we have become conscious of 
 (at the root of the karmic covenant of space-time) 
For all I know in two thousand years from now 
A much different geology will be diverted 
With fitting proofs revealed one after another from the past 
And everyone will surmise that some two thousand years before 
The blue sky was awash with colourless peacocks 
And rising scholars will excavate superb fossils 
From regions glittering of iced nitrogen 
In the very upper reaches of the atmosphere 
Or they might just stumble 
Upon the giant footsteps of translucent man 
In a stratification plane of Cretaceous sandstone 
 
The propositions that you have before you are without exception 
Asserted within the confines of a four dimension continuum 
As the nature of the mental state and time in themselves 
 
Miyazawa Kenji, 20 January 192455 
 
In this prologue to his book of poetry, ‘watakushi (I/Self)’ is expressed as the 
phenomenon of ‘the single illumination of karma’s alternating current lamp’; and thus 
the poems written by watakushi, that is, the alternating phenomenon as such, are 
depicted as nothing but a ‘mental sketch’ (sinshō suketchi 心象スケッチ) which seems 
to be common only in a certain degree to all of us.  Thus, for Miyazawa, what was 
being written is perceived as nothing more than ‘what we have become conscious of’ 
‘at the root of the karmic covenant of space-time’.  Irisawa observes that, according to 
Miyazawa’s view of literature or literary work, everything is alternating continually 
                                                  
55 ‘Introduction to “Spring and Ashura”’ (Hatu to shura ‘jo’ 『春と修羅』序) is translated by Roger 
Pulvers in Eigo de yomu Miyazawa Kenji shishū, Tokyo: Chikuma bunko, 1997, 14–23. 
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with time that is described as the ‘fourth dimension’ (dai yon no jigen dearu jikan no 
jiku ni sotte 第四の次元である時間の軸に添って).56  Therefore, any manuscript of 
his on a certain day expresses a whole truth at the time.  Accordingly, Irisawa 
ascertains that Miyazawa was never contented with any manuscript that is considered 
as his final draft by today’s literary critics.  He points out that Miyazawa kept 
elaborating many manuscripts that had already been published in book form.   
Judging from the above examples, we may reach the conclusion that Miyazawa 
shares his paradoxical view of what was being written as four-dimensional art with 
Nakagami Kenji’s ambivalent attitude towards writing as an endless attempt to search 
for autonomy observed in the preceding chapter.  Though we can only find a few 
essays in which Nakagami talked about Miyazawa Kenji, Nakagami gave a favourable 
short critique of ‘Kaze no Matasaburō’ (風の又三郎 Matasaburo of the Wind).57 
Nakagami expresses a sense of affinity with Miyazawa in this essay by saying that ‘not 
only do we share phonetically the same given name, Kenji, but also I felt that we are 
fated to pursue the same literary tasks’.58   
 
Nakahara Chūya: The Voice of the Living (Inochi no koe いのちの声) 
 
The foregoing discussions of autonomy, which Nakagami Kenji had in common with 
Sakaguchi Ango and Miyazawa Kenji, will lead us further into a consideration of 
Nakahara Chūya’s admiration of Miyazawa Kenji.  Nakahara Chūya (1907–1937), 
                                                  
56 Irisawa, ‘ “Ginga tetsudō no yoru” no honbun no hensen ni tsuite no taiwa’ (「銀河鉄道の夜」の
本文の変遷についての対話), 169. 
57 Miyazawa, ‘Kaze no Matasaburō’, in Miyazawa Kenji zenshū 7, Tokyo: Chikuma bunko, 1985, 
299–353. 
58 Nakagami, ‘Matasaburō’, in NKZ Vol. 15, 270–273. 
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who is one year Ango’s junior and 11 years Miyazawa’s junior, is still one of the most 
popular and widely-read poets in today’s Japan.  Miyazawa died at 37 years old in 
1933, that is, one year before Nakahara Chūya at 26 published his first book of poetry, 
Poems of the Goat (山羊の歌 Yagi no uta).  The first complete works of Miyazawa 
Kenji were published in 1934, one year after his death in 1933.  In the following year, 
Chūya contributed three articles on the complete works of Miyazawa to literary journals 
in quick succession.59  Chūya reminisced about the days he first read Miyazawa’s 
works, in his article, ‘Miyazawa Kenji zenshū kankō ni saishite’ (宮沢賢治全集刊行に
際して On the Publication of the Complete Works of Miyazawa Kenji, 1935), by 
saying that he began to read Miyazawa’s first book of poetry published in 1924, Spring 
and Ashura (Haru to shura 春と修羅), around 1925 or 1926.  Chūya confessed that 
he was so impressed that he distributed many copies to his friends. 
Inspired by Chūya’s favourable remarks about Miyazawa’s poems, Irisawa Yasuo, 
Kitagawa Tōru and many other scholars have been examining the various texts from 
Chūya and Miyazawa and discovered the common ground for their literary works.60  
Many scholars indicate how Chūya had received a great amount of influence from 
Miyazawa.  There is plenty of evidence to show both poets’ many common features in 
                                                  
59 Nakahara Chūya, ‘Miyazawa Kenji zenshū kankō ni saishite’ (宮沢賢治全集刊行に際して), in 
Sakuhin (作品 January 1935).  Nakahara Chūya, ‘Miyazawa Kenji zenshū’ (宮沢賢治全集), in 
Kusano Shinpei (ed.), Miyazawa Kenji kenkyū (宮沢賢治研究 April 1935).  Nakahara Chūya, 
‘Miyazawa Kenji no shi’ (宮沢賢治の詩), in Retsuenzo (レツェンゾ June 1935). 
60 Iida Momo and Nakamura Minoru, ‘“Ginga testudō no yoru” to “Yogisha no shokudō” o megutte’ 
(「銀河鉄道の夜」と「夜汽車の鉄道」をめぐって), in their conversation (taidan 対談) appeared 
in Nakahara Chūya kenkyū (中原中也研究) (No. 8 2003): 3–52.  Irisawa Yasuo, Kitagawa Tōru et 
al., ‘“Shinshō sukecchi” to “meiji izen” o megutte (＜心象スケッチ＞と＜名辞以前＞をめぐっ
て)’, in the round-table-discussion appeared in Nakahara Chūya kenkyū (中原中也研究) (No.8 
2003): 53–78.  Kitagawa Tōru, ‘Miyazawa Kenji to Nakahara Chūya ―Futatsu no purizumu― (宮
沢賢治と中原中也―二つのプリズム―)’, in Satō Yasumasa (ed.), Miyazawa Kenji o yomu (宮沢
賢治を読む), Tokyo: Kasama shoin, 2002, 89–109.  Irisawa Yasuo, ‘“sei” to “sei” Chūya ni okeru 
Kenji mondai (「生」と「聖」 中也における賢治問題)’, in Miyazawa Kenji―Purioshin kaigan kara 
no hōkoku (宮沢賢治―プリオシン海岸からの報告), Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1991, 279–285. 
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their rhetoric.  To follow this up further would involve us in other factors than 
‘autonomy as paradox’ and would take us beyond the scope of this chapter.  What I 
have tried to show from Chūya’s admiration of Miyazawa in this chapter is condensed 
into his poem, ‘The Voice of the Living’, which appeared as the last poem in Poems of 
the Goat. 61  It is a long poem in four parts, and I will explain some significant features 
between the parts. 
 
The Voice of the Living  (‘Inochi no koe’ いのちの声) 
 
“All my many deeds―how they wane beneath the sun”―Solomon 
 
I have already grown tired of Bach and Mozart. 
I have completely grown tired of the flippant rhythm of Jazz. 
I live like an iron bridge under a cloudy sky after rain. 
What is beating a path to my door is always loneliness. 
 
But I am not really buried into that loneliness. 
I am looking for something, always looking for something. 
I am terribly irritated in the midst of something immovable. 
For this reason, my appetite and lust are worth next to nothing. 
 
                                                  
61 Nakahara Chūya, Yagi no uta, in Ōoka Shōhei et al. (eds), Nakahara Chūya zenshū dai 1 kan, 
Tokyo: Kadokawa shoten, 5–139.  Yagi no uta was translated by Paul Mackintosh and Maki 
Sugiyama as Goats Songs, Herefordshire: Gracewing Books, 1993.  It was also translated by Ry 
Beville as Poems of the Goats, Richmond: The American Book Company, 2002.  However, as I 
found their translation of ‘Inochi no koe’ a little unfit, I attempted to translate it by myself. 
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Well, I don’t know, I just do not know what I am looking for, I have never 
been able to figure what I am really looking for. 
I do believe that there are not two but only one. 
Well, I don’t know, I just do not know what I am looking for, I have never 
been able to figure what I am really looking for. 
I have never been able to figure how to find any hit-or-miss method to get 
there. 
 
Sometimes I question myself as if I ridicule myself. 
Is it a woman?  Dainty food?  Is it an honour? 
At that very moment, my heart cries out―That’s not it!  This isn’t it!  
Neither this nor that! 
Then what?  Is it a song of the sky?―a resonant song from high in the 
sky in the morning? 
 
In Part I of this poem, ‘boku (I)’ is endlessly searching for something essential for him, 
he has never been able to figure out what he is looking for.  This sentiment of ‘boku’ 
may be identified with Giovanni, the protagonist of Miyazawa Kenji’s Ginga tetsudō no 
yoru, who is searching for ‘real happiness’ in the course of his 
‘Four-Dimensional-Milky-Way-Dream Train’ journey.  In this short story, Giovanni 
could not identify what is real happiness either.  He says to his companion, 
Campanella: ‘But what is real happiness, Campanella? [･･･] I’m not scared of all that 
dark. [･･･] I’m going to get to the bottom of everything and find out what will make 
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people happy.  We’ll go together, Campanella, as far as we can go.’62  However, the 
more ‘boku’ looks for what he is looking for, the more it seems to be going to drift 
farther and farther away.  Similarly, in the last stanza of Part I, Chūya regards what he 
is searching for as ‘a song of the sky―a resonant song from high in the sky (sora no uta, 
asa, kōkū ni narihibiku sora no uta 空の歌、朝、高空に、鳴り響く空の歌)’, as if it 
transcends the bounds of natural causes and effects in our world.  For this reason, in 
the second stanza, his mundane desires including his appetite or lust seem to vanish.  
All he can do is just to keep searching in vain for it ‘in the midst of something 
immovable’, and in the last stanza, crying out, ‘That’s not it!  This isn’t it!  Neither 
this nor that! （Are demo nai, kore demo nai, are demo nai kore demo nai! あれでも
ない、これでもない、あれでもないこれでもない！)’.  
  In contrast to Part I, we read in Part II that Chūya accepts the mundane world for 
what it is, describing our world as the real world of ‘the clever merchant’ (keibin naru 
shōnin no utsushimi no yo 「慧敏なる商人」の「現身の世」) and admitting that our life 
is governed by this ‘principle that constitutes our world as well as ourselves’.   
 
II 
 
Nay!  It must be something we cannot describe. 
Sometimes I try to explain it in short, 
But my life should not be something I can explain so easily that I believe 
my life is worth living. 
That’s life!  Innocent bliss!  Take things as they come!  Everything and 
                                                  
62 Miyazawa, ‘Ginga tetsudō no yoru’ (Night on the Milky Way Train) translated by Roger Pulvers 
in Eigo de yomu ginga tetsudō no yoru, Tokyo: Chikuma bunko, 1996, 219–220. 
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anything is good! 
 
No matter if we know it or not, whatever we end up doing are the things 
we want to do, 
And if we won’t be able to know precisely whether we are the winner or 
the loser, 
Every one of us, being aware of it, can never be entirely happy with it  
As long as we live in this world and continue to seek it as if it were the 
pleasure of absent-mindedness. 
 
But if our happiness comes from the state of selflessness,  
And the happiness exists in our real life dominated by the clever merchant 
who we regard as being fool, 
We must admit that this world is so unfair, 
Since all of us cannot live on without earning our daily bread. 
 
But then again that’s our life. 
Since we live in this world, and this is not under our voluntary decision 
And if this is the principle that constitutes our world as well as ourselves, 
It might be good to soothe our mind by saying that there exists no extreme 
in this world. 
 
Chūya’s practical perception of others as the sober reality is based on his thought that he 
takes anything in relation to human beings as it comes.  He proclaims in the first stanza 
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of Part II that: ‘That’s life!  Innocent bliss!  Take things as they come!  Everything 
and anything is good! (Soreyo genjitsu! Kegarenaki kōfuku! Arawaruru mono wa 
arawaruru mama ni yoi to iukoto! それよ現実！ 汚れなき幸福！ あらはるるも
のはあらはるるままによいといふこと！)’.  Even if the world is governed by the 
clever merchant, Chūya admonishes us to accept the fact that our real world runs simply 
in this way. 
However, in Part III, Chūya is opposed to his previous remarks again and advances 
his belief that we need to possess individual passions by saying that: ‘Rage! Rage if 
thou are angry from the bottom of thy heart! [･･･] Even if it is on the eve of thy 
ultimate aim in life; Never, never neglect thy anger. (Sareba yō wa, netsujō no mondai 
dearu.  Nanji, kokoro no soko yori rippuku seba, ikareyo! Sa’are, ikaru koto koso na 
ga saigo naru mokuhyō no mae ni de are, kono koto yumeyume orosoka ni suru nakare. 
されば要は、熱情の問題である。汝、心の底より立腹せば 怒れよ！ さあれ、
怒ることこそ 汝が最後なる目標の前にであれ、この言ゆめゆめおろそかにす
る勿れ)’. 
 
III 
 
Well, then, It’s all in thy passionate soul. 
Rage! 
Rage if thou are angry from the bottom of thy heart! 
 
Here you are!   
Even if it is on the eve of thy ultimate aim in life, 
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Never, never neglect thy anger. 
 
Thy passion survives for a while, 
And burns itself out eventually. 
But the social effect of thy passion will remain 
And it will prevent thee from modulating into the next action. 
 
And, finally in the closing stanza in Part IV, in order to express his anger as the spirit of 
autonomous personality, he concludes that all he needs is nothing but his single carnal 
body. 
 
IV 
 
If only I can perceive nothing but my single carnal body under the evening 
sky,  
No more words are needed.   
 
Considering the examples quoted above, Chūya accepts that we are determined by 
various causalities represented by the world of the shrewd merchants, where we cannot 
find our free will.  But then, at the same time, he exhorts us to live by our individual 
passionate spirit and attempts to destroy the world that is determined by external causes.  
Let us recall here that, in Karatani Kōjin’s interpretation of Kant’s morality, first, we 
should theoretically accept our fate that we are bound by the external causalities in order 
to possess our freedom and moral responsibility in a practical manner.  According to 
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Karatani, in reality, we do not have free will sensu stricto.  We, however, have ‘to be 
deemed free’ in order for us to be free and responsible for our action.  Let’s recall that 
‘Kant’s ethics cannot be sought only in his accounts of morality.’  It can be 
summarized in the following sentence: ‘Being theoretical at the same time as being 
practical―the transcendental stance itself is ethical.’  We can say with fair certainty 
that Chūya also keeps both the theoretical stance―one’s awareness of his/her fate that is 
bound by the world of the shrewd merchants―and practical stance―one’s passion 
before his/her ultimate aim in life―at the same time.  Here again, as Nakagami Kenji 
possesses the conflicting dichotomy between self-identity and the integration with 
others when he writes novels, a similar ambivalent attitude between the individual and 
the collective may be observed in the substance of Chūya’s poetic invention.63  Here, 
for further example, is the second stanza from ‘Blind Autumn (‘Mōmoku no aki’ 盲目
の秋)’ in Poems of the Goat.  
 
I really do not care about this, I really do not care about that. 
Nothing else matters. 
 
This doesn’t really matter, that doesn’t really matter. 
I’m not going to let these bother me. 
 
Autonomy is all we need! 
I do not care about anything but autonomy. 
                                                  
63  The explanation of Chūya’s poetic invention is more fully developed in Kitagawa Tōru, 
‘Josetsu―Chika seikatsusha no uta （序説―地下生活者の詩)’, in Nakahara Chūya no sekai, 
Tokyo: Kinokuniya shoten sensho, 1994, 5–37. 
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 Autonomy, autonomy, autonomy, autonomy! 
Autonomy is the only thing that does not judge one’s deed.64  
 
Towards the unexplored perspective of literary autonomy in the field of modern 
Japanese literature 
 
From the viewpoint of Karatani Kōjin’s Kantian ethics for freedom and responsibility, if 
we take another look at modern Japanese literature, having the eternal conflict between 
autonomy and dependence as Nakagami Kenji has, the unexplored perspective of 
literary autonomy may emerge from the literature of Sakaguchi Ango, Miyazawa Kenji 
and Nakahara Chūya.  Of course, the autonomy that is found in the literature of 
modern Japan is not exclusive to these three writers, however, I hope to propose a 
possible list of autonomous writers and become a stepping-stone to the study of 
autonomy in modern Japanese literature.  At first, these three literati pay great 
attention to the external causalities and accept the complex causalities that are ruled by 
the law of nature.  In other words, at the outset, they observe carefully the difference 
(sai) in every single human aspect and ‘affirm’ it no matter what it is.  Then, through 
the act of writing, in order to have their own autonomous freedom, they seem to obey 
the command: ‘be free!’ or ‘be causa sui, self-motivated, subjective, or autonomous’.  
That is to say, they accept their fates, which are determined by the external causes as if 
they regarded themselves as the individuals who take full responsibility for whatever 
                                                  
64 「これがどうならうと、あれがどうならうと、そんなことはどうでもいいのだ。これが
どういふことであらうと、それがどういふことであらうと、そんなことはなほさらどうだ
つていいのだ。人には自恃があればよい！ その余はすべてなるまゝだ･･････ 自恃だ、
自恃だ、自恃だ、自恃だ、ただそれだけが人の行ひを罪としない」 Nakahara Chūya, ‘Mōmoku 
no aki’, in Nakahara Chūya zenshū dai 1 kan, 58–59. 
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they are or they do.  To put it more concretely, it means that we accept whatever 
happens to us as if it ‘has to be deemed’ to be our intention to do just that.  It means 
that we will not shift the responsibility for what happens in our life onto anyone and 
anything.  In this sense, we do not have any freedom to choose our action.  However, 
at the same time, each of us may consider how an individual practical action could take 
place in order to be free and ‘make new judgments with a historically changing 
environment’ within the a priori limits which outline man’s fundamental situation in the 
complex universe.   
Viewed in this light, it seems reasonable to suppose that the writers/poets who were 
examined in this chapter attempted in varying degrees to put Kant’s transcendental 
standpoint into practice through producing their literary works.  For Nakagami Kenji, 
his act of writing is described as aspiring to the ceaseless hell.  The postwar 
existentialist writers such as Noma Hiroshi had scrutinized the unlawful acts of ordinary 
people during the chaotic period immediately after the War and portrayed the 
simultaneous presence of freedom and responsibility.  For Sakagichi Ango, it is 
depicted as ‘farce’ or ‘falling into decadence’.  In his poem, ‘Spring and Ashura’, 
Miyazawa Kenji depicts himself as an angry ‘Ashura’ who had lost his ‘true words’.65  
Moreover, Nakahara Chūya describes this as a passionate soul such as rage before one’s 
ultimate aim in life that is determined by various causalities as typified by the world of 
‘the shrewd merchants’. 
 
 
65 ‘Haru to shura’ is translated by Sarah M. Strong and Karen Colligan as ‘Spring and Ashura’ in 
Masterworks of Miyazawa Kenji―Poems and Fairy Tales, Tokyo: Sanmark shuppan, 2002, 12–14. 
CHAPTER IV 
ONGOING CANON FORMATION: AN IDEOLOGY OF JAPAN’S 
NATIONAL LANGUAGE AND THE JAPANESE LANGUAGE 
BOOM 
 
 
As we have observed in Chapter I, for Nakagami, on the one hand, kotoba (language) 
operates to destroy the fixed concept that is incubated by a collective agency such as the 
modern nation-state or society, which infringes on one’s freedom that is conflated with 
moral responsibility.  Kotoba is Nakagami’s exclusive means to operate as the creator 
of value, which is maintained only by autonomous individuals who bear the ability of 
logical self-definition and assume the moral responsibility for their actions.  However, 
on the other hand, kotoba may bring about the possibility of fostering the transition to 
assimilation of individual people into their collective, or a more virulent form of 
nationalism or totalitarianism.  Thus, this perception of kotoba held by Nakagami 
generates an endless conflict between the establishment of self-identity and dependence 
on others. 
For Nakagami, this kind of ambivalent nature that is found in kotoba generates a 
fantastic ideology, an invented monogatari, and he is instinctively aware, as a 
contemporary writer, that if people employ this kind of delusive monogatari, they 
unwittingly surrender their autonomy to complex causalities.  In sum, in his early days, 
Nakagami viewed kotoba as a deceptive means of modern invention, however, at the 
same time, kotoba was his last resort for freeing himself from dehumanization in a 
highly information-based, mass-consumer society.  Thus, he developed mixed feelings 
towards kotoba that he used as a means of writing, and built up his love-hate feelings 
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towards kotoba through the late 1960s to the early 1970s.  These mixed and 
ambivalent feelings for kotoba could be his starting point as a ‘serious’ writer, and a 
strong inducement for his writing career.  When he started to write his novels in the 
late 1960s, the only reason Nakagami managed not to discharge a gun in the same way 
as Nagayama Norio was the fact that he had this potentially dangerous means, that is, 
‘kotoba’, which he could barely believe in, to fight against the irrational violence in 
society.1 
In this chapter, in order to grasp which elements of the Japanese language Nakagami 
Kenji deeply mistrusted, I would like to examine more closely the issue of canon 
formation and linguistic nationalism, and explore the reason why the Japanese language 
(nihongo) has become a cause of Nakagami’s ambivalent attitude towards his act of 
writing.  Let us now look more carefully into the theoretical background of the critical 
attitude towards the idea of modern language, linguistic nationalism or canon formation.  
I would like to clarify which part of the Japanese language resulting from the genbun 
icchi system specifically Nakagami and the dramatists in the 1960s such as Betsuyaku 
Minoru and Terayama Shūji had misgivings about.   
In terms of the question of the self or subjective freedom, Suzuki Tomi summarizes 
how ‘theory’ had exerted an influence on the notion of subject as follows: 
 
Since the late 1960s, Western critics have attacked the assumption of 
the “self” or “subject” as an a priori, self-sufficient entity.  
Lévi-Strauss, Barthes, Foucault, Lacan, Derrida, and others have 
questioned the notion of the subject as a controlling consciousness and 
as the ultimate origin of meaning.  The subject has been presented 
                                                  
1 「最後の 1 ミリほどで (only just, with extreme difficulty) ことばを信じて」Nakagami Kenji, 
‘Shohatsu no mono’ (初発の者), in NKZ Vol. 14, 1995, 193–195. 
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instead as a process and effect constituted by and resulting from the 
interplay of historically conditioned institutional, political, and 
discursive systems of differences.  There has also been a growing 
awareness in the West of the historicity of Western modernity, spurred 
on in particular by the debate in the 1980s on post-modernism.2 
 
Thus, we can see that recent cultural theories from Foucault or Derrida make us rethink 
whatever is taken as common-sense or natural such as ‘I (watashi)’ or ‘self (jiko)’, and 
demonstrate that what has been considered as natural is actually an historical, cultural 
product.3   
At this point, ‘invented traditions,’ the critical historical approach introduced by Eric 
Hobsbawm in 1983, is worth paying attention to.4  This approach called numerous 
historians’ attention to the elaborate process of creating a ‘modern myth’, which is 
invented by both elites and civilians who produce public opinion in society in the name 
of ‘tradition’ or ‘cultural characteristics.’  An example of this kind of analysis is Carol 
Gluck’s memorable study of ideology in the late Meiji period, Japan’s Modern Myths 
(1985).5 She explains that what drove ‘the tennōsei ideology’ (the Emperor system) 
forward was not only the government officials but also ‘civilians — journalists, 
educators and local notables who produced public opinion or a national orthodoxy.’6  
                                                  
2 Suzuki Tomi, Narrating the Self, 3. 
3 On this matter, Jonathan Culler also summarizes both ideas of Foucault and Derrida very concisely.  
See Literary Theory, 14.  Culler consolidates the role of ‘theory’ as follows: Theory makes other 
arguments […] whether maintaining that apparently natural social arrangements and institutions and 
also the habits of the thoughts of a society are the product of underlying economic relations and 
ongoing power struggles, or that the phenomena of conscious life may be produced by unconscious 
forces, or that what we call the self or subject is produced in and through the systems of language 
and culture, or that what we call ‘presence’, ‘origin’, or the ‘original’ is created from copies, an 
effect of repetition.  See Literary Theory, 14. 
4 Vlastos, ‘Tradition: Past/Present Culture and Modern Japanese History’, 1–16. 
5 Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths, 3–41. 
6 Ibid., 9–10. 
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Similarly, Sheldon Garon raised the question of why Japanese people did not resist the 
oppressive state under the tennōsei ideology and militarism before 1945.7  Garon 
examined how ‘modernization helped cement several key alliances between various 
social groups [mainly those from the new middle class] and the state [officials using an 
“emperor system” to manipulate people] in the first half of the twentieth century.’8  
More than 40 years earlier than Garon’s analysis, Maruyama Masao had already raised 
the question of how various groups or individuals within Japanese society relate to state 
power.  In ‘Thought and Behavior Patterns of Japan’s Wartime Leaders’ (1949), 
Maruyama advanced his theory of ‘essentially irresponsible leadership’:9 the so-called 
‘system of irresponsibility’ (musekinin no taikei) in Japanese society.  What is 
important here is the fact that unlike Marxist analysis of war responsibility which were 
unquestioningly committed to accusing the Emperor himself and war-time leaders, 
Maruyama enlarged the scope of this analysis and posed the trenchant question of the 
responsibility of the ordinary people, including contemporary readers like us, who 
allowed the nation to fall into a state of ultranationalism.   
Added to this perspective, from the viewpoint of Japanese literature, Suzuki Tomi 
defines the problem of I-novel discourse (shishōsetsu gensetsu 私小説言説) as ‘a 
powerful and uncanny signifying without a fixed, identifiable signifíed, generating a 
critical discourse that inform[s] not only the nature of literature but also views of 
Japanese selfhood, society and tradition’.10  She aptly points out that the notion of 
shishōsetsu is still extremely ambiguous and difficult to comprehend even though the 
                                                  
7 Garon, Molding Japanese Minds, 5. 
8 Garon, ‘Rethinking Modernization and Modernity in Japanese History: A Focus on State–Society 
Relation’, 350. 
9 Kersten, Democracy in Postwar Japan, 33. 
10 Suzuki, Narrating the Self, 2. 
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term shishōsetsu was widely disseminated in modern Japanese society, being 
characterized as ‘a direct and faithful transcription or confession of his/her personal 
life,’ or ‘the text’s referential accuracy or faithfulness with regard to the facts of the 
author’s “real life”’.  She continues to explain that this ‘uncanny’ and ‘elusive’ 
character of shishōsetsu has been working as ‘I-novel meta-narrative’, which evolved 
into the normative term that generates a uniform illustration of not only the nature of 
modern Japanese literature, selfhood, society and tradition, but also Japanese classical 
literature.  Suzuki terms this critical discourse that permeates our present times as 
I-novel discourse.  This modern apparatus for the interpretation of Japanese literature 
confines the diverse Japanese cultural and historical identities and traditions in a 
monolithic domain that is symbolized in words or phrases such as ‘immediacy, 
directness, lyricism, spiritual search for the self and unity with nature’.  In addition, 
Suzuki points out that the I-novel meta-narrative was formulated within the binary 
frame between the Western novel and the Japanese I-novel.  This binary frame 
facilitates a one-sided view of Japanese literary traditions such as ‘it is lyrical more than 
anything,’ ‘it emphasizes reality,’ ‘unlike the Western novel, it lacks fictitiousness and 
constructiveness’, and the like.11  Consequently, this polarization brings about a value 
judgment as in the question as to which pole represents the more ‘true’ novel or more 
flawless society, and in this sense, the concept of I-novel discourse never appears to be 
‘neutral or simply descriptive.’12  
Suzuki views shishōsetsu as a literary and ideological paradigm rather than a 
particular literary form.13 Relevant to this point is Suzuki’s following remark:  
                                                  
11 Suzuki Tomi, ‘Watashi-gatari no gensetsu ni tsuite’, 5. 
12 Suzuki, Narrating the Self, 3. 
13 Ibid., 6. 
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 I consider the I-novel issue ultimately as a historically constructed 
dominant reading and interpretive paradigm ― which soon became 
a generative cultural discourse.  Instead of simply examining the 
thematic and formal features of what standard literary histories 
narrowly categorize as I-novels, my study emphasizes the historical 
formation of a discursive field in which the corpus of the I-novel 
was retroactively created and defined and from which the standard 
literary histories emerged.  My study attempts to place this 
dynamic “I-novel discourse” in the perspective of the broader 
historical context of Japan’s modernization, which has hitherto been 
described by this I-novel discourse.14  
 
She goes on to say: ‘By the middle of the 1920s, when the notion of the I-novel 
emerged, these historically constructed and ideologically charged realities and new 
languages had become naturalized and their origins had been forgotten.  The Japanese 
Naturalist texts and other modern shōsetsu regarded as autobiographical began to be 
received and read as a direct transcription of the author’s lived experience and of his 
“self,” which was considered to exist a priori and independently of language, itself now 
regarded as transparent vehicle for expressing the self.’15  What Suzuki focuses on 
here is not to see whether her statement such as ‘the corpus of the I-novel was 
retroactively created’ is a historical fact or not, but what is important to her is to 
examine the manner in which we define the notion of shishōsetsu, to expose the 
historical process of how the notion of shishōsetsu was developed in the history of 
Japanese literature or to expose the manner in which the origin of the notion of 
sh
                                                 
ishōsetsu was created. 
 
14 Ibid., 10. 
15 Ibid., 47. 
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The points made so far in Suzuki’s book apply in principle to Karatani’s following 
remarks.  As early as 1980, in his controversial book, Origins of Modern Japanese 
Literature (Nihon kindai bungaku no kigen, 1980), Karatani Kōjin reveals that the origin 
of the ideological system in which we currently dwell can be traced back to the modern 
period between the early 1890s and the Taishō democracy.  He explains that some 
common-sense notions found in modern Japanese literature—termed as ‘landscape’, 
‘interiority’ or ‘confession’—stem from the establishment of the system of the 
‘unification of the spoken and written languages’ in the 1890s.  Karatani proceeds to 
say that these common-sense notions were nothing but the modern apparatus (kindai no 
sōchi 近代の装置) of Japanese literature, and the origins of these notions were 
concealed as soon as they were produced, making it seem as though these notions had 
always existed.  He writes that ‘[these notions] take on the appearance of an “object” 
that has been there, outside us, from time immemorial’.16  For example, Karatani talks 
about ‘interiority’ as follows: 
                                                 
 
When contemporary scholars of literature speak of the struggle of Meiji 
writers to establish a modern self, they merely confirm an ideology in which 
we are already thoroughly steeped.  They set up an opposition between the 
state, or political power, and faithfulness to interiority, or the self, unaware 
that ‘interiority’ is itself politics and that it is a manifestation of absolute 
authority.  Those devoted to the state and those devoted to interiority 
complement each other.  It was in the face of the overwhelming dominance 
of the West that establishment of both the modern state and interiority in the 
third decade of Meiji became ineluctable.  That these developments took 
place should not be the focus of our critique.  What we can criticize are 
contemporary modes of thought which accept these products of an inversion 
 
16 Karatani, Origins of Modern Japanese Literature, translated and edited by Brett de Bary, 11–96.  
The original text, Nihon kindai bungaku no kigen, (日本近代文学の起源) was published by 
Kōdansha in 1980.  
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as natural.  In every case, scholars go back to the Meiji period to establish 
their foundations.  While the images such scholarship constructs often 
conflict with each other, in conflicting they also complement each other, 
working together to camouflage their real origins.  It is not enough for us 
now to revise our histories of literature.  We must seek to expose the 
historicity of that very “literature,” of literature as a system which 
ceaselessly reproduces itself. 17 
18
notions derived from
means the standard repertoire, the most highly prized or most frequently read or 
                                                 
 
Here, from both Suzuki’s ‘I-novel discourse’ as ideological paradigm and Karatani’s 
observation of the ideological system of modern Japanese literature in the interests of 
creating a modern nation-state, we should notice that the modern system or ideological 
paradigm appears as if it existed a priori and conceals its historicity.  These studies 
indicate that what is considered to be an ancient practice or tradition is actually a 
creation of the modern era in collusion with the interests of creating a modern 
nation-state.  What both Suzuki and Karatani emphasize here is the fact that the 
origins of these common-sense notions in Japanese literature are hidden as soon as they 
are established, as though they had always existed.  It is important to bear in mind that 
‘the narrative texts are related to, and in many cases contributed to, the historical 
formation of the fundamental ideological assumptions’  such as common-sense 
 the system of genbun icchi that Karatani posed as above.   
The issue of this historical formation will lead us further into a consideration of the 
issue of ‘canon formation’.  Shirane defines ‘canon’ as follows: ‘The term “canon” 
usually refers to authorized text, particularly in school curricula, or texts widely 
perceived to be worthy of interpretation and imitation.  Canon in the narrow sense 
 
17 Ibid., 95. 
18 Suzuki, Narrating the Self, 12. 
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performed works within a particular genre or institution.’19  Shirane Haruo and Suzuki 
Tomi examine the manner in which these texts or authors had become privileged and 
had become the cultural icons of Japan’s tradition, and their study of Japanese classics 
indicates the canon formation of Japanese cultural and national identity in accordance 
with the historical process by which Japan’s nation-state was developed.  Similar to 
Gluck’s or Garon’s research on alliances between various social groups, civilians and 
the state in the interests of creating a modern state, Shirane introduces John Guillory 
and Pierre Bourdieu’s study of canon formation and illustrates its nature as follows: 
 
John Guillory has argued that the ideological or cultural value of the text 
in a canon does not lie in the texts themselves but in the processes and 
institutions that give the texts value.  “Canonicity is not a property of the 
work itself but of its transmission” and its relation to institutions such as 
the school.  Pierre Bourdieu, upon whom Guillory draws for his central 
thesis, has pointed to two fundamental forms of production: the production 
of the work and the production of the value of the work.  In fact, for 
Bourdieu, “The production of discourse (critical, historical, etc.) about the 
work of art is one of the conditions of production of the work.”  A 
canonical text in this sense is constantly re-produced.  Canon formation 
is thus concerned not only with the immediate producers of the work—the 
authors, the scribes, the printers, etc.—but also with those agents and 
institutions (such as commentators, patrons, temples, schools, museums, 
publishing houses) that produce or re-produce the value of the text and 
that create the consumers and audiences capable of recognizing and 
desiring that value.  Key questions, then, are how, by whom, and for what 
purposes this value is generated, maintained, and transmitted.20 
 
Viewed from this angle, by referring to the critical historical approach to ‘tradition’ by 
                                                  
19 Shirane and Suzuki, Inventing the Classics, 2. 
20 Ibid., 2–3.  On this subject, see also John Guillory, Cultural Capital: The problem of Lieterary 
Canon Formation, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993. 
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Eric Hobsbawm and the analyses of ‘canon formation’ by John Guillory and Pierre 
Bourdieu,21 Shirane Haruo and Suzuki Tomi attempt to historicize the formation of the 
canon and the social and political processes of how a particular classical text is 
developed and gains the status of being ‘the cultural icon of Japan’s “tradition”’.  Carol 
Gluck summarizes a related matter well: 
 
Sometime during the late 1880s and 1890s, the pronouncements of 
utter historical newness and absolute national essence came together to 
produce the disciplines of modernity.  I think of it as ‘the canonical 
moment’, as if early one afternoon in the late 1880s, all the words 
coalesced and the narratives aligned.  Henceforth there was kokugo, 
kokubungaku and kokushi (national language, national literature, and 
national history); shūkyō, shisō, and shōsetsu (religion, thought, and 
the novel) [… ] tennō, kenpō, and kokutai (emperor, constitution, and 
national polity).  None was utterly new, but all were newly reified, or 
at least, redefined.22 
 
It may be useful at this point to summarize the main points of these discussions. 
 
1. What has been considered as common sense or natural in modern Japanese 
literature (I-novel discourse, the notion of landscape or confession) is in fact a 
historical, cultural product (the creation of the modern era). 
2. The modern system, ideological paradigm or notion, which is considered to be 
natural, appears as though it existed a priori as soon as it was produced and 
conceals its historicity—its origin. 
3. The process of producing these kinds of authorized texts, that is, canons (canon 
                                                  
21 Ibid. 
22 Gluck, ‘“Meiji” for our Time’, 15. 
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formation) recurs ceaselessly.  A canonical text is constantly re-evaluated and 
re-produced. 
 
Viewed in this light, the so-called nihonjinron (the conceptual discussion about the 
Japanese) has been severely criticized as a mere historical, cultural product which 
engenders a uniform perception that the Japanese are unique or Japan is a culturally 
homogeneous nation and the like.  Peter Dale, for example, asserts that ‘the 
nihonjinron may be defined as works of cultural nationalism concerned with the 
ostensible “uniqueness” of Japan in any aspect, and which are hostile to both individual 
experience and the notion of internal socio-historical diversity.’23  Cultural nationalism 
is expressed well by Shirane when he says: 
 
As Eric Hobsbawm and scholars of nationalism have shown, seemingly 
nonpolitical spheres such as aesthetics, literature, and ethics have been 
critical —if not even more powerful than political institutions— in the 
process of constructing nation-states, whose members had to be unified 
through the development of a common cultural identity.  One 
consequence was that cultural phenomena that had been specific to a 
particular region or social community often with the passage of time 
became identified with the nation.24  
 
Shirane enumerates some examples such as kabuki and kokugo (the national language) 
to illustrate this remark.  Seen from the viewpoint of the creation of a large sense of 
cultural homogeneity in the interests of the modern nation-state, Shirane argues that ‘at 
the ideological heart of the national literature movement was linguistic nationalism, the 
                                                  
23 See Peter N. Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness. London: Croom Helm, 1986. 
24 Shirane and Suzuki, Inventing the Classics, 12–13. 
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belief that the nation was founded on a common language, the “national language” 
based primarily on spoken Japanese’.25  Shirane states further:  
 
Meiji Japan, kokumin, generally translated in the following essays as 
“nation” and sometimes as “people of the nation,” was a constitutionally 
defined notion of the nation that lay between the nation-state and the 
various people that had been made new citizens of that state.  This 
notion was used to integrate the people culturally, politically, and 
socially into the new Meiji state, to construct what Benedict Anderson 
has called an “imagined community,” a sense of a unified nation for 
disparate groups or localities that did not necessarily share common 
historical, religious, or ethnic roots.26   
 
Similarly, Suzuki indicates that ‘this sudden transformation [the genbun icchi 
movement] was not a purely literary phenomenon; rather, it was closely related to the 
institutional promotion of a “national language” after the Sino-Japanese War 
(1894-95).’ 27   In 1895, for example, Ueda Kazutoshi (上田万年 1867–1937)—a 
linguist who had just returned from Germany where he had witnessed the promotion of 
a standardized national language by the Deutscher Sprachverein (established in 
1885)—argued that the establishment of a standard national language (hyōjungo, 
kokugo 標準語、国語) was the foremost priority of a modern nation-state’.28  Suzuki 
gives Tanizaki’s narrative texts as an example, and points out that although Tanizaki 
Jun’ichirō ‘astutely’ penetrated the historical and ideological origins of the genbun icchi 
style and viewed it as merely ‘an artificial product of a newly established regime 
                                                  
25 Ibid., 13.  A similar observation can be seen in Sōzō no kyōdōtai (Imagined Communities) by 
Benedict Anderson, 120–139. 
26 Ibid., 12–13. 
27 Suzuki, Narrating the Self, 45.   
28 Ibid.  For further details of how kokugo was formed as an ideology of the modern nation-state in 
Japan, see Lee Yeounsuk, ‘Kokugo’ to iu shisō, and Katō, Nihongo-gaku no shikumi, 26–29, 
186–193. 
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interested in the centralization of the nation-state’; in the end, he reverted to Japanese 
tradition, stressing the possibility of spoken Japanese, which may still retain the ‘unique 
characteristics of the original Japanese language’.  Suzuki concludes that Tanizaki’s 
construction and reinvention of the ‘uniqueness of the original Japanese language’ as 
well as retroactive construction of the historical origins and continuity of the I-novel 
tradition are emblematic of the process by which traditions are reinvented as a modern 
product.  It will be clear from these examples that what Shirane or Suzuki perceives is 
to a considerable extent true for Nakagami Kenji’s sceptical attitude towards the 
Japanese language that is bound by the law/system of a modern nation-state that 
enforced the system of genbun icchi.   
 
Lee Yeounsuk, for example, examines how kokugo (the national language of Japan) 
was formed as an ideology of the modern nation-state in Japan in her book, ‘Kokugo’ to 
iu shisō (An Ideology Called Kokugo, 1996).  She states that the word kokugo meant 
language in general in the early Meiji period, but it began to refer to the national 
language around 1889 (Meiji 22).  She examines thoroughly the process that the 
identity of the Japanese language as a national language was formed by the nation-state 
during the course of the Meiji period.  According to Lee, the establishment of the 
national language would not have become possible unless the people who resided in the 
administrative district of Japan believed that there is only one common language called 
nihongo in Japan.29  However, as Saussure had indicated that any language should be 
merely a social product, which is not called to be a complete system, nihongo should be 
regarded as just another example of the ‘social fact’ which is regarded as ‘a certain 
                                                  
29 Lee Yeounsuk, ‘Kokugo’ to iu shisō, i–ix. 
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average which will not be established, which will undoubtedly not be complete, in any 
individual’.30  Kokugo (the national language of Japan) was also able to be formed 
only when the various language varieties derived from region, social class, gender or 
age were assimilated by an artificial means, or more precisely, by a national policy.  In 
‘Kokugo’ to iu shisō, Lee scrutinizes closely the fact that the Japanese language was not 
regarded as an established complete system in the early Meiji period, and clarifies the 
process of forming the policy of a national language as a unified language towards the 
end of the Meiji era.  Lee also examines the historical process of forming the system of 
genbun icchi focusing on several private associations that promoted the genbun icchi 
system during the 1890s.  She states that Genbun icchi kai (言文一致会  The 
association of promoting the unification of the spoken and written languages) was the 
most powerful institution which made the implementation of genbun icchi pass in the 
both the House of Peers and the House of Representatives.  In 1902 (Meiji 35) after the 
resolution passed in both Houses, Kokugo chōsakai (国語調査会 The government’s 
expert panel on the national language) was established, and the implementation of the 
system of genbun icchi became one of kokka jigyō (国家事業 national project).31  It 
cannot be discussed here in more detailed for lack of space, but Lee had focused on the 
well-known linguist, Ueda Kazutoshi who began kokugogaku (studies in the Japanese 
language), which was based on the modern linguistics in the 1890s and Hoshina Kōichi 
(保科孝一 1872–1955) who was one of Ueda’s disciples.  Lee attempts to clarify the 
correlations between the construction of the nation-state and the establishment of the 
national language policy by Ueda and Hoshina.32   
                                                  
30 Eisuke Komatsu (ed.), Saussure’s Third Course of Lectures on General Linguistic, 69a. 
31 Ibid., 64–71. 
32 Over the past decade, a considerable number of studies have been made on the issue of the 
process of forming the national language (kokugo).  See, for example, Yasuda Toshiaki (安田敏郎), 
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Nakagami Kenji was similarly aware of the fact that our act of naming mono 
(things/objects) is unconsciously fettered by the logic of the modern nation-state, to use 
Nakagami’s term, the rule of the Emperor.  This perception of the Japanese language as 
standard Japanese (hyōjungo) or the national language leads the playwright, Betsuyaku 
Minoru, to state that he can only find the intrinsic energy of language in various dialects 
(hōgen) not in standard Japanese.  For Betsuyaku, standard Japanese appeared to be 
extremely flat and insipid or tasteless.  He also considers that abstract words in a 
language can easily turn into obsolete words unless we continue to define the meanings 
of today’s abstract words depending on current social conditions.33   In a similar 
manner that Nakagami and Betsuyaku distrust the Japanese language, Terayama Shūji 
finds it impossible to suppose something like Japan’s carnal body corresponding to the 
national language called nihongo.  These aspects of the Japanese language or kokugo is 
a problem to which we shall return later in the next chapter. 
 
The Japanese language boom and ‘petit-nationalism’ 
 
Taking these discussions into consideration, when we face our society today, what is 
true for modern people who are re-producing ‘canon’ in pursuing a centre-oriented 
                                                                                                                                                  
‘Kokugo’ no kindaishi (国語の近代史), Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 2006.  Yasuda Toshiaki (安田敏
郎), Teikoku nihon no gengo hensei (帝国日本の言語編制), Yokohama: Seorishobō, 1997.  Brian J. 
Mcveigh, Nationalisms of Japan, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004.  Komori 
Yōichi (小森陽一), Nihongo no kindai (日本語の近代), Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2000.  Suzuki 
Yoshisato (鈴木義里), Tsukurareta nihongo: Gengo to iu kyokō, (つくられた日本語、言語という
虚構 ), Tokyo: Ubun shoin, 2003.  Kawamura Minato (川村湊 ), Umi o watatta nihongo: 
Shokuminchi no ‘kokugo’ no jikan (海を渡った日本語 植民地の「国語」の時間), Tokyo: 
Seidosha, 2004.  See also Daikōkai (大航海) (No.46, 2003): 「特集日本語という幻想」 
(‘Tokushū Nihongo toiu gensō’) and Gendai shisō (現代思想) (Vol.26-10, August 1998): 「液状化
する日本語」 (‘Ekijōka suru nihongo’). 
33 Betsuyaku describes the Japanese language he speaks as chūsei-teki (中性的).  Fuller discussion 
about Betsuyaku’s distrust of language will be presented in Chapter V. 
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modernization is to a considerable extent true for Japanese people who set their mind on 
searching for the correct use of the Japanese language today.  Before turning to a fuller 
discussion of Nakagami Kenji’s sceptical attitude towards the Japanese language, it may 
be useful to examine a concrete example of ongoing canon formation in Japan.  An 
illustration from the recent nihongo boom may be a notable example.  Let us now 
attempt to enlarge the discussion of cultural (or rather, linguistic) nationalism into the 
issue of the recent Japanese language boom.  Over the past few years, a number of 
scholars called our attention to a growing tendency towards linguistic nationalism based 
on the observation of the recent Japanese language boom and Japanese people’s apathy 
towards the discussion of nationalism at large.  For instance, Komori Yōichi raises a 
caution about linguistic nationalism regarding the Japanese language in present-day 
Japan.  He argues that ‘Japanese people who have lost faith in their country as a result 
of the seemingly endless recession and corruption at the highest levels of government 
and business seek a final refuge in their Japanese identity and the fact that they speak 
Japanese.’34  Moreover, the psychologist and the critic, Kayama Rika calls young 
Japanese people’s innocent or naive attitude towards nationalism ‘the petit-nationalism 
syndrome’.35  Komori and Kayama draw our attention to the risk that this kind of 
‘petit-nationalism’ could develop into ‘a more virulent form of nationalism at any 
time’.36 
Overlapping the years of the bubble economy in Japan, the Japanese language boom 
crested all over the world at the end of the 1980s.  Known to all, this boom, called the 
tsunami phenomenon, brought an enormous increase of in the number of students of 
                                                  
34 Komori, ‘Nihongo būmu to nashonarizumu (Japanese and Nationalism)’, Nihongo kyōiku (No.116, 
January 2003): 119.   
35 Kayama, Puchi-nashonarizumu shōkōgun, 33 
36 Komori, ‘Nihongo būmu to nashonarizumu (Japanese and Nationalism)’, 119. 
 155
Japanese and newly established Japanese language/studies programs at universities 
outside Japan.  Booms, however, never last long.  As Japan’s bubble economy burst 
in the early 1990s, bringing the present long recession, the Japanese boom in the world 
began to cool down, and the newly established Japanese language departments have 
been obliged to reduce the scale of their programs.  In contrast to the downturn in the 
Japanese fever outside Japan, there has been ‘a boom in the appreciation of the Japanese 
language’37 at home in recent years.   
This ‘nihongo boom’ was touched off by the publication of Nihongo renshūchō 
(Japanese Language Workbook) in 1999, a book that sold a million copies written by the 
prominent linguist Ōno Susumu (b. 1919).  In addition, another book that also sold a 
million copies in 2001, Koe ni dashite yomitai nihongo (Japanese You Want to Read Out 
Loud) by Saitō Takashi (b. 1960) has accelerated this unprecedented boom.  Further, 
the sequel to the above book, Koe ni dashite yomitai nihongo II was published in the 
following year, and more than 5 million copies were sold all together by the beginning 
of 2004.  Taking advantage of this ‘nihongo boom’, many publishers worked 
frantically to publish similar books on the Japanese language in order to recover from 
the prolonged recession.  Jōshiki to shite shitte okitai nihongo (Japanese You Want to 
Know as Common-sense) was, for example, written by the doyen of Japanese linguists, 
Shibata Takeshi (b. 1918), in 2002, and dozens of kindred books were published one 
after another to date.  Major bookstores now set up selling counters to display such 
books, which are mostly rehashes of the old ones.  Some scholars have made important 
statements on this matter in order to look deep into the cause of this nihongo boom.  
Komori Yōichi, for instance, summarized the main points of Nihongo renshūchō as 
                                                  
37 Ibid. 
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follows:  
 
    The central point of Nihongo renshūchō is to clarify the rules of 
Japanese colloquial speech which the Japanese use 
unconsciously everyday.  More than a million Japanese people 
purchased the book, because they felt some uneasiness about the 
correct use of their colloquial language, which was never taught 
in their school education―kokugo kyōiku (national language 
education)―after the war.  In addition, the opportunities to 
come in contact with foreign people in our daily life increased 
during the bubble economy in 1980s, and these encounters raised 
our awareness that we are indeed incapable of explaining the 
rules of spoken Japanese to those foreign learners of Japanese.  
In this sense, Nihongo renshūchō pinpoints the blind spots of the 
postwar “national language education”, that is to say, the 
understanding of how we objectively see Japanese as a 
foreign/second language.38  
 
National language education in Japan has hitherto indeed laid overemphasis on reading 
comprehension and appreciation of various major literary works, masterpieces of all 
ages and civilizations.  On the contrary, logical and objective understanding of the 
Japanese spoken language has been missing from the national language education.39  
                                                  
38 Ibid., 2. 
39 For a discussion of kokugo kyōiku and nihongo kyōiku, a long dispute over the naming of ‘kokugo 
gakkai (the Association of National Language Studies) and ‘nihongo gakkai (the Society of Japanese 
Linguistics) is still fresh in our memory.  The members agued that ‘kokugo’ does not sound 
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Suzuki Yoshisato also assumes that the purchasers of Nihongo renshūchō may be people 
who were born around 1950 and they may have less confidence in their Japanese usage 
as a foreign language for the reason stated above.  On the one hand, these people often 
criticize the language of young people as a debased form of Japanese; on the other hand, 
they are deeply uneasy as to whether their own language usage is correct or not.40  
Under these circumstances, the middle-aged and elderly feel a sense of crisis regarding 
their language usage when they are asked not to view Japanese as “kokugo (national 
language),” which had overemphasized the interpretation and appreciation of Japanese 
literary works, but as “nihongo”, one of many languages in the world, as a second 
language or a foreign language.   
Compared with Nihongo renshūchō, another best selling book, Koe ni dashite yomitai 
nihongo is not this kind of how-to book but an anthology of fine pieces of prose.  It is 
comprised of various kinds of prose, such as the opening paragraphs of masterpieces of 
Japanese classics and modern literature, poems, famous lines from the kabuki, 
Hyakunin isshu (Hundred Poems by Hundred Different Poets), 41  naniwa-bushi 42  
recitations, gama no abura uri no kōjō (traditional sales talk show of toad oil), iroha 
karuta (traditional Japanese playing cards), word play and the like.  The central point 
of Koe ni dashite yomitai nihongo is to revive the oral tradition of Japanese and promote 
recitation in Japanese.  Both Komori and Suzuki point out the reasons for the success 
                                                                                                                                                  
appropriate in this time of globalization, and the Association’s name was changed to ‘nihongo 
gakkai’ in 2004. 
40 Suzuki, Tsukurareta nihongo, 212–217.  One of the major publishers obtained information by 
means of questionnaires about the recent disarray of the Japanese language, the result showed that 
more than 90% of the high school teachers are displeased at the recent debased form of Japanese.  
See ‘Kokugo kyōshi no kyū wari kotoba no midare jikkan’ (90% of Japanese Language Teachers at 
School Felt the Corruption of Japanese Language), Asahi shinbun, 28 March, 2004, p.8. 
41 It is an anthology of waka poems which was compiled by a well-known poet, Fujiwara no Teika 
(or Sada’ie) (1162–1241). 
42  Naniwa-bushi, which is also known as rōkyoku, is a singing style of narrative to the 
accompaniment of the shamisen.  It can be dated from the early Meiji period. 
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of this book as follows:  
 
First, all of the prose or poetry in Koe ni dashite yomitai nihongo is from 
masterpieces of Japanese literature that repeatedly appeared in school 
kokugo textbooks from the past.  Secondly, in prewar days, many people 
were passing down the phrases appearing in Koe ni dashite yomitai 
nihongo, such as naniwa-bushi recitations, sayings, iroha karuta, from 
generation to generation by oral tradition in their daily lives.  Many 
pieces in this book may, therefore, evoke nostalgia in many people over 40 
years old when they recite them.43   
 
Komori argues that many people who read Nihongo renshūchō have now become 
preoccupied with the “correct” use of the spoken language, and Koe ni dashite yomitai 
nihongo, with perfect timing, furnishes these people with “beautiful” samples so that 
they can read aloud the examples of the ‘correct and beautiful nihongo’.  Moreover, for 
younger people or children, when they recite these oral pieces in rhyme, for example a 
fixed form of classical verse in seven-five syllable metre, which provides a unique 
tempo and rhythm, the recitation itself must be something new and must stir up their 
curiosity.  Moreover, based on the above book, Saitō Takashi has been supervising 
Nihongo de asobō, the educational TV programme broadcast by the NHK (Nihon hōsō 
kyōkai Japan Broadcasting Cooperation) since 2003.  It remains hugely popular among 
many children as the young kyogen actor Nomura Mansai and the former ōzeki sumō 
wrestler Konishiki take part in the show.  For the reasons given above, Koe ni dashite 
                                                  
43  Komori, ‘Nihongo būmu to nashonarizumu (Japanese and Nationalism)’, 2–3.  Suzuki, 
Tsukurareta nihongo, 212–217. 
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yomitai nihongo was well received by a range of people, resulting in its record-breaking 
book sales and the ‘nihongo boom’ at home. 
It is in this context that Komori calls our attention to nationalism regarding the 
Japanese language.  He argues that Japanese people attempt to preserve their identity 
by reaffirming the Japanese language and ‘the fact that they speak Japanese’. 44   
Komori, for example, introduces Tsuboi Hideto’s comment on the close affinity between 
Saitō’s strident advocacy of recitation in Japanese and the patriotic poetry recitation 
campaign (aikoku-shi rōdoku undō) during the war as social control.   
Responding to this kind of criticism concerning his promotion of Japanese recitations, 
Saitō remains quite indifferent to the claims that he is nationalistic.  He had originally 
been studying the philosophy of body, physical education, osteopathic therapy, the 
perception of one’s body in Yoga or Zen and the like.  In consequence, Saitō merely 
agues that contemporary humans, especially children, have to learn how to control their 
breathing, focusing on their lower abdomen, tanden or shitahara, which is said to 
contain people’s energy.  Saitō also advocates that we learn how to strain the pelvic 
region, which makes it possible for us to attain a posture of balanced readiness 
(shizentai) based on the techniques of Japanese traditional martial arts such as jūjitsu.   
He continues to say that we have forgotten this kind of body perception based on the 
abdominal breathing with the vision of one’s energy coming through one’s pelvic region, 
tanden.  He points out that the Japanese used to possess this perception of body as a 
traditional body culture, the so-called koshi-hara bunka (the culture/custom of life 
which makes us lower our centre of gravity to the lower back and stomach for a stable 
                                                  
44 Komori, ‘Nihongo būmu to nashonarizumu’, 119.   
 160
posture).45  Taken in this light, Saitō strongly asserts that the tradition of recitation in 
relation to one’s elocution, that is, speaking from the diaphragm, the lower abdominal 
region, has been neglected in our everyday life as well as recent Japanese language 
education (kokugo kyōiku).46  The postwar ‘kokugo kyōiku’, indeed, does not attach 
much importance to the oral tradition of recitation but has a tendency to overemphasize 
the interpretation and appreciation of Japanese literary works.47  I stress that I am not 
opposed to his assertion itself as a method of school education or health care to maintain 
a good posture.  It may be clear that Saitō did not have any intention to promote 
Japanese recitations with the purpose of promoting a nationalistic idea.  Here, whether 
or not he promotes Japanese recitations with the intention of instigating nationalism is 
not the point in question.  What has to be noticed here is the fact that Saitō does not 
seem to have noticed the nationalistic aspect of his promotion of Japanese recitations.  
We must draw attention to our insensible motion or unintentional attitude, and must 
recall that one of the elements consist of ‘the system of irresponsibility’, namely 
‘submission to faits accomplis’ that was analysed Maruyama Masao.  According to 
Maruyama, submission to faits accomplis is ‘the point of view that because something 
has happened one is obliged ipso facto to approve of it’.48  For example, he explains 
that the consensus of the accused was that as it had already happened, it could not be 
                                                  
45 See, for example, Saitō, Shintai-kankaku o torimodosu, Tokyo: NHK Books, 2000 and Kodomo ni 
tsutaetai＜mittsu no chikara＞: Ikiru chikara o kitaeru, Tokyo: NHK Books, 2001. 
46 Saitō, Koe ni dashite yomitai nihongo, 199–209. 
47 The detailed discussion of the issue of national language (kokugo) and the history of the language 
policy for Japanese as ‘canon formation’ are well illustrated in Shirane’s book, Inventing the 
Classics.  We find the problem discussed on pages 220 to 249.  See also Suzuki Yoshisato, 
Tsukurareta Nihongo, Gengo to iu kyokō: Kokugo kyōiku no shitekita koto (Invented Japanese, 
Fictitiousness of Language―What the Japanese National Language Education Has Made), Tokyo: 
Ubun shoin, 2003. 
48 Maruyama Masao, ‘Thought and Behavior Patterns of Japan’s Wartime Leaders’, translated by 
Ivan Morris, in Ivan Morris (ed.), Though and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics, London: 
Oxford University Press, 1963, 84–134. 
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helped.  They may have been opposed to it, but they felt there was nothing that could 
be done as the event had already occurred.  Maruyama analyses these kinds of remarks 
of the accused and takes notice of the fact that reality is something ‘which has already 
been created’ or ‘which has arisen from somewhere in the past.’49  Acting realistically 
means acting being bounded by the past and drifting along by ‘a blind inevitability 
flowing from a determined past.’  What is central here is not whether one does the 
right things or not, but the fact that faits accomplis has a greater power than anything 
else.  If we were Saitō, and were consistent in our argument that our promotion of 
Japanese recitation had been simply conducted as part of our practice of regaining the 
traditional body culture in Japan, we might feel that the growing nationalistic tendency 
backed by the overheating Japanese language boom today was an unexpected incident 
which we did not intend to bring about.  The question now arises: From this kind of 
standpoint, could we really assert that it could not be helped as the event had already 
occurred beyond our control?  It seems to me that our explanation for the cause of the 
recent nationalistic tendency can be considered as the system of irresponsibility in 
microcosm.  We should not overlook that what Saitō genuinely thinks right for our 
health care may incidentally promote nationalistic tendency.  It must be noted that we, 
thus, sometimes unknowingly take part in strengthening state control.  As we have 
argued in Chapter I, the notion of autonomy may remind us of exercising our free will 
as well as taking our moral responsibility so as not to allow the nation to turn into a 
state of ultranationalism.  Awareness of our positive personal autonomy may turn into 
an ethical framework for us to accept responsibility not only for our immediate actions 
but also such indirect incidents that we had no intention to bring about. 
                                                  
49 Ibid., 106. 
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There is further evidence to illustrate the manner in which Saitō is not aware of the 
nationalistic aspect of his advocacy of recitation in Japanese.  In another TV 
programme of the NHK, Nihongo naruhodo juku, when Saitō was invited as a guest 
lecturer and made a point that we should restore the power of our mother language, he 
did not use the Japanese word bogo but bokokugo.  Both bogo and bokokugo can be 
translated by the English word ‘mother tongue’.  However, the word bo-koku-go 
consists of three Chinese characters: bo (stands for mother), koku (stands for a nation, 
state) and go (language).  As can be seen from this, while bo-go clearly means ‘the 
language one learns at one’s mother’s knee’,50 bokoku-go refers to the language that is 
used in one’s home country.  Viewed in this light, strictly speaking, the bokokugo for 
Japanese-born Korean residents in Japan whose mother tongue is Japanese should not 
be Japanese but Korean.  Some Japanese linguists who are concerned with the danger 
of nationalism proclaim that they avoid using the word bokokugo, which implies the 
sense of nation-state consciousness.51  Saitō has been unconcerned about this kind of 
sensibility to wording with a nationalistic flavour.52  This may illustrate that Saitō has 
been just guileless and nonchalant about the issue of nationalism regarding the Japanese 
language.  Tsuboi aptly describes Saitō’s unconcerned attitude towards the nationalistic 
aspect of his exhortation: ‘Read out beautiful Japanese and keep fit both mentally and 
physically’ as ‘tai’ikukai-tekina meirōsa (a cheerful jock mentality)’ because in 
Japanese sport’s clubs at school and at large, the junior is surely asked to obey his/her 
senior blindly or with a blithe spirit.53   
                                                  
50 Kenkyūsha, Shin waei chū jiten. 
51 For detailed arguments on this, see Tanaka, Gengo no shisō, 45–62. 
52 See also Saitō, Koe ni dashite yomitai nihongo, 204–205. 
53 Komori, ‘Nihongo būmu to nashonarizumu (Japanese and Nationalism)’, 3.  See also Kayama, 
Puchi-nashonarizumu shōkōgun, 33. 
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 The psychologist Kayama Rika calls this kind of behaviour ‘the petit-nationalism 
syndrome’.  She also analyses the “overnight” supporters of the Japanese national 
soccer team (who were new and fickle soccer fans) at the World Cup 2000 Korea/Japan, 
who wore the same blue uniform, had their faces painted with the rising-sun flag, and 
had no cares about singing Kimi ga yo, the national anthem, in unison or in swinging the 
national flag with joy.  Kayama illustrates here that these young supporters are also 
free from care as to the issue of nationalism: they are uninterested in the history of the 
rising-sun flag or Kimi ga yo.  Why do they swing hinomaru (the national flag) 
nonchalantly?  Kayama surmises that the young supporters may answer 
matter-of-factly by saying something like: ‘We are Japanese, aren’t we?  Hinomaru?  
Why not, it’s our national flag, isn’t it?  It is nothing to do with nationalism in wartime.  
I grew up, with no thought about whether I am a right winger or a left winger’.  This 
kind of unconcerned attitude of young Japanese people may indicate that Japanese 
history education has not been taking up the issue that the rising-sun flag or Kimi ga yo 
may offend the feelings of Chinese or Korean people.  Kayama concludes that as far as 
one’s apathy towards nationalism is concerned, the same observation applies to both the 
‘nihongo boom’ and the overnight soccer supporters during the World Cup.54   
There is one further example that we must not ignore.  The ministry of education 
approved the school textbook authored by the Japanese Society for History Textbook 
Reform (Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho o tsukuru kai).  The members of this society 
portray postwar history education as a self-tormenting view of national history; for this 
reason they advocate that we Japanese should not feel too much remorse for war crimes 
                                                  
54 Kayama, Puchi-nashonarizumu shōkōgun, 16–54. 
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anymore.  Regarding this matter, Oguma Eiji and Ueno Yōko analysed the mentalities 
of the members of the above society.  Oguma and Ueno name their attitude 
‘nationalism as healing’ (iyashi no nashonarizumu) and conclude that the many 
members of the society are not some kind of radical/extreme right wingers as Oguma 
and Ueno had assumed.55  They are, however, described as ordinary people who are 
afflicted with identity crisis in contemporary society today.  According to Oguma, they 
are gnawed by some kind of anxiety.  For this reason, in order to fill some sort of void 
in their lives, they need to hold gatherings in pursuit of some kind of emotional healing 
and stability.  All they need is to secure their place in society.56  Here, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that their views have much in common with those that Kayama 
analyses as ‘petit-nationalism’ among the ordinary young people in contemporary Japan.  
It is in this context that Komori and Kayama draw our attention to the risk of how this 
kind of ‘petit-nationalism’ could develop into ‘a more virulent form of nationalism at 
any time’.57   
In spite of the loud warning bell regarding the growing tendency towards nationalism 
or neo-conservatism elsewhere in the world, when we watch the trends of public 
opinion today, the same principles apply to ‘petit-nationalism’ and to a considerable 
extent to our naked, unquestioning attitudes towards state control or social control in 
many aspects of our everyday life.  Examples abound.  The Self-Defense Forces were 
dispatched to Iraq without general consensus.  The Hollywood movie Last Samurai 
                                                  
55 Oguma and Ueno, Iyashi no nashonarizumu, Tokyo: Keiō Gijuku Daigaku shuppan-kai, 2003, 
8–9. 
56 Ibid.  I translated the summary from the original text in Iyashi no nashonarizumu as follows:「少
なくとも『史の会』で見るかぎり、参加者たちのありようは、『右派団体のメンバー』とい
う言葉からイメージされがちな人間像とは、いささか異なっている。むしろそこに見られ
るのは、ある種の不安と空虚さを抱えながら、いわば束の間の解放感と安定感を求めて、『歴
史』という場所、『日本』という場所に群れつどう『普通の市民』たちの姿である。」 
57 Komori, ‘Nihongo būmu to nashonarizumu (Japanese and Nationalism)’, 119. 
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had a long run throughout Japan, and its advertising statement in Asahi shinbun was 
‘The Pride Called Nippon’ (Nippin to iu hokori) or ‘The Pure Heart Called Nippon’ 
(Nippon to iu junjō).  The box-office hit Last Samurai induced us to reread Nitobe 
Inazō’s Bushidō: The Soul of Japan (1900).  With the catchphrases such as ‘The beauty 
and intensity of Japanese spirit!’, a lot of similar kind of books which provided the 
revised text of Bushidō with Japanese translation on the opposite page were newly 
published one after another in 2004.58  In the annual textbook screening in 2007, the 
ministry of education ordered the revision of high-school textbooks dealing with the 
mass suicide driven by the Imperial Army.  The order is that new high-school 
textbooks should no longer treat the fact that the Imperial Army urged civilians to 
commit mass suicide in Okinawa.  Former Prime Minister Abe Shinzō wrote and 
published the book entitled Utsukushī kuni e (美しい国へ  Towards a Beautiful 
Country, Japan) which became the best-selling book in 2006.  He reported in March of 
2007 that he would no longer offer an apology on the issue of the wartime comfort 
woman.  From 2006 to 2007, Kokka no hinkaku (国家の品格 The Dignity of the 
State) written by Fujiwara Masahiko (藤原正彦) hit the best-seller list, selling two and 
half million copies.  In Kokka no hinkaku, Fujiwara asserts that Japan’s postwar 
reconstruction was achieved by the people who maintained the spirit of bushidō.  In 
the same way as the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, the comic artist 
Kobayashi Yoshinori continuously publishes a range of books and magazines and 
asserts that we should part with the self-tormenting view of our national history.  
Kobayashi proposes that the Japanese should revive ‘Japan’s tradition’, such as public 
                                                  
58 See, for example, Nitobe Inazō hakase to bushidō ni manabu kai (The Association which Learns 
from Nitobe Inazō and Bushido), Bijuaru-ban Taiyaku Bushidō, Tokyo: Mikasa shobō, 2004. 
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spirit or a sense of beauty, which have been lost in our society today.59  It may be too 
much to say that the motivations of the numerous people who bought Koe ni dashite 
yomitai Nihongo (Japanese You Want to Read Out Loud) in order to recite and 
re-evaluate ‘the very best of Japanese in the good old days’ can be considered as a 
tendency to return to the good old ‘tradition’ with which Kobayashi concurred.  From 
the point of view of ‘canon formation’ illustrated by Shirane or ‘the invention of 
tradition’ developed by Hobsbawm in the previous section, the same may be said, no 
doubt, of what Saitō Takashi calls ‘nihongo of the highest quality in the good old days’ 
or Kobayashi Yoshinori’s return to Japanese tradition or Japanese spirit that he defines 
as one’s good manners in public space or modesty and believes that they were very 
much alive before and during the War.   
If we assume the notion of ‘the very best of Japanese in the good old days’ supposed 
by Saitō to be ‘canon formation’, that is, the social, political process of how a particular 
text or an author is developed and privileged as a cultural icon of Japan’s tradition, 
those canonical texts selected by Saitō as ‘jewels of the Japanese language’60 in Koe ni 
dashite yomitai Nihongo can be constantly re-produced as has been pointed out.  It is 
important to keep in mind that a canonical text is formed not only by the immediate 
producers of the work but also by ‘those agents and institutions (such as commentators, 
patrons, temples, schools, museums, publishing houses) that produce or re-produce the 
value of the text and that create the consumers and audiences capable of recognizing 
and desiring that value’.61  Shirane points out several reasons why a text becomes 
canonical in Japan’s context of modernization.  The important point to note here is the 
                                                  
59 Kobayashi Yoshinori, Sensōron 3, 285–310. 
60 Saitō, Koe ni dashite yomitai nihongo, 4. 
61 Shirane and Suzuki, Inventing the Classics, 2–3. 
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following reasons out of the ten proposed by Shirane: ‘the use of a text in a school 
curriculum’ and ‘the incorporation of a text into institutional discourse, particularly state 
ideology’.62   Viewed in this light, Saitō indeed compiles Koe ni dashite yomitai 
nihongo (Japanese You Want to Read Out Loud) from masterpieces of Japanese 
literature: Genji monogatari (The Tale of Genji), Ise monogatari (Tales of Ise, late 10th 
c.), Heike monogatari (The Tale of the Heike), Natsume Sōseki’s Yume jūya (Ten 
Nights’ Dreams), Mori Ōgai’s Maihime (The Dancing Girl), Akutagawa Ryūnosuke’s 
Kumo no ito (The Spider’s Thread) and the like.  These pieces repeatedly appeared in 
school kokugo textbooks since Meiji.  However, Tanaka Minoru points out that the 
masterpieces of Japanese literature had been almost deleted from current junior 
high-school textbooks over the past thirty years.63  In 2002, even the works of Sōseki 
or Ōgai had disappeared.  To the contrary, riding the crest of the Japanese boom, Saitō 
published another book called Risō no kokugo kyōkasho (Ideal Textbook for Japanese 
Language) in 2002, in which he anthologizes the masterpieces of all ages including the 
works of such writers as Sōseki or Ōgai.  All these observations convey an idea that 
Saitō’s re-production of such authorized texts today can be regarded as a compensation 
for a loss of ‘canon’ formed in the interests of a creating a modern nation-state. 
In the same way, if we assume that the notion of ‘the very best of Japanese in the 
good old days’ proposed by Saitō is the embodiment of ‘canon’ or the modern concept 
or ideological paradigm which Suzuki or Karatani poses in the early stage of this 
chapter, that is, ‘an artificial product of a newly established regime interested in the 
centralization of the nation-state’, this notion may appear as if it exists a priori and 
conceals its historicity.  If so, we are now in a position to say that Saitō, losing sight of 
                                                  
62 Ibid., 3. 
63 Tanaka, “Yomu koto no rinri” o megutte, 249. 
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the historicity of what he calls ‘the very best of Japanese’, keeps promoting recitation in 
Japanese as part of a healthy lifestyle without any malicious intent.   
Saitō compiled this book from many sources: Kojiki (Ancient Records and Myths), 
Nihon shoki (Chronicles of Japan), Taketori monogatari (Tale of the Bamboo Cutter), 
Genji monogatari, Ise monogatari, Tu Fu’s Chinese poetry, Confucius’s Rongo (The 
Analects), Heike monogatari, and even Omorosōshi (Ryukyuan folk songs of antiquity) 
and yukar (a cycle of myths and heroic legends of the Ainu people).  Thus, he treats 
these various pieces from the multi-dimensional sources as ‘the very best of Japanese’.  
In his discourse, the diversity of languages that occurred in a chain of islands, which 
happened to be called the Japanese Archipelago in modern space and time, is treated as 
a monolithic and unitary entity called ‘saikōkyū no nihongo (the very best of Japanese)’.  
On what ground, does Saitō consider Omorosōshi and yukar to be ‘jewels of the 
Japanese language’?  I have no space to discuss Amino Yoshihiko’s works or Oguma 
Eiji’s works, but they also endeavoured to historicize the canon formation of Japanese 
cultural and national identity in accordance with the historical process by which Japan’s 
nation-state was developed.64  In addition, as we have seen in the previous section, Lee 
Yeounsuk portrays how kokugo, the national language of Japan, was formed as an 
ideology of the modern nation-state in the historical process of making Japanese 
language policy or its assimilation policy.65  In terms of the viewpoint from both 
Suzuki’s ‘I-novel discourse’ as ideological paradigm or Karatani’s observation of the 
ideological concepts of modern Japanese literature as a result of the system of genbun 
                                                  
64 See, for example, Amino, Yoshihiko (網野善彦), “Nihon” to wa nani ka:  Nihon no rekishi 
<00>  (「日本」とは何か 日本の歴史 <00> What is Japan? The History of Japan 00), Tokyo: 
Kōdansha, 2000.  Oguma Eiji (小熊英二), Tan’itsu minzoku shinwa no kigen: Nihonjin no jigazō 
no keifu (単一民族神話の起源 日本人の自画像の系譜 A Genealogy of Japanese Self-Images), 
Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1995. 
65 Lee Yeounsuk, ‘Kokugo’ to iu shisō. 
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icchi in the interests of creating a modern nation-state, Saitō does not recognize the 
all-important problem of how the narrative texts are related to the process of forming 
the concept of social control or national morality.  Here, it is important to reconsider 
the following remarks by Karatani Kōjin: ‘Once a certain structure has been selected 
and identified as universal, history, of necessity, comes to be seen as linear.’66  It seems 
to me that when Saitō Takashi found his ideal of national language education in reciting 
‘the very best of Japanese’, he may have been trapped in linear national narrative or, to 
use Carol Gluck’s term, ‘the canons of modernity formed in the context of national 
power’.67  Viewed in this light, when Saitō compiled Koe ni dashite yomitai nihongo 
by grouping together the various languages that have existed in the current Japanese 
archipelago merely as nihongo, that is to oversimplify the historicity of languages or to 
extinguish differences, in Karatani’s word, sai (differences).  Karatani Kōjin argues 
that the consciousness of the individual in modern space and time retreats to his/her 
internal world, and lacks exteriority which makes it possible for him/her to recognize 
the diversity, “sai”.68  When Saitō exhorts us to recite ‘furuki yoki jidai no saikōkyū no 
nihongo (the very best of Japanese in the good old days)’ or ‘jewels of the Japanese 
language’, how does he define nihongo, or what is its meaning for Korean residents in 
Japan or for Ainu people? 
It seems to me that Saitō’s promotion of Japanese recitations today appears to be 
similar to the official campaigns (kyōka undō) during the decades of the liberal 1920s in 
the guise of a campaign of both physical and mental health care (kokoro to karada ga 
jōbu ni naru).  Shirane pointed out that canonical texts refers especially to those in 
                                                  
66 Karatani Kōjin, Origins of Modern Japanese Literature, 16. 
67 Gluck, ‘ “Meiji” for our time’, 21. 
68 Karatani, ‘1970 nen = Shōwa 45nen―Kindai nihon no gensetsu kūkan’, in Shūen o megutte, 8–51.  
This book was first published by Fukutake shoten, Tokyo in 1990. 
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school curricula.  As we have seen in page 142, Carol Gluck also indicates that 
civilians such as educators or journalists unwittingly promote ‘the tennōsei ideology’.69  
Likewise, the recent Japanese language boom backed by Saitō’s promotion of Japanese 
recitations in Japanese in his best-selling book might be defined as an ongoing ‘canon 
formation’ driven forward by today’s civilians, to use Sheldon Garon’s term, ‘the rising 
new middle class’ like us.   
Karatani’s views of the 1920s have much in common with those of Garon.  
Karatani’s original interpretation of periodization revealed the analogy between the 
forty-five years of the Meiji era and the first forty-five years of the Shōwa.  As early as 
in 1990 when his book, Shūen o megutte (On the End), was written, Karatani warned 
that when the Shōwa Emperor passed away in 1989 (eighteen years after the 45th year of 
Shōwa), the social/political conditions resembled the beginning of the Shōwa era after 
the fifteen years of Taishō, that is, the time for a seed to germinate the ultra-nationalistic 
ideology in Japan.  Likewise, Ōe Kenzaburō points out the fact that ‘young Japanese 
have become markedly more conservative’.70  He also explains that the recent rise of 
conservatism may be derived from the attitudes of young followers of a subculture fad 
that swept through ‘an average, urban consumer society’ and ‘middle-class 
consciousness’.71  
 
After the storm of postmodernism gradually awakened, we, Japanese people, having 
been labelled as middle class, may have lost an ideological model or ethical framework 
and have endlessly been looking for a true ‘self’ or autonomy.  As we discussed, the 
                                                  
69 Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths, 9–10. 
70 Ōe, ‘Japan’s Dual Identity: A Writer’s Dilemma’, in Japan, The Ambiguous, and Myself, 93. 
71 Ibid. 
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system of modern knowledge collapsed into the postmodern discursive spaces and our 
positive personal autonomy is in danger of dying out.  As it turned out, have we 
become ignorant of our inclination towards nationalism or neo-conservatism?  Do we 
‘seek a final refuge in [our] Japanese identity and the fact that [we] speak the Japanese 
language’?72  We need to bear in mind that we should consistently monitor our own 
deeds and thoughts so as not to act in conspiracy with the established power structure or, 
to put it more simply, a totalitarian state power.  The perception of personal autonomy 
which ties in with the sceptical attitude towards language may be crucial to the issue of 
how each of us creates a new ethical system or framework for today so as to 
self-regulate and modify our action constantly with an unprejudiced view.  So tackling 
this, we may create the alternative model proposed by Ōe Kenzaburō, that is, ‘a model 
of a contemporary age which encompasses past and future’ in order to overcome the 
growing nationalistic tendency which appears secretly under the cover of not only the 
improvement of national language education, that is, the promotion of Japanese 
recitations but also the official campaigns, welfare works, moral education and the like.  
Let us now explore the manner in which the sceptical attitude towards language is 
expressed in the works of Nakagami Kenji, theatrical artists in the 1960s such as 
Betsuyaku Minoru. 
 
72 Komori, ‘Nihongo būmu to nashonarizumu (Japanese and Nationalism)’, 119. 
CHAPTER V 
SCEPTICAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS KOTOBA (LANGUAGE) IN 
MODERN JAPANESE LITERATURE 
 
 
In Chapter I and Chapter II, we have observed that Nakagami Kenji’s act of writing can 
be regarded as an autonomous action that brings out the continuous self-determination 
and seeks different values depending on the circumstances of the time.  Let us recall 
again that Nakagami finds writing in the eternal conflict between the establishment of 
his self-identity and his desire for integration with others.  Being aware that any binary 
frame will never be dialectically reconciled, in my reading of Nakagami, he succeeds in 
actualizing Kant’s transcendental standpoint that is to keep both the theoretical attitude
―his acceptance of the law/system of the collective, that is, the archetype of 
monogatari―and the practical attitude―his attempt to destroy such a law/system of the 
collective, that is, all past chords that repeatedly generate monogatari as a canon― at 
the same time.  It seems to me that the tension between acceptance and destruction 
makes Nakagami continue to search for autonomy.  It would be more correct to say 
that his awareness of the complementary relationship between the two attitudes made 
Nakagami to continually renew his self-determination according to the historically 
changing situations at the time.  For this reason, he regards his act of writing as an 
endless attempt as if it was aspiring to the ceaseless hell.    
This ambivalent attitude towards his act of writing, which was adopted by Nakagami 
Kenji in the late 1960s, developed into a strong scepticism towards kotoba as a 
language sign and an esteem for the carnal body (nikutai) as an object (mono).  In 
Nakagami’s lecture given in Frankfurt, Germany in 1990, he confessed that he was the 
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only literate member in his family.  Nakagami considers the modern Japanese 
language that originated from the genbun icchi movement of the early Meiji period as 
an incomplete orthographic system that can not give a complete portrait of the world of 
his illiterate mother and siblings.  Nakagami laments that it has been difficult to depict 
the world of the roji in the Japanese language, which he regards as a reflection of 
Japanese modernity that has neglected the world of minorities in Japan.1  Nakagami 
was repulsed by the one-dimensional phrase that is typified by Kawabata Yasunari’s 
‘Beautiful Japan’, which Kawabata used in his Nobel Prize lecture in 1968.  Though 
Nakagami admits that Kawabata’s literary universe is surely fertile and beautiful, at the 
same time, he feels the insurmountable gap between his own Japanese and the 
collective term, ‘Beautiful Japan’, because Nakagami thinks that such a phrase is 
devoid of the concrete situation of an individual and its substance, that is, the world of 
his own outcast environments.  As Saussure noted, if ‘the language, considered at any 
moment, however far back in time, is always an inheritance from the preceding 
moment’,2 the language will reflect more of less the collective notions, all-inclusive 
fixed concepts from the past.  Similarly, in my understanding of Nakagami’s essays 
written in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, Nakagami became aware that kotoba itself 
turns into a collective orthographic system which restricts one’s personal autonomous 
freedom, that is, one’s self-determination that chooses his/her actions.  Perceiving this 
paradoxical nature of language, Nakagami considers the Japanese language as a product 
invented by the authorities for the sake of Japan’s modernization, and perceives it as a 
collective idea that was born to be ‘a certain average’3 which will never be complete in 
                                                  
1 Nakagami Kenji, ‘Watashi wa nihon-jin nano ka’, in Karatani Kōjin et al. (eds), Nakagami Kenji 
Hatsugen shūsei 6 (中上健次発言集成 6), Tokyo: Daisanbunmeisha, 1990, 338–340. 
2 Eisuke Komatsu (ed.), Saussure’s Third Course of Lectures on General Linguistic, 94a. 
3 Ibid., 69a. 
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any individual.  Thus, for Nakagami, the Japanese language is seen as an invented 
social apparatus, which is predisposed to discriminate against social minorities such as 
burakumin.   
Compared with this deceptive nature of kotoba, Nakagami emphasizes the body that 
could become an undeniable object complete in itself as an individual of substance.4  
Nakagami asserts that writers sometimes need to return to the world of the object in 
order to unlearn the superficial plausibility of language. 5   Thus, the process of 
Nakagami Kenji’s autonomous selfhood through his act of writing lies in close relation 
with the conflict between the language―a collective notion―and the carnal body or 
mono (the thing or object it represents)―the manifestation of the individual.     
The writers whom this dissertation talks about on this matter are Sakaguchi Ango, 
Miyazawa Kenji, Nakahara Chūya, Betsuyaku Minoru, Hijikata Tatsumi, Terayama 
Shūji, Kara Jūrō, Tsushima Yūko, Takamura Kaoru, Tawada Yōko and Yoshimoto 
Banana.  In my readings of their works and essays, they seem to possess this kind of 
autonomous selfhood, that is, the continuous self-determination through writing 
according to the situation at the time, and have much in common with Nakagami in 
their attitudes that show either a strong distrust of language or the admiration of the 
body.  For them, language is perceived as a social product, which takes on a collective 
nature, and which is seen as a certain average that cannot meet all the requirements of 
individual circumstances.  However, at the same time, these writers, knowing that 
language is an incomplete product which is inadequate in depicting their individual 
circumstances, accept the collective nature of language as inevitable, and they do not 
give up their attempt to make new values by using language within the limit of the 
                                                  
4 Nakagami, ‘Sakka to nikutai’ (作家と肉体), in NKZ Vol. 14, 199–204. 
5 Nakagami, ‘Shohatsu no mono’ (初発の者), in NKZ Vol. 14, 193–195. 
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generalized ideas that stem from the language itself.  Facing this paradoxical dilemma, 
these writers seize on their body as a starting point for discovering their own language 
to identify themselves as a social minority such as burakumin, woman, the first kabuki 
performer known as riverbed beggar (kawaramono)6 and so forth.  Chapter V and VI 
suggest that these writers’ endless attempts to seek their identities can be regarded as 
their autonomous freedom to choose their actions through the conflict between the 
language as a collective notion and the body as the manifestation of an individual act.  
In this chapter, compared with Nakagami Kenji’s sceptical attitude towards kotoba, I 
would like to examine the manner in which the scepticism towards kotoba is expressed 
in the works of modern Japanese writers such as Miyazawa and Chūya, the theatrical 
artists in the 1960s such as Betsuyakyu, Kara, and Terayama.  Then, their recognition 
of the body as the foundation of their thoughts is examined in the following chapter. 
 
Nakagami Kenji’s sceptical attitudes towards kotoba 
 
The points made in Chapter IV apply in principle to Nakagami Kenji’s scepticism 
towards kotoba, that is, the Japanese language as a modern invention resulting from the 
genbun icchi system of the Meiji period.  As seen earlier, the distrust of kotoba can be 
observed in the literature of Nakagami Kenji from the early stage of his career.  
Nakagami recognizes kotoba as a means that reflects the fixed ideas or long-established 
traditions from the past and that generates the archetype of monogatari.  Thus, 
Nakagami, maintaining a cautious distance from the collective nature of modern 
language as we have discussed, attempted to renew the meaning of Japanese words that 
                                                  
6 The riverbed beggar (kawaramono) is a derogatory term used for performers who began kabuki at 
the riverbank of the Kamo river in Kyoto. 
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took on the new meanings of the Constitution after the War under the Occupied 
authorities’ initiative.  In his early twenties, Nakagami was witness to the tumultuous 
period of student protests, the high growth of the economy and the rapid diffusion of 
mass communication in the 1960s and early 1970s.  At the height of the student 
movement, he also tentatively attended student demonstrations against the U.S.–Japan 
Security Treaty.  It appears to be reasonable to assume that Nakagami who belongs to 
the dankai7 generation of writers had common critical and historical insights into 
postwar democracy in Japan, which was formed by the U.S. occupation, and objected to 
the established modern system that was borrowed from the West.  More fundamentally, 
Nakagami depicts how the process of Japanese modernization created an unbridgeable 
gap between the spoken words used in the roji (Nakagami’s implicit term for burakumin 
ghetto, hisabetsu buraku) and the modern écriture invented by the nation-state in the 
name of genbun icchi.  Having regarded kotoba as a modern invention resulting from 
the genbun icchi system of the Meiji period, Nakagami observes a flaw in the Japanese 
language itself; the language functions as an invisible power apparatus that engenders 
an invented monogatari.  As we have seen in Chapter II, Nakagami highlights that 
each monogatari has an archetype of the narrative (monogatari no teikei) that gives a 
predetermined discourse to novels (shōsetsu).  He depicts the archetype of the 
narrative as a set pattern that restricts the freedom of the novel.  Nakagami attempts to 
not only escape from the snare of this monogatari but also delve into the problem of the 
canon formation of Japanese cultural or national identity in accordance with the 
historical process of Japan’s modern nation-state.  In order to accomplish this, he tries 
to find a new form of writing for contemporary novels. 
                                                  
7 The word dankai (団塊) refers to postwar baby-boom generation who were born between 1947 
and 1949. 
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Nakagami’s doubt about the widespread modern notions expressed by Japanese terms 
such as minshu-shugi (democracy), jiyū (freedom) or heiwa kenpō (a war-renouncing 
constitution) in postwar Japan is well illustrated in his early novella ‘Nihongo ni tsuite’ 
(On Japanese, 1968).  The protagonist, ‘Boku (I)’, a nineteen-year-old university 
student, is asked to do a part-time job during the summer vacation.  His official duty is 
to guide an African-American soldier who has stopped over in Japan before being 
dispatched to a forward base in Vietnam.  However, the protagonist’s employer, a 
group of left-wing student activists, asks him to lead the soldier astray; to put it more 
precisely, they ask ‘boku’ to invite the soldier to indulge in the pleasures of nightlife, 
alcohol and sex for five days.  Their ultimate aim is to coerce the soldier into evading 
his military service duties.  Since the soldier is unable to speak Japanese, 
communication between ‘boku’ and the soldier becomes strained.  While ‘boku’ is 
interacting with the soldier, he begins to realize that his pretence of representing the 
Japanese youth who enjoy democratic freedom under the new Constitution that 
renounces war is completely deceptive.  Consequently, he abandons his duty because 
Japanese words such as minshu-shugi, jiyū and heiwa kenpō appear spurious to him.  
That very day, ‘boku’ is informed about the soldier’s attempted suicide on his last day in 
Japan.  The police arrest ‘boku’, and a police officer informs him that the soldier is 
also a student majoring in social science.  He is further informed that the solder had 
been observing him (boku) in order to collect some material for an article that he was 
working on at home.  ‘Boku’ is at a loss for words when he becomes aware that the 
actual aim of his employer, the left-wing group, was to observe not only the soldier but 
also ‘boku’ in order to study the behaviour of a typical Japanese youth who takes peace 
for granted.  ‘Boku’ then questions the police officer who derides him. 
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「もし、あなただったら、日本語をまったく知らない外国人に出あ
った時、最初にどんな言葉を教えるのですか？」 [･･･] 僕は部屋
の中で警察官の嘲笑が僕の言葉をのみこみ、僕の躰をまで溶解させ
てしまうのではないかという恐怖に、躰中をからみつかれてしまっ
ているのを感じていた。僕はほとんど声にもならない言葉を、躰の
奥でぶつぶつとくりかえしていた。「あなたがどの日本語から教えは
じめるのか、僕はそれを知りたい。」8 
 
‘If you were in my position, I would like to know the first word you 
would teach a foreigner who cannot speak any Japanese.’ […] 
I was seized with fear in the room, as if the police officer’s scornful 
laughter was going to swallow my words and melt my body.  I 
reiterated a low murmur deep in my body, uttering a word in 
something that can hardly be called a voice.  ‘I just want to know the 
first Japanese word you would teach.’  
 
This excerpt illustrates the ambivalent attitude, namely, the identity crisis, faced by 
Japanese youth during the decade of the student protests of the 1960s.  At the 
beginning of this novella, the protagonist had no doubts that the Japanese words, which 
were used to assure his identity and democratic freedom, were recognized as 
meaningful words.  His identity was based on the solid democratic notions backed by 
the Japanese language he had always believed in.  However, towards the end of this 
novella, he developed a strong doubt about the Japanese language when he came to 
realize that Japan’s democratic freedom in postwar Japan was fabricated and he started 
                                                  
8 Nakagami, ‘Nihongo ni tsuite’ (日本語について), in NKZ Vol. 1, 207. 
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to depict Japanese words such as minshu-shugi, jiyū and heiwa kenpō as merely names 
or empty words with no substance or meaning.  Consequently, his self-identity, which 
was assured by such Japanese words, was devastated as in the excerpt.  All he could do 
was to ask himself a question about the verity of the Japanese language.  Is there any 
Japanese word of which he can grasp the exact meaning?  Is there any Japanese word 
whose meaning he can confidently explain to foreigners?  As seen above, in as early as 
1968, Nakagami expressed this doubt in nihongo and depicted the notions of 
minshu-shugi and jiyū as ready-made spurious ideas.  Moreover, no matter how 
strongly Nakagami denied the Japanese language as a deceptive system, for Nakagami, 
the Japanese language was his only means that enabled him to search for his 
self-identity.  We can observe here again how Nakagami Kenji, whose language had 
been caught in a conflict between the individual and the collective, attempted endlessly 
to seek the self-legislation or autonomy in the late 1960s.  
 
Ferdinand de Saussure’s paradox between langue and parole 
 
Nakagami Kenji’s perceptions discussed above will lead us further into a consideration 
of Ferdinand de Saussure’s paradox between langue and parole posed by a Japanese 
language teacher and a translator, Aihara Natsue.  In ‘On Japanese’, we can observe 
Nakagami’s disbelief in the Japanese language.  Throughout this novella, Nakagami 
repeatedly questions which Japanese word should be taught first when we teach a 
foreigner who cannot speak any Japanese.  Do we really seize the precise meaning of a 
word?  If so, when and by whom was the determination of a word’s meaning made?  
It is difficult to answer these questions as definitions of the meaning of any word 
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certainly vary historically and geographically.  It might be interesting to examine the 
collective nature of language from a theoretical perspective of a Japanese language 
teacher.  Aihara translated Saussure’s Third Course of Lectures on General Linguistics 
(1910–1911) From the Notebooks of Emile Constantin into Japanese. 9   She 
interestingly points out Saussure’s paradox from the viewpoint of a Japanese language 
teacher who is a native speaker of Japanese and teaches Japanese to foreign students as 
a second language.  She directs her attention to the manner in which Saussure defines 
the language (langue) as follows, ‘The language [langue], as far as I am concerned, is 
that social product whose existence allows the individual to use the language faculty.’10  
Added to this, she goes on to point out the following remarks by Saussure: 
 
The social act cannot reside elsewhere than in the individuals added 
together, but as for any <(other)> social fact, it cannot be considered 
outside the individual.  The social fact will be a certain average which 
will not be established, which will undoubtedly not be complete, in any 
individual.11 
 
Saussure’s findings in this excerpt led her to question whether the Japanese language 
can truly be called a complete system, and led her to conclude that it ‘will never turn out 
to be absolutely complete’.12  As is well known, Saussure advocates that the link 
between the sign and the idea represented is found in ‘absolute arbitrariness’.  He 
                                                  
9 Eisuke Komatsu (ed.), Saussure’s Third Course of Lectures on General Linguistics (1910–1911) 
From the Notebooks of Emile Constantin. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1993.  English translation by 
Roy Harris.  This book contains French original text: Troisieme cours de linguistique generale 
(1910-1911) d’après les cahiers d’Emile Constantin.  Ferudinan do Sushūru Ippan gengo-gaku dai 
3 kai kōgi: Konsutantan ni yoru kōgi kiroku (フェルディナン・ド・ソシュール 一般言語学第
三回講義 コンスタンタンによる講義記録), translated by Aihara Natsue and Akitsu Rei, Kyoto: 
Editto Paruku, 2003.   
10 Eisuke Komatsu (ed.), Saussure’s Third Course of Lectures on General Linguistic, 66a. 
11 Ibid., 69a. 
12 Ibid., 7a. 
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points out that ‘the link connecting a given acoustic image with a specific concept and 
conferring upon it its value as a sign is a radically arbitrary link.’13  The Japanese 
language is also considered as ‘the product of a society’ and merely one of ‘languages 
(les langues)’, that is, ‘an infinite diversity of languages’ whose underlying principle is 
‘absolute arbitrariness’.  In other words, the Japanese language is just another example 
of the ‘social fact’ which is regarded as ‘a certain average which will not be established, 
which will undoubtedly not be complete, in any individual’.  Saussure also describes 
the langue as ‘a machine which keeps going regardless of the damage inflicted on it’.14  
Aihara explains this matter from her practical experiences as a Japanese language 
teacher.  She states: ‘I came to realize that although I dwelled on the fact that the 
Japanese language is a langue, that is, a social product which is not called on to be a 
complete system, I, a Japanese language teacher, have to treat the Japanese language as 
if it were a complete system that is represented by a complete grammar book when I 
teach Japanese as a practical matter in a classroom.’15  She continues to explain that, in 
class, the Japanese language, though it is nothing but ‘a certain average’ for the 
individuals, tends to be regarded as the universal ideal in the name of the standard 
Japanese language backed by correct grammar.  In other words, Japanese language 
teachers have to regard, more or less, the Japanese language as a complete system as 
though it existed a priori.  Otherwise they cannot conduct class to teach Japanese as a 
practical matter in a classroom.  Even if a Japanese language teacher perceives the 
Japanese language as one of langues which is an incomplete system, at that very 
moment of teaching Japanese as a second language in class, s/he has to treat Japanese as 
                                                  
13 Ibid., 76a. 
14 Ibid., 113a. 
15 Aihara Natsue, Soshūro no paradokkusu (ソシュールのパラドックス Saussure’s Paradox), 
Kyoto: Edit.Parque, 2005, 9–14. 
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a universal system regulated by laws of grammar which are written on paper as a static 
fact.  Here, the point I wish to stress is made by the following remarks by Saussure: 
 
There is nothing in the language [la langue] which has not entered 
<directly or indirectly> through speech [la parole], that is through the sum 
total of words [des paroles] perceived, and conversely no speech [de 
parole] is possible before the development of this product called the 
language [la langue], which supplies the individual with the elements for 
the composition of his speech [sa parole].  
 
Developing and fixing this product is the work of the collective 
intelligence.  Everything that is the language [langue] is implicitly 
collective.  Whereas there is no collective speech [de parole].  <To say 
that a word [un mot] has come into the language [la langue] is to say that 
it has received collective approval.> Acts of speech [Les actes de parole] 
remain individual, apart from being momentary. [･･･] This thing, although 
internal to each individual, is at the same time collective, lying beyond the 
will of the individual. [･･･] 
 
I conclude that, if it is true that the two objects, the language and speech 
[langue et parole], presuppose each other, cannot exist without each other, 
nevertheless they are so little alike in nature that each requires a separate 
theory. [･･･] 16 
 
It will be clear from Saussure’s remarks that what Japanese language teachers in class 
perceive is to a considerable extent true for Nakagami Kenji’s ambivalent attitudes 
towards writing as well, that is, a paradoxical attitude between his practical attempt to 
establish his self-identity/autonomous selfhood and his theoretical approval to his 
inevitable involvement with the law/system of collective/others.  While Nakagaki was 
aware of the incompleteness of language because of its collective nature, he, as a 
                                                  
16 Eisuke Komatsu (ed.), Saussure’s Third Course of Lectures on General Linguistic, 91a–92a.  
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professional writer, had to show his self-determination or his free will to create new 
values through the Japanese language he mistrusts.  Saussure’s paradoxical view of 
langue and parole may also have much in common with two types of autonomy 
advanced by Maruyama Masao: ‘personal autonomy’, which is attained by the 
individual whose action carries ‘the principle of self-regulation, or responsibility as the 
corollary of his/her action’, and ‘social autonomy’, which refers to ‘a pluralistic society 
in which multi-dimensional individuals preserve their mobility in society’.17  It is 
important to bear in mind that Maruyama considers the notion of autonomy as ‘a system 
founded on paradox’ and there always exist ‘difficulties involved in reconciling the 
individual and the collective’.  Moreover, Saussure’s paradoxical view of langue and 
parole can also be perceived as Kant’s transcendental standpoint as something that is 
called a functionally autonomous alternation between the theoretical attitude and the 
practical attitude.  To put it more concretely, when Japanese language teachers regard 
the Japanese language as an incomplete system, their attitude, bracketing the practical 
attitude, can be theoretical.  To put it the other way round, when Japanese language 
teachers regard Japanese as a complete system backed by correct grammar, and actually 
teach Japanese in class, their attitude, bracketing the theoretical attitude, can be practical.  
Nakagami’s sceptical attitude towards the Japanese language can be explained by this 
paradoxical nature in language between the langue that has received collective approval 
and the parole that is the act of speech made by the individual, which were posed as 
each other’s presupposition by Saussure.  On this account, Nakagami Kenji’s act of 
writing should be re-considered as his strong will that continues to question what is the 
original meaning of one’s words and keeps rejecting the standard meaning of modern 
                                                  
17 Kersten, Democracy in Postwar Japan, 102–104. 
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language, having a consciousness that every being is relative to the concrete situation in 
a paradox between the individual and the collective. 
 
Scepticism towards the modern language: Betsuyaku Minoru and the small theatre 
movement (shōgekijō undō) in the 1960s 
 
When Nakagami wrote his essay entitled ‘The Report from a Criminal, Nagayama 
Norio’ and his early novella, ‘On Japanese’, in 1968/1969, in my readings of 
Nakagami’s works, Nakagami attempts to actualize the notion of autonomy through his 
act of writing that can be regarded as the continuous self-determination under the 
tension between self and others.  For Nakagami, the language can be seen as not only 
the reflection of the firm principles or the universal ideas but also a value generator that 
continues to create a new judgment in accordance with the concrete situation at the time.  
As I mentioned earlier, at this time Nakagami had become involved with the student 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s.  For the present, it may be useful to look more 
closely at some of the more concrete features of the student activists, artists of the older 
generation such as Betsuyaku Minoru, Kara Jūrō and Terayama Shūji who belong to the 
so-called yakeato sedai (焼跡世代 the yakeato generation)18 who express their doubts 
about a modern language, that is, the Japanese language itself.  The artists who belong 
to the yakeato generation grew up in the burned-out ruins of Japan at a susceptible and 
impressionable age and experienced a dramatic transformation of both political and 
                                                  
18 Roman Rosenbaum, ‘True Survivors: The “yakeato sedai” in Contemporary Japanese Literature’.  
He describes the yakeato sedai (the yakeato generation) as the ‘generation coming of age amidst the 
burned-out ruins after the war’.  This paper was presented to the 16th Biennial Conference of the 
Asian Studies Association of Australia in Wollongong 26 June – 29 June 2006.  See the following 
homepage: Asia Reconstructed: Proceedings of the16th Biennial Conference of the ASAA, 2006, 
Wollongong, Australia. ISBN 978-0-9580837-3-7. 
http://coombs.anu.edu.au/SpecialProj/ASAA/biennial-conference/2006/proceedings.html 
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ideological frameworks from militarism to postwar democracy.  Their scepticism 
towards the Japanese language may have stemmed from their childhood experiences as 
witnesses to the drastic changes that took place in people’s sense of values after the 
Japanese defeat in the War.  For instance, Nishikawa Nagao indicates that Ishikawa Jun 
(1899–1987), who was older than the yakeato generation and had experienced the defeat 
when he was 46, felt a profound detestation for the Japanese spirit (nihon seishin) that 
was imposed by the patriotic militarists in wartime Japan.  Nishikawa points out that 
kotoba (the Japanese language) was one of the most conventional and conservative 
elements which embodied the Japanese spirit.  According to Nishikawa, the yakeato 
sedai writers had also fallen into a dilemma in which they had to create radical works 
that opposed to the wartime militaristic Japanese spirit by using the Japanese language, 
that is, the very means that embodied the Japanese spirit.19 
Similar to the manner expressed by Nakagami Kenji in his early works, this kind of 
scepticism towards the modern language was especially conspicuous in the new field of 
Japanese theatre and drama, the so-called ‘small theatre movement’ or ‘post-shingeki 
movement’ that began in the 1960s.  After the 1960 demonstration against the renewal 
of the U.S.–Japan Mutual Security Treaty was quelled, the sentiment of disillusionment 
with postwar Japanese democratic institutions and a sullen pessimism became pervasive 
in people’s lives, and they lost their clear goals and universal ideology.  In the process 
of developing into a high-consumption and information-oriented society, instead of 
adopting positive activism against the established order, they searched for a new means 
of expressing their views, feeling that their lives were filled with a sense of absurdity 
and meaninglessness.  In this kind of atmosphere, many young yakeato sedai 
                                                  
19 Nishikawa, Nihon no sengo shōsetsu―haikyo no hikari, 60–61. 
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dramatists at the time sought to destroy the established modern Japanese 
drama—shingeki (新劇  literally, new theatre)—that emulated modern European 
drama.20  Betsuyaku Minoru (b. 1937), one of the leading dramatists in contemporary 
Japan; Hijikata Tatsumi (1928–1986), the founder of butō dance; Terayama Shūji 
(1935–1983), the poet and playwright from the legendary theatrical company 
Tenjōsajiki; Kara Jūrō (b. 1940), the Akutagawa Prize winner, playwright and actor in a 
theatrical company called Karagumi, and others had shared similar grounds for denying 
that the Japanese language was the established modern system that was borrowed from 
the West in varying degrees. 
Interestingly, some of the contemporary Japanese writers of the younger generation, 
the so-called ‘Baby Boomer generation’—including Nakagami Kenji (1946–1992) and 
Tsushima Yūko (b. 1947)—appeared to share the scepticism of these dramatists.  As 
we have already observed, Nakagami Kenji stated that ‘Language is deceptive!’, and his 
distrust of the Japanese language was displayed in his early works such as ‘On 
Japanese’ that we have discussed before.21  I would like to clarify how both the 
yakeato generation artists and Nakagami Kenji, who was born right after the war, 
developed their distrust of kotoba during the postwar years, how their scepticism 
towards kotoba, across two different generations, was intertwined, which dimension of 
Japanese language they expressed their distrusts in and whether there were any other 
modern artists/writers who express this notion of distrust of the modern language. 
 
One of the yakeato generation artists, Betsuyaku Minoru, was greatly influenced by 
                                                  
20 See David G. Goodman, Japanese Drama and Culture in the 1960s, 3–32.  In addition, see 
Robert T. Rolf and John K. Gillespie (ed.), Alternative Japanese Drama: Ten Plays, 1–23. 
21 For example, see Nakagami, ‘Toki wa nagareru…’, in NKZ Vol. 14, 239–242. 
 187
Samuel Beckett and his plays Waiting for Godot (1953), and Endgame (1958).  As a 
result, in his own plays Betsuyaku also searched for a new dramaturgy to describe the 
reality of postwar society in Japan.  He was a prolific writer, and many of his works 
were highly acclaimed.  Among the works that were critically acclaimed are Zō (The 
Elephant, 1962), Macchi uri no shōjo (The Little Match Girl, 1966), Mazā・Mazā・Mazā 
(Mother Mother Mother, 1979), and Tarō no yane ni yuki furitsumu (The Snow Falls on 
Tarō’s Roof, 1982).  Today, his plays are continuously staged by a range of theatrical 
groups.  Betsuyaku is currently the leader of the Piccolo Theatre Company in Hyogo 
prefecture.  Let us now clarify how Betsuyaku Minoru developed his distrust of kotoba 
during the postwar years, how his scepticism towards kotoba was intertwined with 
Nakagami Kenji’s distrust of the Japanese language, which dimension of the Japanese 
language Betsuyaku expressed his distrust in and whether there were any other modern 
Japanese artists/writers who shared this notion of distrust of the modern language. 
Let us begin by considering Betsuyaku’s early background as a repatriate from 
Manchuria.  I would like to focus on the foundation of Betsuyaku’s distrust of the 
Japanese language. Betsuyaku was born in Manchuria in 1937.  Since his father 
worked for the Information Bureau of the General Affairs Agency in Manchukuo, 
Betsuyaku and his family had to be relocated frequently after the War ended in 1945 till 
the time his family was repatriated from Xinjing in 1947.  When he was in the second 
grade of elementary school, after his father’s death in 1946, he boarded a repatriation 
ship with his mother and arrived in Kōchi on the island of Shikoku.  Betsuyaku insists 
oddly that he does not know the Japanese language though he admits that he is 
undoubtedly Japanese.  The reason why he made this remark is that he is unaware of 
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the various dialects in Japan.22  He further explains that he can only find the intrinsic 
energy of language in dialects; he assumes that the Japanese language he acquired, that 
is, hyōjungo or standard Japanese, is something devoid of this intrinsic energy that 
brings a language into existence.23  Since he lived in a Japanese settlement where 
everyone spoke in standard Japanese, Betsuyaku felt that his Japanese had become 
extremely flat, insipid or tasteless.  After he arrived in Kōchi in 1947, he spent some 
time there and moved to Shizuoka on the main island, Honshū.  Both these provinces 
had heavily accented dialects.  In retrospect, he confesses that he could not become 
accustomed to the dialects of every place that he moved to in Japan.  He recalls that 
upon leaving the continent, he had gradually developed a kind of a love-hate feeling for 
dialects as he moved from one place to another.  He cites this as the reason he has 
never acquired any particular dialect, even though he was still in his early teens.24  As 
a playwright, he believes that this is the fatal flaw that exerted a baneful influence on his 
works.  For Betsuyaku, while the standard Japanese appears to be a hollow language, 
the dialects in Japan appear to be the living language, which takes on the essential 
meaning and intrinsic energy. 
In addition, he points out that an increasing number of abstract words (chūshō-go) are 
becoming obsolete in modern Japanese society.  He regards everyday conversational 
abstract words as mere signs/symbols but not words.  Consider the word justice (seigi) 
as an example.  According to Betsuyaku, this word is not really tangible because it 
cannot be seen as an object or matter.  To grasp its meaning, we have to ceaselessly 
define it based on our everyday experiences.  In other words, we have to constantly 
                                                  
22 Betsuyaku, Kotoba e no senjutsu, 32–34.   
23 Ibid.  
24 See Senda, Gekiteki runessansu, 106–138. 
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update our definition of the word justice.  However, due to a deluge of abstract words 
in modern society, people do not attempt to find their own meaning for these words; 
instead, they rely on the meanings that have already been defined by others, or rather, 
by the foremost authority on the subject.  If people continue to use borrowed concepts 
without ascertaining by themselves the meanings of words, these words may gradually 
be transformed into obsolete language.  Influenced by his early background as a 
returnee from the continent and knowing only standard Japanese, which lacked the 
intrinsic energy of dialect, Betsuyaku defines kotoba as follows: 
 
Kotoba can be something that is created by each of us every day or 
something that changes every hour.  Strictly speaking, the moment we 
speak a word, a decision is reached with regard to what the definition of 
the word is, and simultaneously the word becomes a hollow language.  
As a result, we have to continuously decide the meanings of words.25   
 
As early as 1946, philosopher Tsurumi Shunsuke pointed out the issue of the 
ambiguity of the modern language.26  He terms the excessive use of abstract words in a 
language as an amulet that protects us from harm or misfortune (kotoba no 
omamori-teki shiyōhō).27   He also criticizes this kind of use of language as our 
unconscious, insidious habit of using a word without knowing its exact meaning in 
order to protect ourselves under the shelter of the influence of a person or institution in 
power.  In protecting our social or political status, we tend to make statements using 
                                                  
25 Betsuyaku, Kotoba e no senjutsu, 32–34.  
26 Tsurumi, Tsurumi Shunsuke shū 3: Kigō-ron shū, 389–408. 
27 Ibid., 390. 
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terms that are authorized by established institutions or individuals.  Some examples of 
this include kokutai (the national polity of Japan), nihon-teki (Japanized or typical 
Japanese), and kōdō (the imperial way) all of which originated in the pre-war period, but 
also minshu-shugi (democracy), jiyū (freedom/liberty), seigi (justice) which pertain to 
the present.  Tsurumi argues that if we are able to develop the habit of understanding 
the meaning of each word more concretely in our everyday lives, we could not be so 
easily incited by demagogues.  Thus far, the point made by Tsurumi may apply in 
principle to what Betsuyaku terms as ‘hollow language’, in other words, one that is not 
constantly updated in meaning, as mentioned above.  Furthermore, the sense of 
discomfort that Nakagami found in the gap between Kawabata Yasunari’s ‘beautiful 
Japan’ and his Japanese used in the roji may be explained on similar lines. 
 
Betsuyaku Minoru also analyses the recent juvenile suicides which were caused by 
bullying at school, ijime.28  He illustrates the tendency that it is very difficult to 
identify the independent activists (i.e. bullies) in recent cases.  In other words, 
although no particular person or group conduct any direct action, the systematic 
merciless bullying continues indubitably under the guise of playing a prank or a game.  
Lacking any sense of responsibility, no one in the system develops any sort of guilt 
feeling towards bullying.  Betsuyaku calls this peculiar systematic mechanism 
‘anonymous malice’ (無記名性の悪意).29  He also points out that there is no ‘ko’ (個 
the individual/modern subjectivity) who is determined by the modern system/law or the 
                                                  
28 Betsuyaku, for example, examines a 13-year-old boy’s suicide caused by bullying at Fujimi 
Junior Highschool in Morioka prefecture in 1986.  See, Betsuyaku Minoru, Beketto to ijime (ベケ
ットといじめ), Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2005, 38–87.  The first edition was published by Iwanami 
shoten in 1987. 
29 Ibid., 40–87.  
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cause-and-effect relationship but ‘ko’ (孤 a solitary nucleus/isolated topos) who is free 
from the ‘community’s codes’ at the scene of recent ijime cases caused by ‘anonymous 
malice’.  Betsuyaku applies the same logic to the contemporary drama, and points out 
that such a nonexistent individual subject or rather a causal correlation itself cannot be a 
protagonist in any established modern drama.  Instead, an interrelation, or rather, 
causality within a closed system, in a sense, walks by itself and acts like a protagonist in 
contemporary drama.  It is all a secluded ‘ko’ (孤) can do to recognize its position or 
role in the closed system.  Thus, Betsuyaku attempts to clarify the manner in which the 
mechanism of this ‘anonymous malice’ intersects with the contemporary dramaturgy 
proposed by Samuel Beckett.  Betsuyaku points out that, in modern drama, we could 
draw a clear boundary between the mastermind and the sympathizer; conversely, in 
contemporary drama, ‘anonymous malice’ has served to blur the line that used to be 
drawn sharply between the mastermind and the sympathizer.  Thus, in the topos of 
contemporary drama that is ruled by ‘anonymous malice’, Betsuyaku recognizes the 
literary topos (ba 場) where the conflicts between the individual (self) and the 
collective (others) are intricately-intertwined with each other and coexist preserving its 
individual nature.  Examples of Betsuyaku’s notion of anonymous malice abound in 
his dramas.  For example, Betsuyaku’s viewpoint of the mechanism of anonymous 
malice is expressed best in Tarō no yane ni yuki furitsumu which is based on the prison 
diary of Isobe Asa’ichi (1905–1937) who was one of the alleged masterminds of The 
February 26 Incident in 1936.30 In this scene, a man is questioned by a woman as to 
why he works for Kita Ikki (1883–1937) who was the suspected intellectual mastermind 
of the incident. 
                                                  
30 The February 26 Incident (2. 26 jiken) was an attempted coup d’État in 1936, which was mounted 
by the radical officers of the Imperial Japanese Army. 
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 男２ 私だってそうです。私にだってわからないんです。[･･･] それと
もあなたがた、私が何か知っているとでも思っているんですか。
とんでもない。今も言いましたように、私は一番の下っぱの使い
走りですよ。物の数にも入らないくらいの人間です。私にこれを
させたのは、私の上司です。でも、その上司が何かを知っている
だなんて思わないで下さい。そうじゃないからです。その上司に
そうさせたのは、そのまた上司だからです。そして、その上司に
もまた、上司がいるんです。ともかく、私は、その三番目の上司
の、顔すら見たことがないんですからね。しかも･･････、ですよ。
その顔すらも見たことのないような上司が、またその上にいるん
です。私がどれほどの下っぱかということなんか、あなたがたの
思いも及ばないほどですよ･･････。[･･･] 私は時々考えますよ。
もしかしたら、私の上司の、そのまた上司の、更にその先の、無
限の彼方には、ただ風だけが吹いているんじゃないかって
ね･･････。そうです。風ですよ。風が、私たちにそうさせている
んです･･････。31     
 
Man 2  Me neither.  I don’t understand, neither. [･･･] No way!  Do you 
think I know something about this?  No, I’m not kidding.  As I said 
just before, I’m just one the lowest messenger boys on the totem pole.  
I must be counted for nothing.  It was my boss that made me do this.  
Oh, wait!  But don’t you ever think that my boss knows something.  
That’s not true, either.  It was his boss that made him do this.  And 
his boss has his immediate superior, too.  Anyhow, I have never seen 
the face of the boss who is three ranks higher than me.  Moreover, 
there is another boss who is senior to him in rank, too.  You just can’t 
imagine how low rank I am. [･･･] I sometimes imagine that beyond 
this infinite rank of our higher-ups, there is only a wind blowing.  
                                                  
31 Betsuyaku, Tarō no yane ni yuki furitsumu, 235–236. 
 193
Yes!  There must be a wind.  I believe this very wind makes us do 
this･･･. 
 
There is a suggestion here in my reading of Betsuyaku that Betsuyaku’s notion of 
anonymous malice shows a resemblance to the kokutai ideology, which could infiltrate 
into any spiritual or interior sphere of the individual.  On this matter, Maruyama 
Masao, exemplifying the affairs of the ill-treatment of Allied prisoners during the war, 
revealed the system in which morality is subtly blended with the power of the nation.  
Rikki Kersten summarizes the system of this phenomenon as follows:  
 
The cohabitation of morality with the state was in turn justified by what 
Maruyama called ‘proximity to the ultimate value’, personified by the 
Emperor. This idea was a vital factor as far as war responsibility was 
concerned.  The importance lay, in Maruyama’s view, in the vertical nature 
of power relationships built into the concept of proximity.  The position of 
an individual or group was a relative position, one of comparative proximity 
to the Emperor, and therefore, a position whose power was defined relatively.  
Power was not inherent in any position, instead it was transferred 
downwards from positions of greater proximity.  Therefore, those in a 
position of leadership felt superior due to their evident proximity; however, 
power did not emanate from their nominal status, neither were decisions 
justified by their status as leaders.  Maruyama described this as a sort of 
‘unconscious despotism’, which led to the complete absence of any feeling 
of responsibility for the conduct of the war.  The country merely slithered 
into war. 32 
 
As we can see from the above quotation, in a society where everything is decided by 
this yardstick—proximity to the Emperor (tennō e no kyori)—a dictator could not wield 
                                                  
32 Kersten, Democracy in Postwar Japan, 31–32. 
 194
arbitrary power, because every single individual or group restrains and checks each 
other.  In this case, is the Emperor the only entity who has subjective freedom?  The 
answer is ‘no’.  Kersten explains that ‘In this theory even the Emperor carried such a 
burden, in the form of the wishes of his ancestors which had to be “transformed” down 
the line.  This completes an appalling picture of utter irresponsibility, where the 
dynamics were invisible psychological pressures, and men moved in destructive ways 
wielding anonymous power.’33 
The similar logic may be said, no doubt, of Nakagami Kenji’s paradoxical and 
sceptical attitudes towards his act of writing by using kotoba, which has a conflicting 
nature between the individual and the collective.  It is not to be denied that, in the 
topos of contemporary drama where Betsuyaku or Nakagami dwelt, without the definite 
mastermind―the autonomous self who continuously decides the meanings of words 
and produces new values, one’s word (kotoba) could easily lose its exact meaning and 
intrinsic energy. 
On this matter, the moral philosopher, Takeuchi Sei’ichi takes notice of two Japanese 
words: onozukara and mizukara which share the same kanji, 自, that means ‘self’ (with 
different readings and their declensional kana ending : onozu-kara and mizuka-ra).  
Mizukara means ‘to act of one’s own accord, that is, free will’.  In contrast, onozukara 
means ‘something happens by itself or naturally’.  Takeuchi argues that, in Japan, we 
may think that something is actualized because not only do we try to put it into practice 
by our intention or free will but also all of our acts are determined by the various 
causalities spontaneously.  Takeuchi asserts that the ambiguous attitude of Japanese 
people may stem from this alternative attitude between onozukara and mizukara, which 
                                                  
33 Ibid., 32. 
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exists in our language itself.34  Viewed in this light, Nakagami Kenji’s act of writing 
can be considered as an autonomous action that is perpetually called on to bring out the 
self-determination and to create new values with a historically changing environment 
which is found in the conflict between onozukara and mizukara.  For this reason, 
Nakagami finds this act of writing in the eternal conflict between the establishment of 
his autonomous selfhood and his acceptance of external causalities that inevitably 
restrict his autonomous freedom as the law/system of the collective.  As he is aware 
that any binary frame will never be dialectically reconciled, Nakagami’s ambivalent 
attitude towards his act of writing can be explained by Kant’s transcendental standpoint 
that is to keep both the theoretical attitude (onozukara) and the practical attitude 
(mizukara) at the same time; and he seems to know how to bracket and unbracket one 
of the attitudes according to the situation at the time.  This is because the individual 
(mizukara) and the collective (onozukara) are premised on each other and cannot exist 
without each other in the same way as langue and parole.  In this way, we may explain 
that Nakagami regards his act of writing as aspiring to the ceaseless hell as we have 
seen in Chapter I. 
 
The écriture of the Emperor (tennō no kakikotoba) as an invented modern écriture 
 
As we have seen in the early part of this chapter, in the process of writing his novels, 
Nakagami showed a strong mistrust of the collective term, such as minshu-shugi 
(democracy), jiyū (freedom) or heiwa kenpō (a war-renouncing constitution).  Thus, 
from this viewpoint one may say that Nakagami confronted the estrangement between 
                                                  
34 Takeuchi Sei’ichi, ‘Onozukara’ to ‘Mizukara’: Nihon shisō no kisō（「おのずから」と「みずか
ら」日本思想の基層), Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 2004, i–vi. 
 196
our words—kotoba (the language sign)—and what they represented—mono (the 
things/objects). 
  Saussure points out that ‘the language, considered at any moment, however far back 
in time, is always an inheritance from the preceding moment.’  He goes on to explain: 
 
The postulated act by which, at a given moment, names were assigned to 
things, the act by which a contrast was completed between ideas and signs, 
between the signifying and signified elements, this act is purely imaginary.  
It is an idea inspired by the feeling we have of the arbitrariness of the sign, 
but belongs to no recognizable reality.  Never has any society known its 
language other than as a product more or less perfected by preceding 
generations and to be taken just as it is.  In other words, we recognize a 
historical fact at the origin of every language state.35 
 
In a similar manner, Nakagami Kenji points out that our act of naming mono 
(things/objects)36 is unconsciously fettered by the logic of the collective such as the 
law/system of the modern nation-state or the rule of the Emperor.  After publishing 
Tales of Kishū: Land of Trees, Land of Roots—which is his reportage revealing the 
realities of discrimination against the burakumin in Kishū—in 1978, Nakagami began to 
address a series of seminars titled Buraku seinen bunka-kai (The Cultural Society for 
Outcast Youth) in Shingū City.  In these seminars, he discussed the gaps between 
kotoba and mono.37  During his first lecture in February, 1978, Nakagami stated that 
when he visited Grand Shrine of Ise, which may be regarded as one of the most sacred 
shintō shrines in Japan, he was utterly astonished by its well-stocked library which has 
                                                  
35 Eisuke Komatsu (ed.), Saussure’s Third Course of Lectures on General Linguistic, 94a. 
36 Nakagami uses the word mono as an all inclusive term that includes not only tangible objects but 
also phenomenal facts, everything in the universe that is bound by the law of nature―the cause and 
effect relationship. 
37 Nakagami, ‘Mono to kotoba’ in Karatani Kōjin and Watanabe Naomi (eds), Nakagami Kenji to 
Kumano, 18–35. 
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more than two hundred thousand books regarding shintō and the Emperor of Japan.38  
Looking at a vast number of books in the Shrine of Ise, Nakagami confessed that he 
could not help asking himself the question of whether the syntax of nihongo might be 
more or less subjugated by the rule of ‘the tennōsei ideology’ (the Emperor system) 
from ancient Japan.  As Saussure stated, if we assume that language can be defined as 
a social product, that is, ‘a product more or less perfected by preceding generations’,39 
the Japanese language can also be regarded as a social product that was flavoured by the 
tennōsei ideology in the history of Japan to a greater or lesser extent.  In Nakagami’s 
terms, this standardized language was referred to as ‘the écriture of the Emperor’ (tennō 
no kakikotoba), an invented modern écriture.  While travelling around Kishū in several 
burakumin ghettoes for the purpose of collecting material for Tales of Kishū: Land of 
Trees, Land of Roots, Nakagami witnessed the harsh reality of some burakumin ghettoes.  
It became clear to him that it was almost impossible to illustrate their severe realities of 
individuals living in a roji by using the existing standard Japanese that was coloured and 
toned by the collective intelligence such as, in Nakagami’s phrase, the law/system of 
modern nation-state or the écriture of the Emperor.  Nakagami saw some grass on the 
ground in a burakumin ghetto and the idea of ‘what is’ suddenly struck him.  He could 
not resist questioning what constitutes kusa (grass).  Nakagami concluded that the 
substance of kusa may not be kusa itself (as an object) but merely our act of naming an 
object (a very common green plant with long, thin, spiky leaves40) ‘kusa’ (that is, its 
vocalized sound, [k∝sa]).   
 
                                                  
38 Ibid. 
39 Eisuke Komatsu (ed.), Saussure’s Third Course of Lectures on General Linguistic, 94a. 
40 Sinclair (ed.), Collins COBUILD English Language Dictionary, 634. 
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I previously believed that kusa (grass) is kusa [as an object].  But now I 
realized that the substance of kusa is not a being or an object but merely a 
term, that is, a kotoba (word) that is simply uttered as kusa.41  
 
Further, in Nakagami’s opinion, when we name any object/event, our act of naming 
mono is unconsciously bound, in some inexplicable way, by the law/system of the 
collective.  Nakagami explains that when we name something, or more precisely, when 
we define a word to identify something, we are unconsciously being shackled by a 
conventional idea, namely the syntax of nihongo, which bears more or less the logic of 
the modern nation-state after the Meiji period or the rule of the Emperor from ancient 
Japan. 
Nakagami tried to find a way out of this impasse of current standard Japanese and 
stated that if we attempt to escape from these bonds created by the syntax of nihongo, 
we have to introduce a language with a different dimension.42  As a possible means to 
break the shackles of the écriture of the Emperor, Nakagami considered the state of 
exact correspondence between the name/term as the linguistic sign (kotoba) and the 
thing or object it represents (mono).  At this time, he encountered many aged, illiterate 
women in the burakumin ghettoes and listened to their conversations.  In the narrative 
style (katarikuchi) of their conversations, he observed the state of perfect conformity 
between kotoba and mono.  He focused his attention on their narrative, such as ine, 
tsurai nee (イネ、辛いねぇ Sister, this is such a hardship, isn’t it?) as examples in 
which a word perfectly coincides with the matter it represents.  Nakagami felt that the 
                                                  
41 「草は草である。そう思い、草の本質は、物ではなく、草と名づけられた言葉ではない
かと思った。」Nakagami, Kishū: Ki no kuni, ne no kuni monogatari, in NKZ Vol. 14, 609. 
42 Nakagami describes this as ibō no kotoba (異貌の言葉 the language with a different face) in 
Nakagami, Kishū: Ki no kuni ne no kuni monogatari, in NKZ Vol. 14, 605–612. 
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discourse of their artless, or in a way, earthy narrative may not have been tinged by the 
syntax of standard Japanese.  Nakagami explains that the Japanese word samui (cold), 
for example, refers not only to ‘something that has a lower temperature or a lower air 
temperature’ but is also a term that is used to exchange greetings.  However, when he 
travelled in America as a non-native speaker of English, if he said it is ‘cold’ in English, 
it implied nothing but ‘coldness’ because he was not able to express his feelings in the 
various ways of English native speakers.  According to Nakagami, the same 
observation applied to the veracity of the unpretentious narratives of the old women in 
Kishū; he believed that this naiveté in their narrative style could enable us to revive 
standard Japanese that he considered as a hollow language in contemporary Japan.  
Nakagami assumes that the discourse of the old women’s narratives may break the 
impasse of Japan’s standard language resulting from a centripetal force made by the rule 
of the collective such as the genbun-icchi system of the Meiji period.  Here, we can 
recognize from Nakagami’s attempt that he struggled to bring kotoba close to mono, or 
it would be more accurate to say that he tried very hard to see any entity (concrete entity 
or abstract entity) as its state that we have not named yet.  He tried very hard to treat 
kotoba as mono that has not been contaminated by its assigned name because Nakagami 
considered any words in Japan as a social product that has more or less been tinged with 
the law/system of the collective such as the logic of the modern nation-state or the 
écriture of the Emperor.  It is on such grounds that he believed that using the narratives 
of the old women living in the roji, he could counter the logic of Japan’s modern 
nation-state that have been regarded as one of Japan’s collective forces which may have 
engendered sabetsu (discrimination) against burakumin.  However, on this matter, 
Nakagami recognized the difficulty of his attempt, describing this attempt as a glaring 
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contradiction simply because narrating (katari) or oral literature should not be written.  
He despairingly admitted that once it is written, it is no longer narrating.43  Yet, he 
did not abandon kotoba and continued to look at every possible way, clinging 
tenaciously to kotoba, to break the spell of the law/system of the collective, which can 
be, in some cases, considered as an embodiment of the logic of the modern nation-state 
or the écriture of the Emperor. 
This observation of the old women’s narratives as a touchstone to destroy the modern 
écriture can be found in Sennen no yuraku.  Nakagami met an illiterate, old woman 
named Tabata Ryū, the wife of a Buddhist priest Tabata Reijo, in Kasugachō town, that 
is, roji, a burakumin ghetto in Shingū City.  He was deeply inspired by her narrative 
and the fact that she could recite the entire contents of the town’s family register; in 
other words, she knew about all the births and deaths in her town and functioned like a 
walking encyclopaedia.  One of the protagonists in Nakagami’s important novels was 
modelled on this woman.  In his major novels including the trilogy of Akiyuki and 
Sennen no yuraku, she became the omniscient and omnipotent focal character, Oryū no 
oba, a midwife in the roji who remembers the stories of the lives of all the people.  In 
Sennen no yuraku, the main characters are the six young men of the Nakamoto family 
who died when they were young.  One day, one of the main characters, Oriento no 
Yasu, brings a gramophone to encourage Oryū no oba to enjoy music.  However, Oryū 
does not comprehend the lyrics from a piece of music that she has listened to and says: 
  
「なんなよ、他の国の言葉でうたわれてもわからんよ。」とオリュウ
ノオバが言うと、オリエントの康は悲しげな顔をして「日本語じゃ」
                                                  
43 「あるいは書くこと、書かれる事を拒む語りの言葉か。書かれてある語りとはムジュン
もはなはだしいが･･･」 Nakagami, Kishū: Ki no kuni ne no kuni monogatari, in NKZ Vol. 14, 
609–610. 
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と言う。オリュウノオバは新時代が来たと思い知らされた気がした
のだった。日本人が日本語でうたっているのを同じ日本語をしゃべ
っている自分がさっぱり聴きとれず、鳥の鳴き声のようにただ音だ
けが耳に響く。44 
 
‘What is this?  I cannot understand anything if a song has foreign words’. 
‘It is a Japanese song’, replied Oriento no Yasu, with a disappointed 
expression.  
Oryū no oba realized that a new era had arrived.  She was made acutely 
aware of the fact that she, a Japanese-speaking person, could no longer 
understand a song sung in Japanese by a Japanese singer.  Instead, the 
mere warble-like sounds resounded in her ears.  
 
Following this scene, Oryū recalls the day when the ordinance of the outcast liberation 
(Eta kaihō rei) was promulgated at the beginning of the Meiji period, which ironically 
generated a harsher counter-discrimination against the burakumin.  She remembers the 
episode in which no one in the roji was aware of the precise meaning of a newly 
invented word banzai; they would dispiritedly repeat banpai instead of banzai since 
they had not memorized the word correctly.  From this extract, it is evident that 
Nakagami depicts how the process of Japanese modernization created an unbridgeable 
gap between the spoken words used in the roji and standard Japanese, which Nakagami 
considered as the modern écriture invented by the nation-state in the name of 
genbun-icchi. 
 
In addition, Nakagami’s central characters speak Shingū-ben (a Kishū dialect).  This 
                                                  
44 Nakagami, Sennen no yuraku in NKZ Vol. 5, 103. 
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illustrates a clear distinction between Shingū-ben as the living language and standard 
Japanese as a hollow language.  An example of this is found in Sanka (讃歌 Paean, 
1990), which was written towards the end of his polyphonic series of novels called the 
Kumano saga.  In his previous novel Nichirin no tsubasa (The Wings of the Sun, 1984), 
Tsuyoshi and Tanaka, the protagonists, drive their large refrigerated truck from Ise to 
Tokyo, carrying in it seven old women who were evicted from their roji, which was 
destroyed to make way for the re-development of the area during the earliest period of 
Japan’s bubble economy.  Having lost their land, the outcasts’ community, roji, which 
was depicted as a mythical utopia where there was no boundary between the sacred and 
the impure in Sennen no yuraku, the two young men, Tsuyoshi and Tanaka, and seven 
old women set out on a wandering journey in order to seek safe refuge.  When they 
arrive at the Meiji Shrine in Tokyo, the seven old women vanish in the city.  The 
narrative of searching for another roji ends suddenly in the course of their journey, and 
it seems to last forever.  In Sanka, the lengthy sequel to Nichirin no tsubasa, after the 
disappearance of the old women in Tokyo, Tsuyoshi and Tanaka having lost the place to 
which they could return, become high-class male prostitutes.  Tsuyoshi transforms 
himself into a ‘cyborg of sex’ (sei no saibōgu) who speaks the standard language; he 
gives himself an androgynous nickname—‘Yves’.  However, he is unable to immerse 
his heart and soul into this superficial way of life in the massive, flourishing, consumer 
culture of Tokyo.  His mental framework as a cyborg becomes extremely confused, 
and interestingly, this confusion is manifested by his return to the Shingū dialect that 
had been pushed aside in his subconscious domain.  One afternoon, when Yves is 
about to leave for the gymnasium that he has been visiting regularly, he finds himself 
unable to fit into his role as the cyborg of sex. 
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 入口で預けてあった会員証を受け取ろうとすると、インストラクタ
ーが様子の違ったイーブに気づいて怪訝な顔をし、 
「今日はちょっと違うじゃない」と声をかけた。 
「用事を思い出したものだから」イーブは答え、ふっと自分の言葉
がサイボーグの合成語だったような気がし、「これから仕事キャンセ
ルしに行くんじゃよ」と方言を使ってみる。 
「仕事、仕事でつまらん。ちょっとは遊びをもろてもええじゃろ、
と思て」45 
 
When Yves is about to receive his membership card that he has left behind 
at the reception, an instructor notices a different, indescribable expression 
on his face. 
‘You look a little different today, you know?’ he says hesitatingly to Yves. 
‘That is because I have just remembered the business I have got to do…’, 
replies Yves, suddenly feeling that his words sounded typical of a cyborg.  
‘I am going to cancel my appointment now’, he replies in an attempt to 
use his hometown dialect.  
‘Work, work, work…it has bored me stiff.  Why can I not have a little 
fun?  What do you reckon?’  
 
The above excerpt adequately reflects Nakagami’s stance on dialects in his writing.  
Here, he clearly portrays the Shingū dialect as the language used by real people, those 
made of flesh and blood, and sets this language against the standard language that is an 
artificially-synthesized (the language of the cyborg).46  It is very interesting to recall 
                                                  
45 Nakagami Kenji, Sanka, in NKZ Vol. 7, 384. 
46 Nakagami Kenji, ‘Kasuga to “Kojiki”’ in Karatani and Watanabe (eds), Nakagami Kenji to 
Kumano, 27–35. 
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that Betsuyaku Minoru also strongly asserts that the intrinsic energy of words can only 
be found in dialects, and he deplores the fact that he could never acquire any specific 
dialect as he was born on the continent and constantly shifted from one place to another. 
 
Nakagami incessantly fixes his critical eyes on kotoba itself, pondering over what 
collective terms such as jiyū, burakumin or minshu-shugi essentially mean in everyday 
life according to the concrete situations of postwar Japan.  Viewed in this light, in the 
same way as Betsuyaku Minoru who sees words in our language as something that 
should constantly be updated in meaning, Nakagami never abides by the same state of 
being burakumin but he is reborn as a burakumin and reconsiders everyday what this 
word means to him with regard to the changing social conditions of contemporary Japan.  
On the same account that Saussure recognizes langue (the language) and parole (the 
individual speech) which presuppose each other and cannot exist without each other, 
both Betsuyaku and Nakagami become aware that the individual is deemed to continue 
to bring out the self-determination and to make new values which are relative to a 
concrete situation poised on the brink between the individual (parole) and the collective 
(langue).  
 
The Anpo protesters and their scepticism toward the Japanese language 
 
In ‘The Report from a Criminal, Nagayama Norio’ and ‘On Japanese’ which were 
written in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, Nakagami harboured his distrust of the 
Japanese language.  As we have discussed, kotoba appeared to be a collective notion 
that generalized the reality of the individual living in his outcast neighbourhood where 
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he was born and raised.  Then, what made Nakagami perceive kotoba as something 
deceptive during this period?  As I mentioned earlier, Nakagami had been involved 
with the student movements of the 1960s and 1970s.  Can we correlate his 
involvement with the student activism to his distrust of the Japanese language?  
Similar to Nakagami, when we re-evaluate the works of Betsuyaku Minoru in the 
context of the yakeato generation playwrights, another important aspect to be 
considered is the involvement of this generation in the political activities of the 1960s 
and 1970s, known as the 1960 Anpo protests and the 1970 Anpo protests, both of which 
opposed to the U.S.–Japan Joint Security Treaty.  Betsuyaku studied at Waseda 
University in 1958 but left in 1960 in order to commit himself completely to both 
theatre and political activities.  The question that arises here is whether his deep 
involvement in the student movements of the 1960s had some relevance to the issue that 
made him distrust the Japanese language.  For the present, it might be useful to look 
more closely at the paradoxical self-identification of student activists in the 1960s. 
 
One of Betsuyaku’s contemporaries—Yamazaki Masakazu (b. 1934)—another 
yakeato generation literary critic and playwright, examined the rapid changes in public 
morals during the political upheaval of the 1960s and 1970s.47  He portrays the 
sentiments of the young protesters, in his book entitled Onrii iesutadei ’60s (Only 
Yesterday ’60s, 1977); he analyses the agitation of student activists at that time and 
directs his attention to the nature of their agitations.  He points out the fact that young 
agitators accentuated each particle or the end of each phrase in their written appeals 
(gekibun) and pronounced the accented syllable for slightly longer than usual, as if they 
                                                  
47 Yamazaki Masakazu, Onrii iesutadei ’60s (おんりい・いえすたでい ’60s), Tokyo: Bunshun 
bunko, 1985.  The original book was published in 1977. 
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were long vowel.  For example the sentence ‘Wareware waa, teikoku-shugi noo, 
dan’atsu oo, danko to shitee, funsai shii…’.48  Moreover, Yamazaki points out that the 
style they used in their appeals was full of two character Chinese compounds that were 
extremely abstruse as if they were some sort of conjuration.  He explains that their 
written appeals did not imply anything but merely expressed a kind of momentary 
ambience, feeling or mood that developed from the situation.  Upon hearing their 
agitation, Yamazaki describes these student agitators as ‘troops of young people who 
agonize over inconclusive debates and stumble over their words, searching for a firm 
conclusion pertinent to their time’.49   
With regard to this matter, Sakurai Tetsuo (b. 1949), a social theorist, explores the 
phenomenon of the loss of kotoba in contemporary Japan.  He explains that the 
ambivalent feelings of Japanese youths at the time originated in ideological conflict, a 
strong identification with Japan’s traditional maternal society, and their search for the 
firm establishment of democratic subjectivity (shutaisei) in modern Japan.  Sakurai 
analyses the debate between Mishima Yukio and the ‘All-campus Joint Struggle 
Committee of Tokyo University’ (Tōdai Zenkyōtō) students in 1969 and states: 
 
What we seemingly observe here can be regarded as the ideological 
conflict between Mishima who is seized with an impulse to integrate with 
                                                  
48 「われわれワァ、帝国主義ノォ、弾圧ウォ、断固としテェ、粉砕シィ」Yamazaki, Onrii 
iesutadei ’60s, 156.   
49 I translated the summary of the following original texts:「あの絶叫は、口ごもりながら結論を
模索して、しかし、いつまでたっても得られない結論の前に、彼ら自身が身悶えている姿
であったといえるかもしれません。[･･･] 口ごもる青年たちの、巨大で、激しい身悶えの結
集であったと見ることができそうです。」in Yamazaki, Onrii iesutadei ’60s, 226.  Further, 
Yamazaki explained that unlike Mishima Yukio (1925–1970) who strongly expressed his wrath 
against the falsehood [uso] of the social conditions of the day, the masses of ordinary people during 
the 1960s, knowing full well that a falsehood was nothing but a falsehood, participated in society as 
though they were enjoying playing out the part of their lives on a stage. 
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others and the Zenkyōtō students who reject any concept of ‘dependence’ 
in postwar Japan.  However, what has to be noticed is the fact that on the 
one hand the Zenkyōtō activists deny any kind of formalism/legalism and 
state that every being can be dismantled, diffused into a cause-and-effect 
relationship, and everything is nothing but insubstantial vision. On the 
other hand they are seized with a powerful desire to identify themselves 
with others as the underlying motivation behind their behaviour.50 
 
He explains that the youths, confronted with this dilemma, were inflamed by the 
ambiguity of unfinished Japanese modernity; this made it difficult for them to set up 
their individual selves and be conscious of the existence of others acting on their behalf.  
He further states that following their defeat in the student protests of the 1960s, their 
distrust in kotoba culminated in the 1980s when mass culture was flourishing.51  He 
refers to these students as the ‘youth who lost their words’ (kotoba o ushinatta 
wakamonotachi). 
From both Yamazaki and Sakurai’s illustrations of the young protesters of the 1960s, 
it would not be an overstatement to say that Betsuyaku’s scepticism towards the 
Japanese language may have stemmed from his involvement in the 1960 Anpo protests 
as an active member of a left-wing union.  Many other dramatists such as Suzuki 
Tadashi (b. 1939), Ninagawa Yukio (b.1935), Shimizu Kunio (b. 1936) were also 
involved in the student movement of the 1960s.  In future, I would like to further 
analyse the experiences of the yakeato generation and their involvement with the 
                                                  
50 Sakurai Tetsuo, Kotoba o ushinatta wakamonotachi (ことばを失った若者たち The Youth Who 
Lost Their Words), Tokyo: Kōdansha gendai shinsho, 1985, 112–115. 
51 Ibid., 79–125. 
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student movements of the 1960s in order to ascertain whether their experiences had a 
significant impact on their distrust of the Japanese language. When examining 
contemporary Japanese literature, an analysis of the scepticism towards the Japanese 
language among the above-mentioned yakeato generation dramatists as well as 
Betsuyaku may shed new light on the literary venture of contemporary Japanese writers 
today. 
 
Miyazawa Kenji’s Ashura who lost the true words 
 
In Chapter III, we have observed the paradox that is found in the literature of Miyazawa 
Kenji.  Interestingly, Miyazawa acutely expresses his distrust of language (kotoba) in 
his poems.  One can cite many examples that seem to support this.  His scepticism 
towards kotoba is well illustrated in one of his best known poems, ‘Haru to shura’ (春と
修羅 Spring and Ashura).  Sarah M. Strong and Karen Colligan translated ‘Spring and 
Ashura’ as follows: 
 
Spring and Ashura 
 (mental sketch modified) 
 
Out of the steel gray of consciousness 
akebi tendrils entwine the clouds 
tangle of wild rose and humus marsh 
over everything everywhere, flattery’s twisted pattern 
(when, more dense than woodwind music at noon, 
  amber fragments pour down) 
The bitterness and blueness of anger 
At the bottom of April’s shining atmospheric strata 
spitting gnashing, pacing 
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I am an Ashura 
  (the landscape quaking in my tears) 
Shattered clouds as far as the eye can see 
Holy crystal winds traverse 
the radiant sea of heaven 
ZYPRESSEN, a row of spring, 
blackly inhale ether 
Through their somber row of trunks 
shines the snowy ridge of the very 
Mountains of Heaven 
(shimmer of heat haze, white polarized light) 
but the true words are lost 
Clouds tear apart, flying across the sky 
Ah, through the depth of glittering April 
gnashing, burning, pacing 
I am an Ashura 
(scudding, quartzite clouds 
  where is it singing, that spring bird?) 
As the solar disk dims blue 
Ashura sounds echo through a grove 
From heaven’s sunken, spinning bowl 
clusters of black trees extend, 
their branches sadly proliferating 
a scene with everything double 
a crow starts up, flashing 
from the crest of a dazed woods 
(air strata ever more clear the time when the cypress rise to heaven in a hush) 
something is coming through the yellow-gold of the meadow 
something clearly of human form 
that farmer in a straw coat looking at me 
can he really see me? 
At the bottom of dazzling sea of atmosphere 
(sadness deepens, blue into blue) 
ZYPRESSEN quietly sway 
a bird once more cuts the clear sky 
(the true words are not here, 
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the Ashura’s tears fall on the ground) 
 
As I breathe the air anew 
my lungs contract, faintly white 
(may this body be scattered among fine particles of sky) 
the tops of the ginkgoes flare again 
ZYPRESSEN turn darker still 
sparks of clouds pour down 52 
 
We should recall that, in ‘Introduction’ of his poetry book, Haru to shura, ‘watakushi 
(I/self)’ is expressed as the phenomenon of ‘the single illumination of karma’s 
alternating current lamp’（因果交流電燈のひとつの青い照明); and thus the poems 
written by watakushi, that is, the alternating phenomenon as such, are depicted as 
nothing but a ‘mental sketch’ (心象スケッチ) which seems to be common only in a 
certain degree to all of us.  For Miyazawa, what was being written is perceived as 
nothing more than what we have become conscious of ‘at the root of the karmic 
covenant of space-time’.  This is very interesting in that it shows Miyazawa’s nihilistic 
self-awareness that every being as well as watakushi is determined by the principle of 
causality in the final analysis.  He, therefore, sees kotoba written by such an individual 
(watakushi) like ‘a composite body of each and every transparent spectre’ (あらゆる透
明な幽霊の複合体) as a mere manifestation of the collective notion, which we can 
share only to some extent.  As Kant indicated that ‘when we think we do something by 
our free will, we do so only because of our unawareness of its being determined by 
external causes’, we may say that Miyazawa cool-headedly faces up to the reality of the 
crucial gap between langue and parole which Saussure advocated.  This nihilistic 
                                                  
52 ‘Haru to shura’ is translated by Sarah M. Strong and Karen Colligan as ‘Spring and Ashura’ in 
Masterworks of Miyazawa Kenji―Poems and Fairy Tales, Tokyo: Sanmark shuppan, 2002, 12–14. 
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perspective of his self-image and the scepticism towards kotoba uttered by such a being 
as watakushi (the phenomenon of ‘the single illumination of karma’s alternating current 
lump’) unfolds in the phrases of ‘Haru to shura’.  His selfhood (watakushi) is depicted 
as an Ashura, the lowest deity who is derived from the malevolent spirit/deity of 
Hinduism.  The Ashura embodies human nature in acts such as fighting, battle, fury, 
force or violence in Buddhism cosmology.  In ‘Haru to shura’, when watakushi had 
lost his ‘true words’ (まことのことば); the world of his ‘mental sketch’ was 
surrounded by clouds entwined by ‘akebi tendrils’, ‘tangle of wild rose’ and ‘humus 
marsh’.  And, at that very moment when the true words were lost, he turns into an 
Ashura.  The Ashura who lost his true words has nothing else to do but ‘spitting’, 
‘gnashing’ and ‘pacing’ ‘at the bottom of April’s shining atmospheric strata’.53   In the 
world without ‘the true words’, his ‘sadness deepens, blue into blue’ (かなしみは青々
ふかく) and he realises again that the true words are not found anywhere.  The scenes 
that surround him appear to him ‘double’ in this world.54  In the end, all he could do is 
to shed his bitter tears on the ground.55  Here, we notice that there is a striking contrast 
between the world where the true words are lost and the actual world ‘at the bottom of 
April’s shining atmospheric strata’.  For instance, the steel gray of his consciousness 
contrasts markedly with ‘April’s shining atmospheric strata’ in ‘glittering’ spring.  The 
‘flattery’s twisted pattern’ out of Ashura’s consciousness contrasts starkly with a 
‘ZYPRESSEN’ (cypress) tree which stands as if it were ‘a row of spring’, whose treetop 
                                                  
53 Shigatsu no kisō no hikari no soko o/Tsubakishi hagishiri yukiki suru/Ore wa hitori no shura 
nanoda (四月の基層の光の底を 唾しはぎしりゆききする おれはひとりの修羅なのだ)  
Miyazawa, ‘Haru to shura’, in Miyazawa Kenji zenshū 1, Tokyo: Chikuma bunko, 1985, 29. 
54 Subete nijū no fūkei o (すべて二重の風景を)  Miyazawa, ‘Haru to shura’, in Miyazawa Kenji 
zenshū 1, Tokyo: Chikuma bunko, 1985, 31. 
55 Makoto no kotoba wa kokoninaku/Shura no namida wa tsuchi ni furu （まことのことばはここ
になく/修羅のなみだはつちにふる）Miyazawa, ‘Haru to shura’, in Miyazawa Kenji zenshū 1, 
Tokyo: Chikuma bunko, 1985, 31. 
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is where ‘holy crystal winds traverse’.56  The tree ‘ZYPRESSEN’ is conical in shape, 
and its scientific name, ‘sempervirens’ refers to ‘live forever’.  On the other hand, 
‘ZYPRESSEN’ in Greek mythology is related to Pluto’s underworld and death.  As we 
can see, ‘ZYPRESSEN’ connotes a paradoxical view between life and death, which may 
be considered as a boundary line between life and death.  Thus, the poignant sorrow of 
Miyazawa who dwells in the world where the true words are lost is condensed ironically 
into this poem.  However, after realizing watakushi (selfhood) as an Ashura who lost 
the real words and thus became a mere manifestation of the collective notion that is 
expressed as an alternating phenomenon called the mental sketch ‘which seems to be 
common only in a certain degree to all of us’; Miyazawa still continues to search for 
‘real happiness (hontō no saiwai)’ as if he was Giovanni who could not identify what is 
real happiness either.  In reality, he accepts the fact that everything is determined by 
external causalities as the mental sketch and that the individual (watakushi) cannot help 
turning into a phantom entity like ‘a composite body of each and every transparent 
spectre’.  But, he never stops getting ‘to the bottom of everything and find out what 
will make people happy’ through his act of writing in his literary universe. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
56 Tengoku moyō (天国模様) and ZYPRESSEN, haru no ichiretsu (ZYPRESSEN 春のいちれつ); 
seihari no kaze ga ikikai (聖玻璃の風が行き交ひ)  Miyazawa, ‘Haru to shura’, in Miyazawa 
Kenji zenshū 1, Tokyo: Chikuma bunko, 1985, 29–30.  For more detailed arguments for this matter, 
see Mita Munesuke, Miyazawa Kenji: Sonzai no matsuri no naka e (宮沢賢治 存在の祭りの中へ), 
Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2001, 100–127. 
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Nakahara Chūya: The world of objects that have not been named yet (Meiji izen no 
sekai) 
      
それにしても私は憎む、 
対外意識にだけ生きる人々を。 
―パラドクサルな人生よ。 
 
But still, I hate people who only keep up appearances― 
Paradoxical human life 57  
 
Nakahara Chūya, ‘Shuragai banka’ (1930) 
 
Nakahara Chūya inherited the predisposition to harbour a strong distrust of the modern 
language from Miyazawa Kenji.  Geijutsu-ron oboegaki (芸術論覚え書 Notes on 
Art)58 is one of the most crucial essays/notes on poetics written by Chūya.  It is 
assumed that this poetics was written when Chūya contributed three articles on the 
complete works of Miyazawa to literary journals around 1935.  It is also presumed that 
at that time Chūya wrote Miyazawa Kenji no sekai (宮沢賢治の世界 The World of 
Miyazawa Kenji), an article that was not published during his lifetime.  It is very 
interesting that, in Miyazawa Kenji no sekai, he extracted the several passages from the 
first part of Geijutsu-ron oboegaki, stating: ‘If Miyazawa Kenji had written an essay on 
art, he might remark the following.’59  It opens with the following remark: 
 
z It is good if we could feel the hand that is the mere object before we 
                                                  
57 Nakahara Chūya, ‘An Elegy for the Town of Shura’ (Shuragai banka 修羅街輓歌), in Ōoka 
Shōhei et al. (eds), Nakahara Chūya zenshū dai 1 kan, 105.  
58 This was one of Chūya’s essyas/notes on poetics unpublished during his lifetime.  Nakahara 
Chūya, ‘Geijutsu-ron oboegaki’ (芸術論覚え書), in Ōoka Shōhei et al. (eds), Nakahara Chūya 
zenshū dai 4 kan (中原中也全集第 4 巻), Tokyo: Kadokawa shoten, 139–153. 
59 Nakahara Chūya, ‘Miyazawa Kenji no sekai’ (宮沢賢治の世界), in Ōoka Shōhei et al. (eds), 
Nakahara Chūya zenshū dai 4 kan  (中原中也全集第 4 巻), Tokyo: Kadokawa shoten, 154–155. 
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recognize it as a hand or before we utter the term (meiji 名辞), 
‘hand ’, when we make a statement such as ‘This is a hand.’60   
z If a term comes to the mind of an artist quickly, it should be said that 
it is unfortunate for him/her.  The more it comes to our mind quickly, 
the more our consciousness attaches itself to the secondary 
consciousness which deals with the concept such as ‘One has to make 
money’.61  
z Fixed ideas (koteikannen 固定観念) ruin artists.  The reason why 
not everyone becomes an artist is that far too many people are trapped 
by stereotypical views.  No one can avoid embracing fixed ideas 
entirely.  While artists embrace fixed ideas under certain conditions, 
most of us unconditionally have some fixed ideas.62   
 
It will be clear from these excerpts that Chūya had strong doubts about the ambiguous 
nature of a linguistic sign.  As Saussure indicated, most of us would accept that ‘the 
link connecting a given acoustic image with a specific concept and conferring upon it its 
value as a sign is radically arbitrary.’63  Saussure stresses that we must not dissociate 
what is associated in the linguistic sign (i.e. the material side and the mental side, that is, 
sounds and concepts).  He summarizes as follows: ‘The concept becomes a quality of 
                                                  
60 「『これは手だ』と『手』という名辞を口にする前に感じてゐる手、その手が感じてゐら
れゝばよい。」 Ibid., 154. 
61 「名辞が早く脳裡に浮かぶといふことは、尠くも芸術家にとつては不幸だ。名辞が早く
浮ぶといふことは、『かせがねばならぬ』といふ、二次的意識に属する。」Ibid. 
62 「芸術を衰褪させるものは、固定観念である。誰もが芸術家にならなかつたといふわけ
は、云ってみれば誰もが固定観念を余りに抱いたといふことである。誰しも全然固定観念
を抱かないわけには行かぬ。芸術家にあつては固定観念が謂はば条件反射的に抱かれてゐ
るのに反して、芸術家以外では無条件反射的に抱かれてゐると云ふことが出来る。」Ibid., 
155. 
63 Eisuke Komatsu (ed.), Saussure’s Third Course of Lectures on General Linguistic, 76a. 
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the <acoustic> substance, as sonority becomes a quality of the conceptual substance.’64  
Saussure goes on to explain that while ‘they [concept and acoustic image] will both be 
inside the subject, both be mental, both centred on the same mental spot by their 
association’; ‘there is indeed an object which is outside the subject’.65  Here, we 
should recall Saussure’s remarks: ‘Never has any society known its language other than 
as a product more or less perfected by preceding generations and to be taken just as it is.  
In other words, we recognize a historical fact at the origin of every language state.’  He 
acutely concludes that ‘the language, considered at any moment, however far back in 
time, is always an inheritance from the preceding moment.’66  In the same way, Chūya 
advocates that the artists must feel an object that is outside us before we utter its name, 
which entails both an acoustic image and a certain degree of concept, that is, its fixed 
idea―‘an inheritance from the preceding moment’. 
His views have much in common with those of Nakagami Kenji when he remarks 
what constitutes grass, that is, the substance of grass, may not be grass itself as an object 
but merely our act of naming an object ‘kusa’ (that is, its vocalized sound, [k∝sa]) in 
Japanese, and our act of naming objects is unconsciously bound, in some inexplicable 
way, by collective notions such as the logic of the modern nation-state or the rule of the 
Emperor, as it were, the fixed ideas.  As mentioned above, Nakagami strives to make 
kotoba correspond to mono that is uncontaminated by its assigned name which has been 
tinged with the law/system of the collective.  Chūya also recognizes kotoba as ‘a 
product more or less perfected by preceding generations and to be taken just as it is’.67  
It is precisely on such grounds that he lays a special emphasis on the entity before we 
                                                  
64 Ibid., 79a. 
65 Ibid., 74a–81a. 
66 Ibid., 94a. 
67 Ibid., 69a. 
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assign a name to it.  Let us consider another quotation from Miyazawa Kenji no sekai. 
 
z For artists, the world that should be the place where no modifications 
are perceived no matter how good or bad they are.  For an artist, a 
hand is nothing more than a tangible object called hand, a face can be 
an object called face.  The imaginary world of the artist is restricted 
by the only formula for assigning a name to an object: A=A.  Thus, 
for an artist, the phenomenon that is exclusively regarded as 
interesting fuels his/her motivation to work.68  
 
In this excerpt, too, it is clear that Chūya tries to see any being as a mere object before it 
is named.  As Nakagami Kenji found the state of perfect unification between kotoba 
and mono in the narrative style of old women in Kishū, when Chūya says it is 
‘interesting’, it implies nothing but ‘interesting’ which is not defined by any term that 
was bound by the preceding fixed ideas. 
Similarly to Miyazawa Kenji, first, Chūya also bitterly accepts the real world of ‘the 
clever merchant’ by saying that ‘That’s life!  Innocent bliss!  Take things as they 
come!  Everything and anything is good!’69  But, after realizing this, he emphasizes 
that we must continue to perceive the object itself, using the language but at the same 
time questioning it, in order to break down stereotypes, that is to say, any fixed 
                                                  
68 「芸術家にとって世界は、即ち彼の世界意識は、善いものでも悪いものでも、其の他如
何なるモディフィケーションを冠せられるべきものではない。彼にとって「手」とは「手」
であり、「顔」とは「顔」であり、即ち名辞するとしてＡ＝Ａであるだけの世界の内部に、
彼の想像力は活動してゐるのである。従って彼にあっては、『面白いから面白い』ことだけ
が、その仕事のモチーフとなる。」 Nakahara Chūya, ‘Miyazawa Kenji no sekai’, in Ōoka Shōhei 
et al. (eds), Nakahara Chūya zenshū dai 4 kan, 155. 
69 Nakahara Chūya, ‘Inochi no koe’, in Nakahara Chūya zenshū dai 1 kan, 135–139. 
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conceptualised idea which is inexorably associated with its naming as kotoba.  It is 
indeed paradoxical that he, as a poet, had to continue to write his poems in the world of 
objects that have not been named.  One of his unpublished poems, ‘It’s such a 
hardship!’ (‘Tsuraikotta, turaikotta!’ 辛いこつた辛いこつた！),70 illustrates well his 
torn sentiment. 
 
It’s Such A Hardship! 
 
It’s such a hardship!  
I was set up as a legendary poet. 
In the world of people who taunt the language, 
I was set up as a legendary poet. 
(I was deprived of a piece of bread but was given a bunch of flower.) 
Oh! In this world, sick people, caught the disease occurring in children, 
are swaggering around! 
 
They are messed up in the head with the hollow words, 
Their heart is filled with complete nonsense. 
As artificial flowers bloom on their ambition, 
People who got lost desperately cling to the artificial flowers. 
By the way, the real flowers are not as talkative as artificial flowers. 
 
Ah, it absolutely ludicrous that the creators of those artificial flowers are 
                                                  
70 Nakahara Chūya, ‘Tsuraikotta, tsuraikotta!’, in Nakahara Chūya zenshū dai 2 kan, 325–326. 
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making a lot of money. 
As I perceive now that we cannot see this as a ludicrous thing, 
To me, what the artificial flowers say sounds impertinent. 
The real flowers cannot tell a lie 
No matter how terribly they get tongue-tied. 
 
In the first stanza, he describes our present world as the world of people who taunt the 
language (gengo ganrō sha 言語玩弄者).  He deplores the fact that he was set up as a 
legendary poet (densetsu teki sonzai 伝説的存在) by these people who downplay the 
language.  In the second stanza, he points out that those people cannot make anything 
but artificial flowers (zōka 造花), which bloom on their desires.  For this reason, 
people who have lost their way are glad of these fake flowers.  Chūya ridicules the 
people who do not care about the language as clever merchants. However, he cannot 
talk as smartly as they do.  Then, he uses real flowers as a metaphor for a poet who has 
become tongue-tied.  In the final stanza, he concludes this short poem with the remark 
that, even though the real flowers slur their words, the real flowers cannot lie as much as 
the artificial flowers.71 
 
Having observed the works of Nakagami, Betsuyaku, Miyazawa and Chūya from 
their perception of disbelieving kotoba, I would like to convey the conclusion that these 
literati perceived the language as the collective notion that was inevitably tinged with 
fixed ideas from the past.  They theoretically accept this generalization that originated 
from the collective aspect of language as the external causalities that restrict their 
                                                  
71 Ibid. 
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personal autonomy to choose their actions.  Nakagami or Betsuyaku found this 
universal generalization in the Japanese standard language, which was redefined by the 
Western democracies in postwar Japan.  For Miyazawa, this was perceived as a mere 
‘mental sketch’ which seems to be common only in a certain degree to all of us ‘at the 
root of the karmic covenant of space-time’.72  Chūya also accepted various causalities 
that were derived from ‘the world of the shrewd merchants’.73  Moreover, they did not 
accept their circumstances from the one-dimensional point of view, and found two 
aspects to a matter at the same time.  Nakagami and Betsuyaku thought about their 
own actions from the viewpoint of people being left out of society.  Miyazawa 
described himself as Ashura who was groping for his true words at the verge of an abyss.  
Similarly, Chūya depicted himself as a poet who had become tongue-tied in the world of 
people who taunt the language.  In my understanding of their attempts, these writers 
seemed to possess their freedom which ‘is synonymous to being causa sui, 
self-motivated, subjective, and autonomous.’74   As they deeply reflected on their 
actions from the perspective of both sides of a matter and recognized their own 
evil/immoral side, their freedom appeared as their continuous self-determination to 
choose their actions which ties in with their moral responsibility.  In order to find their 
true identities and set new values upon them, they never stopped searching for their own 
‘true words’ within the limits of the universal generalization of language.  Viewed in 
this light, their endless attempt to seek their true words through their act of writing can 
be regarded as a reflection of their autonomy to choose their actions according to the 
situation at any given time.  Their attempts, however, fell into an ironical paradox as 
                                                  
72 ‘Introduction to “Spring and Ashura”’ is translated by Roger Pulvers in Eigo de yomu Miyazawa 
Kenji shishū, Tokyo: Chikuma bunko, 1997, 14–23. 
73 Nakahara Chūya, ‘Inochi no koe’, in Nakahara Chūya zenshū dai 1 kan, 137–138. 
74 Karatani, Transcritique on Kant and Marx, 115.   
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they had to cling to their incomplete but only means, that is, the very language they 
disbelieved.  In the following chapter, let us enlarge our discussion into these writers’ 
awareness of the individual body as a means to unlearn the fixed ideas that hide in our 
language as generalized notions. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE BODY (NIKUTAI) IN MODERN JAPANESE LITERATURE 
 
 
In the previous chapters, we have observed the manner in which modern Japanese 
literati express their distrust of the Japanese language in their works when they regard it 
as a collective notion that inhibits their autonomous freedom to choose their actions.  
When Nakagami, Betsuyaku, Miyazawa and Chūya attempted to seek their own 
identities by giving new values to them through their act of writing, the language was 
perceived as a collective product that not only generalized the individual circumstances 
but also restricted their autonomy construed as the continuous self-determination 
according to the situation at the time.  They considered Japanese words as words that 
were tinged with collective notions that could not perceive the realities of people who 
were kept out of the process of Japanese modernity.  In this chapter, I would like to 
examine the manner in which modern Japanese writers/artists as well as Nakagami 
Kenji perceive their individual body (nikutai) as the foundation of their thought in order 
to dismantle the fixed notions that were tinged with kotoba.  
The perception of kotoba held by Nakagami generates conflicts between dependence 
on others and self-autonomy forever, and it became the prime force of his writing.  
Accordingly, Nakagami Kenji regards his act of writing as a never-ending task as if it 
were aspiring to the ceaseless hell.  On this matter, Nakagami Kenji’s ambivalent 
attitude towards writing can also be regarded as two attitudes: the strong scepticism 
towards modern language―a manifestation of a collective notion―and the esteem for 
the body―a reflection of an individual situation.  In other words, Nakagami Kenji’s 
search for his autonomous selfhood through his act of writing lies in close relation with 
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the conflict between kotoba and nikutai, to be precise, the carnal body as an object.  I 
will argue that modern Japanese writers, especially, Sakaguchi Ango, Nakahara Chūya 
and the postwar existentialist writers have much in common with Nakagami Kenji in 
their attitudes that show a strong distrust of kotoba which is inextricably linked with the 
emphasis on the body.  Then, I would like to attempt to extend this observation into 
the contemporary playwrights in the 1960s. 
 
Saussure emphasized that ‘one must not dissociate what is associated in the linguistic 
sign [the concept and the acoustic image]’. 1   He summarized that ‘the concept 
becomes a quality of the <acoustic> substance, as sonority becomes a quality of the 
conceptual substance.’2  He went on to say: ‘Only as long as the association remains 
are we dealing with a concrete linguistic object.’3   It is interesting to note that 
Saussure compared the association between the two elements that comprise language 
with human beings who are also made up of two elements: body and soul.4  Moreover, 
we need frequently to remind ourselves of his following remarks: ‘Never has any 
society known its language other than as a product more or less perfected by preceding 
generations and to be taken just as it is.  In other words, we recognize a historical fact 
at the origin of every language state. [･･･] [T]he language, considered at any moment, 
however far back in time, is always an inheritance from the preceding moment.’5  The 
points made so far apply in principle to Nakagami Kenji’s and Nakahara Chūya’s 
perception of kotoba and mono.  In Chapter V, we saw that Nakagami Kenji found the 
                                                  
1 Eisuke Komatsu (ed.), Saussure’s Third Course of Lectures on General Linguistic, 79a. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., 80a. 
4 Ibid., 78a–79a. 
5 Ibid., 94a. 
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state of perfect unification between kotoba and mono in the narrative style of the old 
women in Kishū.  He attempted to regard kotoba as mono, which is not tinged with the 
collective notion such as the écriture of the Emperor.  Similarly, Nakahara Chūya 
advocated that the artists must feel an external object before we utter its name, which is 
inevitably coloured by some fixed ideas.  In addition to this kind of scepticism 
towards kotoba, Nakagami, as a contemporary writer, talks about his obsession with his 
body in his first collection of essays, Tori no yōni kemono no yōni (鳥のように獣のよ
うに Like a Bird or a Beast, 1976).6   For the moment, let us look closely at 
Nakagami Kenji’s perception of body. 
                                                 
 
Nakagami Kenji: Body as mono (an object) 
 
Hirano Ken (1907–1978) talked about the antinomy in I-novelists from the late Meiji to 
the early Shōwa era.7  He explained that when their works were advanced, the artists’ 
lives were destroyed; on the other hand, when they conformed rationally to society and 
settled down, they were unable to write anything.  According to Hirano, for example, 
Shimazaki Tōson wrote Shinsei (New Life, 1918–1919) that deals with his own 
autobiographical love affair: an extra-marital relation with his niece.  On the other 
hand, Shiga Naoya lost his creative urge when he found balance in his life.  Itō Sei 
(1905–1969) developed this analysis further and concluded that while struggling with 
the process of Western modernization, Japanese writers tried to secure their standpoint 
on the perception of either ‘mu’ (the impermanence of all things) or ‘zen’ (all) in life, 
 
6 Nakagami, ‘Sakka to nikutai’ (作家と肉体), in NKZ Vol. 14, 200.  
7 Hirano Ken, ‘Shishōsetsu no niritsu haihan’, in Hirano Ken zenshū Vol. 2, Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 
143–163.  The original text first appeared in Hirano Ken, Geijutsu to Jisseikatsu, Tokyo: Kōdansha, 
1958.  
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mainly focusing on the former ― transient and empty.8  As a result, it produced the 
binary frame such as ‘shi’ (death) or ‘kakumei’ (revolution), that is, either social 
escapism towards self-destruction and its culmination, suicide; or desperate resistance to 
the oppressive state as a revolutionist.9  The former type is well known as, in Itō Sei’s 
term, hametsu gata writers who were typified by Kasai Zenzō (1887–1928), Kamura 
Isota (1987–1933) or Dazai Osamu (1909–1948) and the like.10 
Taken in this light, it seems to me that Nakagami Kenji tried to shake himself free 
from such polarization, which modern writers fell into in the past.  Nakagami wrote 
about the relation between work and writing as a profession in Tori no yōni kemono no 
yōni.11  Admitting his distrust of kotoba as we have discussed, he worked at Haneda 
International Airport as a labourer (a cargo-handler) in the early 1970s.  During this 
period, although he also struggled with his dilemma between ‘geijutsu’ (art) and 
‘jisseikatsu’ (real life) which Hirano posed as above, Nakagami had actively confronted 
ambivalence between being a labourer using his body as an undeniable fact and being a 
novelist who wrote novels using kotoba as a fictional device.  He called his experience 
at Haneda ‘half suicide’ as if it were the suicide of his sensitivity.  He regarded his 
physical work as an attempt to become a blockhead, and said that he dared himself to 
commit half suicide to become a blockhead in order to unlearn the collective notion 
which is derived from kotoba and discover the true introspective nature of ‘self’.  
Nakagami dared to stir up the community of his literary contemporaries and regarded 
them as fragile armchair theorists who lack the experience of being this kind of 
                                                  
8 Itō Sei, Kindai nihonjin no hassō no shokeishiki, 39–71.  The original text first appeared in Itō 
Sei, Shōsetsu no ninshiki, Tokyo: Kawade Shobō, 1955. 
9 Ibid., 34–36. 
10 Itō Sei, ‘Kindai nihon sakka no seikatsu’, in Kindai nihonjin no hassō no shokeishiki, 98. 
11 Nakagami, ‘Shohatsu no mono’, 193–195. 
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blockhead.  Persisting in his radicalism, he kept casting a coldly critical eye upon 
himself, addressing the fundamental reason for being a novelist, and had no other 
recourse but to keep writing as a professional writer.   
He remembers the times when he led a wild life indulging in modern jazz and drugs, 
he endured heavy labour at the airport, and he was soaked in drinks.  He describes 
these deeds as playing intentionally a double game between body-contempt and 
body-admiration, 12  or rather he admits that it might be self-destruction.  This 
self-destruction, however, is different from the one that hametsu gata writers fell into as 
a result of negative social escapism.  While he chose a last resort, that is, the act of 
writing, Nakagami positively decided to destroy himself, in other words, to commit a 
‘half suicide’.  Nakagami explains that even after he chose to become a serious writer, 
the sense of imbalance never went away.  The reason for this is that, according to 
Nakagami, his body is too overabundant to control or to keep in balance.13   
Thus, Nakagami’s experience as a cargo handler significantly contributed towards 
generating an important insight into recognizing his body that is an object as an 
undeniable reality.  Nakagami named this an ideology of object.  An illustration from 
‘Sakka to nikutai’ (作家と肉体 Novelist and Body) in Tori no yōni kemono no yōni 
may be informative. 
 
An object, for example, can be cargo or machinery for loading cargo at 
the airport.  The object is the law of nature.  The object says words.  
The object exists here undoubtedly.  How can I tell you that this fact is a 
                                                  
12 Nakagami, ‘Sakka to nikutai’, in NKZ Vol. 14, 200.  
13 Ibid., 204. 
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sheer ideology, which cannot be made light of. [･･･]14  
At Haneda Airport, there is sheer naked nature. [･･･] and it’s very violent.  
[･･･] It always reminds you of the existence of your very body. [･･･] 
The real physical labour with sweat pouring off us is somehow 
different from the one we think of in our time.  It should be a state in 
which we are able to free ourselves from what is called ‘work’ because 
we do not need to call it ‘work’ anymore.  It should be equal to a 
flawless state of how human beings exist in the world with supreme bliss. 
[･･･]  
This is what is called the right thing.  
I like physical work.  I like construction labour.  Physical labour may 
be one that is closest to the archetype of labour.  As the sun is rising, we 
start working.  As the sun is going down, we stop working.  Why don’t 
I live like that?  Why have I started to write a novel? [･･･] Body exists.  
An object exists.  Every experience should be perceived not by our 
conscience, mentality or knowledge but by flesh and blood. 
The object, the cargo, exists here in front of me.  I touch it, lift it up 
and move it.  What we call the archetype of labour may be described as a 
rapport or communication between people and objects.  That should be 
physical ecstasy.  We exist in front of the object, and we realize that we 
ourselves exist as an object likewise.15  
                                                  
14 「物、ここでは、たとえば一個の貨物であり、空港内でつかう貨物搭載用の機材であっ
たりする。そして、自然である。物は、言葉を語り、一個の貨物がそこに確かに在ること
が、けっしてあなどれない思想そのものだという実感を、どう伝えたらよいか。」 Ibid., 200. 
15 「羽田では、自然がむきだしだ、ということである。･･･  言ってみれば、肉体が絶え
ずついてまわるのである。･･･ 汗水たらす労働とは、今の、われわれの時代の労働という
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 From this excerpt, we can say with fair certainty that Nakagami recognized his body as 
an undeniable object, and this perception of object became one of the foundations of his 
literature.  Eve Zimmerman also made several important points on this matter.  
Nakagami’s perception of body is well illustrated in Karekinada.  Let us consider the 
following translation by Zimmerman: 
 
The sun penetrated Akiyuki as if he were a tree in the landscape.  The 
wind caressed him as it did the blades of grass.  While working Akiyuki 
understood that he became an object that couldn’t think about or know 
itself, couldn’t see or reply, couldn’t listen to music … Akiyuki was no 
longer Akiyuki but rather the love that he felt towards the sky, the sun in 
the sky, the mountains warmed by the sun, the houses, the illuminated 
leaves, the earth, stones, each detail of the landscape around him.  He 
was each and everything.  To Akiyuki working as a laborer, the 
sun-soaked landscape was like music.  Even the sounds of the cicadas 
which until just a moment ago had sounded like the Buddhist chants 
namu-amida-butsu or namu-myō-hō-renge-kyō had now become the breath 
of the mountain.  Akiyuki was breath … 16 
 
Zimmerman describes the consecutive construction works of the protagonist, Akiyuki, 
as a labourer in Karekinada as follows: ‘Nakagami breaks through Akiyuki’s tortured 
deliberations about himself (in which he attempts to read himself through the tangled, 
                                                                                                                                                  
言葉とは別のものかもしれない。労働者がいつの日か解き放たれて名づけることもいらな
くなった状態、ただ、人間としか言いようのない十全な存在の至福の労働である。･･･ ま
っとうとはそのことである。肉体労働が好きである。土方が好きである。それが労働の原
型にもっとも近いと思うのである。日と共に働き、日と共に働き止める。何故、それに自
足できず、小説など書いてしまったのだろう。肉体が在る。物が在る。物の体験、経験と
は、知識や心理や意識でするのではなく、まず生身の肉体がするはずである。物、貨物が
ここにある。この貨物に触れ、持ちあげ、動かす。労働の原型にあるのは物との交感であ
り、物質的恍惚とでも言うやつである。そして、物を前にして、自分もまた、物として、
物質としてまず在ることに気づく。」 Ibid., 203.  
16 Zimmerman, ‘In the Trap of Words’, 144. 
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metaphoric relations of the family) and suspends him in a realm of pure sensation.’17  
Nakagami ‘continues to test the boundaries of the self by placing Akiyuki in the 
figurative, mystic landscape’, that is, the place that is ruled by the ideology of mono.  
The world of mono may be equated with the world where Nakahara Chūya does not 
give any name to any object, that is to say, the world of objects that have not been 
named.  It seems to me that Nakagami produced a series of works known as Kumano 
saga, coming and going ceaselessly between the two worlds: the tangible world of mono
―the undeniable reality in front of us―and the fictional world of kotoba―‘the mental 
imprint of the sound’,18 that is to say, an arbitrary association made by the mind 
between an acoustic image and a concept in the individual subject.  When Nakagami 
portrayed the sheer reality of his outcast environments through his act of writing, he had 
to return to the world of mono in order to unlearn the fixed ideas that were tinged by the 
universally generalized words in the Japanese language as we have observed in the 
previous chapter. 
When he wrote an essay, ‘Shohatsu no mono’ (A Novice at Writing Novels), in 1974, 
Nakagami quit his labouring job at Haneda Airport and began to commit himself more 
fully to his writing career; he was 28.  Nakagami likened himself to Sakaguchi Ango 
who aroused the morale of the people at the time, urging them to keep falling into 
decadence which is equated to the continual rejection of ‘true principle’ made by others 
as ‘an already fixed and stationary existence’.  Nakagami wrote: 
 
In the same way as Ango who inspired people to keep falling into 
decadence immediately after defeat in the War, I talk to not other people 
                                                  
17 Ibid. 
18 Eisuke Komatsu (ed.), Saussure’s Third Course of Lectures on General Linguistic, 74a–75a. 
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but myself, ‘Go back to the world of mono, and live through your life now   
while you are taking umbrage at any meaning in your life and are still 
clinging to the language in which you are barely able to believe.’19  
 
The Body explored by Sakaguchi Ango and the postwar existentialist writers 
 
In Chapter III, we have seen the similarity between Sartre’s intersubjectivity, which was 
demonstrated by the postwar existentialist writers, and the continuous search for 
autonomy, which was expressed in the works of Nakagami Kenji.  Both Sartre’s notion 
of configurations posed by the postwar existentialists and the endless search for 
autonomy found in the works of Nakagami Kenji function as a fundamental concept 
which is perpetually being conceived now in this time and space.  As it is clear from 
the excerpt quoted in the previous section, when Nakagami was around 28 years old, he 
was aware of the worldview of Sakaguchi Ango who shared his thoughts with the 
postwar Japanese writers and Sartre who were considered as the writers of carnal 
literature.  Sakaguchi Ango who belongs to the school of the postwar existentialist 
writers has also much in common with the 1960s theatrical artists due to his strong 
distrust of language, which is inextricably linked with the emphasis on the body.  
Sakaguchi Ango had challenged the morale of the people immediately after defeat in the 
War by urging them to keep falling into decadence.  Both the postwar existentialists 
and the dramatists in the 1960s confront the conflict between one’s self-determination 
and one’s leaning towards the collective.  Their acts are recognizable as something that 
                                                  
19 「安吾が敗戦直後、堕ちよ、堕ちよ、と人を鼓舞したように、ぼくは、人にむかってで
はなくこの自分自身にむかって、いま、生きよ、物の世界にもどれと言ってみる。『人生の
意味』に不快を感じながら、最後の一ミリほどで言葉を信じて、である。」 Nakagami, 
‘Shohatsu no mono’, in NKZ Vol. 14, 195. 
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is perpetually being negotiated with the historically changing environment.  Victor 
Koschmann quotes from the article written by Tsurumi and Kuno, and summarizes the 
sentiment of postwar writers as follows: 
 
As Tsurumi Shunsuke has observed, the postwar generation ‘witnessed the 
values they had believed in fade to the point of transparency.’  They 
became convinced of the ‘meaninglessness of all values,’ and concluded 
that ‘only when the self hurls forth passion will the world respond with 
meaning.’  This loss of faith in values, philosophies, and ideologies often 
correlated with new concern about defining and differentiating humanity 
from other forms of life.  For many writers, it was only in the lowest 
common denominator of human existence that some glimmer of hope for 
the future could be perceived, and this often meant emphasizing the flesh 
rather than the spirit.20 
 
Koschmann examines the work of Tamura Taijirō (1911–1983) whose works are well 
known as products of nikutai bungaku (carnal literature) at the time, and argues from 
textual evidence, namely, Tamura’s fiction entitled Nikutai no mon (Gateway to the 
Flesh).21  In his book entitled The Body in Postwar Japanese Fiction, Douglas N. 
Slaymaker scrutinizes the manner in which the postwar writers such as Sakaguchi Ango, 
Noma Hiroshi as well as Tamura redefined the conceptions of the body; and regard the 
body as a means to contravene ‘the boundaries of state and religious authority’.22  He 
attempts to clarify the manner in which Jean-Paul Sartre’s philosophy of existence 
becomes equated with the physicality of postwar Japan as expressed by the postwar 
existentialist writers (sengo-ha).  Slaymaker points out that ‘the body became an 
obsessive object of focus in the years following Japan’s defeat for a complex of 
                                                  
20 Koschmann, Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan, 57. 
21 Ibid., 57–60. 
22 Slaymaker, The Body in Postwar Japanese Fiction. London and New York: Routledge, 2004, 1. 
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reasons.’  The following are three major reasons:  
 
1. [The obsession with the body] resulted from ‘the sheer physicality of 
everyday life ―  the demands of bodily needs ―  which, for urban 
populations in particular, was given over to securing food and finding shelter’. 
2. ‘[T]he body offered antidotes to the bankruptcy of the traditional and 
military values which characterized the previous fifteen years of war.’  ‘[Many 
Japanese people’s] celebration of the carnal body (nikutai 肉 体 
“physical/carnal body”) suggests a punning contrast to the national polity 
(kokutai 国体 “national body”), the focus of their desecration.’ 
3. ‘[T]his obsession with the body was also, in part, a response to the wartime 
censorship that made it extremely difficult to write of the erotic, of the political, 
and of wartime deprivations.’23 
 
Slaymaker concludes as follows: ‘The confluence of these circumstances ― wartime 
and postwar privations, the reaction to an individual-denying social order, and the 
constrictions of censorship ― fostered the ubiquitous concern for the body in postwar 
Japan generally, and in postwar writing particularly.’24  He quoted from Tamura’s 
article, ‘Nikutai ga ningen de aru’ (The human body is the human being), appeared in 
Gunzō (May 1947), and considered his assertion about ‘the place of the body’ to be 
crucial.  This is how Tamura explains the issue: 
 
“Thought” is, at this time threatening to push us down; it does nothing else.  
“Thought” has, for a long time, been draped with the authoritarian robes of 
a despotic government, but now the body is rising up in opposition.  The 
distrust of “thought” is complete.  We now believe in nothing but our 
own bodies.  Only the body is real.  The body’s weariness, the body’s 
fatigue―only these are real.  It is because of all these things that we 
                                                  
23 Ibid., 1–2. 
24 Ibid., 2. 
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realize, for the first time, that we are alive.25 
 
Commenting on this excerpt, Slaymaker explains that Tamura Taijirō rejected ‘the 
ideology of militarist state’ and he attempted to topple the militarist control by using the 
individual body as a means of revolution.26 
  Slaymaker also investigated the notion of physicality expressed by Sakaguchi Ango.  
He points out that ‘Ango admonishes unrepentant prioritising of the physical as a 
countermeasure to militarist control and as a means to achieve his ideal society.’27  He 
goes on to explain: ‘In 1946 [Ango] paired the recently available translations of 
Jean-Paul Sartre with Tamura’s writings and suggested that together they constituted a 
“literature of flesh,” because they share a representational strategy of the individual that 
appeared independently of one another, in different countries.’ 28   He continues: 
‘Sakaguchi Ango, when he praised Sartre’s short story “Intimité” (translated as 
“Mizuirazu” in the October 1946 issue of Sekai bungaku) for the manner in which it 
was “thinking through the physical,” marked the point at which the two streams 
converged.’29  Slaymaker examines Ango’s short essay, ‘Nikutai jitai ga shikō suru’ 
(The Body in Itself Thinks),30 and arrives at the following conclusion: 
 
In Ango’s important short essay entitled “Nikutai ga shikō suru,” he 
                                                  
25 Ibid., 3. 
26 For further details of ‘the literature of flesh (nikutai bungaku) proposed by Tamura, see Douglas 
N. Slaymaker, ‘Tamura Taijirō’, in The Body in Postwar Japanese Fiction. London and New York: 
Routledge, 2004, 43–70.  See also Koschmann, Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan, 
57–60. 
27 Slaymaker, The Body in Postwar Japanese Fiction, 4. 
28 Ibid.  He examines ‘Darakuron’ (On decadence) and ‘Hakuchi’ (The Idiot), and shows in full 
detail how Ango read the early works of Sartre and established the genre of nikutai bungaku together 
with Tamura Taijirō.  For detailed discussions, see Douglas N. Slaymaker, ‘Sakaguchi Ango’, in 
The Body in Postwar Japanese Fiction. London and New York: Routledge, 2004, 99–130. 
29 Slaymaker, The Body in Postwar Japanese Fiction, 24. 
30 Sakaguchi Ango, ‘Nikutai jitai ga shikō suru’, in Sakaguchi Ango zenshū 14, 576–578. 
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praises Sartre’s “Intimité” for its focus on the carnal body and for doing 
away with the cerebral.  The thrust of his argument is succinctly 
reproduced in his title: “The Body Thinks.”  Ango wrote of Sartre’s short 
story as though it were nikutai bungaku, cut from the same cloth as the 
fiction of Tamura (and his own).  His characterization of Sartre as a 
writer of the body was to set the tone for subsequent readings, by others, 
of Sartre’s fiction in Japan.  This reading established Sartre as a writer of 
carnal erotic fiction.  Ango suggested that Sartre’s characters [appeared 
in ‘Intimité’] think only through their bodies, that they are only nikutai, 
displaying no abstract spirit at all, and he praises “Intimité” for 
accomplishing what other postwar writers had unsuccessfully attempted.  
With Ango’s compelling essay, writers in Japan felt they had found in 
Sartre a comrade engaged in a common project.31 
 
Slaymaker stresses the point that ‘Sartre’s fiction was extremely important to postwar 
Japanese fiction because it was read as displaying concern for the body and its carnality, 
and for its impatience with abstractions.32  The point he emphasizes is the carnal body 
‘that thinks, that tells the story’ ‘by highlighting the personal and concrete against the 
abstractions of the wartime seishin (spirit)’.33  Thus, Slaymaker revealed the manner in 
which Sartre’s philosophy is equated with the postwar existentialist writers including 
Sakaguchi Ango. 
Since Slaymaker, has already shown in detail how ‘[t]he physical body in Ango 
focuses the elemental and provides the means for liberation’ or how ‘it maintains the 
means for daraku [(decadence)]’, I do not elaborate on Ango’s emphasis on the physical 
body here.34  Slaymaker explains that ‘[t]he irony of [Ango’s] imagery is that the 
liberation and community of humanity by daraku leads to a place of solitude and 
                                                  
31 Slaymaker, The Body in Postwar Japanese Fiction, 25. 
32 Ibid. 
33 For details see Slaymaker, ‘When Sartre Was an Erotic Writer: Body, Nation and Existentialism in 
Japan after the Asia-Pacific War’, Japan Forum (14:1 2002): 77–101. 
34 For further details of this matter, see Slaymaker, The Body in Postwar Japanese Fiction, 99–130. 
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dissolution of that individual, physical body.’35  Here, let us look briefly at the opening 
paragraph of Hakuchi, one of Ango’s major works, which was first published in 1946. 
 
  Various species lived in the house: human beings, a pig, a dog, a hen, a 
duck.  But actually there was hardly any difference in their style of 
lodging or in the food they ate.  It was a crooked building like a 
storehouse.  The owner and his wife lived on the ground floor, while a 
mother and her daughter rented the attic.  The daughter was pregnant, but 
no one knew who was responsible. 
  The room that Izawa rented was in a hut detached from the main house.  
It had formerly been occupied by the family’s consumptive son, who had 
died.  Even if it had been assigned to a consumptive pig, the hut could 
hardly have been considered extravagant.  Nevertheless, it had drawers, 
shelves, and a lavatory.36 
 
From the above excerpt, in the same manner as Ango’s essay, ‘FARCE ni tsuite’ (On 
Farce, 1932) which we have observed in Chapter III, we can see Ango’s sheer 
perspective which accepts the bare fact of human beings as it is.  Ango depicts an idiot, 
a prostitute, a madman, a disabled person or any suppressed person as they really are.  
The reader finds no empty rhetoric or exaggeration but merely the existential 
description of a harsh reality in Ango’s fictional universe.  Moreover, we may even 
find some sort of spice of humour in them.  Ango equates human beings with animals 
and accepts them alike for what they are.  There exists a sheer reality of all flesh, all 
animate beings.  A feeling of emptiness or decadence immediately after defeat in the 
War is symbolized through Ango’s solitary body in a devastated land.  In Hakuchi, the 
                                                  
35 Ibid., 100. 
36 Sakaguchi Ango, Hakuchi (白痴), translated by George Saitō as The Idiot, in Ivan Morris (ed.), 
Modern Japanese Stories―An Anthology. Boston, Rutland, Vermont, Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1962, 
384–415.  Sakaguchi Ango, Hakuchi, in Sakaguchi Ango zenshū 4, Tokyo: Chikuma bunko, 1990, 
7–40. 
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protagonist, Izawa spent a night with the idiot woman who was a runaway wife from the 
neighbouring house.  Izawa talked to her and felt as follows: 
 
“I do not dislike you,” Izawa began solemnly.  “There are other ways, 
you know, of expressing love than by simple physical contact.  The 
ultimate abode for us human beings is our birthplace, and in a strange way 
you seem to be living permanently in such a birthplace.”  Of course there 
was no possibility of her understanding what he said.  But what, after all, 
were words?  What real value did they have?  And where did 
reality reside?  There was no evidence that it could be found even in 
human love.  Where, if anywhere, could there be anything so real that it 
warranted a man’s devoting his entire passion to it?  Everything was 
merely a false shadow.37 [Emphasis mine] 
 
In this excerpt, we can see the reality of the idiot woman who cannot express her 
thoughts by means of words.  One may say that this indicates Ango’s distrust of 
language.  Nishikawa Nagao also points out that the distrust of language is one of the 
major characteristics that are shared by the postwar existentialist writers.38  Ango 
portrays Izawa’s sentiments under the extreme circumstances of the ruins of the war as 
follows: 
 
War produces a strangely wholesome kind of amnesia.  Its fantastic 
destructive power caused a century of change to take place in a single day, 
made last week’s events seem as if they had happened several years before 
and submerged the events of the previous year at the very bottom of one’s 
memory. [･･･] The feeble-minded woman too had become one of the 
multifarious fragments belonging to this wholesome amnesia.  Her 
face lay among the various other fragments: among the sticks and splinters 
on the site of the evacuated “people’s bar” in front of the railway station 
                                                  
37 Ibid., 396. 
38 Nishikawa Nagao, Nihon no sengo shōsetsu: Haikyo no hikari, 96. 
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where, until a couple of days before, people had been waiting in queues, 
among the holes in the nearby building that had been wrecked by a bomb, 
among the fire-ravaged ruins of the city.39 [Emphasis mine] 
 
The world of the feeble-minded woman, which can be called a world without words, 
symbolizes ‘the fire-ravaged ruins of the city’ that suffered ‘a strangely wholesome kind 
of amnesia’.  In the world where everything is placed on a plane and is treated as 
nothing but a mere object, the only thing that stands out in Izawa’s mind at the time is 
the face and body of the feeble-minded woman.  And this makes Izawa recognize the 
idiot woman’s existence as the absolute solitude which is ‘devoid of any thought’.  
Izawa’s mind is preoccupied with nothing but this very body of the idiot woman, that is 
to say, the realization of absolute solitude.   
 
There were no words, no screams, no groans; nor was there any 
expression.  She was not even aware of Izawa’s existence.  If she were 
human, she would be incapable of such solitude.  It was impossible that a 
man and a woman could be together in a closet with one of them entirely 
forgetting about the other.  People talk of absolute solitude, but absolute 
solitude can exist only by one’s being aware of the existence of others.  
Absolute solitude could never be such a blind and unconscious thing as 
what Izawa was now witnessing.  This woman’s solitude was like a 
caterpillar’s―the ultimate in wretchedness.  How unbearable it was
―this anguish entirely devoid of any thought!40 [Emphasis mine] 
 
Here in the ruins of the War, Izawa feels something that is beyond words when he 
perceives the feeble-minded woman as ‘[a] coma of the mind combined with a vitality 
                                                  
39 Sakaguchi Ango, Hakuchi (白痴), translated by George Saitō as The Idiot, in Ivan Morris (ed.), 
Modern Japanese Stories―An Anthology, 399–400. 
40 Ibid., 403. 
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of the flesh’41 and realizes the absolute solitude of her existence.  The above excerpt 
reminds me of the solitude of Miyazawa Kenji’s Ashura which we have observed in 
Chapter III.  When the poet had lost his ‘true words’, he turns into an Ashura who has 
nothing else to do but ‘spitting’, ‘gnashing’ and ‘pacing’ ‘at the bottom of April’s 
shining atmospheric strata’.42  This sentiment of the absolute solitude may also be 
identified with Giovanni, the protagonist of Ginga tetsudō no yoru (Night on the Milky 
Way Train), who keeps searching for ‘real happiness’ and could not help feeling 
‘indescribably lonely’ in the course of his ‘Four-Dimensional-Milky-Way-Dream Train’ 
journey.  Similarly, enduring his absolute solitude, Nakahara Chūya lays special 
emphasis on his body, that is, the entity before we assign a name to it.  In the first 
stanza of ‘The Voice of the Living’ (‘Inochi no koe’), though the poet is endlessly 
searching for something essential for him, he has never been able to figure what he is 
looking for.  At the end of the day, what is beating a path to his door is always his 
loneliness.43  In the last line of this poem, after accepting his solitary circumstances 
that are determined by various causalities as typified by the world of the shrewd 
merchants, that he could not find his free will, he still insists on living according to his 
individual passionate spirit and attempts to destroy the world that is determined by 
external causes by using his own body.  Let us see the last two line of ‘Inochi no koe’ 
again. 
 
ゆふがた、空の下で、身一点に感じられれば、万事に於て文句はな
                                                  
41 Ibid., 401. 
42 Miyazawa, ‘Haru to shura’, in Miyazawa Kenji zenshū 1, Tokyo: Chikuma bunko, 1985, 29. 
43 「僕に押寄せてゐるものは、何時でもそれは寂寞だ。」Nakahara Chūya, ‘Inochi no koe’ (い
のちの声), in Ōoka Shōhei et al. (eds), Nakahara Chūya zenshū dai 1 kan  (中原中也全集第1巻), 
Tokyo: Kadokawa shoten, 135. 
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いのだ。44 
 
If only I can perceive nothing but my single carnal body under the evening 
sky,  
No more words are needed.  
 
As if Miyazawa’s Ashura who lost his true words paces around the ground or Chūya’s 
solitary self, in Hakuchi, after the great air raid of March tenth in Tokyo, Izawa wanders 
aimlessly in the middle of the ruins. 
 
The bombing ended.  Izawa raised the crouching woman in his arms.  
[･･･] He was falling through space with a corpse in his arms.  Nothing 
existed but the dark, dark, endless fall.  Immediately after the bombing 
Izawa took a walk past the houses that has just been mowed down.  In the 
ruins he saw a woman’s leg that had been torn from her body, a woman’s 
trunk with the intestines protruding, and a woman’s severed head.  
Among the ruins of the great air raid of March tenth, Izawa had also 
wandered aimlessly through the still rising smoke.  On all sides people 
lay dead like so many roast fowl.  They lay dead in great clusters.  Yes, 
they were exactly like roast fowl.  They were neither gruesome nor dirty.  
Some of the corpses lay next to the bodies of dogs and were burned in 
exactly the same manner, as if to emphasize how utterly useless their 
deaths were.  Yet these bodies lacked even the pathos implied in the 
expression “a dog’s death.”  It was a case, not of people having died like 
dogs, but of dogs lying there in the ruins next to other objects, as though 
they were all pieces of roast fowl neatly arranged on a platter.  Those 
four-legged things were not really dogs; still less were those two-legged 
objects human beings.45 
                                                  
44 「ゆふがた、空の下で、身一点に感じられれば、万事に於て文句はないのだ。」Nakahara 
Chūya, ‘Inochi no koe’, in Nakahara Chūya zenshū dai 1 kan, 139. 
45 Sakaguchi Ango, Hakuchi (白痴), translated by George Saitō as The Idiot, in Ivan Morris (ed.), 
Modern Japanese Stories―An Anthology, 403–404. 
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 After this scene, Izawa and the feeble-minded woman were bombed on the day of the 
second great air raid, and managed to survive the massive fire.  However, this narrow 
escape filled Izawa with ‘a sense of vacancy — a vacancy that came from a vast, 
ineffable wariness, from a boundless feeling of nothingness’.  He could not help 
feeling that everything was ‘strangely insignificant and absurd’.46  Izawa wanted to 
run away from the woman, but he was unable to escape.  Nishikawa Nagao points out 
that the reason why Izawa could not abandon the woman was that the bare existence of 
this woman without words had become equated with his entire life at the time.  As 
Slaymaker pointed out the existential aspect of Ango’s work before, Nishikawa also 
indicates that the theme of this short story is thought to be similar to the themes of 
Sartre in postwar France.  Nishikawa explains that the postwar existentialists began 
with the realization that the world is absurd, and yet they resorted to the absurdity that 
they felt as an expression of their solidarity.47  In the closing paragraph of Hakuchi, 
although Izawa was devoid of any hope for the future and could not do anything but to 
leave himself to the mercy of the ‘impartial judgment’ of ‘the gigantic love extended by 
the destructiveness of war’, he could still manage to show his own self-determination 
and self-responsibility: ‘Izawa decided that at daybreak he would wake the woman and 
without even a glance in the direction of the devastated area, they would set out for the 
most distant possible railway station in search of a roost.’48    
Nishikawa adds that the works of Sakaguchi Ango were zealously read by the youth 
towards the end of the 1960s and in the 1970s.  He suggests that the young people who 
                                                  
46 Ibid., 410. 
47 Nishikawa Nagao, Nihon no sengo shōsetsu―Haikyo no hikari, 99. 
48 akaguchi Ango, Hakuchi (白痴), translated by George Saitō as The Idiot, in Ivan Morris (ed.), 
Modern Japanese Stories―An Anthology, 415. 
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had experienced the brutal suppression of the student movements at the time have a 
great deal of empathy not only for Ango’s radicalism and his rebellion against power 
but also his hopeless, absolute solitude.   
Nakagami Kenji had also been involved with the student activism in his early 
twenties.  Since Nakagami wrote two essays on Ango, namely, ‘Sakaguchi Ango: Sora 
kakeru ahōdori’ (Sakaguchi Ango: Albatross in Flight) written in 1976 and ‘Sakaguchi 
Ango―Minami kara no hikari’ (Sakaguchi Ango: The Light from the South) written in 
1985, it is not too far from the truth to say that Nakagami Kenji was one of those 
campus activists who were ardent readers of Sakaguchi Ango in the late 60s and in the 
70s.  Let me also stress again that Nakagami Kenji found the state of perfect 
unification between kotoba and the body as mono in the narrative style of the old 
women in Kishū, and strove to regard kotoba as the body as closely as possible.  It 
seems reasonable to conclude that, regarding Sakagichi Ango’s emphasis on the body, 
the points made by Slaymaker may also apply in principle to Nakagami Kenji.  
 
Body explored by the contemporary playwrights in the 1960s and the 1970s 
 
On these grounds, I would like to suggest that the playwright, Betsuyaku Minoru 
appeared to share his view with the postwar existentialist writers as typified by 
Sakaguchi Ango.  We should recall Betsuyaku’s distrust of kotoba discussed in 
Chapter V.  Betsuyaku’s work emphasizes that an increasing number of abstract words 
were easily transformed into hollow language in modern society.  In his book of 
critical essays, Kotoba e no senjutsu (The tactics towards language, 1972), Betsuyaku 
urges us to shift away from the literariness towards the dramatic representation or 
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theatricality.  He criticizes the function of language found in literature as being hollow 
because it focuses attention on the question of how a discourse carries a logical meaning 
and reaches a conclusion on the basis of certain conventional rules.  Compared with 
this, Betsuyaku asserts that the language function that is found in drama emphasizes the 
fact that an actor acts out an idea, which has not been given any fixed meaning yet.49   
The theatre critic, Ōzasa Yoshio examines Betsuyaku’s first play, A and B and a Girl 
(A to B to hitori no onna), which was written in 1961 during the tumultuous years of 
student activism.50  Ōzasa points out that Betsuyaku’s texts contain many words that 
are linked with the human body.  He describes Betsuyaku’s language as something 
carnal or material.  Ōzasa explains that what the audience sees directly in the theatre is 
not an abstract theme but a concrete body of actors who become interrelated with a 
situation on the stage at the time.  Let us look briefly at another example of 
Betsuyaku’s texts written in the 1960s, one of his major plays, Elephant, which was first 
staged in 1962 and published in 1969.  Elephant is a play about the issue of survivors 
of the atomic bombings known as hibakusha.  The word elephant expresses the keloid 
scar of a hibakusha as a metaphor.   
 
Man:  
But listen, Uncle. You used to strip down and show off your keloid in the 
streets, didn’t you?  I remember those days.  Your back, it shone. 
Invalid: 
                                                  
49  Betsuyaku, Kotoba e no senjutsu, 91–102.  I translated the summary of the following 
Betsuyaku’s original text.「演劇的な言語機能の、文学的な言語機能との相違は、往々にして、
前者がそれを云う事実自体
、、、、、、、、、
の重要性を問題にするのに対して、後者は云われた事の内容が
完結して意味を持ち、その意味の重要性を問題にする、と云う点にある。」 For detailed 
arguments for Betsuyaku’s interpretation of language and body, see Nishidō Kōjin et al., Enshutsuka 
no shigoto―60 nendai, angura, engeki kakumei (演出家の仕事―六〇年台・アングラ・演劇革命), 
Tokyo: Renga shobō shinsha, 2006, 29–64. 
50 Ōzasa Yoshio, Dōjidai engeki to gekisakka tachi, 160–187. 
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[…] Yes, I didn’t really mind that work first.  The sightseers would come 
by, and I’d tell them about Hiroshima and what it had been like.  I’d tell 
them a bit of a joke that would really get ‘em where it hurts.  And I’d 
think up new poses for their cameras.  I’d take off my shirt, and then, all 
at once, a gasp of shock and surprise would rise from the crowd.  That 
wasn’t bad.51  
 
Similar examples are abundant in Betsuyaku’s early plays written in the 1960s as well 
as in Elephant.  We can see, hinted in this extract from Elephant, how Betsuyaku’s text 
in the 1960s was filled with the words tied to carnality.  Moreover, Ōzasa explains that 
the carnality of the texts found in Betsuyaku’s early plays may be an indispensable 
prerequisite for contemporary dramatists in the 1960s. 52   A theatre critic, Kan 
Takayuki (b. 1936) also points out that Betsuyaku’s early plays such as Elephant (1962) 
or The Little Match Girl (1966) were at the vanguard of the rise of the small theatre 
movement in the late 1960s and in the 1970s.53  For the flag-bearers of the small 
theatre movement, the body had developed into their central obsession in contrast to the 
written manuscripts that carried a logical meaning and the universally generalized 
words in the Japanese language.   
                                                 
 
Let us examine further the theatrical artists in the late 1960s and 1970s who illustrate 
 
51 Betsuyaku Minoru, Zō, translated by David Goodman as Elephant, in Concerned Theatre Japan, 
(Volume 1 Number 3, Autumn 1970): 80.  Betsuyaku Minoru, Zō, in Betsuyaku Minoru, 
Macchi-uri no shōjo: Betsuyaku Minoru gikyoku-shū, Tokyo: San’ichi shobō, 1969, 199–256. 「男：
でもね、おじさん。叔父さんは街頭で裸になって背中のケロイドをみせてましたね。僕は
あの時の事を覚えていますよ。叔父さんの背中は、ギラギラ光っていた。」 「病人：[…] そ
うさ、あれも最初は嫌な仕事じゃなかったな。俺は見物人にヒロシマの、あの時の様子を
話してやったり、一寸気の利いた冗談を云って、笑わせたり、カメラのために新しいポー
ズを考えたりしたもんだ。俺がシャツを脱いで見物に背中を向けると、一斉にホホッと云
うようなため息が聞こえる。それは悪くなかったよ。」 
52 Ōzasa Yoshio, Dōjidai engeki to gekisakka tachi, 163–164. 
53 Kan Takayuki, Zōho sengo engeki: Shingeki wa norikoeraretaka, 172–183. 
 243
the points that we have been considering. 
In Chapter V, compared with the manner in which Nakagami Kenji expressed his 
scepticism towards the Japanese language in his early works, we have observed the 
distrust of the modern language which was conspicuous in the so-called ‘small theatre 
movement’ or ‘post-shingeki movement’ in the 1960s and the 1970s.  As Nishikawa 
Nagao suggests,54 after the 1960 student demonstration against the renewal of the 
U.S.–Japan Mutual Security Treaty, the sentiment of disillusionment with postwar 
Japanese democratic institutions became omnipresent in students’ lives, and the purpose 
of their life became obscure, losing the unshakable value or universal ideology.  Under 
these circumstances, the contemporary playwrights in the 1960s searched for a new 
means of expressing their views.  Their attitudes were often typified by absurd drama, 
which corresponded with the apathy, a sense of loss, and the frustration of the 
generation.  Accordingly, many of the young theatrical dramatists who were the 
promulgators of the small theatre movement at the time had very similar reasons for 
denying the Japanese language.  They regarded the Japanese language as a kind of 
fabrication or hoax, advocating that it was one of the invented modern systems that 
were borrowed from the West in varying degrees.  Then, in the 1960s and 1970s, by 
denying kotoba that they could not trust, where did those young theatrical dramatists 
seek the basis for their theatrical acts?  The answer was inevitably their body in 
themselves.   
Slaymaker asserts that ‘an individual and erotic body that has long been a central 
component of the intellectual and literary tradition of Japan’,55 or to put this assertion 
more concretely, ‘[t]he nikutai bungaku of the 1940s, which included Sartre’s fiction, 
                                                  
54 Nishikawa, Nihon no sengo shōsetsu: Haikyo no hikari, 279–295. 
55 Slaymaker, The Body in Postwar Japanese Fiction, 7.  
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quickly developed in the 1950s, and developed in the 1960s, into a more sophisticated 
philosophical conceptualization.’ 56   Slaymaker explains that ‘[postwar Japanese 
writers’] reading of the body corresponds to Sartre’s in which, stated rudely and 
summarily, consciousness proceeds from an awareness of the body as thing, as physical 
object.’  These observations of the postwar writers’ awareness of the body were also 
evident in the Japanese contemporary theatrical artists during the age of the student 
movements.  This section suggests that their appreciation of the body can be regarded 
as a countermeasure against the established convention of modern drama/literature at 
that time, which was adopted by many Japanese contemporary theatrical artists such as 
Hijikata Tatsumi, Kara Jūrō and Terayama Shūji, in the 1960s, the 1970s and the 1980s.  
Other examples of this are Suzuki Tadashi (鈴木忠志 b. 1939) who applies the 
perception of the body from the noh play to his method; Yamazaki Tetsu (山崎哲 b. 
1947) who is well known for his series of plays based on actual criminal reports; Noda 
Hideki (野田秀樹 b. 1955) who is one of the leading playwrights and theatre directors 
in the Japanese contemporary drama world; and many others.  Hyōdō Hiromi indicated 
that when the ideology of modern art including the avant-garde art developed a high 
degree of subversity in the 1960s and reached a point of saturation, the body had 
emerged as a central obsession with these flag-bearers of the small theatre movement.57  
He points out that although ideas and principles vary among artists, they share 
opposition to the established modern Japanese drama, known as shingeki, which they 
consider as imitations of the West.  Let us now examine how Kara Jūrō, Hijikata 
Tatsumi and Terayama Shūji perceive the body as physical object. 
                                                  
56 Ibid., 30.  
57 Hyōdō Hiromi, Enjirareta kindai <kokumin> no shintai to pafōmansu (演じられた近代 <国民
>の身体とパフォーマンス), 275. 
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Kara Jūrō: The ‘theory of the privileged body’ 
 
Kara Jūrō created a legendary theatre company known as Jōkyō Gekijō (The Situation 
Theatre) in 1967 and began scandalous, guerrilla-like performances at the mobile tent 
theatre called Red Tent.  He was also influenced by Sartre’s existentialism and 
provocatively espoused the so-called ‘theory of the privileged body’ (tokkenteki 
nikutairon).  There, Kara boldly asserted that great play manuscripts are no longer 
necessary for contemporary drama, but it is the dramatic body of actors on stage that is 
important.58  
 
The great play manuscripts are no longer necessary.  The playwright’s 
great spirit, which is found in the manuscripts, does not move the actors.  
The dramatic spirit of actors inspires the manuscripts.59 
 
For theatre and drama, first of all, there should not be a manuscript nor a 
plan of stage directions but a set of actors’ bodies that look very striking.60  
 
In his plays, the dialogue described as ‘irrational’ shakes itself free from the shackles of 
the cause-and-effect explanation in modern drama.  As a countermeasure against 
rationalism and the coherent narratives of modern drama, Kara emancipates the actor’s 
                                                  
58 Kara, Koshimaki Osen, Tokkenteki nikutairon, 3–18. 
59 Ibid., 38. 「もはや偉大な戯曲が必要なのではない。戯曲の中にある作家の劇的な精神が
役者を動かすのではない。劇的な役者の精神が戯曲を呼び起こすのだ。」 
60 Ibid., 49. 「まず戯曲があるのではなく、演出プランがあるのでもなく、バリッとそろっ
た役者体があるべきなのです。」  For further details of Kara Jūrō’s dramaturgy, see Nishidō 
Kōjin et al., Enshutsuka no shigoto―60 nendai, angura, engeki kakumei, 29–64.  Yamazaki Tetsu, 
Shitsugo no genzaikei (失語の現在形), Tokyo: Shinyagyōshosha, 1984, 11–23. 
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body from the restraint of play manuscripts and revives the actor’s grotesque being and 
dark emotions that stem from noh and kabuki.  John K. Gillespie translated one of 
Kara’s early major works, Shōjo kamen (The Virgin’s Mask 1969), and shows in detail 
how Kara is opposed to realism, which is typified by the so-called Stanislavski 
System. 61   Reading and translating Shōjo kamen, Gillespie comments on Kara’s 
emphasis on the actors’ body by saying that ‘Kara recalls the very origin of kabuki and 
the riverbed beggars (kawaramono) who were dissipating their bodies for the highest 
bidder but were looking, perhaps in vain, for a stage body through which they could 
express themselves.’62  Gillespie gives a synopsis of Shōjo kamen as follows: 
 
[In this play,] The action occurs in a subterranean coffeehouse called “The 
body,” which is owed by Kasugano Yachiyo, a former heartthrob of the 
Takarazuka all-female musical review.  Kasugano has fallen on hard 
times, having dissipated her body and her talent over many years in the 
theatre.  There remains no body for her to possess.  She is nothing more 
than a “pitiful ghost gradually fading away.”  Other relationships in the 
play parallel that between Kasugano and her body.  There are a 
Ventriloquist and a Dummy, for example, whose interaction reflects the 
separation of actor and body.  And the young virgin, Kai, eager for a life 
on stage, is pressed into the role of Catherine opposite Kasugano’s 
Heathcliff in an imaginary staging of Wuthering Heights, two lost souls 
begging for the bodies that will allow them to consummate their love.63 
 
At this juncture, a few lines from the opening scene of Shōjo kamen will illustrate this 
point: 
 
                                                  
61 The Stanislavski System is one of the most influential approaches to acting which was developed 
as a grammar of acting by Russian actor and theatre director, Constantin Stanislavski (1863–1938). 
62 Robert T. Rolf and John K. Gillespie (eds), Alternative Japanese Drama: Ten Plays, 255. 
63 Ibid., 254. 
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OLD WOMAN: It’s what ghosts always want.  
亡霊が、いつも欲しがるもの、それは― 
KAI: Which is? ･･･ 
それは―？ 
OLD WOMAN: A body. (Sings.) 
      肉体。 
 
 As time goes by the virgin becomes an old woman, 
 if time still goes by I wonder if the old woman becomes a virgin. 
 I had children in the past, 
     only one of them, the smooth talker, 
     came back alone from the mountain― 
     Zarathustra rubbing his big grimy feet on my thighs, 
     this is a superman [Übermensch], rub, rub, rub. 
 Listen, mother, the body is big reason.  
     If so, Son, is reason a big body? 
 Then his big feet suddenly stopped･･･ 
（Spoken, aside.）“Logic cannot make a U-turn so easily,” 
 The creep of a superman with that mouth said, 
  in an instant putting his chin in his hand like a dwarf. 
 Alchemy to Saint-Germain. 
 The art of forming the eye to Merleau-Ponty. 
 To who[m] the art of forming the body? 
 As time goes by the virgin becomes an old woman, 
 if still time goes by  
who knows the U-turn secret 
of an old woman becoming a virgin? 
   
時はゆくゆく乙女は婆ァに、それでも時がゆくならば  
婆ァは乙女になるかしら  
むかし、あたしにガキがいた、かずある中で只一人、口八丁の
知恵主は山から帰ったツァラツストラ、垢で汚れた大足をあた
しの股にすりつけて  
これが超人、グリグリグリ 
母さん、聞いてよ、肉体は大きな理性でございます。ならば息
子よ、理性とは大きな肉体のことなのけ？ すると大足ピクリ
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ととめて、 
「論理はそう簡単に Uターンすることはできません。」 
ニャロメ、言ったその口で、みるみるうちに超人は、小人のよ
うに、頬杖ついた。 
錬金術、サン・ジェルマンに。錬眼術はメロ・ポンに。錬肉術
は誰にしよう。 
時はゆくゆく 
乙女は婆ァに、 
それでも時がゆくならば、 
婆ｧが乙女になるような、Uターン秘術を誰が知ろう。 
 
OLD WOMAN AND KAI: (Together.) More than anything, the body!64 
                何よりも、肉体を！ 
 
Let us consider the following quotation from Scene III. 
 
KASUGANO: Ah, the wind that rages in Yorkshire’s wilderness―a 
stormy heath for fifty-five years―wrested everything away from 
me. 
       ああ、ヨークシャの荒野を吹きすさぶ風は、五十五年の嵐ヶ
丘は、俺から何もかも奪い去ってしまった。 
KAI: What?! 
  何をよ!? 
KASUGANO: My body. Don’t you see?  We are ghosts of love and at 
the same time beggars for bodies. 
    肉体を。ね、わかるかい、お前、俺たちは愛の乞食で
あるとともに肉体の乞食なんだ。 
KAI: You’ve finally said it, haven’t you, Heathcliff.  I was waiting for 
you to say it.  But what is the body? 
とうとう言ったわね、ヒースクリッフ。あたしはあんたが  
いつ、それを言うか待っていたのよ。でも、肉体って何よ！ 
KASUGANO: Look at that over there. (She points beyond the audience.) 
                                                  
64 Ibid., translation adapted by John K. Gillespie from an original translation by Paul H. Krieger, 
259–260. Japanese texts are taken from Kara Jūrō, Shōjo Kamen/Kara-ban Kaze no Matasaburō, 
Tokyo: Hakusuisha, 1997. 
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      あれをごらん。 
 
       (Suddenly, there is a loud noise above the stage, and at the same time 
applause for the virgins wells up like a tidal wave.)  
 
KASUGANO: My body has been completely taken over by all those girls. 
      あたしの肉体は、皆、あの子たちに奪われてしまった
んだ。 
KAI: Who are you talking about?  Where are they? 
  どこに誰がいるって言うの？ 
KASUGANO: Virgins whose names I don’t even know.  That’s why 
when you are not there I always acted on stage merely as a 
single ghost, rapidly growing old.  But, you know, I’m 
glad.  Having you as a friend, my sadness has decreased 
a little.  But don’t forget that you and I, as always, are 
still beggars for bodies. 
 
         あの名も知らぬ処女たち。だから、あたしはいつも舞
台でお前のいない間、たった一人の愛の幽霊として振
まってきた、いつだってあたしの肉体をあたしが所有
したことなんてありゃしない。あたしはどんどんふけ
てゆく、かわいそうな幽霊だった。でもお前、うれし
いよ。お前という同僚に会えていくらかさみしさはへ
ったんだもの、でもあたしもお前も相変わらず同じ肉
体の乞食だってこと、忘れちゃだめよ。 
 
KAI: I don’t like that ･･･ eternally being a beggar for a body. 
  あたし、嫌よ、永遠に肉体の乞食なんて。 
KASUGANO: Then how will you get it back?65 
      じゃ、どうやってとり戻すんだ。 
 
What this excerpt makes clear at once is the absurdity of Kara’s text and his strong 
obsession with the body.  A prominent dramatic critic, Senda Akihiko indicates that 
                                                  
65 Ibid., translation adapted by John K. Gillespie from an original translation by Paul H. Krieger, 
278–279. 
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Kara uses the word, the privileged body, as a poetic image and as agitation against 
conventional theatre and drama at the time.66  Interestingly, he stresses that he found 
dual characteristics in the privileged body posed by Kara.  He points out that, in Kara’s 
conceptualisation of privileged body there exists a contradiction between the inner self, 
which suffered from some kind of angst or pain, and the performer as a decadent outlaw.  
Interestingly, in the theory of the privileged body, the former angst or pain of the 
performer is exemplified by the poet, Nakahara Chūya.  When Kara describes the 
figure of the poet, Chūya, though Chūya did not have any illness, Kara still portrayed 
the poet as an invalid who possesses the privileged body.  Kara explains that the 
privileged body is a combination of pain, the gaze of others and a grudge.  Kara 
remarks: 
 
Whenever I think of this ailing man [Nakahara Chūya], I get this feeling: 
The pain is the flesh.  Therefore, I did not gaze at his poems but at the 
manner in which he makes verses.  [･･･]  Pain makes us aware of the 
existence of our body.  Shame serves to perpetuate the pain in our flesh.  
However, our consciousness of pain is not spontaneously bred from our 
internal world.  The stares of others separate them. [･･･]  The pain of 
the body that is stared at by others turns us into a stone.  To put it more 
simply, it seems to me that the body was changed into an object like a 
stone by the sense of being stared at.67  
                                                  
66 Senda Akihito, Kara Jūrō no gekisekai (唐十郎の劇世界 Theatrical World of Juro Kara), Tokyo: 
Yubun shoin, 2007, 261. 
67 「この病者を思う度に、私はこう考える―痛みとは肉体のことだ。だから、私は彼の詩
より、詩をうたう物腰を凝視しているのかもしれぬ。･･･ 痛みは、肉体を気づかせ、恥は、
肉体の痛みを持続させる。しかし、痛みの意識は、自らの内に自然に発生するものではな
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 Similarly, through his experience as a cargo handler at Haneda International Airport, 
Nakagami Kenji viewed his body as an undeniable entity that has not been named yet, 
or more precisely, that has not been tinged by the law/system of the collective.  One of 
the prime forces of his writing was his perception of his own body as mono, to use 
Kara’s term, the body as if it had transformed into a stone because of being stared at by 
others.  Nakagami recognizes his physical work as an attempt to become a blockhead, 
which is described as his half suicide.  It follows from what has been said that Kara’s 
emphasis on the physical presence of the performer’s body on stage may coincide with 
Sakaguchi Ango’s or Nakagami Kenji’s recognition of body itself as the subject that 
thinks and speaks.  When Kara and Nakagami met in 1982, they discussed the revival 
of an existential body that exists as if it were ostracized on stage and which is not 
comprehensible to those who use the modern language and think cerebrally.68   
 
Kara： The reason why I pioneered advocating the theory of the privileged 
body is that, at that time, I had a view that ideology decays more 
easily compared with the body on the stage. [･･･] For example, 
the old man who is crouching or crawling on the kitchen floor, etc. 
[･･･ ] How we revive the concrete body which cannot be 
comprehended by, or more precisely, which is dropped from the 
                                                                                                                                                  
く、そこには必ず他者の視線が介在する。･･･ 視られた肉体の痛みは、自らを石にさせる
のだ。つまり、肉体が、石のような物になるように思えて了う。」Kara, Koshimaki Osen, 
Tokkenteki nikutairon, 3, 14.  See also Senda, Kara Jūrō no gekisekai, 260–261. 
68 Kara and Nakagami, ‘Genshō toshiteno shintai: Nayamu nikutai—Nayamanai nikutai’ (現象とし
ての身体 悩む肉体―悩まない肉体), Gendaishi techō (April 1982): 56–70. 
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language or imagination of modern drama?69  
 
Interestingly, Kara and Nakagami comment on people’s sentiment about yami’ichi 
(black market) in the ruins (yakeato) immediately after the War, and they relate it to 
their recognition of the body as an undeniable reality.70  Moreover, Kara also explains 
the matter with an example from Ango’s Hakuchi.  He focuses attention on Ango’s 
treatment of the sun in Hakuchi.  Kara goes on to explain the fact that Ango treats the 
sun that beats down on the pig the same as the sun that beats down on human beings in 
Hakuchi. 71   Thus, Kara and Nakagami conclude that the body should not be 
encompassed by the logic of civil society.  It may be worth pointing out that though 
Kara and Nakagami agree on their perspective of body as physical object, their modes 
of expression are certainly different.  While Kara uses his own body as his means for 
expressing his scepticism towards kotoba when he acts on stage, Nakagami certainly 
cannot use his body physically as a means for writing.  Nakagami’s body is a means to 
make him become aware of any collective notion that is brought about by the 
generalized words and to make him unlearn the fixed ideas that appear as if they exist a 
priori.  Here, we can observe Nakagami’s grave dilemma that he still has to cling to 
kotoba to express his sceptical attitude towards kotoba.  To date, Kara has been 
actively staging his plays at the well-known Red Tent Theatre. 
 
                                                  
69 「最初ぼくが特権的肉体なんてことをいいだしたのは、観念というのは腐るのが早いけ
れども肉体というのはもう少しいいところがあるんじゃないかという見方から考え出した
ことであるわけでね。つまり、台所ではいつくばっている老人とか、うずくまっていると
か ･･･ 演劇における言葉やイメージでは包含しえない、逆につまはじきされてしまったよ
うな即物的な肉体の状態ね―、そういうものはどうやって復活するのかっていうことなん
だよね。」 Ibid., 61. 
70 Ibid., 66. 
71 Ibid., 67. 
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Body perceived by Hijikata Tatsumi and Terayama Shūji 
 
There is one further ‘great charismatic figure of the time’ that we must not ignore.  
That is the now-legendary dancer, Hijikata Tatsumi who created a new performing art 
known as ankoku butō (lit. black or dark dance, and commonly known as just butō).  
His style and concept greatly influenced contemporary dramatists and actors at the time.  
Takahashi Yasunari describes Hijikata and his performance as follows: 
 
[Hijikata] himself considered [butō as] a kind of “ur-kabuki,” a return to the 
roots of the indigenous sense of corporeality.  His haggard body, 
apparently at the nadir of ignoble impotence, moving with an extreme 
slowness reminiscent of noh, was the visible epitome of everything that was 
opposed to the comfortable intelligibility of modern culture.  His art was at 
once a critique of modernity and a manifesto of a new aesthetics rooted in 
the ‘darkness’ within the Japanese body and psyche.72  
 
Miryam Sas explores Japanese surrealism and closely scrutinizes the works of 
Takiguchi Shūzō, Nishiwaki Junzaburō, and butō dancers such as Ōno Kazuo as well as 
Hijikata in her book, Fault Lines: Cultural Memory and Japanese Surrealism.  This is 
her comment on Hijikata:  
 
Hijikata imagines the body here as alternately container and contained, as 
wicker trunk that becomes a saw that cuts river and then expands to 
become like the sky, metamorphosing into a plate, which one could break: 
“a human-body plate,” continually expanding.  This series of images 
suggests Hijikata’s continual transformation of the body and its figures 
(and metaphors).  The body becomes, exchanges itself for, and engaged 
with objects in a continual process of expansion, rupture, and 
                                                  
72 Robert T. Rolf and John K. Gillespie (eds), Alternative Japanese Drama: Ten plays, 6. 
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reconstitution.73 
 
Hijikata’s perception of body indicated as above had a profound influence on many 
postwar playwrights, performers, artists and writers in the 1960s and the 1970s.     
Another giant of modern Japanese theatre and poetry at the time, Terayama Shūji may 
be considered as one of those advocates of Hijikata’s art form.  He is well known as 
poet, film director, as well as the playwright and director of the legendary theatrical 
company called Tenjōsajiki.  Terayama, referring to the performances of Hijikata, 
develops his poetics that he names ‘action-poem’.  He explains that both Hijikata’s 
butō dance and action-poem are grounded in each single moment of life that will never 
happen again.  He goes on to explain that the latter makes the emotion across time fix 
in a certain space, and thus the written poem should not be a poem anymore.74  
Terayama’s perspective on action-poem becomes synonymous with Betsuyaku Minoru’s 
definition of kotoba which ‘can be something that is created by each of us every day or 
something that changes every hour’ as we have seen before.75  We may recall again 
Betsuyaku’s remarks on language: ‘Strictly speaking, the moment we speak a word, a 
decision is reached with regard to what the definition of the word is, and simultaneously 
the word becomes a hollow language.  As a result, we have to continuously decide the 
meanings of words.’76  Similarly, Terayama asserts that we do not need to put any 
poem into print but, instead, go outside and spout poetry on the spot, describing any 
object or event as it is.  He states that he does not believe in the genbun-icchi system of 
                                                  
73 Miryam Sas, Fault Lines: Cultural Memory and Japanese Surrealism, Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 1999, 173. 
74 Terayama Shūji, ‘Kōi to sono hokori=Chimata no gendaishi to Action-poem no mondai’ (行為と
その誇り＝巷の現代詩と Action-poem の問題), in Shiteki jijoden: Kōi toshite no shigaku (詩的自
叙伝 行為としての詩学), Tokyo: Shichōsha, 2006, 22–43. 
75 Betsuyaku Minoru, Kotoba e no senjutsu, 32–34. 
76 Ibid. 
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the Meiji period, sharing his view with Nakagami Kenji.  He explains that it is simply 
because the written language can be read over and over again compared with the spoken 
language which will never recur in a strict sense.  Terayama provocatively states, ‘For 
me, the static poem is mash for pigs.’77   
In Chapter I, we have observed how Nakagami Kenji struggled to establish his 
personal autonomy, facing up to the conflict between two attitudes, namely, establishing 
his self-identity and integrating himself with the collective, which coexist 
complementarily.  Similarly, Carol Fisher Sorgenfrei points out ‘several paradoxical 
images combine desire with revulsion’ which ‘reflects yearnings and fears shared by 
many of [Terayama’s] countrymen’.78  This is how she illustrates the matter: 
 
y Woman: seen simultaneously as demon whores and as sacrificing 
mothers 
y Traditional social outcasts: seen simultaneously as tainted sideshow 
freaks and as martyred saints 
y Japan’s past: seen simultaneously as a corrupt, superstitious, militaristic 
society and as a lost, idyllic paradise 
y American culture: seen simultaneously as grotesque bully and as cultural 
icon 79 
 
Sorgenfrei goes on to say that: 
 
                                                  
77 Ibid., 42. 
78 Carol Fisher Sorgenfrei, Unspeakable Acts: The Avant-garde Theatre of Terayama Shūji and 
Postwar Japan, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005, 3–4. 
79 Ibid., 4. 
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Each intertwined pair suggests an overriding theme that encompasses 
them all: the quest for identity, both personal and national.  Interwoven in 
this quest is a deep ambivalence about the very substance of both the 
personal and the national character, an image of the self and of Japan as, 
simultaneously, the innocent, childlike victim of some outside power and 
the inhuman victimizer of the powerless.80 
 
In Sorgenfrei’s observation of Terayama’s works, we may be astonished by the close 
resemblance between Terayama’s ambivalent images and Nakagami’s two conflicting 
attitudes, first to establish a firm self-identity, and secondly to identify himself with the 
collective, which functionalize as a precondition for each other.  Moreover, Terayama’s 
ambivalent images between the personal and the national accord to Slaymaker’s 
observation that ‘the body offered antidotes to the bankruptcy of the traditional and 
military values which characterized the previous fifteen years of war’ as we have seen 
before.81  In the same way as Slaymaker indicates that ‘[Many Japanese people’s] 
celebration of the carnal body suggests a punning contrast to the national polity, the 
focus of their desecration’, 82  Terayama noted the relationship between body and 
language as follows: 
 
While the body can be identified by each individual, the language tends to 
be identified by each nation-state.  Therefore, the language used by the 
theatrical people of the established modern drama should be called 
‘national language’ rather than language in general.  The national 
language is fated to be a unit that carries a meaning only within the bounds 
                                                  
80 Ibid. 
81 Slaymaker, The Body in Postwar Japanese Fiction, 1–2. 
82 Ibid. 
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of the category governed by the nation-state.  The Japanese language that 
we use in the play comes into existence only within “the administrative 
district” that is called Japan.  However, in reality, when we express 
ourselves in the play, the administrative district called “Japan” has often 
no utility.  The situation or topos (ba) where the play is generated and 
dies out can be formed in any place where human beings exist.  The play 
can be generated at any place except uninhabited islands.  It does not 
matter if the place is situated in Western civilized countries or 
undeveloped regions.  In a nutshell, it is impossible to suppose Japan’s 
carnal body which corresponds to the national language called nihongo 
(the Japanese language) simply because every encounter between 
individual bodies precedes the politicized.83  
 
With regard to the admiration of the body, there is further evidence to show how 
Nakagami’s notion of the body has some similarities with the postwar existentialist 
writers typified by Sakaguchi Ango who are strongly influenced by Sartre’s notion of 
existentialism and the yakeato generation dramatists like Betsuyaku, Hjikata, Terayama 
and Kara.  Many other interesting examples relating to both scepticism towards the 
                                                  
83 「からだはあくまでも個を単位にできるが、言語は集団＝国家が単位になることが多か
ったのです。つまり、従来の演劇が使ってきた言語というのは、言語というより国語だっ
たんですね。そして国語というのは一単位であって、その国が管理する政治化のカテゴリ
ーでしか意味を持ち得ないという宿命を持っていた。しかし、実際にぼくらが演劇で自己
表出するときには、「日本」という行政単位が何の役にもたたないことがしばしばある。演
劇が生成し、消滅してゆくシチュエーション（「場」）は人間がいるところではすべて成立
することが可能であるはずで、それは無人島以外の場所ならば、未開社会であろうと、西
欧の文明社会であろうとどういう場所でも構わない。要するに日本語に対比できる日本肉
体なんてものは存在しなかったのです。それは、あらゆる肉体の出会いは政治化に先行す
るという考え方ですよ。」 Terayama Shūji, ‘Nikutai gengo no shisei―Chika intabyū yori’ (肉体言
語の私性―地下演劇インタビューより), in Terayama Shūji engeki ronshū (寺山修司演劇論集), 
Tokyo: Kokubunsha, 1983, 201. 
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modern language and the emphasis on the body are abundant in postwar Japanese 
theatre, drama and literature.  One of the interesting examples can be seen in the works 
of Noda Hideki (b. 1955) who is regarded as one of the standard-bearers of the small 
theatre boom (shōgekijō boom) of the 1980s.  Like Kara and Betsuyaku who clearly 
objected to kotoba, Noda also showed his distrust of the Japanese language in the 1980s.  
He says:  
 
When I began to put a play on the stage, the first thing I did was not to 
believe in kotoba.  In those days, there was the tendency in which 
everyone saw words and body through a dichotomous frame, and 
separated them.  But, now I am, in a way, crawling up towards kotoba on 
my knees of my own accord.  However, this is not to say that my distrust 
of kotoba has been removed. [···] at that time, words were my toy to fiddle 
with.84   
 
There is no space for an extended discussion on this matter here, but his play 
manuscripts are filled with wordplays and puns, and the meaning of words backed by 
the logic of modern drama has completely collapsed in Noda’s theatrical world in the 
1980s.  In future, I would like to further explore these phenomena found in the field of 
Japanese theatre and drama in order to reconsider Japanese modern/contemporary 
literature from the perspective of the body. 
                                                  
84 「舞台を作りはじめたころ、ぼくが真っ先にやったことは、ことばへの不信でした。演
劇の世界で肉体とことばを二元論的に対立させる考え方が強かった時代でもありました。
でも、いまは、ぼくの方からことばににじりよっているところです。といっても、ことば
への不信が消えたわけではありませんが。･･･ はじめ、ぼくにとってことばは遊び道具で
した。」 An article from Asahi shinbun (the evening edition) (16 August 1991), in Kazama Ken, 
Shōgekijō no fūkei, Tokyo: Chūkō shinsho, 1992, 108. 
 259
 260
                                                 
 
It should be concluded, from what has been observed above, that Nakagami, Ango, 
Chūya and theatrical artists in the 1960s disbelieved in kotoba as they considered it as 
the manifestation of the generalized notions that were forged by the collective such as 
the modern nation-state, firms, social groups or households and the like.  Instead of 
thinking through the polluted kotoba, they attempted to ‘think through their bodies’, 
trying to display ‘no abstract spirit at all’.85  They regarded their body as the concrete 
foundation of their thoughts, and attempted to look closely at the realities of minority 
groups in modern Japan through the lens of an individual body.  Being aware of any 
conventional idea that is brought about by the language, they constantly needed to 
search for their autonomous freedom―their continuous self-determination to choose 
their actions―in order to set new values upon the self-identification of an individual in 
various social groups such as burakumin, hibakusha, survivors from the ruins of the War, 
the contemporary actors who sought to resurrect the riverbank beggars who were the 
first kabuki actors in the seventeenth century, and so forth.  I would like to suggest that 
their never-ending attempt to create new value judgments by thinking through the body 
can be regarded as another manifestation of their autonomy. 
 
85 Slaymaker, The Body in Postwar Japanese Fiction, 25. 
CHAPTER VII 
AUTONOMY OF WOMEN WRITERS IN CONTEMPORARY 
JAPANESE LITERATURE 
 
 
With regard to the issues of autonomy, the distrust of the Japanese language and the 
emphasis on the body, I would like to extend our previous discussion to the works of 
contemporary Japanese women writers, especially Tsushima Yūko, Takamura Kaoru, 
Tawada Yōko and Yoshimoto Banana.  Before beginning a close examination of the 
works of these women writers, let us briefly examine the main points that have been 
raised in the previous chapters.  As observed, in Nakagami Kenji’s works, the act of 
writing is extended to encompass Maruyama Masao’s two types of autonomy or Kant’s 
notion of autonomous freedom and responsibility.  This is essentially the case when 
two of his contradictory attitudes―his individual differentiation and his identification 
with the external causalities―functionalise each other.  In Nakagami’s writings, we 
can view both his individual act as an endless practice and his act of assimilation into 
the law/system of the collective as being intricately intertwined with each other.  The 
two exist as each other’s preconditions.  For this reason, his act of writing will never 
seem to end.  In this sense, his act of writing is considered to alternate between the 
autonomy of the individual and that of the collective and must always be regarded as 
conditional since it arises ‘in relation to lived, historical situations, [and] it implies 
tireless engagement with a historically changing environment’. 1   Nakagami’s 
ambivalent perception of writing is manifest in his strong scepticism towards kotoba 
which inevitably carries the collective notions and conversely, in his leaning to the body 
                                                  
1 Koschmann, Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan, 183. 
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as an undeniable object which can be the manifestation of an individual.  Thus, 
Nakagami Kenji’s assertion of autonomous selfhood through his act of writing is closely 
associated with the conflict between kotoba and the body.  Moreover, in Chapters III 
and V, I have argued that Miyazawa Kenji, Nakahara Chūya, the postwar writers such as 
Sakaguchi Ango, and theatrical artists of the 1960s have very similar attitudes as does 
Nakagami Kenji—the strong distrust of language, which is inextricably linked with the 
emphasis on the body.   
 
While examining other writers of contemporary Japanese literature from the 
perspective of this endless search for autonomy that manifests itself in the distrust of 
language (the collective notions) and the emphasis on the body (the individual 
differences), I find that certain women writers have come to the fore.  Four women 
writers, specifically, Tsushima Yūko, Takamura Kaoru, Tawada Yōko and Yoshimoto 
Banana, are particularly conspicuous in terms of their focus towards the realization of 
the autonomous individual, tirelessly engaged in making new values depending on a 
historically changing environment.  These writers became aware that language could 
turn into the collective notions that had generalized the issue of women as one of the 
social minorities, and they attempted to rethink women’s identities in contemporary 
Japan through their individual bodies.  Like Nakagami, they struggle to achieve 
autonomous freedom in the form of a mutually exclusive dichotomy between the 
individual and the collective—autonomy and dependence or language and body, which 
function as each other’s preconditions.  This chapter aims to explore the works of these 
women writers and compare Nakagami’s ceaseless autonomous attitudes towards 
writing with the thoughts expressed in the works of these contemporary women writers.  
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Is it possible to recognize these women as contemporary writers who have inherited the 
notion of the autonomous individual who actualizes continuous self-determination in 
accordance with historically changing situations?  As for the social advancement of 
women, Japan still lags behind other industrialized nations.  For this reason, women 
writers may be far more responsive, subjective and realistic about establishing their 
autonomous self than male writers in postwar Japan.2  On this matter, Miyoshi Masao 
discusses ‘the prospects for women’ in the 1960s and 1970s as follows: 
 
There are signs, however, that Japanese women are becoming more 
sensitized to the predicaments of industrial wealth that simultaneously 
doom its supposed beneficiaries to a routinized, dehydrated, or even 
de-eroticized life, with few dreams, little grace, and no criticism.  Once 
fully activated, this sensitivity is bound to lead Japanese women to a room 
of their own in which to reflect on their relationships with men, parents, 
children, and family, both personal and national.  As of now, this 
possibility―not yet an actuality―of autonomy and freedom has not been 
fully explored, nor has it been fully assessed in a deliberation of social 
objectives.  In view of nearly total male absorption in the production and 
consumption cycle, however, it seems a fair enough expectation that 
Japan’s egress from the cycle is incumbent upon its women.3 
 
It is my hope that an exploration of the works of these four contemporary Japanese 
women writers will activate the possibility of autonomy and freedom posed above by 
Miyoshi, and end the production and consumption cycle that desiccates our spirits.  In 
view of the above, Miyoshi Masao unfavorably regards Ōba Minako (1930–2007) and 
Yamamoto Michiko (b. 1936) as writers whose perspectives are ‘unquestioningly 
                                                  
2 I should look more carefully into gender perspectives to discuss women writers’ views in my 
future study.  
3 Masao Miyoshi, Off Center: Power and Culture Relations between Japan and the United States, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press, 1994, 211. 
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“Japanese,” a clichéd vantage-point assumed monolithically and monologically’. 4   
These writers were also criticized by Miyoshi for being ‘self-defensive and 
self-enclosed in tone and observation’.5  Compared to these women writers, Miyoshi 
recognizes writers such as Kōno Taeko (b. 1926), Ariyoshi Sawako (1931–1984), 
Tomioka Taeko (b. 1935) and Tsuhima Yūko as ‘the practitioners who are critically 
alert and historically intelligent’. 6   In particular, Miyoshi places much value on 
Tsushima by stating that she is ‘the best of her generation’.7  How did Tsushima 
practically attempt to activate the possibility of autonomy and freedom?  As a 
contemporary writer attempting to add new values to Japanese literature, what was her 
standpoint and how did she attempt to apply it?  I would like to begin by examining 
the manner in which the scepticism towards kotoba and the affirmative recognition of 
the body is expressed in the literary works of Tsushima Yūko.  
 
Tsushima Yūko 
 
Born in 1947, Tsushima Yūko was a contemporary of Nakagami Kenji, who was born 
one year earlier.  Tsushima is also the daughter of Dazai Osamu (1909–1948), one of 
the most prominent novelists in the history of modern Japanese literature.  While 
studying at Shirayuri Women’s University, she became a member of a traditional 
literary coterie magazine called Bungei-shuto in 1966 and began her writing career by 
contributing her early works to this magazine.  When she was 19, she met Nakagami 
Kenji, who also contributed to Bungei-shuto, and since then till Nakagami’s death in 
                                                  
4 Ibid., 212. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
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1992, the two became rival novelists, and are considered among the foremost of 
contemporary writers belonging to the postwar baby-boom generation.  In 1969, 
Tsushima enrolled in the graduate school at Meiji University but withdrew from it 
because classes were cancelled due to the prolonged campus disputes at the time.  
Tsushima published her first anthology of short stories, Shaniku-sai (Carnival), in 1971.  
To date, she is a prolific and successful writer and has been awarded many literary 
prizes, including the 1st Noma Prize for New Writers for Hikari no ryōbun (Territory of 
Light) in 1979, the 34th Tanizaki Prize and the 51st Noma Prize for her novel Hi no 
yama - yamazaruki (Mountain of Fire: Account of a Wild Monkey) in 1998, the 15th 
Murasaki Shikibu Prize for Nara repōto (Report on Nara) in 2006.  Several of her 
short stories between 1973 and 1984 have been translated into English and were 
published as an anthology titled The Shooting Gallery & Other Stories8 in 1988. 
As a contemporary of Nakagami Kenji, Tsushima Yūko displays an affinity with his 
work.  With deep feeling, she addresses Nakagami as ani (‘elder brother’ in the 
Wakayama dialect).  In her collected essays on Nakagami, Ani no yume, watashi no 
inochi (アニの夢 私のイノチ My Brother’s Dream and My Life, 1999), she gives 
vent to the complex sentiments she experienced on Nakagami’s death in 1992 and 
recalls the days when they exchanged ideas and opinions about contemporary literature 
or when they sometimes criticized each other’s works, in harsh and bitter words.9  She 
also states that their literary works mirrored many of the same themes and concerns.  
The following are a few random examples: modernity in Japan, the Japanese language, 
minority languages, oral literature (oral narration), post-colonialism, self-identity and 
                                                  
8 Tsushima Yūko, The Shooting Gallery and Other Stories, translated by Geraldine Harcourt, New 
York: New Directions Books, 1988. 
9 Tsushima Yūko, ‘Ani Nakagami Kenji no yume’ (アニ中上健次の夢), in Tsushima Yūko, Ani no 
yume, watashi no inochi, Tokyo: Kōdansha, 29–57.  
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the influence of Lévi-Strauss, Yanagida Kunio, Orikuchi Shinobu, Minakata Kumagusu, 
William Faulkner, James Joyce, García Márquez, Michelangelo Antonioni, Federico 
Fellini, free jazz, Kara Jūrō, Terayama Shūji, myth, epic poetry, etc.10   
There are yet other similarities between Tsushima and Nakagami that should not be 
ignored: their fictional territories and motifs.  Miyoshi Masao also points out that 
‘Tsushima’s fictional territory seems nearly always circumscribed by the life she has 
lived’.11  This can best be summarized by Miyoshi’s statement:  
 
The events of life―while still in her infancy, her writer-father’s double 
suicide with his mistress; her lonely childhood with her widowed mother, 
an old sister, and a retarded older brother; her deep love for this 
language-less brother and his sudden death while they are both still small; 
her troubled adolescence; her pregnancy and marriage, and divorce soon 
thereafter; her young motherhood with two children; her difficulties with 
grown-ups; her children’s growth and her need for her own space; her guilt 
and her struggle with it; her children’s distancing themselves from her; her 
son’s death in an accident―such a series of losses and bereavements as 
well as growths and maturations constitutes the stuff of her imaginary 
space.12   
 
Similarly, as we have seen in Chapter II, Nakagami also drew the subject matter or 
fragments for his novels from his own complicated life: growing up in the outcast 
(burakumin) community in Shingū as an illegitimate child; the four half-siblings from 
his mother’s first marriage; his mother’s remarriage when Nakagami was seven years 
old to a building constructor who had a son; his stepbrother’s suicide by hanging when 
                                                  
10 Ibid., 42–47.  See also Tsushima Yūko, ‘Nakagami Kenji to mirāju sentōki to’ (中上健次とミラ
ージュ戦闘機と), in Tsushima Yūko, Ani no yume, watashi no inochi, 72–75.  
11 Miyoshi, Off Center, 214. 
12 Ibid. 
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Nakagami was thirteen and so forth.13 
Like Nakagami Kenji, Tsushima feels a sense of discomfort towards nihongo.  In 
Ani no yume, watashi no inochi, Tsushima reveals that this discomfort stems from 
childhood memories of her mentally challenged, ‘language-less brother’14 and her one 
year stay in France from September 1991 to September 1992.15  She explains that an 
encounter with a language that was completely different from her mother tongue made 
her rethink the meaning of words in her daily conversation.  While struggling 
awkwardly with the French language during her stay in France, she confesses that she 
kept recalling the days she spent with her mentally challenged brother.  Tsushima 
describes these associations with foreigners who speak totally different languages and 
with her brother as experiences that are terribly humorous but also frustrating and 
unsettling. 16   However, she adds that although these experiences destroyed her 
conventional attitude towards kotoba, they unexpectedly led her to adopt a fresh attitude 
towards language.  This is what Tsushima has to say on the subject: 
 
For my elder brother, kotoba is a living organism that he has put a lot of 
love into creating one word at a time, and it is something precious, 
something that shines brightly and that he shares with someone he loves.  
Innocuous greetings, artificial compliments and jokes are not 
comprehensible to my brother.  Only genuine words that have a life of 
their own like human beings are allowed a place in my brother’s world. 
                                                  
13 Nagashima, ‘Kenji Shōden’, in Karatani et al. (eds), Gunzō Nihon no Sakka, 288–298.   
14 Miyoshi, Off Center, 214. 
15 Tsushima Yūko, ‘Junsui na kaiwa’ (純粋な会話), in Tsushima Yūko, Ani no yume, watashi no 
inochi, 118–121. 
16 Ibid., 119. 
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And thus, when I struggle with words in a foreign country, the meaning 
of the words does not become obscure; rather, it comes to the fore more 
clearly and shines beautifully like my brother’s words.  It is true that I 
could not in fact engage in idle talk in French; idle talk was culled from 
my verbal exchanges during my stay in France, and only genuine words 
remained for me.  I felt that I had found my way back to the world into 
which my brother had once brought me. 
Needless to say, it is very difficult for us to organize our social lives 
only around genuine conversations.  For smooth communication with 
others, we usually use fancy words, hide our emotions or keep secrets.  
On the other hand, we often lose the true meaning of someone else’s 
words.  If we live lives based on genuine conversations, what kind of 
words do we really exchange?  What kind of meaning do we find in our 
lives?  I now feel the urge to write about such a world of genuine words 
in my work.17   
 
As Miyazawa Kenji continued to search for his ‘real happiness’ and his ‘true words’ in 
                                                  
17 「兄にとって言葉とは、ひとつひとつ、愛情を込めた美しい生き物であり、愛する人た
ちと与え合う貴重な、光るものだった。兄には、無意味な挨拶、お世辞や冗談は通じなか
った。人間として純粋な会話しか、兄には存在しなかった。 
そして外国で言葉が不自由な私にとっても、言葉の意味が曖昧になったのではなく、逆
に言葉のひとつひとつが明確に浮かびあがり、大事な、美しい光るものになっていった。
むだな言葉のやりとりは、もちろんそれが私にはできなかったことではあるけれども、私
の体から消え失せ、純粋な会話だけが私に残された。私はようやく、兄がかつて教えてく
れた言葉の世界に近づいていた。 
言うまでもなく純粋な会話だけで、私たちはふつう、その社会で生きていくことはむず
かしい。言葉をいろいろに飾ったり、隠したり、約束事に閉じ込めたりして、なんとか無
事に生き抜こうとする。けれどもその一方で、肝心の意味を見失ってしまうことも多い。
純粋な会話をもし、私たちが日々の生活のなかで交し合うのならば、なにを私たちは伝え
合うことになるのか。どんな意味を、自分たちの生に見いだすのか。私はそんな言葉の世
界を小説に書き表したくなった。」 Ibid., 120–121. 
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his works, Tsushima appears to be searching ceaselessly for ‘genuine conversations’ 
with her mentally challenged, ‘language-less brother’ who passed away when she was 
thirteen.  She wrote about her distrust of language, derived from her experiences with 
her brother, in many of her novels and essays, for example, in the anthology of short 
stories Watashi (I, 1999), the long novel Kagayaku mizu no jidai (The Age of Shining 
Water, 1994) and many other works. 
Moreover, the above excerpt is very interesting because it reveals an affinity with 
Nakagami Kenji’s observation on the veracity of the unpretentious narratives of the 
aged, illiterate women in the burakumin ghettoes in Kishū, which he considered as the 
possible means for breaking the impasse of the Japanese language, developed from the 
collective notion which was flavoured by the genbun-icchi system during the Meiji 
period.  It is necessary to note that Nakagami observed a state of perfect 
correspondence between kotoba and mono in the narrative style of their conversations.  
However, Nakagami himself admitted that such an attempt was somewhat contradictory 
because narrative or oral literature should not be written on paper.  He remarked that 
once an oral narrative is written down, it ceases to be an oral narrative.18  In Ani no 
yume, watashi no inochi, Tsushima pointed out Nakagami’s contradictions, which 
frequently appeared in his works, and the fact that Nakagami himself was aware of 
this. 19   While offering a positive interpretation of these contradictions that may 
become a provocative attribute of Nakagami’s works, Tsushima admitted that this kind 
of paradox, which overturns modern rationality, may conversely bind his literary world.  
                                                  
18 「あるいは書くこと、書かれる事を拒む語りの言葉か。書かれてある語りとはムジュン
もはなはだしいが･･･」 Nakagami Kenji, Kishū: Ki no kuni, ne no kuni monogatari, in NKZ Vol. 
14, 609–610. 
19 Tsushima Yūko, ‘Ani Nakagami Kenji no yume’, 29–57.  See also, Tsushima Yūko, ‘Haha no 
katari o hakai suru toki’ (母の語りを破壊する時), in Tsushima Yūko, Ani no yume, watashi no 
inochi, 58–71. 
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Here, it appears that both Nakagami and Tsushima encountered the possibility―and 
impossibility―of autonomy and freedom through their own involvement with language.  
For all the contradictions between speech and written language, Tsushima and 
Nakagami did not abandon kotoba as a means of expressing their literary universe.  
They clung to it yet continued to explore every possible means of breaking conventional 
attitudes towards the writing of novels.   
  As a leading contemporary writer, Tsushima properly appreciates the difficulties of 
the Japanese language as one of the modern languages.  She describes the sentences 
she penned in her novels as follows: 
 
To tell the truth, I am not at all confident of the sentences in my novels.  I 
do not have a clear criterion for the sentences I like.  The more I write what 
I want to write in Japanese, the more my Japanese disintegrates into smaller 
pieces.  It confuses me a lot.  What I wish to express will not complement 
the (Japanese) language I use.  The two sides are so obstinate that I cannot 
help getting flurried or worried, caught between them.  But, for me, writing 
novels may refer to my process of being torn between the things I wish to 
write and the language I use. 
[…] 
For me, writing novels refers to the process of dismantling the meaning of 
the words that raised me up, and for that reason, had locked me into the 
already fixed, internalized domain of myself.20  
                                                  
20 「自分の小説の文章に、実を言うと、私はさっぱり自信がない。こんな文章が好きだと
いう、はっきりした規準もない。自分で日本語の文章を書けば書くほど、日本語がばらば
らになり、わけが分からなくなってくる。私の書きたいことと私の使おうとする日本語が
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 This excerpt suggests that Tsushima was struggling with the paradox between 
establishing her autonomous self and her emotional dependence on kotoba that is 
regarded as a collective notion, similar to Nakagami’s struggle in the process of writing 
his novels.  In her essay, Kairaku no hondana―Kotoba kara jiyū ni naru tame no 
dokusho annai (The Bookshelf for Pleasure―A Reading Guide to Freeing Oneself from 
Language, 2003), Tsushima discusses the condition of human beings who are caught 
between two worlds—between the thing in itself and the thing that is assigned a name 
with a word.  She describes her childhood in the form of a riddle, for example, before 
she got involved with schools and parents, she was a nobody in a world of things that 
have no names.  In contrast, she proceeds to explain her wonderment at suddenly 
becoming somebody who was named ‘onna’ (woman) after she came into contact with 
others in society.21  She quotes a prose work by John Donne: 
 
No man is an island, entire of itself; 
every man is a piece of the continent, 
a part of the main. 
If a clod be washed away by the sea,  
Europe is the less, 
as well as if a promontory were,  
as well as if a manor of thy friends or of thine own were.  
 
                                                                                                                                                  
なかよく手を取り合ってくれない。それぞれがひどく気むずかしく、その間に立って、私
はいつもおろおろ心配させられる。その心配の過程が、言ってみれば、私にとって小説を
書くということでもある。･･･ 自分を育んでくれた言葉から距離を作り、自分の発想がそ
こに閉じ込められないようにするのは、その言葉の経験が内面化されていればいるほど、
ひどくむずかしくなる。ほとんど、不可能なことでもあるだろう。けれどもそのための過
程が『小説を書く』という行為なのに違いない。」 Tsushima Yūko, ‘Nihongo to watashi no aida 
ni’ (日本語と私の間に), in Tsushima Yūko, Ani no yume, watashi no inochi, 122 and 125. 
21 Tsushima Yūko, Kairaku no hondana―Kotoba kara jiyū ni naru tame no dokusho annai (快楽の
本棚―言葉から自由になるための読書案内), Tokyo: Chūkō shinsho, 2003, 4–22. 
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Any man’s death diminishes me  
because I am involved in mankind; 
and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls;  
it tolls for thee. . .  
 
from Devotions22 by John Donne, 1623 
 
Tsushima confesses that when she read this prose work as a university student, she came 
to realize that she could not live her life alone, and that she should not think that she did 
not relate to anyone in society.  On the last page of the Introduction to Kairaku no 
hondana, Tsushima firmly resolves to destroy the prison of her own conventional 
thoughts, which was created by the language she spoke, and thus grasp the essence of 
things while writing novels.  She recognized the profound paradox in the works of 
Nakagami Kenji, and admits that she, too, encountered the same paradox: her act of 
destroying kotoba must be performed through her literary works, which are also 
constructed by kotoba.23   
 
Moreover, it is very interesting to note that Tsushima also comments on the issue of 
the standard language and dialect.  She elaborates her view on dialects as follows:  
 
As a matter of fact, I do not speak any dialect because I was born and 
grew up in Tokyo.  When I was a pupil, I even mocked the provincial 
accent of my teacher.  It was at the time when I started to deplore the fact 
that I could only speak standard Japanese, that I desired to become a 
                                                  
22 John Donne, Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions, edited by Anthony Raspa, Montreal and 
London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1975, 87. 
23 Ibid., 22. 
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professional writer.  I felt that I did not know any “true words”.24   
 
It is necessary to reiterate the fact that Nakagami Kenji also clearly portrayed the 
Shingū dialect as the language used by real people and set the Shingū dialect against the 
standard language that he regarded as artificially synthesized in his work.25  In this 
respect, Tsushima and Nakagami had shared perceptions about dialects.  It is very 
interesting to recall that Betsuyaku Minoru also strongly asserts that the intrinsic energy 
of words can only be found in dialects.  Like Tsushima, Betsuyaku also rues the fact 
that he could never grasp any specific dialect as he was born on the continent and 
constantly shifted from one place to another before and after Japan’s defeat in the War.  
Tsushima explains that she felt the need to create literature when she began to consider 
the question of where she could really find her ‘true words’ or why she felt that her 
Japanese had been so awkward and artificial that it impeded her efforts to write novels.   
Tsushima points out that this kind of discomfort with one’s mother tongue often leads 
us to concerns about unknown people living on the periphery of society.26  As a matter 
of practice, she has been actively involved with the Ainu people and has been studying 
Ainu jojishi Yukara (アイヌ叙事詩ユーカラ the Ainu epic Yukara) for the last two 
decades.  Moreover, she has been promoting the cross-fertilization of ideas among 
writers in diverse remote regions of the world, especially in Asian countries.27  These 
have evolved into important aspects in her recent works. 
                                                  
24 Tsushima, ‘Uzumaku bungaku o mezashite’ (渦巻く文学を目指して), in Tsushima Yūko, Ani no 
yume, watashi no inochi, 127–128. 
25 Nakagami Kenji, ‘Kasuga to “Kojiki”’, in Karatani and Watanabe (eds), Nakagami Kenji to 
Kumano, 27–35. 
26 Tsushima, ‘Uzumaku bungaku o mezashite’, 130. 
27 See, for example, Tsushima Yūko and Shin Kyeong-Suk (申京淑), Yama no aru ie, Ido no aru 
ie―Tokyo Souru ōfuku shokan (山のある家井戸のある家―東京ソウル往復書簡), Tokyo: 
Shūeisha, 2007.  
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   Let us further examine the novels that illustrate her discomfort with kotoba—the 
motif under consideration.  In her short story ‘The Silent Traders’ (Danmari ichi 黙市, 
1984),28 Tsushima depicts the manner in which a divorced woman (designated as 
watashi ‘I’) with two little children, loses the language with which she can express 
herself and remains silent when she faces her ex-husband and her children.  In this 
short story, Tsushima never allows the narrator, ‘I’ (watashi), to indulge in idle talk or 
thoughtless chatter with her husband. 
   
On the day, he was an hour late for our appointment.  The long wait in a 
coffee shop had made the children tired and cross, but when they saw the 
man a shy silence came over them.  ‘Thank you for coming,’ I said to the 
man with a smile.  I couldn’t think what to say next.  He asked ‘Where 
to?’ and stood to leave at once.  He walked alone, while the children and 
I looked as though it was all the same to us whether he was there or not.  
On the train I still hadn’t come up with anything to say. 
[･･･] 
I was becoming desperate for something to say.  And weren’t there 
one or two things he’d like to ask me?  Such as how the children had 
been lately.  But to bring that up, unasked, might imply that I wanted him 
to watch with me as they grew.  I’d only been able to ask for this meeting 
because I’d finally stopped feeling that way.  Now it seemed we couldn’t 
even exchange such polite remarks as ‘They’ve grown’ or ‘I’m glad 
they’re well’ without arousing needless suspicious.  It wasn’t supposed to 
be like this, I thought in confusion, unable to say a word about the children.  
He was indeed their father, but not a father who watched over them. [･･･] 
  If we couldn’t discuss the children, there was literally nothing left to 
                                                  
28 Tsushima, ‘Danmari ichi’, in Tsushima Yūko, Danmari ichi, Tokyo: Shinchōsha bunko, 1990, 
155–171.  The first edition was published by Shinchōsha in 1984.  ‘Danmari ichi’ was translated 
by Geraldine Harcourt as ‘The Silent Traders’ in Tsushima Yūko, The Shooting Gallery and Other 
Stories, New York: New Directions Books, 1988, 35–44.  
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say.29 
 
As is evident from these excerpts, Tsushima has relentlessly repeated her depictions of 
‘I’ (watashi) being lost for words as she tries to avoid artificial conversations and 
superficial relationships.  The more she attempts to be honest, the more she loses her 
language.  Tsushima’s endless quest for genuine words, for living as a genuine human 
being, is vividly portrayed in this short story.  ‘I’ (watashi) seems to be of the opinion 
that it is better to remain silent than to say something superficial.   
 
[･･･] Silence is essential.  As long as we maintain silence, and thus 
avoid trespassing, we leave open the possibility of resuming negotiations 
at any time. 
I believe the system of bartering used by the mountain men and the 
villagers was called ‘silent trade’.  I am coming to understand that there 
was nothing extraordinary in striking such a silent bargain for survival.30 
 
In her long novel Kagayaku mizu no jidai, the protagonist, Misako who is divorced 
has lost her young son.  Traumatized Misako goes to stay in Paris.  Her grieve and her 
process of regaining her self-identity are narrated through the conversations between 
Misako and her cousin Asako.  Asako is a second-generation Japanese-American who 
happens to be staying in Paris, and she can hardly speak Japanese.  Consequently, their 
conversations become a mixture of English, French and Japanese.  For this reason, the 
values by which Misako lives are restructured not by the Japanese language, her mother 
tongue, but by a mixture of rudimentary languages.  An excerpt from the opening 
paragraph may be informative: 
                                                  
29 Ibid., translated by Geraldine Harcourt, 42–43. 
30 Ibid., 43–44. 
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 夢を見たからだと思う。それが理由だと思う。[･･･] アサコに、な
ぜあなたはわたしの父に会わなければならないの、と聞かれたとき、
私は迷ったすえに、結局、こう答えた。アサコの質問が彼女の母国
語だったので、それにあわせたへたな英語で。ふたりで話すときは、
たいてい、その言葉を使っていた。私の母国語を使って話をするの
は、彼女にはほとんど不可能なことだった。そして、ふたりにとっ
て、外国語であるフランス語を使うのは、たがいにどことなく不自
然な感じがしたし、だいいち、それは英語を使うよりさらに、私を
疲れさせることだった。けれども、もし私自身の母国語をあのとき
使えていたら、私はまったくべつの答え方をしていたのかもしれな
かった。31 
 
When Asako asked me the reason why I have to meet her father, after a lot 
of hesitation, I finally answered like this: ‘Because I saw your father in my 
dreams.’  Since she questioned me in her mother tongue, I had to answer 
her in my awkward English.  When we speak, we usually use that 
language.  It is almost impossible for Asako to have a conversation in my 
mother tongue.  As for French, we felt somehow very awkward to 
converse in it because French was not the first language for both of us.  
And anyhow, French conversation makes me more tired than using 
English in the first place.  However, if I could have used my first 
language, I might have answered her question differently. 
In this excerpt, the protagonist Misako shows that she may have fudged the issue by 
giving Asako an ambiguous answer had she used Japanese.  With Asako in Paris, 
Misako has to narrate her course of events not in Japanese but in a new rudimentary 
                                                  
31 Tsushima, Kagayaku mizu no jidai, 7. 
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language.  Through the conversations with Asako, Misako continues to search her 
self-identity and attempts to envision some new angle on her conventional viewpoint 
that was nurtured by the Japanese language.  
 
In Yama o hashiru onna (Woman Running in the Mountains, 1980), the protagonist, 
Takiko gives birth to an illegitimate baby.32  Takiko’s baby is rejected by society and 
lives a life in which ‘[n]o one who means anything ever enters’.  In the first half of this 
novel, her life is portrayed as though it were that of ‘a barely maternal animal’.  
However, Takiko ‘refuses to succumb’ to this routine, insipid existence.  On this point, 
Miyoshi Masao highlights Takiko’s process of developing emotional autonomy through 
her exchanges with Kambayashi, her new colleague and the father of a child with 
Down’s syndrome.  Miyoshi describes the process of her conversion as follows: 
 
She has never met a man who is at ease with being a father.  And through 
knowing this man’s presence, “her acts of giving birth to Akira [her 
illegitimate child] and nurturing him have been given an expression.”33 To 
love a linguistically handicapped child is to learn a wholly new 
language―or to learn what language truly is.  What has been hitherto 
unnamed is now named, and with it a new realm of language and meaning 
is initiated.  She is no longer just working at a plant nursery.  Her 
workplace turns into mountains where animals leap, dreams run free, and 
people care for each other.  One of the most pastoral of Tsushima’s tales, 
Yama wo hashiru onna is a commedia that grants hope.34 
                                                  
32 For detailed arguments on this point, see also Miyoshi, Off Center, 213. 
33 「自分が晶を産み、育てていることに、はじめて神林の存在によって、言葉を与えられ
た気がした。」 Tsushima Yūko, Yama o hashiru onna (山を走る女), Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2006, 276.  
The first edition was published by Kōdansha in 1980. 
34 Miyoshi, Off Center, 213. 
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 From Miyoshi’s observations of Takiko’s conversion in Yama o hashiru onna, it will be 
clear that Tsushima attempts to depict the manner in which a woman faced with the 
harsh reality of her existence establishes her self-identity through the process of 
regaining a language of her own along with Takiko’s transformation into an 
autonomous individual who possesses the right of self-determination and assumes 
responsibility for her words and actions. 
Tsushima emphasizes that our imaginative power has never changed and will never 
undergo a change with time—no matter how evolved our knowledge and experiences 
become.  She states that literature is the field that enables us to recover the unchanged 
imagination of human beings and reconsider how it keeps pace with different times or 
social systems on the occasion.35  She examines the problems of the Ainu people in her 
literary works in the same way that Nakagami deliberated the question of burakumin. 
In ‘Sōron: Seido to kinki’ (総論  制度と禁忌  The General Statement: The 
Law/System and the Taboo), 36  Tsushima talks about the imaginative power that 
originates from the body of the individual.  However, she points out that the individual 
imaginative power that is supposed to be determined by our free will has actually been 
bound by external causalities such as the entity called kami (god), by customs, 
laws/systems and the like.  She asserts that literature may spring out of this kind of 
continuous antagonism between the law/system and personal imaginative power.37  
                                                  
35 Tsushima Yūko, ‘Sōron: Seido to kinki’ (総論 制度と禁忌), in Tēma de yomitoku nihon no 
bungaku: jō, 12–13. 
36 This introductory chapter was written for an anthology entitled Tēma de yomitoku nihon no 
bungaku—Gendai josei sakka no kokoromi (テーマで読み解く日本の文学―現代日本女性作家
の試み  Japanese Literature by Thematic Subjects—Attempts Made by Women Writers of 
Contemporary Japan), Tokyo: Shōgakukan, 2004. 
37 Tsushima Yūko, ‘Sōron: Seido to kinki’, in Tēma de yomitoku nihon no bungaku: jō, 12–15. 
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She focuses on the people who are opposed to the law/system or the people who are 
driven out of the political and economic spheres of communities.  For example, they 
include the Ainu people, travelling entertainers, a fallen/defeated samurai, biwa players, 
members of a cult and women.  She is determined to continue studying the 
imaginative power of the people who have fallen out of the law/system of the collective 
and how literature has originated from their imaginations. 
 
Takamura Kaoru 
 
Takamura Kaoru was born in Osaka in 1953.  After graduating from the International 
Christian University in 1975, she joined a foreign-capital-affiliated trading company.  
In 1990, at the age of 37, Takamura made her literary debut with her best-selling novel 
Ōgon o daite tobe (Leap with Gold in Your Arms).  She won the 3rd Japanese 
Mystery/Suspense Novel Prize for Ōgon o daite tobe in 1991 and the 109th Naoki 
Award for Mākusu no yama (Marks’ Mountain), which boosted her popularity as the 
Japanese ‘Queen of Crime’ in 1993.  Since then, she has continued to publish a series 
of best-selling crime/mystery fiction and has enjoyed immense popularity.  Her style is 
noted for its extremely close observation of human relationships, which stems from her 
deep understanding of human psychology and the criminal mind, and its minutely 
detailed descriptions of the circumstances of characters.  Hence, there is much 
controversy over whether her works should be categorized as junbungaku (so-called 
‘pure’ literature), which is serious and artistic, or as popular literature, which is merely 
meant as entertainment.38   
                                                  
38 For example, see Nozaki Rokusuke, Takamura Kaoru no sekai (髙村薫の世界), Tokyo: Jōhō 
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However, by the time Takamura wrote Haruko jōka (The Ballad of Haruko) in 2002, 
she had stopped writing crime fiction, and her style of writing had also changed 
dramatically.  In Haruko jōka, Takamura writes about the life of a woman, Fukuzawa 
Haruko, who lived through the Taisho and Showa eras.  Haruko’s stormy life before 
and after World War II is depicted through the hundred letters she wrote to her son, 
Akiyuki (彰之).39  In 2005, Takamura published the sequel to Haruko jōka—Shin Ria 
ō (A New Story of King Lear).  These comprised the first two novels of a trilogy, and 
Takamura has been working on the third sequel.  Shin Ria ō presents the story of the 
Fukuzawa (an influential clan in the Aomori prefecture at the northern tip of the 
Japanese mainland).  This is a saga involving four-day long conversations between 
Akiyuki (彰之), who becomes a priest seeking his autonomous self, and his father, 
Sakae (榮), a powerful local politician who lived in the age of the 55-nen taisei (the 
so-called ‘1955 Party Structure’) and witnessed its fundamental impasse in the 1980s.40  
It is very interesting to study Takamura’s attempt at writing a saga portraying the 
conflict between the priest Akiyuki as an individual who is seeking autonomy and the 
politician Sakae who lives as part of the political/social organizational setup.  As 
literary critic Akiyama Shun (b. 1930) suggests, Takamura’s works always treat the 
theme of the relationship between the individual and the social organization.41  In a 
similar way as Ōe and Tsurumi indicated in Chapter III, Akiyama also explains that 
postwar writers like Noma Hiroshi and Ōoka Shōhei were the only practitioners in the 
history of modern Japanese literature who seriously attempted to portray relationships 
                                                                                                                                                  
sentā shuppan kyoku, 2002, 30. 
39 Takamura Kaoru, Haruko jōka: jō/ge (晴子情歌 上／下), Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2002. 
40 Takamura Kaoru, Shin Ria ō: jō/ge (新リア王 上／下), Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2005. 
41 Akiyama Shun, ‘Kaisetsu’, in Takamura Kaoru, Mākusu no yama: ge (マークスの山 下), 
Tokyo: Kōdansha bunko, 2003, 353–354. 
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between the individual and the social organization, which can be regarded as a form of 
the collective.  In this regard, Akiyama asserts that in her works, Takamura Kaoru also 
clearly addresses the question of how the individual relates to the collective notion 
which was formed by his/her social organization such as the world of politics in Shin 
Ria ō.42  A similar attempt can be seen in Nakagami Kenji’s Akiyuki sanbusaku (The 
Trilogy of Akiyuki): Misaki, Karekinada and Chi no hate shijō no toki.  Both 
Nakagami’s and Takamura’s works have recurring themes that are dealt with in a 
multilayered and multifaceted fashion.  In their sagas, if a motif, theme or character is 
depicted from a particular perspective in a novel, a different dimension of the same 
motif, theme or character reappears in a subsequent novel.  In Chapter III, we have 
already seen how Akiyuki’s incestuous relationship with his half-sister and conflict with 
the father or his elder half-brother were reiterated over and over and eventually shifted 
from the protagonist, Akiyuki, to other characters.  It seems to me that Takamura may 
have been inspired by Nakagami’s Akiyuki saga, and she appears to be writing her own 
Akiyuki saga.  As we may have already noticed, the protagonists of both sagas have 
the same name, Akiyuki.  However, the protagonist’s name in Takamura’s saga had 
different Chinese characters—namely, Akiyuki (彰之 )—from Akiyuki (秋幸 ) in 
Nakagami’s saga.  In this regard, Takamura modestly stated that she did not expect her 
attempt to be in the same league as that of Nakagami.  In fact, Takamura exalted 
Nakagami as a genius beyond compare in an interview conducted in December 2003.43  
However, she was determined to become a writer whose ambition was to portray a 
world that can be created using nothing but kotoba or some kind of unknown power that 
                                                  
42 Ibid., 354. 
43 Bessatsu Takarajima henshūbu (別冊宝島編集部) (ed.), Takamura Kaoru no hon (髙村薫の本), 
Tokyo: Takarajima-sha, 2006, 263–264. 
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is derived from kotoba.44 
Thus, Takamura Kaoru has been directing her attention towards the reconsideration of 
the meaning of words in the same way as Betsuyaku Minoru or Nakagami Kenji.  
Takamura has made a few important remarks on her conversion from crime fiction in 
several interviews and her lecture that I attended in 2005. 45  These can be summarized 
as follows:   
 
1. After experiencing the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995, Takamura felt 
that the sudden collapse of everyday life had devastated the system of values or 
meanings that she regarded as the foundation of her thoughts.  Although she 
does not mean to disregard the literary genre of crime fiction or mystery, this 
shocking experience led her to give up writing crime fiction.  
2. She deplores the recent enervation of kotoba because it seems to become a more 
symbolic, abstract linguistic sign in a highly networked information-based 
society.  She asserts that the more today’s tendency towards the weakening of 
language progresses, the more human beings will fall apart and decline. 
3. She harbours deep reservations about the recent tendency towards expressing 
feelings hysterically by repeating simple words found in the dichotomy such as 
good/bad or comfortable/uncomfortable rather than thinking about the 
complex—and often ambiguous—circumstances that arouse our emotions.  
                                                  
44 「中身はなんでもいいんですが、言葉でしかつくれない世界、何物にも置き換えられな
い言葉だけがもっている力の世界―私も、それをつくりたいという野望をもつところまで
来たんですよ。」 Ibid., 265. 
45 Takamura Kaoru, ‘Otoroeru kotoba to tatakau’ (衰える言葉と闘う), Asahi shinbun, the evening 
edition, 23 October 2004, p.10. I also refer to her comments from Takamura’s Special Open 
Lecture entitled ‘Shōsetsu no hyōgen to dōjidai―“Shin Ria ō” o moto ni’ (小説の表現と同時代『新
リア王』をもとに) at The Asahi Cultural Centre Osaka School (Asahi Karuchā Sentā Osaka kō 朝
日カルチャーセンター大阪校) on 17 December 2005.  
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Writers must constantly tackle this dilemma by describing with words the 
ambiguous, unidentified environments that lie beyond words.  This is a 
paradoxical challenge.  
4. She believes that the ambiguous, complex beings called human beings cannot be 
portrayed through the words (or rather terms) of politics or religion alone.  
However, it may be possible to depict them through the words used in writing 
novels.   
5. She needs to ceaselessly evaluate the meaning of words and accommodate many 
words and expressions while describing an event or phenomenon.  This is a 
continual process of trial and error, which is like saying: ‘That’s not it!  This 
isn’t it!’ 
6. In order to depict a single event, hundreds of words must be accumulated.  By 
doing so, we may find our way into the time and space that we have not depicted 
before.   
 
Based on these remarks, we can conclude that Takamura Kaoru should be included 
among those women writers who carefully observe the ambiguity and unreasonable 
complexity of the existence of human beings and the formation of their identity through 
contact with their society or external surroundings.  Such a writer then endeavours to 
express this incomprehensibility as our existence in the form of the ‘self’ through a 
series of novels. 
 
Further, it is noteworthy that Takamura is known as a writer who frequently adapts or 
rewrites her own works.  Whenever her hardcover books were republished as 
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bunkobon—the mass-market paperback (or pocket edition)—Takamura rewrote the 
greater part of her novels and sometimes even their titles.  For example, the hardcover 
edition of Riviera o ute (Fire upon Riviera!) was published in 1992, and its pocket 
edition was published in 1997.  Takamura made some modifications to the pocket 
edition.  The biggest change occurs at the end of the story.  In the 1992 hardcover 
edition, one of the protagonists, Tejima (a deputy inspector), narrates and sums up the 
happenings at the end of the novel.  However, Takamura cut out this entire scene in the 
1997 pocket edition.  It seems to me that through this act, she attempted to allow us to 
draw our own conclusions about what happened in the novel.  As Irisawa Yasuo points 
out upon examining all of the existing manuscripts of Miyazawa Kenji’s Ginga tetsudō 
no yoru in Chapter III, let us again recall the fact that Miyazawa Kenji created his 
literary works in a manner that characteristically negates the concept of the ‘final 
manuscript’ or ‘authorized edition’. 46   I believe that while seeking her own 
autonomous self in accordance with a changing historical environment, Takamura also 
shares Miyazawa’s tendency to never stop elaborating upon the final manuscripts.   
 
Tawada Yōko 
 
Tawada Yōko was born in Tokyo in 1960.  After submitting her graduation thesis on 
the Russian poet Bella Akhatovna Akhmadulina (b. 1937) to Waseda University (School 
of Literature) in 1982, she started travelling alone to India and Europe.  When she 
arrived in Hamburg, she found a job at a trading company that exported German books.  
                                                  
46 Irisawa, ‘“Ginga tetsudō no yoru” no honbun no hensen ni tsuite no taiwa’ (「銀河鉄道の夜」の
本文の変遷についての対話), in Miyazawa Kenji―Purioshin kaigan kara no hōkoku (宮沢賢治―
プリオシン海岸からの報告), Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1991, 167–177. 
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Tawada worked there while studying German at a language school.  In 1983, she began 
attending language and literature classes at the School of Literature in Hamburg 
University and began to translate her Japanese poems into German.  In 1987, her first 
book of poetry, Nur da wo du bist da ist nichts/ Anata no iru tokoro dake nani mo nai 
(あなたのいるところだけなにもない The Place You Exist Is the Only Empty 
Place)—written in both German and Japanese—was published by German publisher 
Konkursbuchverlag.  In 1990, she started work on her Master of Arts thesis at 
Hamburg University.  While she was writing her thesis, she also began to write novels 
in Japanese and made her literary debut in Japan.  In 1991, she was awarded the 34th 
Noma Prize for New Writers for Kakato o nakushite (Missing Heels).  At around the 
same time, writing in both German and Japanese, Tawada created her style and 
produced a prodigious amount of quality work along with her Master’s degree thesis in 
German literature.  In 1993, she won the 108th Akutagawa Prize for her novel 
Inumukoiri (The Bridegroom Was a Dog).  In 1996, she became the first Japanese to 
win the Adelbert von Chamisso Prize—a prize awarded by the Bavarian Art Academy to 
authors whose mother tongue is not German.  Since then, Tawada has been a prolific 
and energetic writer both in German and Japanese and, since 2000, has also been 
writing her Ph.D. thesis at the University of Zurich. 
  From her personal background, it is evident that Tawada has been creating her works 
while travelling back and forth between two countries, and it is easy to imagine that 
Tawada views her native language, that is, the Japanese language, objectively.  Tawada 
developed a sense of discomfort with regard to the meaning of the Japanese language 
upon perceiving the gaps between nihongo as her mother tongue and herself when she 
examined her self-identity.  In her early essay, ‘Subette, koronde, kakato ga toreta’ (す
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べって、ころんで、かかとがとれた Slipped, Fell and I Lost My Heels), written in 
1992, Tawada explains her discomfort with the Japanese language during her early days 
in Hamburg, around 1982. 
 
Half a year went by without my speaking any Japanese at all.  It felt like 
the Japanese language had become detached from my life.  Even the 
things I could touch with my hands, as well my moods―I just didn’t find 
the right words for them in Japanese.  It was probably natural that 
German, a foreign language to me, should not feel right, but becoming 
separated from one’s mother tongue was frightening, like being in a fog 
and gradually not being able to read words anymore. Wordless, I came to 
feel things, think and make decisions. (There are probably people who 
would say this is impossible, but there’s no other way to put it.)  
   [･･･] 
In time, I came to ‘translate’ this life without words into German and 
Japanese.  It was as if the Japanese I had used in the past had died and 
been reborn in another shape.  Although such Japanese might well be 
thought strange, I could not write about the world I saw without it when I 
worked on Missing Heels, for which I received the Gunzo Prize for New 
Writers last year [1991]. 
Missing Heels postulates my contradictory feelings that there are no 
people without heels, and that even without heels, people are able to lead 
brilliant lives.  I wanted to write a novel without heels.  This is not 
literature which wanders freely, ignoring the traditions influencing one, 
however.  Literature without heels is, I believe, literature which is 
unpredictable and looks like it is perpetually about to tumble precisely 
because it is standing on its toes.  And people who look like they are 
about to tumble are far more interesting to me than those who have their 
feet firmly on the ground.47 
 
                                                  
47 Tawada Yōko, ‘Subette, koronde, kakato ga toreta’, in Tawada Yōko, Katakoto no uwagoto, 
Tokyo: Seidosha, 2007, 10–13.  ‘Subette, koronde, kakato ga toreta’ is translated by Alison Watts as 
‘Slipped, Fell and I Lost My Heels’ on the Internet Homepage, Non Profit Internet Publisher, Web 
Press Happa No Kōfu, (http://happano.org/index.html).  This excerpt was taken on 1 June 2007. 
 286
If we regard the people without heels as those who are seeking autonomous freedom 
and regard the people who need heels as those whose decisions are compelled by 
external causalities, then it can be said that Tawada’s contradictory feelings may be 
synonymous with Nakagami Kenji’s contradictory attitudes towards the Japanese 
language.  Moreover, it must be noted that Tawada’s notion of ‘a novel without heels’ 
is not defined as literature that neither wanders freely nor ignores the traditions.  The 
toes of at least one foot of the ‘[l]iterature without heels’ inevitably touch the 
ground—that is, the environment surrounding us—at all times.  On re-evaluating 
Maruyama Masao’s notion of freedom, Ōe Kenzaburō believes that freedom is 
synonymous with personal autonomy, that is, ‘the ability of logical self-definition’48 
rather than freedom resulting from the elimination of man’s environmental constraints.  
Tawada is aware of these constraints on our freedom in writing.  Discerning the 
conflict between personal autonomy and the dependence on the collective, she attempts 
to write ‘a novel without heels’ that ‘is perpetually about to tumble’ in the same way 
that Nakagami continued to write novels aspiring to the ceaseless hell.  Tawada goes 
on to explain her contradictory feelings about the act of writing: 
 
Now and then I accidentally overhear the conversations of Japanese 
travellers at a train station, for example, and there are times when their 
manner of speaking sounds terribly artificial to me.  I don’t quite know 
how to adequately express this feeling, but it sounds just like an English 
class where students are practicing conversation with memorized dialogue.  
I wonder if everyone lives out their lives talking in such a manner.  
Perhaps the words ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’, ‘skillful’ and ‘awkward’ are 
discriminatory terms.  There are no grounds for saying one kind of 
Japanese is natural and beautiful, and anything else is no good.  Isn’t it 
                                                  
48 Kersten, Democracy in Postwar Japan, 103. 
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all right for Japanese to be spoken and written in a completely different 
style?  Especially if it more nearly approaches the experience of the 
people using it in their lives, including foreigners living in Japan or 
Japanese living overseas.  At any rate, I felt that it was impossible to 
write the things I wanted to in ordinary Japanese.  You could say that it 
was as a result of this feeling that a novel without heels was born.49 
 
Tawada’s conclusion that ‘it was impossible to write the things I wanted to in ordinary 
Japanese’ might be considered to be equivalent to Tsushima Yūko’s notion of languages 
that are spoken by people who are displaced to the periphery of the society.  Tawada’s 
realization is also equivalent to Nakagami Kenji’s attempt to seek a new discourse of 
novels, which is found in the narrative style of the aged, illiterate women in the 
burakumin ghettoes in Shingū, in which their words perfectly coincide with what they 
represent. 
  In her essay anthology Exophonie—Bogo no soto e deru tabi (Exophonie—The 
Journey to Get Outside Our Mother Tongue), published in 2003, Tawada proposes the 
notion of exophonie.  Exophonie is a German word that indicates the state that we fall 
into a place where our mother tongue is not spoken widely.  A prime example of this is 
immigrants who move to a country where a different language is spoken.  Tawada 
regards the experience of exophonie as an effective means for contemporary writers to 
reconsider the possibility—and the impossibility—of written language or the novel as a 
genre.50 
  In her recent novel Amerika―Hidō no tairiku (America, the Continent of Outrage), 
                                                  
49 Tawada Yōko, ‘Subette, koronde, kakato ga toreta’, translated by Alison Watts as ‘Slipped, Fell 
and I Lost My Heels’ on the Internet Homepage, Non Profit Internet Publisher, Web Press Happa No 
Kōfu, (http://happano.org/index.html), in Tawada Yōko, Katakoto no uwagoto, Tokyo: Seidosha, 
2007, 10–13.   
50 Tawada Yōko, ‘Dakāru’ (Dakar), in Tawada Yōko, Exophonie―Bogo no soto e deru tabi (エクソ
フォニー―母語の外へ出る旅), Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2003, 3–13. 
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published in 2006, Tawada uses the second person pronoun, anata, as a focal character.  
The story opens as follows. 
 
あなたは飛行機の中でうとうと眠りながら、そんなはずはないのに
機体を外側から見ている自分に驚いていた。鈍い銀色の機体に氷の
粒が何億も貼り付いている。[･･･] 右斜め上から女性の声が聞こえ
て、あなたは目が覚める。目の前に、新書判くらいの大きさのカー
ドがつきだされている。スチュワーデスがあなたを見て微笑みなが
ら、そのカードを突き出している。51 
 
When you are falling asleep on an airplane, you, knowing that it is 
impossible, are surprised to see yourself gazing at the aircraft from the 
outside.  The dull-coloured silver airframe is covered with hundreds of 
millions of ice flakes. […] You are woken up by a woman’s voice coming 
diagonally from your forward right.  A pocket-book-sized card is shoved 
in your face.  A smiling flight attendant is presenting it to you.  
 
Tawada never explains who ‘you’ refers to or why ‘you’ are travelling around the US in 
this novel.  The novel does not end when expected.  Also, the second person pronoun, 
anata has been employed for all the sentences in this novel.  Thus, the end of the story 
is entrusted to the reader.  Similarly, in the short story ‘Umi ni otoshita namae’ (The 
Name That I Dropped into the Ocean), Tawada portrays a woman who suffers a 
memory loss as an after-effect of an injury in an airplane accident.  When the 
protagonist regains consciousness, all she finds is a bunch of receipts from various 
shops.  She does not remember why she has the receipts, who she is, where she came 
                                                  
51 Tawada Yōko, Amerika―Hidō no tairiku (アメリカ―非道の大陸), Tokyo: Seidosha, 2006, 7. 
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from or what she has been doing.  She simply fails to recollect anything about 
herself.52  In an interview in the evening edition of Asahi shinbun, dated 12 December 
2006, Tawada explains that to write about selfhood, which is rooted in shaky ground 
such as the state of exophonie or on the verge of an identity crisis, means to explore the 
possibility of a new style for her novel.  Interestingly, Tawada also comments on the 
binary frame in a manner similar to Nakagami Kenji.  She states, ‘I have always 
resented the bipolar world.  I have always had a tendency to search for its third pole.  
This polarization constitutes a particular pattern between black and white or good and 
evil and the like.  I believe that literature could be one of the means that can lead us out 
of these conventions’.53  Like Nakagami Kenji and Tsushima Yūko, it seems to me that 
Tawada Yōko’s journey in search of her autonomous self in relation to others—that is, 
society or any other wider world beyond the bounds of the mother tongue or the 
nation-state—will continue perpetually. 
 
Yoshimoto Banana 
 
Yoshimoto Banana (よしもとばなな  b. 1964) is undoubtedly one of the most 
renowned contemporary writers both in and outside Japan.  In the 1980s, Ōe 
Kenzaburō criticized Japanese writers, represented by Murakami Haruki and Yoshimoto 
Banana, for their passive attitudes and regarded them as writers creating subcultures that 
                                                  
52 Tawada Yōko, ‘Umi ni otoshita namae’, in Tawada Yōko, Umi ni otoshita namae, Tokyo: 
Shinchōsha, 2006, 103–173. 
53 「昔から二極というのが嫌いで、第三の極をつねに求めてるところがあったんです。二
極って善・悪とか白・黒とかパターンができてしまう。そういう考え方を脱出するひとつ
の手段として文学があるんじゃないかと思います。」 ‘Amerika o “dai 3 no kyoku” ni hyōgen 
hirogeru’ (アメリカを「第三の極」に表現広げる), Asahi shinbun-the evening edition, 12 
December 2006, p. 7. 
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were mere reflections of Tokyo’s vast consumer culture.  Yoshimoto Banana has been 
recognized as a writer at the forefront of the subculture movement or postmodern 
phenomenon in Japan in the 1980s.54  However, after publishing a long novel, Amurita, 
in 1994, Yoshimoto Banana altered her writing style in the same way in which 
Takamura Kaoru stopped writing crime fiction.  Murakami Fuminobu points out the 
following paradoxical aspect of her work: ‘Yoshimoto Banana’s work attempts to 
discover difference in totality or commonness in individuality by changing the form of 
desire’.55  In the late 1990s, Banana portrayed many female protagonists who were 
seeking their autonomy—an autonomy that was inevitably and mutually interrelated to 
others and the external world.  As Murakami indicates, Banana attempts to contrast the 
self against a wide variety of others in a collection of short stories Karada wa zenbu 
shitteiru (The Body Knows Everything, 2000).  As indicated by the title, in these short 
stories, while Banana views the body as a microcosm that encompasses the entire world, 
she also attempts to portray the protagonist’s process of achieving his/her autonomy 
through the individual body under human conditions that are bound by the external 
causality or the law of nature.  In the short story ‘Kuroi ageha’ (A Black Swallowtail 
Butterfly), Banana depicts the mother of two teenage daughters who is on the verge of a 
divorce.  The mother’s actions and words while confronting the crisis of divorce are 
recounted by the younger daughter, who is a focal character.  It is interesting to note 
though the crisis is provoked by the mother’s extramarital affair with a young man, it is 
not the mother who leaves the home.  Instead, it is the father who leaves; the father is 
                                                  
54 See, for example, Murakami Fuminobu, ‘Yoshimoto Banana’s Feminine Family’, in Murakami 
Fuminobu, Postmodern, Feminist and Postcolonial Currents in Contemporary Japanese Culture: A 
Reading of Murakami Haruki, Yoshimoto Banana, Yoshimoto Takaaki and Karatani Kōjin. London 
and New York: Routledge, 2005, 58–94. 
55 Ibid., 58.  I refer to Yoshimoto Banana as Banana, so that readers do not mistake her for her 
father, Yoshimoto Takaaki. 
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depicted as a mazakon (mama’s boy), who often returns to his mother’s home.  On the 
morning of the day that the father leaves the house, the mother keeps her two daughters 
home from school and holds a barbecue party in their garden.  At first, the two 
daughters are baffled by their mother’s plan, but they soon start enjoying themselves.  
The mother asks her daughters to open the good wine, which their father stored in the 
cellar, and she starts drinking it. 
 
私達は、それぞれのコップにワインをついでどんどん飲み、気分よ
くなっていた。[･･･] 肉も野菜も妙においしかった。つらさや寂し
さを吹き払おうとする時、そんなふうにちょっとしたごほうびみた
いに自由が生まれる。56 
 
We started feeling better as we filled each other’s glasses with wine and 
plied one another with drink […] The meat and vegetables tasted 
unexpectedly good.  When we are determined to drive away our growing 
pain and loneliness, a little freedom is afforded to us in this form, like a 
reward.  
 
Thus, the women in the family ironically gain and savour their freedom under 
catastrophic circumstances.  At this juncture, the mother remarks upon her ironical 
situation to her daughters: 
 
つまんないことがある時は、気をつけてみれば、もう一方にはちゃ
んと、こういうわくわくすることが隠れているのよ。神様はちゃん
                                                  
56 Yoshimoto Banana, ‘Kuroi ageha’ (黒いあげは), in Yoshimoto Banana, Karada wa zenbu shitte 
iru（体は全部知っている), Tokyo: Bunshun bunko, 2002, 60.  The hardcover edition was 
published by Bungei shunjū in 2000. 
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と考えていてくださる。57 
 
When we are uptight about stupid, trivial things, if we look meticulously, 
we can always find something that is exciting and has been in hiding.  
Remember that God treats every entity fairly.  God sends us the cold only 
after providing clothes. 
 
When considering the examples quoted above, we find that Banana accepts the reality 
of human beings, which is determined by various external causalities that do not allow 
us to realize our free will.  However, at the same time, she exhorts us to strive for 
freedom under these conditions and attempts to destroy the patriarchal world that is also 
determined by external causalities.  But, this does not imply that the mother rejects her 
husband completely.  The mother tells her daughters that they will forgive the father if 
he does not flee to his mother’s place.  In fact, he sleeps on his friends’ couches for a 
few weeks and returns to his wife and daughters in the end.  We are able to discern 
many contrasting situations and polar oppositions in this novel.  From the perspective 
of the younger daughter, the figure of her mother resembles that of an old doll, despite 
its present sturdiness.  The mother’s floral-print dress is contrasted with a streak of 
smoke ascending from a crematorium.  As we have seen in Chapter III, similar to 
Nakagami, Ango, Chūya and Miyazawa, Banana appears to share the paradoxical 
perspective of the world surrounding her.  Banana continues to produce works that 
convey the irony between the individual and the collective, and portray the manner in 
which individual practical action takes place in the complex world surrounding it.  
This enables her to keep formulating new judgments within a historically changing 
                                                  
57 Ibid. 
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environment and within a priori limits.   
With regard to the issue of autonomy, there is further evidence to illustrate how 
Banana’s notion of autonomy can be observed through the lens of the mutually 
exclusive dichotomy between the collective and the individual.  Examples of this can 
be found in many of her recent works: Deddoendo no omoide (Memory of a Dead-end, 
2003) and Hitokage (A Shadow of Man, 2006)—which is the revised version of Tokage 
(Lizard) written in 1993.  In Lizard (Tokage), the protagonist, Tokage (her nickname), 
is suffering the consequences of a traumatic childhood: a lunatic stabbed her mother in 
front of her.  In the introduction to Hitokage, Banana admits that Tokage’s narration of 
her painful experiences was a one-sided way of looking at the situation.58 Banana adds 
the following comment made by Tokage’s mother:  
 
あんなことをされたことは一生許せないし、死んでも赦されるべき
ではない、でも、･･･ ほんとうに不幸なことだと思う、あんなふう
になってしまったのはあの人だけの責任ではないのに･･･ なんのこ
とはない、家族は前より絆がかたくなったし、前よりも幸せだから、
何にも負けてはいないのよ、どんな悪意にも壊せないものはこの世
にあるの。59 
 
I cannot forgive the man for what he did to us.  Even if he is sentenced to 
death for his crime, I will never forgive him…yet, on the other hand, I 
think what compelled the man to commit this crime was not entirely his 
fault. … In fact, this incident strengthened and tightened the bond between 
our family members, for now we are happier than we were before.  In 
this sense, we are not defeated by anything or anyone.  I believe that 
                                                  
58 Yoshimoto Banana, Hitokage (ひとかげ), Tokyo: Gentōsha, 2006, 1–5. 
59 Ibid., 67–68. 
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there is something in this world that no power can destroy, no matter how 
evil the power is.   
 
This excerpt clearly demonstrates Banana’s multidimensional view about her 
understanding of the complex world. In the revised version of her novel, the 
protagonist does not remain a tokage (lizard) but evolves into something that is 
connected with hitokage (the shadow of a human being). 
As discussed above, many interesting examples of the quest for autonomy, related to 
both the distrust of the modern language that is regarded as a collective notion and the 
emphasis on the body that is recognized as a basis of their individual identities, emerge 
from the literature of contemporary Japanese women writers.  In future, I would like 
to further explore these phenomena in the field of contemporary Japanese literature, 
including Japanese theatre and drama, in order to shed light on Japanese 
modern/contemporary literature from a different perspective. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In the last chapter, we saw that Tawada Yōko has developed her sense of discomfort 
about the meaning of the Japanese language in perceiving the gaps between nihongo (as 
her mother tongue) and herself when she examines her self-identity living in Germany.  
Similarly, when Nakagami Kenji delivered a lecture in Frankfurt, Germany, in 1990, he 
pointed out that the words and actions of his illiterate mother, siblings and his 
neighbourhood could not be depicted by the Japanese standard language.  He felt that 
his people had not existed within the world that was perceived by the language that had 
developed with the process of establishing modern Japan.1  Nakagami confessed with 
anger that he sensed the gaps between himself and ‘Beautiful Japan’ with which 
Kawabata Yasunari concurred in his Nobel Prize lecture.  He had to ask himself a few 
fundamental questions repeatedly: ‘How am I related to Japan?  Do I coincide with it?  
Do I still have a connection with it?  Is what I write something to do with “Japan”?  
Am I Japanese?’2  
For Nakagami Kenji, writing novels using kotoba means that it reacts against the 
conventional concepts or ideas backed by the law/system of the collective, for instance, 
the modern nation-state, social groups, households, which regulate the individual acts.  
However, at the same time, Nakagami became aware that kotoba itself possesses an 
element of turning into a social product which reflects the collective idea that restricts 
                                                  
1 Nakagami Kenji, ‘Watashi wa nihon-jin nano ka’, in Karatani Kōjin et al. (eds), Nakagami Kenji 
hatsugen shūsei 6 (中上健次発言集成 6), Tokyo: Daisanbunmeisha, 1990, 338–340. 
2 「あらためて問うしかないわけです。＜日本＞と＜私＞は、どうつながるのか。重なって
いるのか、切れているのか。私の書くのは＜日本＞なのか。私は＜日本人＞なのか。そう
問うわけです。」 Ibid., 344–345. 
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one’s personal autonomous freedom or one’s self-determination that chooses his/her 
actions.  Nakagami faced this paradoxical nature caused by kotoba throughout his life.  
In previous chapters, we have observed that Nakagami’s kotoba in his writing means to 
operate as an eternal creator of new values, and writing something using kotoba is 
operated by the individual who is perpetually seeking autonomy, that is to say, 
constantly making his/her ‘logical self-definition’ which tirelessly engages ‘with a 
historically changing environment’.3  In addition to this, it is important to note that this 
self-determination is always formulated with one’s ethical responsibility for it.  
However, on the other hand, kotoba can enlarge the possibility to give rise to one’s 
totalitarian identification, or coercive assimilation into the collective.  When Nakagami 
regards the Japanese language as a modern invention that creates a uniform and 
monolithic ideological system, it also creates the archetype of narrative.  Thus, 
Nakagami’s perception of kotoba generates an eternal conflict between autonomy and 
dependence, and it became the prime force of his writing. 
Thus, for Nakagami, writing novels using kotoba contains the potential risk of 
creating a fantastic ideology, that is, an invented monogatari that he calls the 
law/system of the collective.  He is fully aware that people, being incited by the 
one-dimensional monogatari or the archetype of narrative, inadvertently surrender their 
autonomy to external causalities.  Nevertheless, no matter how much he disbelieved 
the concept of kotoba, he could not abandon this potentially dangerous means for 
writing, kotoba, and he constantly endeavoured to expand the frontiers of language.  In 
this sense, Nakagami Kenji’s act of writing can be regarded as an autonomous action 
that perpetually brings out the self-legislation and makes new judgments ‘according to 
                                                  
3 Koschmann, Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan, 183. 
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standards that arise in relation to lived, historical situations’.4  As Nakagami became 
aware that any binary frame will never be dialectically reconciled, his ambivalent 
attitude towards writing can be explained by Kant’s transcendental standpoint that is to 
possess both the theoretical attitude―observing an event through a lens of the relation 
of cause and effect―and the practical attitude―rewriting an event according to the 
situation at the time―at the same time.  It seems to me that this kind of bilateral 
character of Nakagami gives the flexibility and gravity to his literary universe.  
Nakagami always celebrates his freedom to choose his action, meeting the requirements 
of the times, however he will never find satisfaction in his decision at any given time.  
Accepting old traditions and conventions, he continues to revise them in compliance 
with demands from the environments surrounding him.  For example, Nakagami did 
not reject the monogatari genre, or rather, he clung to it.  And simultaneously he 
attempted to create a new discourse of shōsetsu by using the narrative style of the old 
women’s story-telling in the roji.  However, it was a paradoxical attempt since he had 
to use language in which he disbelieved, and for that reason, it was an endless strife.  I 
feel that Nakagami’s paradoxical attempt to create―and to destroy―the values through 
his act of writing within the limits of a given situation5 is highly valuable as it deals 
with the issue of autonomy or one’s self-determination to choose his/her actions that are 
closely linked with one’s moral responsibility.  Tsujimoto Yūichi also points out that 
Nakagami always had two impulses that go into opposite directions at the same time.  
He introduces Nakagami’s comment on this matter in Asahi shinbun (4 January 1982) as 
follows: 
 
                                                  
4 Ibid., 183. 
5 Ibid., 182. 
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 I am a radical reformer who is opposed to the form of monogatari, but at 
the same time I am a writer who conforms to the system.  On the one 
hand I think I should be a creator of much more institutional monogatari, 
on the other hand I want to destroy it.  Because I must admit what 
transcends the archetype of monogatari is inevitably monogatari itself, I 
should get going having two poles at the same time.6  
 
For this reason, Nakagami’s ambivalent perception about writing developed into the 
strong distrust of language as a collective notion and the awareness of the body as an 
undeniable object that reflects the individual differentiation.  While Nakagami 
becomes aware that the language itself turns into a collective notion that generalizes 
one’s individual differences, he attempts to reconsider the reality of his outcast 
environment through the individual body of people who dwell in the roji in order to 
unlearn the generalized notions of the Japanese outcast that were brought about by the 
Japanese language itself.  Thus, the process of establishing his autonomous selfhood 
was developed from Nakagami’s act of writing, which was described as the conflict 
between kotoba and the body.  I agree with Nakagami and Tsushima in thinking that 
literature may evolve from a paradox, irony or ambivalence.  In this respect, 
Nakagami was seeking autonomy eternally by writing novels, it was, as it were, his 
endless self-legislation.  He certainly did not succeed in incorporating the concept of 
autonomy in all of his works.  However, his perspective of autonomous freedom, for 
                                                  
6 「ぼくは反物語の急進的な作家であると同時に、非常に制度的な作家です。もっと制度的
な物語のつくり手になれと思う一方で、もっと破壊的になれと思う。物語の構造を超える
のも物語である以上、この両方をかかえてやっていきたい」 Tsujimoto Yūichi, ‘Nakagami 
bungaku ni okeru Kumano (Kumano) no isō’ (中上文学におけるクマノ（Kumano）の位相), in 
Kokubungaku kaishaku to kanshō bessatsu: Kumano sono shinkō to bungaku･bijutsu･shizen (国文
学解釈と鑑賞 別冊 その信仰と文学・美術・自然) (January 2007): 168. 
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which he constantly quests, may serve as a stepping-stone to reinterpret modern 
Japanese literature. 
Nakagami’s attempt is not confined to his works alone.  In Chapters III, V and VI, 
we have seen that Sakaguchi Ango, Miyazawa Kenji, Nakahara Chūya have much in 
common with Nakagami in their attitudes that show either the strong distrust of 
language or the admiration of body.  From Chapter VI to VII, I extended the same 
observations to the contemporary playwrights in the 1960s such as Betsuyaku Minoru, 
Kara Jūrō, or Terayama Shūji and contemporary women writers such as Tsushima Yūko, 
Takamura Kaoru, Tawada Yōko and Yoshimoto Banana in the process of forming their 
autonomous self or seeking their own autonomy. 
 
To become burakumin to become free 
 
Neither the state, groups nor individuals could be attributed to a monolithic or 
homogenous pattern.  Converging and diverging concurrently, they are all diverse from 
one another with a historically changing environment.  The new concepts in 
contemporary (or, if anything, post-modern) Japan bring ‘multifarious Japan’ from the 
past to the place we are standing right now, and asks each of us the question of who we 
are and where we are standing.  As Tsushima Yūko suggested, when we ask ourselves, 
‘Who am I?’ or ‘How do I establish my autonomous self?’, a more detailed discussion 
of people who reside on the periphery of our society/community becomes crucial.  
What is our autonomy which is inevitably intertwined in some way or other with 
‘others’: women, burakumin, ethnic minorities such as Ainu people, Korean residents in 
Japan (zainichi korian 在日コリアン), Hansen’s disease patients, people with HIV, 
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sexual minorities such as gay and lesbian people and so forth? 
The literature of Nakagami Kenji may become a touchstone or at least may give a 
hint that will guide us in answering the above question.  Reading the various attempts 
made by the writers discussed above as well as Nakagami, we become aware that our 
self-differentiation or self-identification is complexly intertwined with the existence of 
others, the external causalities, which confine our individual freedom, the spell of 
monogatari backed by kotoba as one of the ‘modern myths’.  It is important to bear in 
mind that the invented monogatari is not a mere pleasant construction but can turn into 
‘a story that explodes in blood’ (kitte chi no deru monogatari)7 as a sheer reality, 
differences, or others surrounding us. 
Nakagami never stays long in a convergent state.  For example, as we have seen in 
Chapter II, even though the maternal utopia such as the roji—the world of Oryū no oba 
in Karekinada and Sennen no yuraku was critically acclaimed by many literary critics, 
Nakagami immediately destroyed the roji in Chi no hate shijō no toki.  Nakagami 
emphasizes that the binary frame will never be dialectically reconciled and it continues 
repeatedly.  He explains that two eternally conflicting poles operate to generate fiction, 
the rule of the game or what he calls, the archetype of monogatari.  He asserts that the 
dichotomy between the two heats up the narrative domain and entertains the readers.  
However, at the same time, this kind of dichotomy may prevail over our perspectives 
and confine us in a certain narrative domain.  On this account, Nakagami sees a 
problem in the Japanese language itself, which functions as an invisible apparatus that 
formulates the canon formation of Japanese cultural and national identity in accordance 
with the historical process by which Japan’s modern nation-state developed.  
                                                  
7 Nakagami, Kishū: Ki no kuni ne no kuni monogatari, in NKZ Vol. 14, 576. 
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Nakagami attempts to escape from the snare of this kind of monogatari, or the 
archetype of narrative.  The progression of chords that develop the tale functions as 
‘canon’ readily leads us into perceiving our society as a uniform and monolithic entity.  
However, accepting any fact or entity that appears as our sheer reality in our society, 
Nakagami endeavours to establish the individual who endlessly searches for 
autonomous freedom, while observing his changing environments bound by external 
causalities.  Confronting the Japanese language, that is, the law/system of established 
modern society, Nakagami twists it as if he were playing free jazz, attempting ‘to 
become endlessly free from all past chords’.8  Thus, Nakagami cannot allow himself to 
connive at the gaps between kotoba and mono or his body as physical object.  
Confronting the fissure of kotoba, Nakagami is always concerned with the divergence 
of every entity and endeavoured to elucidate the protrusion from the fissure.  
Attempting to retrieve the living words, he sometimes goes back to the world of mono 
and renews the definition of each kotoba to free himself from the spell of monogatari. 
Let us consider Nakagami’s comment on Ushimatsu in Shimazaki Tōson’s Hakai 
(The Broken Commandment, 1906).  
 
[…] although the people who dwell outside the buraku claim that 
Ushimatsu [the protagonist of Hakai] is a burakumin, I strongly doubt 
whether he ever was one.  It merely appears that the state of affairs within 
a closed system in modern Japan makes Ushimatsu seem like a burakumin.  
However, to me, Ushimatsu had never ‘become’ a burakumin.9  
                                                  
8 Alan Tansman, ‘History, Repetition, and Freedom in the Narratives of Nakagami Kenji’, Journal 
of Japanese Studies (24:2 1 998): 271. 
9 Nakagami, ‘Kotoba to mono’, in Karatani and Watanabe (eds), Nakagami Kenji to Kumano, 
20–21. 
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 In this excerpt, Nakagami views Ushimatsu as a person who had never ‘become’ a 
burakumin.10  In Hakai, Ushimatsu is consistently ashamed of being a burakumin.  
After he revealed his origin to his pupils, he fled into Texas.  Nakagami does not blame 
Ushimatsu for flying to America.  However, he sharply questions how Ushimatsu is 
able to identify himself as a burakumin in America.  Ushimatsu is certainly a victim in 
the context of modern logic or from the viewpoint of ‘community’s codes’.  However, 
while Ushimatsu retreats inside the logic of the modern nation-state to conceal the 
substance of burakumin or sabetsu (discrimination), Nakagami seems to make great 
efforts to reveal it.  Writing the trilogy of Akiyuki and other related stories, Nakagami 
incessantly fixes his critical eyes on kotoba itself, ponders over how we should define a 
word such as burakumin or freedom in the context of postwar Japan and attempts to 
give it a new meaning daily in the context of the day.  Viewed in this light, he never 
abided by the state of being burakumin (burakumin dearukoto), but chose to become a 
burakumin (burakumin ni narukoto) perpetually.  In other words, he chose to be reborn 
as a burakumin day after day and to continuously ponder its fundamental meaning.  In 
the Akiyuki trilogy, as we have observed in Chapter II, Akiyuki progresses from an 
innocent child to an independent, responsible man who quests for his autonomy. 
Michel Foucault (1926–1984) stated that ‘we should try to “become” gay — not just 
to reassert ourselves as gay.’11  It would be interesting to compare Nakagami’s concept 
of ‘becoming burakumin perpetually’ with the following remark by Foucault, ‘Rather, 
we have to create a gay life. To become.’  Foucault goes on to say that ‘This process 
                                                  
10 On this matter, see also Suga Hidemi, ‘Sei no in’yu, sono kyozetsu’, in Gunzō nihon no sakka 24, 
88–102.  See also Nakagami, ‘Kotoba to mono’, 18–35. 
11 Michel Foucault, ‘Sex, Power and the Politics of Identity’, in Sylvère Lotringer (ed.) (1989, 1996), 
Foucault Live (Interviews, 1961–1984), New York: Semiotext(e), 382–390. 
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[of sexual liberation] was very good, both in terms of the situation and in terms of 
opinions, but the situation has not definitely stabilized.  Still, I think we have to go a 
step further.  I think that one of the factors of this stabilization will be the creation of 
new forms of life, relationships, friendships in society, art, culture and so on, through 
our sexual, ethical and political choices.  Not only do we have to defend ourselves, not 
only affirm ourselves as an identity but as a creative force.’12  Now, each individual 
may well return to a simple question again: What is freedom or autonomy?  
Maruyama’s remark in his essay ‘“Dearu” koto to “suru” koto’ (To Be and To Do, 1959) 
may be a guiding principle in answering this question: 
 
Freedom is not something that is, like an object, but rather something that 
can be only protected by action in the present; in other words, something is 
free for the first time through trying day by day to become free.13  
 
As Sakaguchi Ango suggests in On Decadence, we may come to realize the fact that we 
are not really free when we have obtained all of our freedom.  Maruyama Masao also 
points out this notion by using Fukuzawa Yukichi’s view of freedom: ‘[F]reedom that 
rules uniformly is no longer freedom at all: “freedom is born amidst unfreedom.”’14  
This is how Rikki Kersten summarized the same point: ‘Freedom was born not in 
triumphant struggle between two absolute ideas such as absolute freedom and 
dictatorship, but in the tension produced between these two concepts in a pluralistic 
intellectual arena.  In short, “freedom is born where there is no freedom” […]  It is 
within the confrontational struggle between freedom and dictatorship that freedom can 
                                                  
12 Michel Foucault, ‘Sex, Power and the Politics of Identity’, 382–383. 
13 Quoted in Kersten, Democracy in Postwar Japan, 103.  
14 Quoted in Koschmann, Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan, 184.  
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be found, the lone dominance of freedom is not freedom at all.’15  This must be a 
never-ending attempt to become free. 
 
Nakagami Kenji’s permanent attempt 
 
In Chi no hate shijō no toki, the homeless people, who live on the grass-covered land, 
that is, the site of the demolished roji, made an appearance.  Standing in front of the 
site of the roji (alley) which now became a vacant lot, Akiyuki describes it as follows: 
 
路地は秋幸だった。秋幸の過去のすべてだった。降り出した雨の日、
土地の方々に根を張ったその根の一つ一つのような、老化で起る
様々な障害に苦しむ老婆らがおぼつかない足取りで道場に出かけて
目にした半ばミイラ化した腐乱死体のように、路地跡は今、土地の
真中に空洞としてある。 
 
The alley was Akiyuki.  It was all about Akiyuki’s past.  The site of the 
alley is now present as a hollow in the middle of the land as if it were a 
partially-mummified decomposed body which old women in the alley who 
suffer from various age-related diseases witnessed when they fumbled 
their way to the training hall, or as if it were one of the interlocked tree 
roots which set down new roots around the land on the past rainy days.16  
 
The alley used to be the maternal utopia that embraces all parts of the world and 
encompasses all of time and space.  Now, the site of the alley exists not as a universal 
                                                  
15 Kersten, Democracy in Postwar Japan, 72. 
16 Nakagami Kenji, Chi no hate shijō no toki, in Nakagami Kenji Zenshū 6, 347. 
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utopia any longer but a mere passing point where numerous people come and go.17  
One of the former residents of the alley, Yoshi-nii began to live on the site of the alley.  
Yoshi-nii who spent his youth with Akiyuki’s biological father, Ryūzō, can be regarded 
as Ryūzō’s alter ego.  On the one hand, Ryūzō destroyed himself by committing 
suicide, while on the other hand Yoshi-nii claimed that he was descended from Genghis 
Khan, in other words, a descendant of some nomads of Genghis Khan’s kinsmen.  
Yomota Inuhiko explains that this ‘metamorphosis’ in ‘becoming’ Genghis Khan’s 
kinsmen does not mean the succession to someone’s life through the archetype of 
monogatari, rather, it indicates that one directly ‘becomes’ someone, to live someone’s 
peerless life.18  This concept of nomads may enable him to sever his connections with 
the archetype of monogatari.  For Yoshi-nii, every place can be mere relay points, to 
use Nakagami’s term, ‘utsuho’ or ‘a neutral place hanging in midair’ where all sorts of 
people or things interplay with each other and he has no sense of belonging anywhere.  
As expressed by a main point of Kantian ethics posed by Karatani, in order to be free, 
we ought to obey the command: ‘be free!’ or ‘be causa sui, self-motivated, subjective, 
or autonomous!’  To put it more concretely, we ought to accept our fate which is 
determined by the external causalities as if it is deemed to be something causa sui, the 
state brought about by our free will.  Taken in this light, Nakagami accepts what he is 
now but never stays long in a convergent state to be free, and tirelessly becomes an 
entity ‘according to standards that arise in relation to lived, historical situations’.19  In 
the last part of Chi no hate shijō no toki, Akiyuki set fire to the site of the roji and began 
a journey to an unknown land.  It was rumoured that he had left for somewhere like 
                                                  
17 On this, see Iguchi Tokio, Kiki to tōsō: Ōe Kenzaburō to Nakagami Kenji (危機と闘争 大江健
三郎と中上健次), Tokyo: Sakuhinsha, 2004, 167–174. 
18 Yomota, Kishu to tensei: Nakagami Kenji, 181–187. 
19 Koschmann, Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan, 182. 
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San Diego, Brazil or Africa.20  
In the same way as Yoshi-nii or Akiyuki, from the end of 1970s, Nakagami himself 
travelled around underdeveloped places in various countries including South America, 
Korea, India, the Philippines, Indonesia, Taiwan as well as Okinawa in Japan.  
Nakagami’s seminars on contemporary novels are compiled in Gendai shōsetsu no hōhō 
(Methods for Contemporary Fiction).21  In his seminar entitled Shōsetsu o sogai suru 
mono (Things that Hamper the Novel) held in Tokyo in 1984, Nakagami talked about 
his trip to Peshawar in Pakistan, near the border of Afghanistan.  Because of the 
Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, there was millions Afghan people who took 
refuge in Peshawar.  Nakagami met a boy called Amin who was one of the Afghan 
refugees.  Nakagami saw Amin who commuted a long way to a trading post everyday 
in order to collect information about his missing father.  Though Amin was not certain 
whether he could get any information, he did not stop walking a long distance to the 
post.  Nakagami thought that Amin, if he wished, could have simply made a phone call 
to a hotel near the post in order to check whether there was some new information about 
his father.  Nakagami wondered why Amin continued his daily routine that may have 
appeared a rather wasteful practice.  At first, Nakagami saw Amin’s long walk as waste 
of energy and time, however he came to realize that this Amin’s act might provide an 
imaginative source for a novel.  Nakagami explains that if people choose a seemingly 
easy way such as making a telephone call instead of walking, it would not supply the 
primary source for a good novel.22  On the contrary, Nakagami advocates that the more 
a writer depicts Amin’s every move and his surroundings such as his body dripping with 
                                                  
20 Nakagami Kenji, Chi no hate shijō no toki, 452. 
21 Nakagami Kenji, Gendai shōsetsu no hōhō (現代小説の方法), Tokyo: Sakuhinsha, 2007. 
22 Ibid., 19–26 
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sweat or the wind carrying the smell of town, the more what is needed to produce good 
literature is accumulated.  Certainly, this episode does not suggest that Nakagami 
encourages the little boy to walk a long distance in a war zone for the sake of the 
ingredients of his novel.  What matters is rather that, with this episode, Nakagami tries 
to show his perspective that avoids jumping to the all-too-common conclusion such as ‘I 
was deeply touched by the courage shown by Amin in commuting to collect the 
information about his missing father.’  Accumulating the descriptions of one’s daily 
life, his or her day-to-day details and everyday environments, Nakagami succeeded in 
depicting how an individual establishes the autonomous freedom to choose his/her 
action under the environmental constraint, that is to say, the law/system of the collective.  
It is certainly not that all his works are successful in reflecting the notion of autonomy.  
In addition, his attitude of examining the same event from many angles or depicting 
daily trivialities many times from different point of views may sometimes make 
Nakagami’s descriptions look ambiguous or ambivalent.  However, I believe that this 
ambivalence is instrumental in making Nakagami’s literature what it is today.   
An illustration from a conversation between Oda Makoto (1932–2007) and 
Nakagami in 1989 may be informative on such a view.  Oda points out that the style of 
Nakagami’s latest work, Izoku, is different from that of Nakagami’s representative 
works written between 1977 and 1983, namely, Karekinada or Sennen no yuraku.  
Oda describes the style found in Karekinada as well regulated.  He goes on to indicate 
that, as the roji, the maternal utopia of Oryū no oba depicted in Karekinada and Sennen 
no yuraku had been destroyed and turned into a burnt-out empty land, the 
well-regulated style of Nakagami’s novel was also destroyed by Nakagami himself.  
Oda asked Nakagami: ‘Your roji goes beyond the border, and now exists in any part of 
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the world.  You apply the issue of the roji not only to Asia but also everywhere in the 
world.  In doing so, I suspect that you cannot write about the issue by using the same 
well-regulated style, can you?’23  Nakagami, admitting Oda’s points, explained that he 
no longer constructed the narrative discourse with the ki-shō-ten-ketsu structure, that is, 
the structure of introduction, development, turn, and conclusion, but utilized the form 
of the Ramayana and Mahabharata, two major Sanskrit epics, which develop 
discursively and extend transversely up to infinity.24  Observing the battle between 
Rangda and Barong that appeared in traditional Balinese mythology, Nakagami 
emphasizes that the binary frame will never be dialectically reconciled.  Let us recall 
his remarks again: ‘They keep fighting an indecisive battle, sometimes winning, 
sometimes losing, the battle is never over.  Rangda can never live in concord with 
Barong, and thus the endgame of this battle is spinning out endlessly.’25  As we can 
observe here, Nakagami regards the dichotomy as a never ending binary frame.  Not 
only delving into his own real life with the mythical landscape of Kumano but also 
expanding his horizons in the world: ‘becoming burakumin perpetually’ to establish his 
autonomy/autonomous self, Nakagami vigorously released controversial works one 
after another until his death in order to persevere with his efforts to write ‘shōsetsu’.  
Nagashima Kiyoshi cites Nakagami’s words in his later years:26  
 
‘Kumano’ [roji] exists everywhere in Japan, and beyond the border, I think it 
                                                  
23 Nakagami Kenji and Oda Makoto, ‘Nihon bungaku no waku o koete’ (日本文学の枠を超えて), 
in Karatani Kōjin et al. (eds), Nakagami Kenji hatsugen shūsei 4 (中上健次発言集成 4), Tokyo: 
Daisanbunmeisha, 1997, 16–17. 
24 Ibid., 18–19. 
25 Nakagami, ‘Futatsu no kōkyū saron’, 81. 
26 「熊野はまた日本中どこでも在り、さらに日本を越えて世界中に存在するとも思ってい
る。」 Nagashima Kiyoshi, ‘Nakagami Kenji Shōden’, 298. 
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exists everywhere in the world as well. 
 
In 1992, he died of kidney cancer at forty-six, halfway through writing five novels.  It 
seems to me that Nakagami hastened his death by devoting himself to thrusting the 
question of kotoba, monogatari and nikutai before everyone in contemporary Japan, 
being aware that our personal autonomy and moral responsibility coexist 
complementarily.   
 
From what has been observed in previous chapters, I have come to the conclusion 
that the examination of the concept of autonomy in modern Japanese literature is indeed 
significant to me as it makes me aware that the language itself can possibly turn into a 
social product that promotes a one-dimensional way of thinking.  Nakagami’s 
ambivalent attitude towards his act of writing became the catalyst for me to unlearn the 
fixed ideas that were brought by the Japanese language itself.  We tend to create the 
dichotomy between the two in order to seize the reason of an event, and as a result of 
this, it often causes a one-sided way of looking at things.  For this reason, it is indeed 
difficult for us to become aware that our freedom of will is inevitably linked with our 
moral responsibility.  We tend to deem ourselves to be free, but strictly speaking, all of 
us are bound by the law of nature, that is, external causalities.  Nakagami’s literary 
universe through an ambivalent world view shows that the dichotomy between the two 
will not be dialectically reconciled, rather, two poles coexist forever because one pole 
functions as the precondition for the other.  There are no men who exclusively possess 
purity.  The examination of Nakagami’s autonomy encourages us to internalize the 
impure side of human beings on our own initiative.  It shows us how to exercise our 
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autonomous freedom to determine our actions, which are inseparably related to our 
moral responsibility within the limits of external causalities.  
In future, I would like to continue to explore the idea of other writers in modern 
Japanese literature and to examine whether Nakagami’s endless autonomous attitude 
that grows out of the mutually exclusive dichotomy could be traced back to the ideas of 
previous writers such as Sakaguchi Ango, Miyazawa Kenji and Nakahara Chūya.  I 
would also attempt to extend the notion of autonomy into other contemporary 
artists/writers who may have inherited this kind of autonomous attitude with the aim of 
establishing their identities.  It might be interesting to compare the degree of autonomy 
between the autonomy of Nakagami’s Akiyuki and that of the protagonist in Murakami 
Haruki’s trilogy known as ‘The Trilogy of the Rat’: Hear the Wind Sing (1979), Pinball, 
1973 (1980) and A Wild Sheep Chase (1983).  I will examine further the notion of 
autonomy through the ambivalent attitude between language and body, and apply it to 
those writers who regarded kotoba as a collective notion and developed their distrust in 
it, and also became aware that the body turns into a sheer reality of the individual and 
tried to build their autonomous freedom from it.  With regard to the issue of the 
distrust of language and the admiration of the body, there is further evidence to show 
how Nakagami’s notion of autonomy through the conflict between language and body 
has some similarities with the yakeato generation dramatists like Betsuyaku Minoru, 
Kara Jūrō and Terayama Shūji, contemporary women writers such as Tsushima Yūko, 
Takamura Kaoru, Tawada Yōko and Yoshimoto Banana.  In principle, this dissertation 
focuses on autonomy in modern Japanese literature as a whole, and little attention to 
gender issues in discussing women writers has been given.  However, I would like to 
expand my arguments on the purity myth, otherness, individual/social identity or the 
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maternal utopia.  As discussed in the previous chapters, many interesting examples 
relating to both scepticism towards the Japanese language and thinking through the 
body are observed in postwar Japanese theatre, drama and contemporary Japanese 
literature.  In my readings of recent contemporary writers, on the issue of autonomy, I 
am currently keeping an eye on writers such as Shōno Yoriko (笙野頼子, b. 1956), 
Yoshida Shūichi （吉田修一, b. 1968）,  and Hoshino Tomoyuki (星野智幸, b. 1965).  
I would like to further explore the manner in which the idea of autonomy is treated in 
the works of various writers in order to interpret modern Japanese literature from 
different perspectives, and continue to serve as a stepping-stone to address future issues 
and examples regarding the concept of autonomy. 
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